According to Spencer Overton, many states include prison populations for purposes of redistricting--even though as (mostly) convicted felons, they are (mostly) not allowed to vote. What's more, they're counted as residing in the district where they are incarcerated, rather than where they lived prior to incarceration.
The net effect is dilute voting strength in (mostly black) inner-city neighborhoods, and transfer that strength to white representatives in the rural counties which hold the prisons. One rural Nevada district includes a county where 95% of the black "residents" are in prison.
I concur with Alex Coolman--I am struck by parallels to the 3/5 compromise. For those of you lacking knowledge of this ignoble constitutional clause, the 3/5 compromise was the answer by the North and the South to the nagging question: How should slaves be counted in the federal census? The North wanted them counted for taxation but not representation. The South wanted them counted for representation but not taxation. And after much debate and discussion, they hit on the solution: Count them as 3/5 of a person both ways! And everybody was happy (except, of course, the slaves, but they're weren't really persons anyway--or at most 3/5 of one).
At least on face, however, this arrangement is worse than the 3/5 compromise (contextually, it isn't as bad since it isn't tied up with the slave system). It basically represents the Southern position--black prisoners are completely present for purposes of representation, even though they themselves are not allowed to choose their representatives. And, like in the "old days," these persons are placed inside their districts not by where they have chosen to live, but by where the powers-that-be have decided it most convenient for them to be placed. And wouldn't you know it? The arrangement just happens to be that black voter strength is sapped away by disenfranchised black persons, and transferred, vampire-like, to predominantly white districts electing white representatives who then (predictably) pass laws to put more black persons ("voters"?) into their prisons--thus strengthening their hand yet more. What a horrifically vicious cycle.
This may be a strained analogy, but I see parallels to the ID/Evolution debate here. You look at this system and how it so perfectly suppresses black people and elevates white power, while at the same time cloaking itself in the impenetrable armor of justice and righteousness, and you think: This must be designed. There is no way that such an incredibly complex, subtle, and effective method of preserving racial hierarchy could have come about naturally. But, good evolutionist that I am, I am ultimately swayed by the--in my view--scarier position. That these systems come into being not by a conscious design to keep black people in their place, but because our system is proactively racist when left on auto-pilot. If left to its own devices, without a conscious effort to correct, steer, and guide it away, our society will naturally and inevitably gravitate toward racist results. That's the way we, in our glorious color-blindness, work.
Personally, I oppose felon-disenfranchisement laws (especially for such bogus felonies as non-violent drug possession). But if we do have them, then prisoners should be counted as residents of where they lived as civilians--where their interests as citizens remain. The status quo completely strips prisoners of their personhood--which may, by itself, be a necessary incarceratory tool (I'm skeptical)--and then turns the dehumanized husk into slaves to the whims of the legislature; political pawns to be pushed around as line-drawing demands. You can't do both. You can't say that prisoners are no longer persons, and then re-create their identity into nothing more than a demographic tool. That is an unprecedented expansion of governmental authority to declare by fiat a polar shift in reality, a veritable deconstruction and reconstruction of what is to suit what the politicians want it to be. The state's power cannot justly extend that far.
Saturday, October 08, 2005
Thursday, October 06, 2005
The Students Have Become The Masters
Apparently, Iraq is failing in its quest to become a democracy because of parliamentary tricks like this:
Cheap parliamentary tactics in the pursuit of partisan advantage, only bowing to severe outside pressure, all ending in the complete embitterment of the minority party? Sounds like they may be learning too well.
I wonder if we can extradite Tom DeLay to run the Iraqi parliament? He is well-suited...though he'd probably make the civil war go nuclear.
On Sunday, the Shia- and Kurdish-dominated Iraqi parliament decreed that the threshold for rejecting the constitution would be raised from two-thirds of the voters in three provinces to two-thirds of registered voters in three provinces, while the approval of a simple majority of those who turn out to vote for the constitution would be sufficient for ratification. Yesterday, under extreme international pressure, the parliament abandoned the change. But most significant is the fact that the ruling factions in the parliament felt unconstrained by any law in the pursuit of their sectarian advantage. The U.S.-brokered interim constitution establishes a daunting parliamentary super-majority to amend its provisions. But instead of embarking upon such a daunting course, the parliament ignored what counts for law: The referendum decree was merely a "clarification," according to its parliamentary advocates. Moreover, after the decree was scrapped, Shia leaders threatened to challenge any rejection of the constitution; and Sunni leaders remained embittered and defiant by the scheme. As a result, all that the constitution represents is the triumph of a zero-sum sectarianism that the Bush administration is desperately portraying as the march of freedom.
Cheap parliamentary tactics in the pursuit of partisan advantage, only bowing to severe outside pressure, all ending in the complete embitterment of the minority party? Sounds like they may be learning too well.
I wonder if we can extradite Tom DeLay to run the Iraqi parliament? He is well-suited...though he'd probably make the civil war go nuclear.
Victory! (Priorities?)
The Senate has voted in favor of the McCain Amendment banning torture, 90-9. My position on this was rather clear, so I'm of course thrilled, and very happy at the lop-sided nature of the vote--it gives me hope that we'll prevail in what promises to be an uphill battle in the House. However, the fact that we won big today shouldn't stop us from shaming those who voted pro-torture:
War and Piece by way of Kevin Drum. Though many of those folks are big names, few are prone to political pressure, being from rock-solid red states (Allard and Bond may be the exceptions to that). However, I believe that John Cornyn is contemplating a presidential run--this should be hung on his neck like a 100 pound weight.
Most people seem to be supportive. Andrew Sullivan is of course thrilled--as he should be. He worked harder than anybody to publicize the abuse, we all owe him a debt of gratitude. Instapundit is maybe less gung-ho, but still terms White House resistance to the bill "a mistake." Maybe the closest things to negative reactions I've seen are at Belgravia Dispatch (which is just sick of discussing torture period--a misguided position, in my view) and Outside the Beltway, which expects a veto because torture is apparently "considered a fundamental part of presidential authority." Gosh, I hope not. The latter doesn't have much to say on the subject, but the post at Belgravia is very interesting. I think, though, that it falls into the trap of assuming anti-torture advocates are just representative of the loony anti-war left and/or that the vote was designed to placate them. This, I think is misguided--myself and Mr. Sullivan are two pro-war voices that have come out strongly in favor of this bill, and of the 90 senators who voted "yea" there are plenty of them who continue to support the war as well. As for trying to buy off anti-war dissenters, I agree this will have little effect, but I couldn't care less. It was the right thing to do. And by showing the US won't tolerate torture, we take out one arrow in Al-Qaeda's propaganda arsenal (I should be clear that based on my reading of BD's post, he is also supportive of this measure. He's just in a slightly reduced state of ecstasy than I am).
Finally, perhaps the oddest reaction comes from John Cole at Balloon Juice. He writes:
Now, I too was an opponent of McCain/Feingold when it came out (though I'm slowly moving to other side on it, right now I'm on the fence). But a little bit of prioritization, please? McCain managed to almost single-handedly get an issue of critical moral importance onto the Senate floor when it was presumed to be old, dead news, convinced the leadership to hold a vote, and won a landslide victory that will galvanize supporters and put pressure on the House to vote likewise. In comparison, a dispute over how far we can go in trying to reduce the influence of special interests on elections is chump change. Even if McCain/Feingold was ever important enough to me for me to vote off of (which it wasn't), passing this amendment makes me forgive him.
Wayne Allard (R-CO)
Christopher Bond (R-MO)
Tom Coburn (R-OK)
Thad Cochran (R-MS)
John Cornyn (R-TX)
James ["outraged by the outrage"] Inhofe (R-OK)
Pat Roberts (R-KS)
Jeff Sessions (R-AL)
Ted Stevens (R-AK)
War and Piece by way of Kevin Drum. Though many of those folks are big names, few are prone to political pressure, being from rock-solid red states (Allard and Bond may be the exceptions to that). However, I believe that John Cornyn is contemplating a presidential run--this should be hung on his neck like a 100 pound weight.
Most people seem to be supportive. Andrew Sullivan is of course thrilled--as he should be. He worked harder than anybody to publicize the abuse, we all owe him a debt of gratitude. Instapundit is maybe less gung-ho, but still terms White House resistance to the bill "a mistake." Maybe the closest things to negative reactions I've seen are at Belgravia Dispatch (which is just sick of discussing torture period--a misguided position, in my view) and Outside the Beltway, which expects a veto because torture is apparently "considered a fundamental part of presidential authority." Gosh, I hope not. The latter doesn't have much to say on the subject, but the post at Belgravia is very interesting. I think, though, that it falls into the trap of assuming anti-torture advocates are just representative of the loony anti-war left and/or that the vote was designed to placate them. This, I think is misguided--myself and Mr. Sullivan are two pro-war voices that have come out strongly in favor of this bill, and of the 90 senators who voted "yea" there are plenty of them who continue to support the war as well. As for trying to buy off anti-war dissenters, I agree this will have little effect, but I couldn't care less. It was the right thing to do. And by showing the US won't tolerate torture, we take out one arrow in Al-Qaeda's propaganda arsenal (I should be clear that based on my reading of BD's post, he is also supportive of this measure. He's just in a slightly reduced state of ecstasy than I am).
Finally, perhaps the oddest reaction comes from John Cole at Balloon Juice. He writes:
That is spectacular news. Our troops should never have been put in this position, and I am still unable to believe that no one has been held accountable for pas transgressions. Well, they did get criminal mastermind Lyddie England.
I will never vote for John McCain for his participation in creating McCain/Feingold, but he deserves the lions share of the credit for this. Thank you, Sen. McCain.
Now, I too was an opponent of McCain/Feingold when it came out (though I'm slowly moving to other side on it, right now I'm on the fence). But a little bit of prioritization, please? McCain managed to almost single-handedly get an issue of critical moral importance onto the Senate floor when it was presumed to be old, dead news, convinced the leadership to hold a vote, and won a landslide victory that will galvanize supporters and put pressure on the House to vote likewise. In comparison, a dispute over how far we can go in trying to reduce the influence of special interests on elections is chump change. Even if McCain/Feingold was ever important enough to me for me to vote off of (which it wasn't), passing this amendment makes me forgive him.
Wednesday, October 05, 2005
To Be American
The Senate is gearing up for a long-overdue debate regarding (among other things) the torture of detainees. Amendments by Senators McCain and Graham are both expected to be voted on shortly. The gist:
The Bush administration has issued a veto threat if the amendments are passed. If that came to pass, it would represent the first veto Bush has issue during his tenure of office. How twisted that the only thing apparently beyond pale for President Bush is forbidding Americans to torture people. That would be an awful reflection of this administration's (lack of) values.
Obsidian Wings asks everyone to write to their senator, and I wrote to Sen. Norm Coleman (R-MN), focusing on the McCain amendment. Here is what I sent:
McCain's amendment would ban the use of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" against anyone in U.S. custody and require all U.S. troops to follow procedures in the Army Field Manual when they detain and interrogate suspects. Graham's amendment would define "enemy combatant" and put into law procedures for prosecuting detainees at Guantanamo Bay.
The Bush administration has issued a veto threat if the amendments are passed. If that came to pass, it would represent the first veto Bush has issue during his tenure of office. How twisted that the only thing apparently beyond pale for President Bush is forbidding Americans to torture people. That would be an awful reflection of this administration's (lack of) values.
Obsidian Wings asks everyone to write to their senator, and I wrote to Sen. Norm Coleman (R-MN), focusing on the McCain amendment. Here is what I sent:
Sen. Coleman,
I am writing to you to ask your support for the McCain amendment regarding American detainee policy. Simply put, America should never, under no circumstances, tolerate torture. This is not a "trust the President" issue. This is not a "trust the military issue." This issue cuts to the very heart and soul of what it means to be an American. That we are not thugs and lawless brutes. Our mission in the war in terror is not just to kill evildoers. It is also and equally to create the conditions where young men and women are not driven to terror in the first place. They may "hate us for our freedoms," but that does not make the responsible choice the elimination of our most cherished values and principles.
I've always thought that being American is not about a nationality, ethnicity, or location. It's about a commitment to certain ideals. That some policies are beyond the pale of what a respectable society will tolerate. That there are some lines we will refuse to cross, no matter how evil our enemy is, no matter what atrocities they commit, no matter how just our vengence may be. It is that commitment to a higher set of values that makes us different from them.
