tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7321349.post156358510522984177..comments2024-03-18T22:21:33.261-07:00Comments on The Debate Link: He Said She SaidDavid Schraubhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/04946653376744012423noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7321349.post-56232983451779401212013-09-23T19:03:20.812-07:002013-09-23T19:03:20.812-07:00That "Person" referred to both male and ...That "Person" referred to both male and female persons seems clear from the fugitive slave clause; it would be absurd for the Constitution to protect the slaveholder's ability to recover only his male slaves, particularly inasmuch as female slaves were the major source of new slaves.<br /><br />See also: "A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime." I'm pretty sure this applied to female persons fleeing their alleged crimes as well.PGhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09381347581328622706noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7321349.post-83608711810419623532013-09-23T15:15:28.645-07:002013-09-23T15:15:28.645-07:00Balkin would explain it better than I would, but i...Balkin would explain it better than I would, but in short, "semantic meaning" is the dictionary definition of words, as they'd be generally understood at the time, while "expected application" is how the principles in question would play out in particular contexts. While Balkin's particular typology is perhaps not dominant amongst originalists, it is fair to say that the majority of originalists no longer believe that the original <i>intent</i> of the framers controls, but rather rely on some theory about the original public meaning of the text.<br /><br />To give an example that might illustrate Balkin's distinction: suppose our Constitution was written in 1270 and contained a passage that "no nice men shall serve as judges." "Nice" today means kind or friendly, but at the time it meant incapable or ignorant. We would maintain the original semantic meaning of the word (ignorant or incapable), not the contemporary meaning. However, even if (hypothetically), in 1270 the framers believed that all persons of non-noble birth were inherently "nice" (ignorant, incapable, etc.), that would only be an <i>expected application</i> and we would not be bound to it.<br /><br />Finally, has anyone told you that your comment handle reads like a encryption code?David Schraubhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04946653376744012423noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7321349.post-74403410247145304872013-09-23T14:48:14.903-07:002013-09-23T14:48:14.903-07:00This idea of distinguishing between original seman...This idea of distinguishing between original semantic meaning and original expected application is interesting but strange. I have always understood originalism to be for constitutional jurisprudence what determining legislative intent is, based on whereas clauses etc, for sub-constitutional jurisprudence. Accordingly: What is the warrant for originalism if one deliberately sets aside the intentions of the authors? Or if Balkin dodges that one, then what is the difference between intention and expected application?<br />Does 'semantic meaning' somehow draw on a broader contemporary literature base, accounting for aspirations that others than the enacting legislators placed on the law?<br />I should and probably will go read Balkin to answer these Qs, I know.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com