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Monday, June 05, 2023

IHRA Cited In Pitch To Ban "Israel Apartheid Week" Displays

One of the more common points of controversy over the "IHRA" working definition of antisemitism is the allegation that it is used to chill free speech. For what it's worth, my sense is that the attempt to censor speech has actually very little to do with IHRA as a text, and is more related to IHRA's perceived symbolic status. If IHRA didn't exist, the claims wouldn't look much different.

In any event, in assessing whether IHRA "is used to chill speech," we could look at one of two things: cases where persons trying to censor speech appeal to IHRA, and cases where persons engaging in censorship justify it by reference to IHRA. The difference between attempt and success, basically. There are undoubtedly more cases of the former than the latter, and one could fairly argue that the former shouldn't "count" both because they did not actually lead to the suppression of speech and because they're functionally impossible to police (any yahoo with a web browser can say "don't allow this speech because of IHRA"; it doesn't mean anything if they're consistently not successful).

Nonetheless, I do think it is notable when semi-prominent actors use IHRA in order to call for censoring speech. Recently, for instance, a group called the "Combat Antisemitism Movement" released a report that called for universities to adopt IHRA and then use that understanding of antisemitism to bar "Israel Apartheid Week" demonstrations (via).

Allowing this virulent form of discrimination to persist under the auspices of academic freedom is simply intolerable during a time where antisemitism is rising. If such hateful displays would not be tolerated when directed at other ethnic or religious minorities, Jewish students should not be an exception.

.... While universities have an obligation to promote a diverse marketplace of ideas, they also must ensure principles of tolerance and respect for diversity are upheld. Given that it would certainly be deemed inappropriate to set up a week-long demonstration on campus calling for the destruction of another sovereign state, such as Italy, then Israel cannot be the outlier.

On the level of free speech and academic freedom, the university indeed must permit "Israel Apartheid Week" demonstrations; just as they regularly do permit displays and presentations that are deemed offensive to other minorities. But beyond that seemingly banal but nonetheless apparently not-taken-for-granted point, much lies in the framing here. There are university demonstrations which target, for example, Chinese atrocities in Xinjiang, Turkish repression of Armenians, American police violence against racial minorities, or Russian aggression in Ukraine, in extremely harsh tones. No doubt the governments of those nations, to say nothing of any nationals present on campus, may find the claims objectionable or unfair. But the university is not permitted, nor should it be permitted, to say that such protests (and "displays" thereto) are "inappropriate" and can be banned from campus. Israel indeed cannot be the outlier.

Of course, one could argue that Israel is not properly compared to China or Russia. It is better thought of, perhaps, as an Italy. But -- leaving aside whether the university would prohibit raucous protests against Italy that were deemed offensive to Italian students (I'm doubtful -- cf. protests against Columbus Day and claims by Italian-American groups that these protests constitute anti-Italian discrimination) -- the problem is that enforcing this norm would require the university to decide as a matter of institutional policy the correctness or soundness of moral appraisals about Israel's status or conduct. This, of course, is the very centerpiece of what academic freedom is meant to avoid. As the University of Chicago's famous Kalven Report argued, "The university is the home and sponsor of critics; it is not itself the critic." It is generally not the business of universities to institutionally affirm or reject a particular political stance, whether popular or unpopular; the university rather is designed to serve as a forum where these issues can be debated and hashed out. 

This does not mean tolerating actual discrimination. But discomfort with speech, even outrageous speech, is not discrimination. To keep on the Chicago theme, the U of C's widely-praised principles of freedom of expression address this very point:

Of course, the ideas of different members of the University community will often and quite naturally conflict. But it is not the proper role of the University to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive. Although the University greatly values civility, and although all members of the University community share in the responsibility for maintaining a climate of mutual respect, concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members of our community.

[....]

In a word, the University’s fundamental commitment is to the principle that debate or deliberation may not be suppressed because the ideas put forth are thought by some or even by most members of the University community to be offensive, unwise, immoral, or wrong-headed. It is for the individual members of the University community, not for the University as an institution, to make those judgments for themselves, and to act on those judgments not by seeking to suppress speech, but by openly and vigorously contesting the ideas that they oppose.

And despite the mau-mauing about what is allegedly "not tolerated" for other groups, these principles are the same that explain why Kyle Duncan must be allowed to speak at Stanford, Milo must be allowed to speak at Berkeley, and Christina Hoff Sommers must be allowed to speak ta Lewis & Clark. It's not because there aren't colorable arguments that any or all of these speeches or speakers are hateful. It's not even -- though the Kalven Report might disagree -- that the university isn't allowed to issue its own judgment about the propriety or not of the speech. It's that these judgments cannot, consistent with the basic principles of academic freedom, be used as a vector for prohibiting the speech.

Again, I don't think "IHRA", as a text, is responsible for these calls for censorship. But IHRA is symbol as much as it is text, and its symbolic usage has become increasingly tied to appeals such as this. Those who wish to promote IHRA's utility should think very carefully about standing by and letting it become an avatar of institutional censorship in this way. It does no service to the fight against antisemitism, nor IHRA's role in supporting that fight.

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