I attend Carleton College, but I am a registered Minnesota voter, and rest assured this vote will be instrumental in how I evaluate your character when you come up for re-election. I understand that it is difficult to break from the party line, especially when the administration is whispering in your ear that to oppose any tactic he may choose in the war on terror is to support the terrorists themselves. However, you and I both know that the motivation behind this amendment is not to weaken our fight against evil but to strengthen the moral foundation upon which we stand. The ethical foundation. The American foundation.
I look forward to seeing your "yea" vote on the McCain amendment.
Sincerely,
David Schraub
Carleton College '08
The Debate Link: http://dsadevil.blogspot.com
Monday, October 03, 2005
OMG OMG OMG!!!!
I don't think it's fair that law professors don't have groupies. I mean, I understand they might be smaller than those for rock stars or actors, because the fan base is smaller. But still, law geeks should also have the experience of being smitten with absolute adulation for a particular professor.
For me, that Professor (or more accurately, those professors) are Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic--two of the most prolific and accessible authors in the field of Critical Race Theory. I can honestly say that their books and articles have changed the way I think about the world, about politics, about philosophy, and about race. I can't count the number of blog posts that have been inspired by what they had to say, but here is a brief list:
I don't expect the two Profs to agree with all I write--especially my effort to apply Critical Theories to non-leftist groups. But the point is that they've expanded my horizons at a time when I thought my politics had reached a dead end. At the end of high school, I was in the midst of a slow spiral into libertarianism, and I hated myself for it. Then, I stumbled across "Critical Race Theory: An Introduction," which they co-wrote, and I saw there was another way that was both philosophically coherent and responded to the gaping injustices I saw in the world around me. In my opinion, they are two of the most important social thinkers and legal minds in America today, and I wish that more people--of all political persuasions--were exposed to their trechant criticisms of American life and society.
And now they can, because THEY'RE GUEST BLOGGING AT BLACKPROF FOR TWO WHOLE WEEKS!!!!!!
You can color me excited.
Oh, and on the subject of neat professors blogging, the Chicago Law Blog is up, with a neat post by Cass R. Sunstein on how we evaluate Supreme Court nominees. Sunstein also is a uber-cool law professor--just not quite on the hallowed terrain of a Delgado or Stefancic.
I look forward to what all of them have to offer the blogosphere.
For me, that Professor (or more accurately, those professors) are Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic--two of the most prolific and accessible authors in the field of Critical Race Theory. I can honestly say that their books and articles have changed the way I think about the world, about politics, about philosophy, and about race. I can't count the number of blog posts that have been inspired by what they had to say, but here is a brief list:
Speaking Double
Eyes on the Prize
The Internal Critic and Intersectionality: Who's Looking Out for the Minority Right?
Standpoint Theory, The "Voice of Color", and Uncle Toms: Positioning Conservative Minorities
They're Boycotting WHAT? And Other Thoughts on Reparations
Recasting "The Lorax"; Or, The Triumph of the Crits
I don't expect the two Profs to agree with all I write--especially my effort to apply Critical Theories to non-leftist groups. But the point is that they've expanded my horizons at a time when I thought my politics had reached a dead end. At the end of high school, I was in the midst of a slow spiral into libertarianism, and I hated myself for it. Then, I stumbled across "Critical Race Theory: An Introduction," which they co-wrote, and I saw there was another way that was both philosophically coherent and responded to the gaping injustices I saw in the world around me. In my opinion, they are two of the most important social thinkers and legal minds in America today, and I wish that more people--of all political persuasions--were exposed to their trechant criticisms of American life and society.
And now they can, because THEY'RE GUEST BLOGGING AT BLACKPROF FOR TWO WHOLE WEEKS!!!!!!
You can color me excited.
Oh, and on the subject of neat professors blogging, the Chicago Law Blog is up, with a neat post by Cass R. Sunstein on how we evaluate Supreme Court nominees. Sunstein also is a uber-cool law professor--just not quite on the hallowed terrain of a Delgado or Stefancic.
I look forward to what all of them have to offer the blogosphere.
The Miers Miscalculation
So, the nominee is Harriet Miers, who is without a doubt very qualified--just not for this job. As so often is the case, my views parallel Legal Fiction: I'll listen to what she has to say--but this sounds remarkably like a judicial version of Michael Brown.
So, whereas my summary judgment on Roberts was "Could Be Worse", on Miers it's "Can't be a Crony." I don't like cronies, especially Bush cronies, and Miers fits that bill a bit too neatly.
But if you think I'm upset, you should hear what they're saying on the right. Orin Kerr has a round-up, and they are livid. I think there is a lot of pent up anger pouring out here.
Southern Appeal in general is apoplectic, but this post by Steve Dillard is maybe the best of the lot:
That about sums up the right-wing response. They are pissed. And they'll be more so now that Democrats are playing the happy-dance. For example, DKos says this is a victory for the left, and drops the hint that she'll become another Souter--the right's worst nightmare.
But I'd tread softly if I were them. In a way, Miers is a very smart pick (in the "pure political motivation" sense that defines this administration). For one, I don't think she will become a Souter or Kennedy? Why? Because she'll want to prove herself to all of her "allies" who attacked her. If many justices drift left to please the Times and Post, then this one may tack right to please Powerline and Malkin.
Second, there will be the temptation to oppose her on qualification grounds--indeed, Paul Horwitz advises Democrats to take precisely this option. It certainly does mesh well with the Michael Brown/Julie Myers story line floating about (and croynism has a mental link to corruption too!). But I'm inclined to agree with Hillel Levin on this. Suppose Democrats team up with disaffected Republicans and say "no, Miers is not qualified for this job." Then Bush comes back and nominates a hyper-conservative with impeccable credentials. Democrats would be caught--I don't think they'd be able to make the shift from "credentials are key" to "ideology is key" convincingly. This wouldn't be bad if the nominee was someone like Michael W. McConnell, but if it's a Janice Brown Rogers then we got trouble (Charging RINO also offers up this scenario). Of course, confirming Miers legitimizes the whole notion of appointing poorly qualified cronies to high offices. It's lose-lose.
So to be honest, I'm not thrilled at all. I think conservative anger will fade once she starts voting with the Scalia bloc (they say they'll still be upset, because this was a missed opportunity to break from the "stealth nominee" trend, but since when does the right care about strong qualifications from the evil liberal universities, academy, and judiciary anyway?). Liberals are going to depressed once they realize they've been played, and put a pure hack on the Court. And if by some miracle Senate Republicans grow a backbone, oppose the President, and reject her--we'll just get a bona fide right wing ideologue rather than one in disguise.
Woohoo. (And as always, TMV has a stellar round-up. Woohoo!).
MORE: James Joyner at Outside the Beltway has a terse but tremendous take-down of Hugh Hewiit (one of the very few bloggers defending the Miers pick). Hewitt argues that she's a good choice because she's been inside the administratio and thus knows the true nature of the war on terror:
Joyner responds:
Spot on.
YET AGAIN: Protein Wisdom has some shocking info, if true. Did Miers really recommend that we stop discriminating against homosexuals in adoption decisions? Shouldn't be that controversial, but it does conflict with the 10th Circuit precedent on the matter--and probably won't thrill social conservatives. And TalkLeft says that Miers actually is an okay gal:
Very interesting....
So, whereas my summary judgment on Roberts was "Could Be Worse", on Miers it's "Can't be a Crony." I don't like cronies, especially Bush cronies, and Miers fits that bill a bit too neatly.
But if you think I'm upset, you should hear what they're saying on the right. Orin Kerr has a round-up, and they are livid. I think there is a lot of pent up anger pouring out here.
Southern Appeal in general is apoplectic, but this post by Steve Dillard is maybe the best of the lot:
I am done with President Bush: Harriet Miers? Are you freakin' kidding me?!
Can someone--anyone--make the case for Justice Miers on the merits? Seriously, this is the best the president could do?
And what really sticks in my craw is the president's unwillingness to have a national debate about the proper method of interpreting the Constitution. I suppose I should have seen this coming when White House staffers freaked out over Chief Justice Roberts's ties to the Federalist Society.
Thanks for nothing, Mr. President. You had better pray that Justice Miers is a staunch judicial conservative, because if she turns out to be another O'Connor then the Republican Party is in for a world of hurt.
Un-freakin'-believable.
Oh, and if any of you RNC staffers are reading, you can take my name off the mailing list. I am not giving the national Republican Party another dime.
That about sums up the right-wing response. They are pissed. And they'll be more so now that Democrats are playing the happy-dance. For example, DKos says this is a victory for the left, and drops the hint that she'll become another Souter--the right's worst nightmare.
But I'd tread softly if I were them. In a way, Miers is a very smart pick (in the "pure political motivation" sense that defines this administration). For one, I don't think she will become a Souter or Kennedy? Why? Because she'll want to prove herself to all of her "allies" who attacked her. If many justices drift left to please the Times and Post, then this one may tack right to please Powerline and Malkin.
Second, there will be the temptation to oppose her on qualification grounds--indeed, Paul Horwitz advises Democrats to take precisely this option. It certainly does mesh well with the Michael Brown/Julie Myers story line floating about (and croynism has a mental link to corruption too!). But I'm inclined to agree with Hillel Levin on this. Suppose Democrats team up with disaffected Republicans and say "no, Miers is not qualified for this job." Then Bush comes back and nominates a hyper-conservative with impeccable credentials. Democrats would be caught--I don't think they'd be able to make the shift from "credentials are key" to "ideology is key" convincingly. This wouldn't be bad if the nominee was someone like Michael W. McConnell, but if it's a Janice Brown Rogers then we got trouble (Charging RINO also offers up this scenario). Of course, confirming Miers legitimizes the whole notion of appointing poorly qualified cronies to high offices. It's lose-lose.
So to be honest, I'm not thrilled at all. I think conservative anger will fade once she starts voting with the Scalia bloc (they say they'll still be upset, because this was a missed opportunity to break from the "stealth nominee" trend, but since when does the right care about strong qualifications from the evil liberal universities, academy, and judiciary anyway?). Liberals are going to depressed once they realize they've been played, and put a pure hack on the Court. And if by some miracle Senate Republicans grow a backbone, oppose the President, and reject her--we'll just get a bona fide right wing ideologue rather than one in disguise.
Woohoo. (And as always, TMV has a stellar round-up. Woohoo!).
MORE: James Joyner at Outside the Beltway has a terse but tremendous take-down of Hugh Hewiit (one of the very few bloggers defending the Miers pick). Hewitt argues that she's a good choice because she's been inside the administratio and thus knows the true nature of the war on terror:
Consider that none of the Justices, not even the new Chief, has seen the battlefield in the GWOT from the perspective or with the depth of knowledge as has the soon to be Justice Miers. The Counsel to the President has seen it all, and knows what the President knows, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs and the Attorney General.
I suspect that the President thinks first and foremost about the GWOT each morning, and that this choice for SCOTUS brings to that bench another Article II inclined justice with the sort of experience that no one inside the Court will have.
Joyner responds:
Of course, Article III judges are supposed to have an independent perspective. I prefer a judge who will read and apply the Constitution, not factor in their career experience.
Spot on.
YET AGAIN: Protein Wisdom has some shocking info, if true. Did Miers really recommend that we stop discriminating against homosexuals in adoption decisions? Shouldn't be that controversial, but it does conflict with the 10th Circuit precedent on the matter--and probably won't thrill social conservatives. And TalkLeft says that Miers actually is an okay gal:
didn't get to know her well, but we sat next to each other for several hours at the last meeting she attended and I liked her. We only talked law, not politics, but she won me over - and I was pre-disposed not to like her, that being the year that Bush was running for President and knowing she was his personal lawyer.
The other members of that Board at that time, at least four of whom are former ABA Presidents (including Martha Barnett who is quite progressive on women's and social issues)know Ms. Miers from her ABA work and spoke very highly of her.
My opinion could change should additional information surface that she is a Thomas or Scalia, but I don't think that will be the case. Compared to some of those under consideration he might have chosen, like the ultra-conservative 4th Circuit judges or Priscilla Owen or Janice Rogers Brown, Ms. Miers is a far better choice.
Very interesting....
Sunday, October 02, 2005
Speaking Double
Maybe it's just me, but I found this post at Southern Appeal, regarding Bush's upcoming choice for the next Supreme Court Justice, to be a mite disturbing. Most of it was just standard conservative pining for conservative Supreme Court nominees. I don't care about that (well, I do, but it's nothing newsworthy). However, when the author, "Rice Grad," started talking about gender and ethnicity, things got a bit odd:
This just seems to suffer from a bad version of cognitive dissonance to me. He doesn't want a woman because doing so would make this seat into a "woman's seat," and the Supreme Court is supposed to represent the entire nation (apparently, eight of nine residents of "the nation" are male. No wonder finding a date is so difficult). At the same time, he demurs slightly--it would be nice to have a woman on the court to deflect negative press on abortion decisions. And these political considerations carry the day for Hispanic nominees. Apparently, we are told, Bush should pick his Supreme Court justice with an eye on keeping Texas in the GOP column for the foreseeable future. And the way to do this is, as it turns out, is inextricably connected to having a guy with a name like "Estrada" on the Court.
