There's Always Someone

When various rabble-rousers in Egypt were agitating to annul the peace treaty with Israel, I remarked somewhat smugly that "reputation for rabid warmongering aside, there is no political constituency of note in Israel that has called for a repudiation of peace with Egypt. It seems that once Israel makes a final agreement with one of its neighbors, it is capable of keeping it with little fuss from its citizens' end." So of course I read an Israeli editorial in Ynet that proposes doing just that. Because Lord knows if Israel didn't have its share of morons it would just be too easy.

Fortunately, it does seem like this guy is quite the marginal figure -- there remains "no political constituency of note" making this call that I've seen. And even in Egypt, the claim that there is some groundswell support for annulling the treaty is also badly overstated (the "million man march" that was planned to press for canceling the treaty drew terribly). But still, it's just so, so annoying.

Clarification: We're Dumb

I love it when newspapers issue "clarifications" regarding statements that were actually just flagrantly false. Here's USA Today, "clarifying" that a pay raise "could very well bump you into the next tax bracket, possibly leaving you with less money." As Jon Chait notes, there is no situation where a pay raise could leave you with less money due to increased taxes, because our tax system is graduated. Worse yet, the column was entitled "math tips". Come on, people -- even I can get this.

Spy Games

I remember being quite blase when a story broke about Israel spying on the US. I just didn't find it that shocking. Nations -- even friendly nations -- don't take each other at their word. They spy on each other. It didn't surprise me that Israel spies on us, and I'd be shocked if we don't spy on Israel.

And it turns out we do! Again, nothing shocking here. If anything, the most interesting twist is that the leaker was an Israeli Jew working for the FBI on contract, who was worried about what he perceived to be Israel's overly aggressive tendencies (he gave the info he intercepted to a left-wing Jewish blogger). It's such a delicious inversion of the trope that Jews can't be trusted to put American interests over Israeli ones.

Hell's Kitchen All-Stars: Heroes and Villains

Another episode of Hell's Kitchen, another day where Elise is still in the kitchen. Alas. But I did enjoy getting to see some of my old favorites make a return -- indeed, I'd have liked to hear more about where they are now. I admit to not being the biggest Trev fan, but I adore Jillian, Tennille, and even Van (Season 6 was the first one I saw, so it has a special place in my heart). And as for Ben, well, he was the recipient of one of the coldest Chef Ramsey remarks in the show's history (he pulled Ben aside and whispered in his ear "I want you out."), but I guess that didn't do any permanent damage.

Anyway, someone speculated that this episode was a dry run for a potential "Hell's Kitchen All-Stars". Which is an awesome idea on its own. But what would be even awesomer would be to make it into a "heroes versus villains" affair. Two teams of eight, one composed of fan favorites, the other, famous HK antagonists.

So below is my roster for Hell's Kitchen All-Stars: Heroes and Villains. All participants had to at least make the black jackets, but not win, in their respective seasons. Beyond that, it's a purely subjective assessment on my part. So, without further delay....

Heroes

Ralph (Season #1, Second Place)
Julia (Season #3, Fourth Place)
Petrozza (Season #4, Second Place)
Paula (Season #5, Second Place)
Ariel (Season #6, Third Place)
Tennille (Season #6, Fourth Place)
Jillian (Season #8, Third Place)
Will/Jennifer (Season #9, ??? Place -- obviously, one of them won't win, and while I'll be shocked if Will doesn't win this season, I can't just assume it).

Villains

Sara (Season #2, Fourth Place)
Jen (Season #3, Third Place)
Corey (Season #4, Third Place)
Suzanne (Season #6, Fifth Place)
Benjamin (Season #7, Third Place)
Russell (Season #8, Second Place)
Sabrina (Season #8, Sixth Place)
Elise (Season #9, ??? Place, but apparently she doesn't win).

What do you think?

Going Proactive?

In the Jerusalem Post, Dana Gordon makes the argument that Israel should get out in front of Palestine's statehood bid by submitting a statehood proposal of its own, with terms that include the necessary protections Israel needs as part of a final resolution of the conflict. This, Gordon argues, would be a "proactive" move by Israel that would allow it to recapture the terms of the debate and stem the international sentiment that it is the primary obstructionist towards peaceful resolution of the conflict.