We are thus led to believe several interesting premises. The first is that in selecting a member for a (nominally) non-partisan post, one in which we are told again and again that the nominees should look past their personal ideologies and to what the constitution "says," it is undesirable to select a candidate on racial or sexual grounds, but perfectly just to pick one on purely political grounds that happen to mirror racial or sexual ones. Second, Rice is willing to recognize identity politics only as far as he can exploit them. The idea that women or Hispanics might vote in an easily manipulable hoard (wave Estrada in front of them, and they'll follow) flows just fine, but the idea that they might have something useful to say or add to our judicial perspective is summarily dismissed (again, except insofar as a woman could be used as a human shield on abortion cases). Third, Rice seems genuinely torn about putting another woman on the Supreme Court. Ultimately, he concludes that the worst scenario would be to put a woman on the Court to put a woman on the Court (or, to be more charitable, to put a woman's perspective on). The ideal scenario is to put a woman on the Supreme Court, but to be absolutely clear that it's not because she's valuable as a woman, no sir-ee Bob. Of course, it's not because she's valuable as an intelligent jurist either--Rice justifies it on her being a useful political tool. The upshot of the entire thing is basically "we should pay attention to race and ethnicity only and as far as where we can reap political rewards for it." Is it any wonder that this "occasionally" devolves into race-baiting? I am at a loss about why what Rice is doing could even be justified as "equivalent" to liberal calls for equal representation (hell, representation, period)--let alone "better than."
This is a rather twisted form of color-blindness. It isn't actually color-blind, it is very cognizant of race (and gender). However, it "notices" these factors not to benefit their beholders (or to marginalize them), but to benefit US and marginalize THEM (in this case, defined politically). It is a complete, utter, and overt objectification. There's no agency or autonomy. Indeed, the implicit argument being made in Rice's piece is that we should actively seek a white male candidate (he puts it in the reverse, that we should avoid pandering to minority "interest groups", but effect is the same), but for the political benefits that we can gain by using the minority group properly. That's what the dilemma for Rice comes down to--between doing something good for the non-dominant races/gender (bad), and doing something good for the dominant (mostly white, mostly male) party (good). And if we remember that, in this case, not doing something good for minorities = doing something good for the majority, then the conflict becomes even starker: how do we best enhance the interests of white males? Woman and minorities are just a prop in the play--the only they're recognized as potentially independent actors, it's portrayed as some sort of threat ("Texas might go Democrat!").
It is posts like this which give credence to assaults on color-blindness. Color-blindness is impossible because it can always be recast into something else, especially something statistical: people more likely to vote Democrat or Republican, people more likely to commit crimes, people more likely to be pro-choice. At the point where these things can as nakedly be used as proxies for race, it's fair to say that race remains relevant.
2. Hopefully NOT be a woman.
I'd like President Bush to resist -- as he did in originally nominating Judge Roberts to O'Connor's seat -- establishing SCOTUS seats as "female," "black," or "Hispanic" seats. The Supreme Court belongs to the nation, not to particular demographic or interest groups.
However, I think it's great to have another woman on the court. When abortion is restricted in any way (eg, overturning Stenberg, which allowed partial birth abortions), it would be nice politically to have another woman on the court. That's a pretty big concern.
Therefore, I lean slightly against picking a woman, partly in the hope that Bush will have the opportunity for another Supreme Court nomination. Then, he could and should nominate a woman.
3. The nominee ought be Hispanic.
I believe strongly that the greatest challenge to our nation is assimilating Hispanic immigrants. The US has always succeeded in assimilating ethnic groups, with forced African immigrants being the lone exception.
As a Republican, I likewise think the greatest long-term challenge is to ensure that Hispanics vote for Republicans in growing numbers. If we lose Hispanics in Texas, we lose Texas, which means that Democrats win the presidency for the forseeable future.
Nominating a Hispanic like Estrada furthers both goals. If Democrats fight Estrada, then that will be a very high-profile slap in the face to what used to be a reliable constituency for the Democrats.
Furthermore, Estrada is an immigrant, which speaks to how dynamic American society is.
This just seems to suffer from a bad version of cognitive dissonance to me. He doesn't want a woman because doing so would make this seat into a "woman's seat," and the Supreme Court is supposed to represent the entire nation (apparently, eight of nine residents of "the nation" are male. No wonder finding a date is so difficult). At the same time, he demurs slightly--it would be nice to have a woman on the court to deflect negative press on abortion decisions. And these political considerations carry the day for Hispanic nominees. Apparently, we are told, Bush should pick his Supreme Court justice with an eye on keeping Texas in the GOP column for the foreseeable future. And the way to do this is, as it turns out, is inextricably connected to having a guy with a name like "Estrada" on the Court.
We are thus led to believe several interesting premises. The first is that in selecting a member for a (nominally) non-partisan post, one in which we are told again and again that the nominees should look past their personal ideologies and to what the constitution "says," it is undesirable to select a candidate on racial or sexual grounds, but perfectly just to pick one on purely political grounds that happen to mirror racial or sexual ones. Second, Rice is willing to recognize identity politics only as far as he can exploit them. The idea that women or Hispanics might vote in an easily manipulable hoard (wave Estrada in front of them, and they'll follow) flows just fine, but the idea that they might have something useful to say or add to our judicial perspective is summarily dismissed (again, except insofar as a woman could be used as a human shield on abortion cases). Third, Rice seems genuinely torn about putting another woman on the Supreme Court. Ultimately, he concludes that the worst scenario would be to put a woman on the Court to put a woman on the Court (or, to be more charitable, to put a woman's perspective on). The ideal scenario is to put a woman on the Supreme Court, but to be absolutely clear that it's not because she's valuable as a woman, no sir-ee Bob. Of course, it's not because she's valuable as an intelligent jurist either--Rice justifies it on her being a useful political tool. The upshot of the entire thing is basically "we should pay attention to race and ethnicity only and as far as where we can reap political rewards for it." Is it any wonder that this "occasionally" devolves into race-baiting? I am at a loss about why what Rice is doing could even be justified as "equivalent" to liberal calls for equal representation (hell, representation, period)--let alone "better than."
This is a rather twisted form of color-blindness. It isn't actually color-blind, it is very cognizant of race (and gender). However, it "notices" these factors not to benefit their beholders (or to marginalize them), but to benefit US and marginalize THEM (in this case, defined politically). It is a complete, utter, and overt objectification. There's no agency or autonomy. Indeed, the implicit argument being made in Rice's piece is that we should actively seek a white male candidate (he puts it in the reverse, that we should avoid pandering to minority "interest groups", but effect is the same), but for the political benefits that we can gain by using the minority group properly. That's what the dilemma for Rice comes down to--between doing something good for the non-dominant races/gender (bad), and doing something good for the dominant (mostly white, mostly male) party (good). And if we remember that, in this case, not doing something good for minorities = doing something good for the majority, then the conflict becomes even starker: how do we best enhance the interests of white males? Woman and minorities are just a prop in the play--the only they're recognized as potentially independent actors, it's portrayed as some sort of threat ("Texas might go Democrat!").
It is posts like this which give credence to assaults on color-blindness. Color-blindness is impossible because it can always be recast into something else, especially something statistical: people more likely to vote Democrat or Republican, people more likely to commit crimes, people more likely to be pro-choice. At the point where these things can as nakedly be used as proxies for race, it's fair to say that race remains relevant.
Friday, September 30, 2005
The Love Affair Continues
I don't mean to swoon over every word Barack Obama writes, I really don't.
But Christ almighty, is he good. This is just a great and critical point for liberals to hear, that this type of "with us/against us" dichotomy that one so often hears, where one "wrong" vote makes a politician a "war-supporter" or "Bush-lite" or "practically Republican," is damaging to a progressive agenda and harmful to the Democratic party. We shouldn't tolerate it. And Obama manages to make this point without alienating those he criticizes too.
And I might I just point out how refreshing it is that he actually is engaging in a discussion with the blogosphere that neither belittles nor kowtows to it? This is a serious point Obama is making in his post. Indeed, while DKos has a general policy of not elevating the diaries of actual politicians to the main page, they made an exception because the post "addresses in substance an issue that has been a major focus of discussion in our community." Tied to the fact that the folks Obama is attacking are, in a very real way, Kos' key constituency, and it just shows yet more how incredible this man really is.
But Christ almighty, is he good. This is just a great and critical point for liberals to hear, that this type of "with us/against us" dichotomy that one so often hears, where one "wrong" vote makes a politician a "war-supporter" or "Bush-lite" or "practically Republican," is damaging to a progressive agenda and harmful to the Democratic party. We shouldn't tolerate it. And Obama manages to make this point without alienating those he criticizes too.
And I might I just point out how refreshing it is that he actually is engaging in a discussion with the blogosphere that neither belittles nor kowtows to it? This is a serious point Obama is making in his post. Indeed, while DKos has a general policy of not elevating the diaries of actual politicians to the main page, they made an exception because the post "addresses in substance an issue that has been a major focus of discussion in our community." Tied to the fact that the folks Obama is attacking are, in a very real way, Kos' key constituency, and it just shows yet more how incredible this man really is.
Eyes on the Prize
Noted moral maven Bill Bennett has raised a bit of a stir when he claimed that a way to lower crime rates would be to abort all black children. To be fair, he quickly added that this would be "morally reprehensible." However, he and his defenders (who, at the moment, does not include the Bush administration) state that the comments are perfectly acceptable because on sociological grounds (blacks do commit a disproportionate amount of crime), he's accurate. Does this get him off the hook?
I'm not sure it does, and inadvertently, it's James Joyner's defense that explains why. He writes:
The emphasis is my own. Now, I find it at least somewhat amusing to read the phrase "aside from the genocide issue"--as if this is some minor thing we can just table for later. When Bennett assures that he doesn't actually want to kill all black people (because that would be very, very, wrong), it still has the subtext of "but the world would be better off if we could. Damn deontological ethics!"
But that's not where my real critique comes from. It's in Mr. Joyner's admission that Bennett's comments could equally be applied to killing all white males, young people, or poor people. Yet, I cannot imagine anyone ever even doing the "one step forward, one step back" tango Bennett did with regards to any of those groups. In other words, when we discuss "groups that commit a disproportionately high amount of crime," it always, immediately, and solely translates to "black people," even though many groups fit the description. Why is that so? What are the implications?
This is why the "statistically, he's in the clear" argument doesn't cut it for me. I'll just ignore for now the problems in general that exist with statistic-based arguments (you can get at least some of them here). If we made these statistical arguments uniformly and neutrally, it might not be so bad. But there is no attempt at equity here--other groups which could as easily fit inside Bennett's statistics are left out, and only blacks are put in. This creates a distorted social perception of black criminality--a conception which helps reaffirm and reify racist mentalities. It's like finding 30 drug dealers, half white and half black, releasing the white ones, charging the black ones under our (draconian) drug laws, and then defending it all by saying "well, they're guilty aren't they?" That's obviously a relevant consideration, but it isn't the only one, and reducing the argument to "well, they really do commit crimes (really are guilty)" excludes some very important issues critical to the debate. And unfortunately, nobody defending the remarks addresses it.
Ironically though, I am actually hearing a fair few people say that Bennett's remarks are equivalent to saying the same thing about poor people or white males--the argument that, as I note above, has never actually been made independent of defending folks like Bennett. I thus say "ironic" because the folks employing it act as if that argument is made all the time to moral silence, and we're somehow being hypocritical by only making the condemnation when the topic is race. But of course, this is exactly opposite of what happens: the only time the meta-argument is made is in this (racial) context, and the only time the particular cross-application to white males or young people occurs is when defenders assert the argument's racial neutrality by proclaiming that, in some fantasy-land, the argument is made all the time with a variety of multi-racial targets. It just isn't true.
I should note that the one defense, Brad DeLong's, partially gets out of this. He asserts that Bennett's overall point was a critique of ends-based analysis by pointing out that it leads to all manner of bad things. I don't think this entirely gets him off the hook (since it implies that the benefits of aborting all black babies via lowered crime rates outweighs the costs of, well, massive genocide), but it is a superior argument to the simplistic "it's true" claim. It just so happens that he's the only man making it--the blogosphere as a whole is not being quite as sophisticated.