I do think this is a decent idea, but I also think Gordon oversells it. First, Israel is not "strong now". Israel currently has a historically -- almost comically (were it not also so tragic) -- weak government that almost certainly could not launch a bold stroke like this on such a short timeframe. Second, Gordon is considerably more confident than I that a rejection by Palestinians and their allies would be considered a reflection upon them. Why? The counterargument is easy -- that Israeli demands were unreasonable or illegitimate, and that Palestinians had every right to reject them in favor of more favorable terms -- terms which would come up for a vote several weeks later when the Palestinian proposal came up. It might muddy the waters a bit, but to cast it as some sort of unstoppable move of moral jujitsu is wildly off the mark.

What the proposal does have in its favor is that, in its roundabout way, it effectively restores a situation of bilateral negotiations between Israel and Palestine. Israel and Palestine would both be putting their terms on the table, and would know where the other stands. The fact that both plans would be subjected to a UNGA vote would almost be a side theater. I care about as much what the U.N. General Assembly says about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as I do what the Dixiecrat Party has to say about the NAACP. But ignore them. The idea of putting parameters on the table is meaningful, and in that sense I think it is important for Israel to become "proactive" again.

Turkey Ups the Ante Again

After expelling Israel's ambassador, now Turkey is apparently going to send naval escorts to ships trying to break the blockade of Gaza. This, of course, puts them on a military crash course with Israel.

Just so everyone is clear: as a matter of international law, one of the requirements for a blockade to be legal is that it has to be effective. That is to say, the blockade must actually work in stopping all or most shipping into the blockaded area. So, to the extent Israel wants to maintain its blockade, it has to stop all ships trying to breach it -- including those under Turkish military guard.

Meanwhile, Turkey also is promising to take the matter of Israel's blockade to the ICJ. If I were Turkey, and I was set on the course of escalation that they seem to be pursuing, this is exactly what I'd do too. Part of what makes the Palmer Report so notable is its rarity -- a relatively decisive victory for Israel in the international arena. It is a case of Turkey losing a bet where the odds were strongly in their favor. So if I'm them, why not return to the table? The ICJ has not been historically friendly territory for Israel (and in particular, like the UNHRC, it tends to play fast and loose with proportionality claims). If Turkey floods the zone with enough authoritative-sounding international legal opinions, the Palmer Report will become an anomaly and easily dismissed.

But of course, this sort of escalation is dangerous -- even Ban Ki-Moon can sense it. We're getting past the point where this is mere posturing. It is difficult to overstate just how wildly irresponsibly Turkey is behaving. You won't find a more fervent critic of the Israeli foreign ministry than I, but in this case they've made reasonable efforts at rapprochement that Turkey has rejected over and over again. The match is being held to the fuse, and Turkey seems bent on setting the whole region alight.

Sore Losers

In the wake of a comprehensive UN report which largely, though of course not entirely, vindicated Israel's conduct with respect to the Gaza blockade and the flotilla incident, Turkey has expelled the Israeli ambassador. It also announced that it considered the Palmer Report "null and void", which makes sense, as the report sided with Israel over Turkey on most of the key points and its recommendations for reconciliation (a statement of regret) were considerably closer in line with what Israel had offered than what Turkey had been willing to accept.

Turkey has a habit of being more than a little childish in the international arena, so I can't say I'm surprised that their response to a major defeat in the UN is to simply announce that they're ignoring it. Well, let me be a little more charitable: most UN states ignore UN recommendations that go against their interests or conduct, and I can hardly fault them for doing so given that the bodies in question generally lack basic credibility. What makes Turkey unique isn't that it is rejecting a report that went against them; what makes them unique is their utter unwillingness to negotiate in good faith. They weren't looking for a route towards rapprochement, they were looking for a path towards escalation. There were loads of ways Turkey could have indicated its dissatisfaction with the Palmer Report that didn't entail expelling the ambassador of a friendly nation. As is per usual, it isn't Israel who decided to up the diplomatic ante with its neighbors. Turkey made a conscious decision that it wanted to turn a fissure into a chasm, and it acted accordingly.

Palmer Report Largely Vindicates Blockade

The United Nation's long-awaited Palmer Report on the Gaza flotilla incident has now been released, and, from Israel's perspective it has to be seen as a major win. The committee firmly decides that the blockade is legal and notes that an essential element of a legal element is that it has to be enforced consistently (which means intercepting folks trying to breach it, and can entail forcibly boarding resisting vessels). It also notes that the the Israeli soldiers who boarded the Mavi Marmara did face violent resistance. The committee does believe that Israel used excessive force in boarding the vessel and in not pursuing more non-violent interception techniques prior to its forcible boarding action. Statements from the Israeli and Turkish representatives to the commission appended at the end are revealing: the Israeli representative quibbles with the excessive force findings, but the Turkish representative is forced to disassociate himself from virtually the entire document.

I think the committee report is generally solid. It's analysis on the overall legality of the blockade is unquestionably superior to that forwarded by the UNHRC's report, which (and this is true regardless of one's ultimate perspective on the conflict) was frankly an embarrassment to the legal profession (how one even tries to undertake a proportionality analysis without even mentioning the objective in question, see paras. 51-61, compare Palmer Report pp. 38-45, is a mystery). So that's good.

Of course, I remain exceptionally dubious of the utility of these reports or the international law frame at all. The Palmer Report had been delayed several times because everyone believed it would only hurt rapprochement efforts between Israel and Turkey (Turkey is hell-bent on a full apology and an end to the blockade, which Israel is far less likely to do now that a high-profile commission has deemed the blockade legal and vindicated many, albeit not all, of its actions). Folks opposed to Israel's actions will simply cite the UNHRC report instead. Israel knows that, which limits whatever benefits it might reap from citing the Palmer Report. The conflict is political, and will be resolved politically. Whatever formal authority the Palmer Report has (and I'm not sure it has much anyway), formalism is not and should not be the primary lens for examining the issues in this controversy.

UPDATE: This older post by Kevin Jon Heller offers a good foil for some of what I'm trying to say here. Unlike the UNHRC opinion, Professor Heller provides a solid, well-reasoned argument for why the blockade is illegal (which isn't to say I'm necessarily persuaded by it; indeed, Professor Heller is admirably forthright about his uncertainty on the question). Professor Heller's basic claim is that the conflict between Israel and Hamas is not of an international character, and that international law does not contemplate the use of blockades in non-international conflicts.

The Palmer Report considers and rejects that point, instead holding that the conflict between Israel and Gaza is, for all intents and purposes, "international" for the purpose of the law governing blockades:

The Panel now turns to consider whether the other components of a lawful blockade under international law are met. Traditionally, naval blockades have most commonly been imposed in situations where there is an international armed conflict. While it is uncontested that there has been protracted violence taking the form of armed conflict between Israel and armed groups in Hamas-controlled Gaza, the characterization of this conflict as international is disputed. The conclusion of the Panel in this regard rests upon the facts as they exist on the ground. The specific circumstances of Gaza are unique and are not replicated anywhere in the world. Nor are they likely to be. Gaza and Israel are both distinct territorial and political areas. Hamas is the de facto political and administrative authority in Gaza and to a large extent has control over events on the ground there. It is Hamas that is firing the projectiles in Israel or is permitting others to do so. The Panel considers the conflict should be treated as an international one for the purposes of the law of blockade. This takes foremost into account Israel’s right to self-defence against armed attacks from outside territory. In this context, the debate on Gaza's status, in particular its relationship to Israel, should not obscure the realities. The law does not operate in a political vacuum and it is implausible to deny that the nature of the armed violence between Israel and Hamas goes beyond purely domestic matters. In fact, it has all the trappings of an international armed conflict. This conclusion goes no further than is necessary for the Panel to carry out its mandate. What other implications may or may not flow from it are not before us, even though the Panel is mindful that under the law of armed conflict a State can hardly rely on some of its provisions but not pay heed to others. (p. 41, para. 73)

This sort of analysis appeals to my legal pragmatist streak generally. And specifically with it is hard to argue against the Palmer Report's conclusion that the conflict bears the "trappings" of an international one in terms of actually describing the hostilities between Israel and Gaza. Even to the extent he's right, Professor Heller's analysis is another example of formalism and categories triumphing over descriptive and normative realities. That's not a strike against Professor Heller -- he's doing what lawyers do. And perhaps in a world where international law was a stronger force and it didn't seem like all aspects of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict were treated as sui generis anyway, it might be more important to rely on staid legalisms (though I'm not sure why participants in non-international conflicts should never be allowed to resort to blockades anyway. Their omission seems more a function of the rarity of situations where one would make sense -- Israel/Palestine really being "unique" in this regard -- than the result of some normatively sensible distinction). But that isn't our world, and in the world we live in, the Palmer approach seems far, far more reasonable.