Protein Wisdom also tries to address a version of my argument--but I don't think he quite gets it (to be fair, he posted before I wrote all of this, so we can't really blame him). I'm always pleased to be chatting with PW, since they are among the few conservatives with a real grasp of post-modernism. They write the following:
Let's start out by dealing with the question of whether Bennett is "racist." I do not think he is racist in the sense that he overtly dislikes blacks qua blacks--nor do I think that these comments undermine that (again though, his comparative weight between "no more blacks" and "less crime"--putting the latter as an outweighing positive--is troubling in that respect). So in this respect, I think it would be better to call Bennett's remarks "racially insensitive" rather than labeling himself racist. However, PW overstates it's case. The racial impact of Bennett's argument does not just kick in when the statement is distorted or taken out of context by those who wish to damage him. As my above argument shows, the racial impact flows even when Bennett is taken completely in context, because it portrays black criminality inequitably compared to other equivalent social groups; more specifically, that in doing so, it reifies the prevailing social attitude that blacks are different vis a vis these other groups even though they're not. So in this respect, this argument still is a morally wrong one to make in the racial context. The secondary question, on whether Bennett can be held morally liable for these problems, also goes against him. While I am willing to concede that Bennett did not intend a racist statement, intention cannot be the only factor at stake here. Bennett has to be mindful of the context his remarks are operating in--not just how partisans might distort them, but also how they might be damaging even in their "real" context. To not do so is negligent on his part and can be condemned (though obviously to a lesser degree than if he had been actively trying to cause the harm).
Finally, perhaps the most interesting response I've read is by Paul Butler, who argues that we as a society basically are "eliminating" the entire black population, we're just waiting a bit longer to do it.
Our criminal justice system is structured such that it incarcerates a huge portion of young black men. It is true that this is better than killing them off. But in a way, it's achieving the same goal--in order to reduce crime in our society, we're trying to remove as many black people as possible. And it's interesting that while killing blacks is seen as beyond the pale by nearly everyone, this alternative mechanism for removing blacks from American society provokes (at best) a severe partisan split.
Again, one can make the "but they actually are criminals" response, and again, it doesn't fly. Although young black men commit a disproportionate amount of crime, they are also arrested disproportionate to the amount crime they commit. We also punish "black" crime more harshly than white crime, both in terms of giving lengthier sentences to crimes associated with the black community (the crack/powder cocaine example serves here), and in giving harder sentences to the average black offender versus white offender convicted of the same crime. Again, the equity argument comes into play here--while there always will be some people getting heavier sentences and some people getting lighter sentences, and some people getting arrested and others not caught, the point and problem is that these effects aren't randomly distributed, but concentrated to the advantage of white people and disadvantage of black people. That's the problem being critiqued here.
I'm not sure it does, and inadvertently, it's James Joyner's defense that explains why. He writes:
Even aside from the genocide issue, that blacks (or the young, or the poor, or white males, for that matter) commit crimes at a statistically significant higher rate than the population as a whole is incontrovertible.
The emphasis is my own. Now, I find it at least somewhat amusing to read the phrase "aside from the genocide issue"--as if this is some minor thing we can just table for later. When Bennett assures that he doesn't actually want to kill all black people (because that would be very, very, wrong), it still has the subtext of "but the world would be better off if we could. Damn deontological ethics!"
But that's not where my real critique comes from. It's in Mr. Joyner's admission that Bennett's comments could equally be applied to killing all white males, young people, or poor people. Yet, I cannot imagine anyone ever even doing the "one step forward, one step back" tango Bennett did with regards to any of those groups. In other words, when we discuss "groups that commit a disproportionately high amount of crime," it always, immediately, and solely translates to "black people," even though many groups fit the description. Why is that so? What are the implications?
This is why the "statistically, he's in the clear" argument doesn't cut it for me. I'll just ignore for now the problems in general that exist with statistic-based arguments (you can get at least some of them here). If we made these statistical arguments uniformly and neutrally, it might not be so bad. But there is no attempt at equity here--other groups which could as easily fit inside Bennett's statistics are left out, and only blacks are put in. This creates a distorted social perception of black criminality--a conception which helps reaffirm and reify racist mentalities. It's like finding 30 drug dealers, half white and half black, releasing the white ones, charging the black ones under our (draconian) drug laws, and then defending it all by saying "well, they're guilty aren't they?" That's obviously a relevant consideration, but it isn't the only one, and reducing the argument to "well, they really do commit crimes (really are guilty)" excludes some very important issues critical to the debate. And unfortunately, nobody defending the remarks addresses it.
Ironically though, I am actually hearing a fair few people say that Bennett's remarks are equivalent to saying the same thing about poor people or white males--the argument that, as I note above, has never actually been made independent of defending folks like Bennett. I thus say "ironic" because the folks employing it act as if that argument is made all the time to moral silence, and we're somehow being hypocritical by only making the condemnation when the topic is race. But of course, this is exactly opposite of what happens: the only time the meta-argument is made is in this (racial) context, and the only time the particular cross-application to white males or young people occurs is when defenders assert the argument's racial neutrality by proclaiming that, in some fantasy-land, the argument is made all the time with a variety of multi-racial targets. It just isn't true.
I should note that the one defense, Brad DeLong's, partially gets out of this. He asserts that Bennett's overall point was a critique of ends-based analysis by pointing out that it leads to all manner of bad things. I don't think this entirely gets him off the hook (since it implies that the benefits of aborting all black babies via lowered crime rates outweighs the costs of, well, massive genocide), but it is a superior argument to the simplistic "it's true" claim. It just so happens that he's the only man making it--the blogosphere as a whole is not being quite as sophisticated.
Protein Wisdom also tries to address a version of my argument--but I don't think he quite gets it (to be fair, he posted before I wrote all of this, so we can't really blame him). I'm always pleased to be chatting with PW, since they are among the few conservatives with a real grasp of post-modernism. They write the following:
the idea that Bennett's words are still his beyond his intent to use them in a certain way--which simply echoes the old Judith Butler axiom that "actions continue to act after the intentional subject has announced its completion," which, while true, is nevertheless incidental, and becomes dangerous as an assertion when interpretation is released from the ground of appealing back to the speaker's intent. That is, what is at stake here is the role the subject plays in the "meaning" of the act vs. the role played by contingency in giving that act its (subsequent) meaning(s)--or, to put it more specifically, what William Bennett meant vs. what his words can be made to look like they might mean by those in whose interests it is to damage him. In short, they are taking ownership of his words, resignifying them, then using that resignification to taint Bennett with the charge of racism.
Let's start out by dealing with the question of whether Bennett is "racist." I do not think he is racist in the sense that he overtly dislikes blacks qua blacks--nor do I think that these comments undermine that (again though, his comparative weight between "no more blacks" and "less crime"--putting the latter as an outweighing positive--is troubling in that respect). So in this respect, I think it would be better to call Bennett's remarks "racially insensitive" rather than labeling himself racist. However, PW overstates it's case. The racial impact of Bennett's argument does not just kick in when the statement is distorted or taken out of context by those who wish to damage him. As my above argument shows, the racial impact flows even when Bennett is taken completely in context, because it portrays black criminality inequitably compared to other equivalent social groups; more specifically, that in doing so, it reifies the prevailing social attitude that blacks are different vis a vis these other groups even though they're not. So in this respect, this argument still is a morally wrong one to make in the racial context. The secondary question, on whether Bennett can be held morally liable for these problems, also goes against him. While I am willing to concede that Bennett did not intend a racist statement, intention cannot be the only factor at stake here. Bennett has to be mindful of the context his remarks are operating in--not just how partisans might distort them, but also how they might be damaging even in their "real" context. To not do so is negligent on his part and can be condemned (though obviously to a lesser degree than if he had been actively trying to cause the harm).
Finally, perhaps the most interesting response I've read is by Paul Butler, who argues that we as a society basically are "eliminating" the entire black population, we're just waiting a bit longer to do it.
When I was a student at Harvard Law School, my criminal law professor told us he knew of a sure way to reduce the crime rate. Every young man could be incarcerated. If that was too much, he said, another way would be to incarcerate every young black man. In a limited sense, our criminal justice system has selected Option # 2.
[...]
Even if marginally effective, mass incarceration and abortion are immoral if their only purpose is to lower crime. Mass incarceration is also an inefficient way of achieving this end. It is like amputating a leg to heal a broken toe.
Our criminal justice system is structured such that it incarcerates a huge portion of young black men. It is true that this is better than killing them off. But in a way, it's achieving the same goal--in order to reduce crime in our society, we're trying to remove as many black people as possible. And it's interesting that while killing blacks is seen as beyond the pale by nearly everyone, this alternative mechanism for removing blacks from American society provokes (at best) a severe partisan split.
Again, one can make the "but they actually are criminals" response, and again, it doesn't fly. Although young black men commit a disproportionate amount of crime, they are also arrested disproportionate to the amount crime they commit. We also punish "black" crime more harshly than white crime, both in terms of giving lengthier sentences to crimes associated with the black community (the crack/powder cocaine example serves here), and in giving harder sentences to the average black offender versus white offender convicted of the same crime. Again, the equity argument comes into play here--while there always will be some people getting heavier sentences and some people getting lighter sentences, and some people getting arrested and others not caught, the point and problem is that these effects aren't randomly distributed, but concentrated to the advantage of white people and disadvantage of black people. That's the problem being critiqued here.
Thursday, September 29, 2005
Turnabout Is Fair Play
Like most people concerned about how widespread torture has become in American policy, I was heartened by a District Court ruling holding that pictures of American abuse had to be released to the public. The Bush administration had argued that doing so would aid our enemies by inciting them to act against us. That sounds to me like a good reason for ending the abuse and showing to the world that it will never be tolerated, covered for, or minimized. But I'm not Bush, and he appears to prefer the cover up route. In any case, Kevin Drum points out how the judge neatly dispatched that argument:
Beautiful. I've always been a fan of this sort of political jujitsu by principled opponents of conservative excesses, because the rhetoric they use to justify themselves nearly always can be thrown back in their face. Since terms and "gut feelings" are so important in political discourse today, liberals need to take back some of the critical phrases that inhabit our discursive terrain: "values," "security," "strength," etc..
For example, when I was approached by a Republican asking me if I was going to vote for Bush, I'd always answer something along the lines of:
And for the record, I agree with Judge Hellerstein one hundred percent. Terrorists don't need excuses to kill us, and submitting to blackmail is not the American way. We are a free nation, that strives to do good but does not hide from its mistakes. Or so we should be. It's high time the Bush administration remembered that.
U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein said that terrorists "do not need pretexts for their barbarism" and that suppressing the pictures would amount to submitting to blackmail.
"Our nation does not surrender to blackmail, and fear of blackmail is not a legally sufficient argument to prevent us from performing a statutory command."
Beautiful. I've always been a fan of this sort of political jujitsu by principled opponents of conservative excesses, because the rhetoric they use to justify themselves nearly always can be thrown back in their face. Since terms and "gut feelings" are so important in political discourse today, liberals need to take back some of the critical phrases that inhabit our discursive terrain: "values," "security," "strength," etc..
For example, when I was approached by a Republican asking me if I was going to vote for Bush, I'd always answer something along the lines of:
No, I couldn't do that. I support the war in Iraq.Always stopped them dead in their tracks. And for my part, it was true--one of the key reasons I opposed Bush (though not the only one by any stretch) was that I supported the war in Iraq and thought it unforgivable how he butchered it. But they were so used to those terms and issues leading to a default Bush vote, that they didn't know how to respond when they were hit on their own territory.
And for the record, I agree with Judge Hellerstein one hundred percent. Terrorists don't need excuses to kill us, and submitting to blackmail is not the American way. We are a free nation, that strives to do good but does not hide from its mistakes. Or so we should be. It's high time the Bush administration remembered that.
For Love or Money
It's funny. A short while back, I posted a defense of a group posting the addresses of folks opposing gay marriage in Massachusetts--addresses already in the public domain, mind you--for the express purpose of initiating a dialogue between gay marriage supporters and opponents. Seems some folks thought that it was tantamount to intimidation, despite the fact that the gay marriage advocates already had begun meeting with opponents, and the opponents themselves characterized the meetings as "gracious" and not the slightest bit hostile.
My take on it was that, so long as intimidation stayed out of it, this was precisely the type of positive, grass-roots conversation that we should be encouraging in American democracy. People shouldn't be allowed to completely isolate themselves from folks negatively impacted by their votes. Yet, for the most part, that's the reality we live in. Most white voters know few, if any, African-Americans who will be effected by their votes on Affirmative Action or Reparations. Most rich voters know few, if any, poor voters who are dependent on the Welfare and Job Training programs they try to cut. And most heterosexual voters have little personal contact with gay and lesbian Americans whose rights they wish to expunge from our constitution. Ultimately, this segregated political state undermines Democratic ideals--and efforts to combat it should be applauded, not smeared as intimidating or hostile.
But I digress. Whatever claim anti-gay marriage advocates might have had in terms of "high ground" in the process of putting this issue on the ballot has evaporated at the point where they bus in out-of-state petition gathers and pay them by the signature (H/T: Sullivan). Gay marriage supporter Tom Lang was approached by a signature gatherer who asked him to sign a petition to put an anti-gay marriage amendment on the 2006 ballot. As Lang describes it:
This seems quite unethical if you ask me. Many people who are apathetic toward the gay marriage issue will be loathe to not do someone a favor for something as "meaningless" as signing a petition. But this undermines the whole point of democratic deliberation. It's hard enough to convince people to vote based off of rational considerations, but it's ridiculous when, in addition to that:
Worse yet, this may be the tip of the iceberg. Another Blogger reports that some of the gatherers aren't even telling their targets that they're signing a gay marriage petition--saying that it is for selling alcohol in supermarkets (as far as I can gather, they have the petition for both and make it into a "sign here and here" deal).
It's amazing how contorted our system has become. Out-of-state lobbyists busing in out-of-state activists soliciting signatures for cash is a-okay, but a program enabling neighbors to talk about the real impact on their own lives a political issue will have is caricatured as a threat to public safety. I'm somewhat resigned to the fact that big lobbyists are an inextricable fact of the American system. But this is the first time I've seen them literally placed on a higher scale than actual person-to-person debate.
One wonders why I become more cynical by the day.
My take on it was that, so long as intimidation stayed out of it, this was precisely the type of positive, grass-roots conversation that we should be encouraging in American democracy. People shouldn't be allowed to completely isolate themselves from folks negatively impacted by their votes. Yet, for the most part, that's the reality we live in. Most white voters know few, if any, African-Americans who will be effected by their votes on Affirmative Action or Reparations. Most rich voters know few, if any, poor voters who are dependent on the Welfare and Job Training programs they try to cut. And most heterosexual voters have little personal contact with gay and lesbian Americans whose rights they wish to expunge from our constitution. Ultimately, this segregated political state undermines Democratic ideals--and efforts to combat it should be applauded, not smeared as intimidating or hostile.
But I digress. Whatever claim anti-gay marriage advocates might have had in terms of "high ground" in the process of putting this issue on the ballot has evaporated at the point where they bus in out-of-state petition gathers and pay them by the signature (H/T: Sullivan). Gay marriage supporter Tom Lang was approached by a signature gatherer who asked him to sign a petition to put an anti-gay marriage amendment on the 2006 ballot. As Lang describes it:
[the petition-gatherer has a] Petition about Traditional Marriage that he would like me to sign..."You know", he said, "if you believe in 'Adam and Eve.'" He then added, "this signing on either of these just means you want it on the ballot, it doesn't really mean anything today."
[...]
I was then asked if I wanted to sign "the traditional marriage petition." When I said no, He told me that he was being paid $1 a signature and that it would really help him if I could sign!
This seems quite unethical if you ask me. Many people who are apathetic toward the gay marriage issue will be loathe to not do someone a favor for something as "meaningless" as signing a petition. But this undermines the whole point of democratic deliberation. It's hard enough to convince people to vote based off of rational considerations, but it's ridiculous when, in addition to that:
[W]e now have to worry about a "puppy-dog eyed" signature gatherer claiming that the signer is "helping him out financially" and that signing "doesn't really mean anything."
Worse yet, this may be the tip of the iceberg. Another Blogger reports that some of the gatherers aren't even telling their targets that they're signing a gay marriage petition--saying that it is for selling alcohol in supermarkets (as far as I can gather, they have the petition for both and make it into a "sign here and here" deal).
It's amazing how contorted our system has become. Out-of-state lobbyists busing in out-of-state activists soliciting signatures for cash is a-okay, but a program enabling neighbors to talk about the real impact on their own lives a political issue will have is caricatured as a threat to public safety. I'm somewhat resigned to the fact that big lobbyists are an inextricable fact of the American system. But this is the first time I've seen them literally placed on a higher scale than actual person-to-person debate.
One wonders why I become more cynical by the day.
Wednesday, September 28, 2005
Oh Happy Day
Tom DeLay's been indicted!!!! Oh baby, this feels good.
So what, exactly, is the scoop? Well, via Orin Kerr we find the indictment itself. It's in legalese, but as far as I can gather its an indictment for conspiracy--the only way that DeLay is in the jurisdiction of Travis County. But criminal law is not something I'm an expert on, find someone else to parse the indictment itself.
[Update: Mark Levin thinks the indictment is very weak. I have to admit, I didn't see much in it either. However, Bulldog Pundit says that indictments are commoly quite thin on details. Lorie Byrd gets both hat tips, and adds for her part that she doubts Earle would make the indictment unless he could make the case. She then engages in gratutious Clinton-bashing that, from my perspective, utterly inverts reality, but we'll forgive that. Excellent legal analysis at Southern Appeal as well. On a related note, Kevin Drum thinks that to make the conspiracy charge stick, Earle will need to flip some of the folks already under investigation to testify. I've heard rumors that he's been trying to do that--does he have the goods?]
Powerline gives us excerpts of DeLay's PR defense. It's boilerplate--Earle is a partisan hack, I did nothing wrong, I'll be vindicated in court, etc etc.. The kicker line:
He specifically claims that he has done absolutely nothing wrong or unethical, and is quite adamant about it. This is interesting, because of a certain passage I recall from a recent Washington Times interview conducted with him:
Not quite as blustery back then.
The line that Earle is a partisan Democrat is also belied by the facts. In his time as district attorney, he's prosecuted 11 Democrats for corruption, versus 5 Republicans. And as the Austin American-Statesman informs us, the Democrats weren't small fries either: he went after a state attorney general, state house speaker, state supreme court justice, and state treasurer. Aside from people just asserting it, I've never heard evidence to suggest that he is partisan. The modified version of the meme is that he goes after his "political opponents," but I don't see the evidence to support that either. After all, why is DeLay one of his political opponents anyway? He's not in his district, DeLay wasn't threatening his job or anything. This seems to be paranoia, nothing more.
Democrats are mostly jubilant (as they should be). I concur with Kevin Drum that this has to be the spearpoint of our 2006 campaign--anti-corruption should become the mantlepiece of the Democratic party. This is a major turning point, where the wise and ethical politicians (they do exist) can stand up and say "enough!" Bruce Reed's recommendations are a good start. And If opposing corruption means throwing our members of the dirty 13, so be it.
The Republican response has been interesting. Though there still are some die-hard defenders (like Powerline and Malkin), many others think that the party has made a mistake in defending DeLay. And Legal Fiction (not himself a Republican) wonders how many Republicans are secretly glad to see DeLay step aside?
I would have thought it would be a lot--but recent developments leave me unsure. The word on the street say that rank and file Republicans bucked their leadership to install Rep. Roy Blunt (R-MO) as the new majority leader over David Drier. That's an interesting decision, because Blunt is probably DeLay's closest ally (and it shows--he too is a member of the dirty 13). If elected Republicans really were interested in seizing this opportunity to clean house, they're doing an odd job of showing it.
What makes Blunt really interesting is that he, unlike Drier, has an independent power base. Which means he might be able to hold the majority leader position even if DeLay comes back. The upshot is that the GOP is trying to jettison DeLay while preserving the sleazy politics he founded and Blunt whole-heartedly signs onto. All the more reason for Democrats to hammer on it.
Excellent roundups at Project Nothing and Outside the Beltway. But man, this makes my day. It's the beginning of the end for Tom DeLay and his K Street Crew buddies.
So what, exactly, is the scoop? Well, via Orin Kerr we find the indictment itself. It's in legalese, but as far as I can gather its an indictment for conspiracy--the only way that DeLay is in the jurisdiction of Travis County. But criminal law is not something I'm an expert on, find someone else to parse the indictment itself.
[Update: Mark Levin thinks the indictment is very weak. I have to admit, I didn't see much in it either. However, Bulldog Pundit says that indictments are commoly quite thin on details. Lorie Byrd gets both hat tips, and adds for her part that she doubts Earle would make the indictment unless he could make the case. She then engages in gratutious Clinton-bashing that, from my perspective, utterly inverts reality, but we'll forgive that. Excellent legal analysis at Southern Appeal as well. On a related note, Kevin Drum thinks that to make the conspiracy charge stick, Earle will need to flip some of the folks already under investigation to testify. I've heard rumors that he's been trying to do that--does he have the goods?]
Powerline gives us excerpts of DeLay's PR defense. It's boilerplate--Earle is a partisan hack, I did nothing wrong, I'll be vindicated in court, etc etc.. The kicker line:
Let me be very, very clear. I have done nothing wrong. I have violated no law, no regulation, no rule of the House. I have done nothing unlawful, unethical, or, I might add, unprecedented even in the political campaigns of Mr. Earle himself.
My defense in this case will not be technical or legalistic: it will be categorical and absolute. I am innocent. Mr. Earle and his staff know it. And I will prove it.
He specifically claims that he has done absolutely nothing wrong or unethical, and is quite adamant about it. This is interesting, because of a certain passage I recall from a recent Washington Times interview conducted with him:
Mr. Hurt: Have you ever crossed the line of ethical behavior in terms of dealing with lobbyists, your use of government authority or with fundraising?
Mr. DeLay: Ever is a very strong word.
Not quite as blustery back then.
The line that Earle is a partisan Democrat is also belied by the facts. In his time as district attorney, he's prosecuted 11 Democrats for corruption, versus 5 Republicans. And as the Austin American-Statesman informs us, the Democrats weren't small fries either: he went after a state attorney general, state house speaker, state supreme court justice, and state treasurer. Aside from people just asserting it, I've never heard evidence to suggest that he is partisan. The modified version of the meme is that he goes after his "political opponents," but I don't see the evidence to support that either. After all, why is DeLay one of his political opponents anyway? He's not in his district, DeLay wasn't threatening his job or anything. This seems to be paranoia, nothing more.
Democrats are mostly jubilant (as they should be). I concur with Kevin Drum that this has to be the spearpoint of our 2006 campaign--anti-corruption should become the mantlepiece of the Democratic party. This is a major turning point, where the wise and ethical politicians (they do exist) can stand up and say "enough!" Bruce Reed's recommendations are a good start. And If opposing corruption means throwing our members of the dirty 13, so be it.
The Republican response has been interesting. Though there still are some die-hard defenders (like Powerline and Malkin), many others think that the party has made a mistake in defending DeLay. And Legal Fiction (not himself a Republican) wonders how many Republicans are secretly glad to see DeLay step aside?
I would have thought it would be a lot--but recent developments leave me unsure. The word on the street say that rank and file Republicans bucked their leadership to install Rep. Roy Blunt (R-MO) as the new majority leader over David Drier. That's an interesting decision, because Blunt is probably DeLay's closest ally (and it shows--he too is a member of the dirty 13). If elected Republicans really were interested in seizing this opportunity to clean house, they're doing an odd job of showing it.
What makes Blunt really interesting is that he, unlike Drier, has an independent power base. Which means he might be able to hold the majority leader position even if DeLay comes back. The upshot is that the GOP is trying to jettison DeLay while preserving the sleazy politics he founded and Blunt whole-heartedly signs onto. All the more reason for Democrats to hammer on it.
Excellent roundups at Project Nothing and Outside the Beltway. But man, this makes my day. It's the beginning of the end for Tom DeLay and his K Street Crew buddies.
Tuesday, September 27, 2005
Central Force
A long and great post by Tom Strong on the perils of being a centrist blogger. It has a lot I agree with, and a fair amount I disagree with. But I think the most important thing to draw from it is a centrism of underdogs.
A key part of Strong's narrative is his transition from hippie, WTO protesting leftist, to part of the "sensible center." I identify with this trip, because I made a similar one--I went from a self-described Democratic Socialist to a New Republic style moderate liberal. To some extent, it's a big change, but to some extent it isn't. Strong points out that:
My philosophical framework has always been bottom-centric, not just rooting for but trying to actively aid the "underdog". Society, I think, is obligated to look first to the least well-off. Though this position is identified more with the left than the right, I do not think it is a resident of either pole, because marginalization is very contingent and often includes conservative-identified groups. My favorite example here would be conservatives themselves. Though we don't often think of conservatives as marginalized (and for the most part, we're right), at universities they are very much rendered unwanted outsiders. Liberals are ideologically blinded from seeing this problem, for the simple reason that liberals are defined as in opposition to conservatives and thus are not naturally inclined to see them as someone needing their aid. Liberals also have trouble dealing with cross-cutting forms of oppression where one source is one of the usual suspect oppressors (The West, Whites, males, etc..), but other sources include groups commonly seen as victims. This explains the incoherency of leftist outrage to the US deposing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which though arguably within the stock framework of western imperialism, more concretely was a liberation of persons brutally oppressed by the Iraqi regime (most notably Shiites and Kurds). Because its pre-set ideological predispositions have allies and enemies which precede (though which try and correlate to) oppressors and victims, attempts to formulate anti-oppression theory and praxis solely from the left are doomed to failure.
A bottom-centric centrism can dodge this problem by inverting the chain--letting social realities of oppression precede our decisions on allies and enemies, rather than the other way around. Since sometimes our supposed enemies are on the bottom, centering on the bottom means occasionally centering on theoretical enemies. For example, the main "enemies" of centrists are partisans. If centrists were oriented by the traditional notation of self-interest--helping oneself (and one's friends) and hurting enemies--then we'd attack partisans at every opportunity. If a line is being parroted by the RNC pundit-corps, we'd oppose it on those grounds. However, centrists don't (or shouldn't) tend to operate that way. Rather, we examine the message as such, and see whether it creates a more just world. If so, we don't care who the speaker is--we'll stand up and support it (a position which will put us sometimes in favor of Democratic partisans, sometimes Republican partisans, and very often neither one). Alternatively, centrists might argue that a suppressed message labeled "extreme" be allowed into the limelight--even if we then proceed to bash it later. It is in this respect ends-oriented insofar as the end is hearing as many voices as possible--but this should not stop us from attacking hostile or unhelpful opinions. This is not a strain but a logical conclusion: the goal here is to have a constructive and comprehensive social debate, which requires both the opinions themselves (bring out suppressed voices) and those willing to refute/defend them (smack them down or applaud their insight).
Bottom-centric centrism is combative, militant, forceful, and activist. It does not "simply" try to mediate between opposing poles (although that is an important role, and I'd also assert an active value in of itself). It also must forward unique, innovative plans of its own to bring in voices not being heard within the dominant hierarchy. Above all, centrists must press for and defend a fair social playing field in which all perspectives have a chance to be heard and no person or group is condemned to perpetual marginalization.
A key part of Strong's narrative is his transition from hippie, WTO protesting leftist, to part of the "sensible center." I identify with this trip, because I made a similar one--I went from a self-described Democratic Socialist to a New Republic style moderate liberal. To some extent, it's a big change, but to some extent it isn't. Strong points out that:
Both "radicals" and "sensible centrists" are basically consigned to being political outsiders. The insiders, these days and all days, are political partisans, party people. If you like to root for underdogs, you will eventually find yourself outside all parties, looking in.
My philosophical framework has always been bottom-centric, not just rooting for but trying to actively aid the "underdog". Society, I think, is obligated to look first to the least well-off. Though this position is identified more with the left than the right, I do not think it is a resident of either pole, because marginalization is very contingent and often includes conservative-identified groups. My favorite example here would be conservatives themselves. Though we don't often think of conservatives as marginalized (and for the most part, we're right), at universities they are very much rendered unwanted outsiders. Liberals are ideologically blinded from seeing this problem, for the simple reason that liberals are defined as in opposition to conservatives and thus are not naturally inclined to see them as someone needing their aid. Liberals also have trouble dealing with cross-cutting forms of oppression where one source is one of the usual suspect oppressors (The West, Whites, males, etc..), but other sources include groups commonly seen as victims. This explains the incoherency of leftist outrage to the US deposing Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which though arguably within the stock framework of western imperialism, more concretely was a liberation of persons brutally oppressed by the Iraqi regime (most notably Shiites and Kurds). Because its pre-set ideological predispositions have allies and enemies which precede (though which try and correlate to) oppressors and victims, attempts to formulate anti-oppression theory and praxis solely from the left are doomed to failure.
A bottom-centric centrism can dodge this problem by inverting the chain--letting social realities of oppression precede our decisions on allies and enemies, rather than the other way around. Since sometimes our supposed enemies are on the bottom, centering on the bottom means occasionally centering on theoretical enemies. For example, the main "enemies" of centrists are partisans. If centrists were oriented by the traditional notation of self-interest--helping oneself (and one's friends) and hurting enemies--then we'd attack partisans at every opportunity. If a line is being parroted by the RNC pundit-corps, we'd oppose it on those grounds. However, centrists don't (or shouldn't) tend to operate that way. Rather, we examine the message as such, and see whether it creates a more just world. If so, we don't care who the speaker is--we'll stand up and support it (a position which will put us sometimes in favor of Democratic partisans, sometimes Republican partisans, and very often neither one). Alternatively, centrists might argue that a suppressed message labeled "extreme" be allowed into the limelight--even if we then proceed to bash it later. It is in this respect ends-oriented insofar as the end is hearing as many voices as possible--but this should not stop us from attacking hostile or unhelpful opinions. This is not a strain but a logical conclusion: the goal here is to have a constructive and comprehensive social debate, which requires both the opinions themselves (bring out suppressed voices) and those willing to refute/defend them (smack them down or applaud their insight).
Bottom-centric centrism is combative, militant, forceful, and activist. It does not "simply" try to mediate between opposing poles (although that is an important role, and I'd also assert an active value in of itself). It also must forward unique, innovative plans of its own to bring in voices not being heard within the dominant hierarchy. Above all, centrists must press for and defend a fair social playing field in which all perspectives have a chance to be heard and no person or group is condemned to perpetual marginalization.
Who Are You?
Two posts over at BlackProf cause me to think of my old posts on intersectionality and minority conservatism.
The first post is about a supposed formula to determine which Congressional Black Caucus members best represent the interests of African-Americans. I'm a bit conflicted here, because I think that such an indice is, at least abstractly, useful and because the author of the post (GW Law Professor Spencer Overton) specifically acknowledges the possibility that the methodology used (like any methodology) could be flawed. Nonetheless, two things caught my eye. The first was that the breakdown of "best" and "worst" representatives almost completely tracked "most liberal" to "least liberal." Among the "best" were far left names like Barbara Lee and Cynthia McKinney (as well as Congressional All-Corruption Team nominee Maxine Waters). The "worst" included moderate names like Harold Ford and Albert Wynn. Second, the title of the post was "Black Enough?" Taken together, its a disturbing message--that not only is being hyper-liberal the sin qua non of helping black people (I presume folks like Stephen Carter would disagree), but those that don't fit the paradigm aren't even black at all.
The second post was by Iowa Law Professor Adrien Wing, and was a plea that minorities not be taken in if President Bush nominates a minority conservative to the Supreme Court. I'll admit to confusion though--Wing seems to think that even other minority conservatives should be rallied against a minority conservative Supreme Court nominee. I see no rationale behind this--even granting the implicit argument holding that conservativism is hostile to minority interests (which, to be fair, I think is often true), clearly minority conservatives think differently (otherwise they'd be minority liberals). Wing is calling for racial solidarity to precede political solidarity, but this effectively marginalizes minority conservatives by placing them as outsiders, deviant, threatening to the community at-large. As I argued in a previous post:
The framework Professors Overton and Wing operate in reifies this mindset. It is the deliberate and tactical suppression of a disfavored identity as inauthentic, false, or dangerous (not "Black enough"). In a way, it isn't anyone's fault that we do this. The folks most well-versed in intersectionality theory are almost all leftists, so convincing them to play nice with conservatives is a difficult endeavor. But their critique doesn't lose any of its potency just because the targeted group this time is one that is positively despised by the leftist critics themselves. It just makes it harder to see.
This doesn't, by the way, mean that we should fetishize the move of some blacks to more conservative circles. I was appalled by this NYT article which argued that the Republican Michael Bloomberg's gains amongst black voters in the NYC mayoral race was a sign of growing political "maturity" in the black community. Meaning what? That for the most part, black people are ignorant political babies who vote based on their irrational, pre-adolescent whims? (But look! Some are voting Republican now! Sigh...they grow up so fast...). This is patronizing and paternalistic to the extreme. We should respect black voting decisions as rational, autonomous choices (at least as far as we do for other groups)--not just assume they are in some primordial state of political infancy, waiting to emerge.
The first post is about a supposed formula to determine which Congressional Black Caucus members best represent the interests of African-Americans. I'm a bit conflicted here, because I think that such an indice is, at least abstractly, useful and because the author of the post (GW Law Professor Spencer Overton) specifically acknowledges the possibility that the methodology used (like any methodology) could be flawed. Nonetheless, two things caught my eye. The first was that the breakdown of "best" and "worst" representatives almost completely tracked "most liberal" to "least liberal." Among the "best" were far left names like Barbara Lee and Cynthia McKinney (as well as Congressional All-Corruption Team nominee Maxine Waters). The "worst" included moderate names like Harold Ford and Albert Wynn. Second, the title of the post was "Black Enough?" Taken together, its a disturbing message--that not only is being hyper-liberal the sin qua non of helping black people (I presume folks like Stephen Carter would disagree), but those that don't fit the paradigm aren't even black at all.
The second post was by Iowa Law Professor Adrien Wing, and was a plea that minorities not be taken in if President Bush nominates a minority conservative to the Supreme Court. I'll admit to confusion though--Wing seems to think that even other minority conservatives should be rallied against a minority conservative Supreme Court nominee. I see no rationale behind this--even granting the implicit argument holding that conservativism is hostile to minority interests (which, to be fair, I think is often true), clearly minority conservatives think differently (otherwise they'd be minority liberals). Wing is calling for racial solidarity to precede political solidarity, but this effectively marginalizes minority conservatives by placing them as outsiders, deviant, threatening to the community at-large. As I argued in a previous post:
[Minority Conservatism] is a minority story--especially given intersectionality theory. This posits--correctly in my view--that the experience of a double minority is different than the sum of the two minority groups she belongs. For example, the status of a Black Woman is not merely Woman + Black. Similarly, the status of a female minority conservative is not just Female + Minority + Conservative. The simplest reason why this is so is because whereas becoming a conservative by itself means joining a relatively popular and broad group, becoming a minority conservative means being subjected to endless taunts of being an "Uncle Tom" or traitor, accusations (and occasionally, true moments) of being "used" by majority peers, and other hardships. In other words, while my (White) life would not be significantly changed by switching my political affiliation, for a minority, this switch comes with a lot of baggage. Because the tropes associated with "conservative" are contingent upon one's other identities, one can't simply atomize conservatism (or any other identity) and examine independently of the rest.
The framework Professors Overton and Wing operate in reifies this mindset. It is the deliberate and tactical suppression of a disfavored identity as inauthentic, false, or dangerous (not "Black enough"). In a way, it isn't anyone's fault that we do this. The folks most well-versed in intersectionality theory are almost all leftists, so convincing them to play nice with conservatives is a difficult endeavor. But their critique doesn't lose any of its potency just because the targeted group this time is one that is positively despised by the leftist critics themselves. It just makes it harder to see.
This doesn't, by the way, mean that we should fetishize the move of some blacks to more conservative circles. I was appalled by this NYT article which argued that the Republican Michael Bloomberg's gains amongst black voters in the NYC mayoral race was a sign of growing political "maturity" in the black community. Meaning what? That for the most part, black people are ignorant political babies who vote based on their irrational, pre-adolescent whims? (But look! Some are voting Republican now! Sigh...they grow up so fast...). This is patronizing and paternalistic to the extreme. We should respect black voting decisions as rational, autonomous choices (at least as far as we do for other groups)--not just assume they are in some primordial state of political infancy, waiting to emerge.
Monday, September 26, 2005
Bad Bad Men (and Women)
DKos points to an LA Times article listing one groups notation of the 13 most corrupt members of congress. The report, titled "Beyond DeLay" (the exterminator was exempted from the list), has a variety of familiar faces, and consists of 11 Republicans and 2 Democrats. The full set:
We should be dismayed that, including Rep. DeLay two of the top three leaders in both the House and the Senate are among Congress' most corrupt (Santorum's position places him #3 in the Senate leadership hierarchy. The two congressmen in leadership that aren't on the list are Rep. J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) (Speaker of the House) and Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) (Assistant Senate Majority Leader)). What does this tell us about the current state of affairs in Washington?
We should also note that Kos did not shirk from splashing the Democratic names over his website either. While Rep. Jefferson is the type of Blue Dog Democrat that the lefties tend not like much anyway, Rep. Waters is a stalwart in the House Progressive Caucus. That they put her name up shows that, extreme politics aside, they still care more about clean government than defending even friendly politicos. That's heartening.
UPDATE: Into the Traffic Jam we go.
-Sen. Bill Frist (R-TN) (Senate Majority Leader)
-Rep. Roy Blunt (R-MO) (House Majority Whip)
-Sen. Conrad Burns (R-MT)
-Rep. Bob Ney (R-OH)
-Rep. Tom Feeney (R-FL)
-Rep. Richard W. Pombo (R-CA)
-Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA)
-Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA) (Republican Conference Chair)
-Rep. Randy "Duke" Cunningham
-Rep. William J. Jefferson (D-LA)
-Rep. Charles H. Taylor (R-NC)
-Rep. Marilyn N. Musgrave (R-CO)
-Rep. Rick Renzi (R-AZ)
We should be dismayed that, including Rep. DeLay two of the top three leaders in both the House and the Senate are among Congress' most corrupt (Santorum's position places him #3 in the Senate leadership hierarchy. The two congressmen in leadership that aren't on the list are Rep. J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) (Speaker of the House) and Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY) (Assistant Senate Majority Leader)). What does this tell us about the current state of affairs in Washington?
We should also note that Kos did not shirk from splashing the Democratic names over his website either. While Rep. Jefferson is the type of Blue Dog Democrat that the lefties tend not like much anyway, Rep. Waters is a stalwart in the House Progressive Caucus. That they put her name up shows that, extreme politics aside, they still care more about clean government than defending even friendly politicos. That's heartening.
UPDATE: Into the Traffic Jam we go.
Friday, September 23, 2005
Locke-d In
Paul Horowitz puts forward an interesting question regarding Justice Scalia's views on governmental restrictions on speech that it is funding.
Scalia first made his views on the subject known in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley (524 U.S. 569 (1998)). In that case, Scalia [EDIT: concurred in holding that making "decency" a consideration in the awarding of NEA grants did not violate the first amendment. He argued further that the NEA could engage] in content discrimination when giving out it's grants. He wryly noted that were the NEA's actions upheld, "Avant-garde artistes such as respondents [would] remain entirely free to epater les bourgeois; they are merely deprived of the additional satisfaction of having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay for it." He continued then to argue that it is absurd to equate a lack of taxpayer subsidization with an effort to suppress unpopular ideas. And he specifically claimed that "The nub of the difference between me and the Court is that I regard the distinction between 'abridging speech' and funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side of which the First Amendment is inapplicable....The government, I think, may allocate both competitive and noncompetitive funding ad libitum, insofar as the First Amendment is concerned."
Horowtiz thus inquires:
What with the controversy over President Bush's "faith-based initiatives" and the desire amongst some to make sure these funds only are distributed to groups that meet certain non-merit-based requirements (not discriminating against homosexuals, for example), this is an issue that will eventually come up. So what's the end result?
It's not an exact fit, but the closest case we have in explicating Scalia's views is the recent case of Locke v. Davey. There, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington law in which college scholarships could not be used by students studying theology or other religious vocational training. The Court specifically allowed the possibility that Washington could, if it wished, grant the scholarships (in other words, the discrimination was not constitutionally compelled), however, it said that Washington was equally free not to. Since the decision was discretionary, I think it is safe to say that Washington made its decision based on some presumably distasteful or negative quality of theological training (either that funding it breaches the separation between Church and State, or that theological training is not something the state wishes to foster, or some other reason--it really doesn't matter what).
Scalia dissented quite forcefully from this decision. He argued that
In other words, he was not very much swayed by his previous argument in Finley--that nobody is being stopped from pursuing theological training, they are just deprived of the pleasure of having the secular state subsidize it as well.
Perhaps the analogy might best be understood with regard to Lee v. Weisman. If Locke represented the state privileging a secular viewpoint without providing an equivalent for (but not prohibiting the private expression of) a religious choice, then Lee represents the reverse--the state privileging a religious viewpoint (in this case a graduation prayer) without providing an equivalent secular choice (but not prohibiting the private expression of secularity, by letting the student either stay home from graduation or not join in the prayer). In Lee, the Court held this dualism to be unconstitutional--persons of dissident religions should not be put in a "participate or protest" dilemma, and that it is unfair to effectively kick them out of public activities if they do not adhere to the dominant religious sensibilities. It would be absurd to respond that the dissident student could have her own, private graduation with her own prayers (or lack thereof) and that this would make the First Amendment problem just go away. Instead, it is sufficient to note that the state cannot publicly put religion and non-religion (or majority religion and minority religion) on unequal terms--it must either provide equal opportunity to all, or abstain from the endeavor entirely.
This would mesh very well with what Scalia is saying in Locke--but for the fact that he dissented vigorously in Lee. In Lee he proclaimed the long standing tradition of religious prayers (it should be noted that the Locke statute was in accordance to a long standing provision of the state constitution) and derided the notion that participation the religious portion of the ceremony in any way coerced their assent to religious dogma. This is merely "respect for religion" that the government is perfectly permitted to foster in the public sphere--the student, as noted above, is still perfectly free to believe what he wants in private. Why then cannot the state ask its citizens to be secular in public and in public funding (in accordance with its popular mandate), and abide by whatever religious sensibilities it has in private? It seems that Scalia cannot make sense of his Locke argument given his sweeping dismissal of the logical vein in Lee (one other argument Scalia might use, that religious views gain higher protection than "mere" speech also falters via Lee--Scalia specifically labels the two equivalent: "The government can, of course, no more coerce political orthodoxy than religious orthodoxy.").
I should note that I agree with Scalia when it comes to Locke--I think it was wrongly decided and that it represents state-sponsored discrimination against religion. But that's because I take the broader view of what state-sponsorship means--the view that Scalia rejected for both free speech (Finley) and freedom of religion (Lee) cases. I do not think that Scalia is being consistent here, nor do I think he even realizes he's being inconsistent. But Scalia's religion clause jurisprudence has always been--ironically, since he is one of the loudest critics of this supposed ailment in our legal tradition--among the most incoherent and non-cohesive on the Court.
Scalia first made his views on the subject known in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley (524 U.S. 569 (1998)). In that case, Scalia [EDIT: concurred in holding that making "decency" a consideration in the awarding of NEA grants did not violate the first amendment. He argued further that the NEA could engage] in content discrimination when giving out it's grants. He wryly noted that were the NEA's actions upheld, "Avant-garde artistes such as respondents [would] remain entirely free to epater les bourgeois; they are merely deprived of the additional satisfaction of having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay for it." He continued then to argue that it is absurd to equate a lack of taxpayer subsidization with an effort to suppress unpopular ideas. And he specifically claimed that "The nub of the difference between me and the Court is that I regard the distinction between 'abridging speech' and funding it as a fundamental divide, on this side of which the First Amendment is inapplicable....The government, I think, may allocate both competitive and noncompetitive funding ad libitum, insofar as the First Amendment is concerned."
Horowtiz thus inquires:
What relevance should this position have for Justice Scalia in cases involving public funding of religious programs, or public funding of non-religious activities carried out by religious groups? Does this suggest Justice Scalia believes it is constitutional to impose conditions on such groups -- for instance, that no money flowing to such a group be spent on anything that may contain religious content, or that a religious group receiving government funds may engage in x religious speech but not y religious speech? This is not a gotcha post; commenters are welcome to discuss the ways in which Justice Scalia is or is not consistent in his views on this point. But I think it's an interesting subject for musing and discussion.
What with the controversy over President Bush's "faith-based initiatives" and the desire amongst some to make sure these funds only are distributed to groups that meet certain non-merit-based requirements (not discriminating against homosexuals, for example), this is an issue that will eventually come up. So what's the end result?
It's not an exact fit, but the closest case we have in explicating Scalia's views is the recent case of Locke v. Davey. There, the Supreme Court upheld a Washington law in which college scholarships could not be used by students studying theology or other religious vocational training. The Court specifically allowed the possibility that Washington could, if it wished, grant the scholarships (in other words, the discrimination was not constitutionally compelled), however, it said that Washington was equally free not to. Since the decision was discretionary, I think it is safe to say that Washington made its decision based on some presumably distasteful or negative quality of theological training (either that funding it breaches the separation between Church and State, or that theological training is not something the state wishes to foster, or some other reason--it really doesn't matter what).
Scalia dissented quite forcefully from this decision. He argued that
When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are measured; and when the State withholds that benefit from some individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax.
In other words, he was not very much swayed by his previous argument in Finley--that nobody is being stopped from pursuing theological training, they are just deprived of the pleasure of having the secular state subsidize it as well.
Perhaps the analogy might best be understood with regard to Lee v. Weisman. If Locke represented the state privileging a secular viewpoint without providing an equivalent for (but not prohibiting the private expression of) a religious choice, then Lee represents the reverse--the state privileging a religious viewpoint (in this case a graduation prayer) without providing an equivalent secular choice (but not prohibiting the private expression of secularity, by letting the student either stay home from graduation or not join in the prayer). In Lee, the Court held this dualism to be unconstitutional--persons of dissident religions should not be put in a "participate or protest" dilemma, and that it is unfair to effectively kick them out of public activities if they do not adhere to the dominant religious sensibilities. It would be absurd to respond that the dissident student could have her own, private graduation with her own prayers (or lack thereof) and that this would make the First Amendment problem just go away. Instead, it is sufficient to note that the state cannot publicly put religion and non-religion (or majority religion and minority religion) on unequal terms--it must either provide equal opportunity to all, or abstain from the endeavor entirely.
This would mesh very well with what Scalia is saying in Locke--but for the fact that he dissented vigorously in Lee. In Lee he proclaimed the long standing tradition of religious prayers (it should be noted that the Locke statute was in accordance to a long standing provision of the state constitution) and derided the notion that participation the religious portion of the ceremony in any way coerced their assent to religious dogma. This is merely "respect for religion" that the government is perfectly permitted to foster in the public sphere--the student, as noted above, is still perfectly free to believe what he wants in private. Why then cannot the state ask its citizens to be secular in public and in public funding (in accordance with its popular mandate), and abide by whatever religious sensibilities it has in private? It seems that Scalia cannot make sense of his Locke argument given his sweeping dismissal of the logical vein in Lee (one other argument Scalia might use, that religious views gain higher protection than "mere" speech also falters via Lee--Scalia specifically labels the two equivalent: "The government can, of course, no more coerce political orthodoxy than religious orthodoxy.").
I should note that I agree with Scalia when it comes to Locke--I think it was wrongly decided and that it represents state-sponsored discrimination against religion. But that's because I take the broader view of what state-sponsorship means--the view that Scalia rejected for both free speech (Finley) and freedom of religion (Lee) cases. I do not think that Scalia is being consistent here, nor do I think he even realizes he's being inconsistent. But Scalia's religion clause jurisprudence has always been--ironically, since he is one of the loudest critics of this supposed ailment in our legal tradition--among the most incoherent and non-cohesive on the Court.
Thursday, September 22, 2005
Evil on Earth
Restless Mania directs us to this shocking post by Mr. Sun regarding the investigation of sex abuse in the Philadelphia Archdiocese. A grand jury found that Cardinals John Krol and Anthony Joseph Bevilacqua deliberately concealed sex abuse amongst priests in their diocese--and that due to the statute of limitations, they could not indict anybody.
That, as Mr. Sun points out, is the real tragedy, that the cover-up worked exactly as planned. The Archdiocese is claiming vindication despite clearly getting off on a technicality, and nobody will be punished for their part in this display of raw evil. As Cardozo Law Professor Marci Hamilton put it:
Mr. Sun wants as many bloggers to link Cardinal Bevilacqua's name to "evil" so that his escape from justice does not bring an escape from notice. Lady Penelope and Uncle Willy have already done so--we need to bump that number up.
What makes this all the more twisted is that what seems to be literally the only response from the Church hierarchy is not to crack down on pedophiles and those who abetted them, but a crackdown on homosexuals as such. The new rules coming out of the Vatican are expected to ban ordination of any homosexual person--celibate or not. They will now be considered, as a class and as persons irrespective of conduct, fundamentally unfit for the priesthood. Andrew Sullivan is justifiably outraged--and I am done making excuses for Pope Benedict XVI. This is simply appalling. I once asked a conservative Catholic friend of mine what gay and lesbians should do--how can they be full and functioning members of the Church community. He responded that they should suppress that part of themselves. Obviously, I don't find that answer satisfactory. But now even that position has been kicked out the door. Now even homosexuals willing to be celibate--willing, in other words, to never commit a homosexual act--are still closed off from full equality in the Catholic Church. They are deemed, in Mr. Sullivan's words, Untermenschen. And of course, it goes without saying that the implication that homosexuals are the root of the pedophilia problem, a claim utterly unsubstantiated in reality and being used to insure the real perpetrators go unpunished, is a morally unconscionable.
What's most distressing about this is that I truly believe these actions do not come close to the true beliefs of most Catholics. I have many Catholic friends, some liberal, some conservative. All of them are good-hearted persons with genuine respect for their fellow human beings, regardless of orientation. A few bad apples shouldn't discredit their whole faith. But what do you do when the bad apples are Cardinals and the Pope himself?
That, as Mr. Sun points out, is the real tragedy, that the cover-up worked exactly as planned. The Archdiocese is claiming vindication despite clearly getting off on a technicality, and nobody will be punished for their part in this display of raw evil. As Cardozo Law Professor Marci Hamilton put it:
Let's put the technicality of the statute of limitations aside, and look at the substance of the report. It is unequivocal. On the merits, but for the statute of limitations, the dozens of priest perpetrators, who were placed in one parish after another, were guilty of rape, statutory sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, indecent assault, endangering welfare of children, and corruption of minors. The tragedy is that victims need such a long period of time to come forward and none had the capacity to come before the grand jury within the statute of limitations. It is still everyone's hope involved in this investigation that those who were more recently abused will be able to stop the cycle of abuse and come forward now.
Mr. Sun wants as many bloggers to link Cardinal Bevilacqua's name to "evil" so that his escape from justice does not bring an escape from notice. Lady Penelope and Uncle Willy have already done so--we need to bump that number up.
What makes this all the more twisted is that what seems to be literally the only response from the Church hierarchy is not to crack down on pedophiles and those who abetted them, but a crackdown on homosexuals as such. The new rules coming out of the Vatican are expected to ban ordination of any homosexual person--celibate or not. They will now be considered, as a class and as persons irrespective of conduct, fundamentally unfit for the priesthood. Andrew Sullivan is justifiably outraged--and I am done making excuses for Pope Benedict XVI. This is simply appalling. I once asked a conservative Catholic friend of mine what gay and lesbians should do--how can they be full and functioning members of the Church community. He responded that they should suppress that part of themselves. Obviously, I don't find that answer satisfactory. But now even that position has been kicked out the door. Now even homosexuals willing to be celibate--willing, in other words, to never commit a homosexual act--are still closed off from full equality in the Catholic Church. They are deemed, in Mr. Sullivan's words, Untermenschen. And of course, it goes without saying that the implication that homosexuals are the root of the pedophilia problem, a claim utterly unsubstantiated in reality and being used to insure the real perpetrators go unpunished, is a morally unconscionable.
What's most distressing about this is that I truly believe these actions do not come close to the true beliefs of most Catholics. I have many Catholic friends, some liberal, some conservative. All of them are good-hearted persons with genuine respect for their fellow human beings, regardless of orientation. A few bad apples shouldn't discredit their whole faith. But what do you do when the bad apples are Cardinals and the Pope himself?
I'm Gonna Be That Guy
The fall out over this NYT article on Ivy League women who want to be stay-at-home moms continues with this thoughtful post by Heidi Bond.
Now, as regular readers know, I want to be a law professor. An event which (tragically, perhaps) first requires me to attend law school. Knowing my social skills, if I end up meeting someone whom I feel enough for to get married, it will probably be there. And since the odds of finding another future law professor seems astronomical, I can very easily see myself marrying what one of my Georgetown friends lovingly refers to as (and aspires to become) "a corporate whore." In which case, I'd probably be the guy staying at home--that guy who would benefit from what Ms. Bond is talking about. So yeah, it'd be nice.
So, is there stigma? Well, I don't really know, since for me it's still all speculative at this point. I've told a few people (mostly female) that I'd be willing to be a stay-at-home dad with no ill results. But still, there is that expectation of being the big macho breadwinner (and we all know how macho law professors are seen in today's society). Furthermore, a law professor is a job that probably would be effected least by taking some time off or reduced time to raise children (most schools now, or so I hear, will delay tenure review in these cases). But writing and researching is something I can do from home (I may be underestimating the distracting powers of stopping a two year old from choking to death on a grape). Finally, I'll admit some degree of semi-sleazy quid pro quo at work here--I'm willing to be a stay-at-home dad because in doing so I'll have the opportunity to be a professor and still get all the financial perks of being a lawyer. If, by some miracle of societal intervention, I met someone who wasn't going to be a lawyer (or some similarly high-power hyper-job) I might re-evaluate my stance. In other words, I'm willing to be the primary care-giver, but I don't necessarily desire it. Does that make me a bad person? Probably. But if I was a good person, I wouldn't want to attend law school at all, now would I?
What I want is for men to have the real opportunity to be child rearers in our society. This means that if I had the choice between expanding maternity leave for mothers and acquiring paternity leave for fathers who are not full time caretakers, I'd vote for the fathers.
It means that if I had a choice between reducing stigma for women who take years off to rear children, and reducing the stigma for men to take time off at all to rear children, I'd vote for the men. Of course most women will opt to take time off to take care of kids; the option to take time off is rarely available to the man, if he has a wife that appears to be functional. It's not always actually available, and even if policies dictate otherwise, it's rarely socially available.
So really, I want men to have the same opportunities as women.
Now, as regular readers know, I want to be a law professor. An event which (tragically, perhaps) first requires me to attend law school. Knowing my social skills, if I end up meeting someone whom I feel enough for to get married, it will probably be there. And since the odds of finding another future law professor seems astronomical, I can very easily see myself marrying what one of my Georgetown friends lovingly refers to as (and aspires to become) "a corporate whore." In which case, I'd probably be the guy staying at home--that guy who would benefit from what Ms. Bond is talking about. So yeah, it'd be nice.
So, is there stigma? Well, I don't really know, since for me it's still all speculative at this point. I've told a few people (mostly female) that I'd be willing to be a stay-at-home dad with no ill results. But still, there is that expectation of being the big macho breadwinner (and we all know how macho law professors are seen in today's society). Furthermore, a law professor is a job that probably would be effected least by taking some time off or reduced time to raise children (most schools now, or so I hear, will delay tenure review in these cases). But writing and researching is something I can do from home (I may be underestimating the distracting powers of stopping a two year old from choking to death on a grape). Finally, I'll admit some degree of semi-sleazy quid pro quo at work here--I'm willing to be a stay-at-home dad because in doing so I'll have the opportunity to be a professor and still get all the financial perks of being a lawyer. If, by some miracle of societal intervention, I met someone who wasn't going to be a lawyer (or some similarly high-power hyper-job) I might re-evaluate my stance. In other words, I'm willing to be the primary care-giver, but I don't necessarily desire it. Does that make me a bad person? Probably. But if I was a good person, I wouldn't want to attend law school at all, now would I?
Racial Costs of Don't Ask/Don't Tell
UCLA Law Professor Devon Carbado has written a very interesting post exploring the link between racism and heterosexism in the lives of gay blacks. He gives a number of statistics, but the one that really caught my eye was this one:
The higher proportion of blacks in the military compared to whites is well known, but I did not realize it extended to homosexual couples as well. What does this mean?
Well first, the 21% figure also should raise eyebrows because it shows that the "problem" of gays in the military is not isolated. Many homosexuals have served; undoubtedly many more would gladly volunteer if the terms of service didn't include official self-marginalization.
But there is a second problem more intimately connected to the economic realities gay blacks live in. I'm not an expert on DADT, but I assume that gay couples can't get the same type of benefits that accrue from military service as do straight couples. This includes both monetary benefits as well as social support groups. Coupled with the disparity in incomes between black and white homosexual couples, and this becomes very distressing. Carbado quotes statistics saying that black homosexual couples make, on average, a little over $60,000/year, while other same-sex couples earn just over $90,000/year. In other words, gay blacks serve more and need the benefits that come with service more, but don't get them because of discriminatory military policy. DADT isn't the only offender here--any military policy which seeks to cut, defer, or otherwise reduce benefits harms blacks disproportionately because blacks serve disproportionately. But gay blacks are particularly vulnerable because of there twice-removed state of oppression--they are even less sympathetic victims than gay whites or straight blacks, since the observer (or would-be supporter) has to both transcend racism and homophobia to relate. Even amongst "natural" allies, this can be a problem (racism in the homosexual community, or heterosexism in the black community, for example). So a policy whose main victims are not just gays and not just blacks, but gay blacks, is likely to avoid any groundswell of opposition, and will also slide to the backburner of black and gay rights organizations (if it hits the radar screen at all).
Black partners in same- and different-sex couples have similar and higher rates of military service (21% and 22% respectively ) than individuals of other races in same-sex (13%) and different-sex (15%) couples.
The higher proportion of blacks in the military compared to whites is well known, but I did not realize it extended to homosexual couples as well. What does this mean?
Well first, the 21% figure also should raise eyebrows because it shows that the "problem" of gays in the military is not isolated. Many homosexuals have served; undoubtedly many more would gladly volunteer if the terms of service didn't include official self-marginalization.
But there is a second problem more intimately connected to the economic realities gay blacks live in. I'm not an expert on DADT, but I assume that gay couples can't get the same type of benefits that accrue from military service as do straight couples. This includes both monetary benefits as well as social support groups. Coupled with the disparity in incomes between black and white homosexual couples, and this becomes very distressing. Carbado quotes statistics saying that black homosexual couples make, on average, a little over $60,000/year, while other same-sex couples earn just over $90,000/year. In other words, gay blacks serve more and need the benefits that come with service more, but don't get them because of discriminatory military policy. DADT isn't the only offender here--any military policy which seeks to cut, defer, or otherwise reduce benefits harms blacks disproportionately because blacks serve disproportionately. But gay blacks are particularly vulnerable because of there twice-removed state of oppression--they are even less sympathetic victims than gay whites or straight blacks, since the observer (or would-be supporter) has to both transcend racism and homophobia to relate. Even amongst "natural" allies, this can be a problem (racism in the homosexual community, or heterosexism in the black community, for example). So a policy whose main victims are not just gays and not just blacks, but gay blacks, is likely to avoid any groundswell of opposition, and will also slide to the backburner of black and gay rights organizations (if it hits the radar screen at all).
What to Do With JetBlue
I try to fly JetBlue as often as possible, so obviously the report of a plane which had to make an emergency landing at LAX due to a landing gear failure was a bit distressing (I'm also a JetBlue stockholder, so that was a bit distressing too). I certainly am having some nasty little flashbacks of how my family always used to fly ValueJet--another low cost airline which went out of business because, well, because its planes had a disturbing habit of dropping out of the sky. But, as tragedy seems to have been averted, I now wonder how we should view the Blue in its wake?
As far as I can gather from the reports, the crew was as professional and adept as could be expected in the situation. Sure, leaving the satellite TV feed on so the passangers could watch their own drama live might not have been the best choice in retrospect. But aside from that, the pilot got the plane on the ground, the crew in the air instructed the passengers to do the things necessary for their own safety, the crew on the ground got the plane down as quickly as possible (no bureaucratic snafus here), and the emergency workers were on the ready as soon as the plane landed. JetBlue immediately promised an inquiry, while at the same time noting that the planes they use--Airbus A320s--are designed so they can land with precisely this sort of failure. So it seems they took and are taking all the right steps.
Obviously, man is somewhat of an irrational beast, so for many this will mean they will never fly JetBlue again. However, from a human perspective (as well as a business perspective--they seem to overlap here), I think we couldn't ask for much more out of JetBlue. Of course, all that assumes that nothing untoward comes out of the inquiry.
As far as I can gather from the reports, the crew was as professional and adept as could be expected in the situation. Sure, leaving the satellite TV feed on so the passangers could watch their own drama live might not have been the best choice in retrospect. But aside from that, the pilot got the plane on the ground, the crew in the air instructed the passengers to do the things necessary for their own safety, the crew on the ground got the plane down as quickly as possible (no bureaucratic snafus here), and the emergency workers were on the ready as soon as the plane landed. JetBlue immediately promised an inquiry, while at the same time noting that the planes they use--Airbus A320s--are designed so they can land with precisely this sort of failure. So it seems they took and are taking all the right steps.
Obviously, man is somewhat of an irrational beast, so for many this will mean they will never fly JetBlue again. However, from a human perspective (as well as a business perspective--they seem to overlap here), I think we couldn't ask for much more out of JetBlue. Of course, all that assumes that nothing untoward comes out of the inquiry.
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