Between "One-Sided" and "Equating", Part II

A few days ago there was a dust-up at the Park Slope Food Coop after a member, during a coop meeting, stated that "Jewish supremacism is a problem in this country." Following an outcry, the store's general manager condemned the remark, along with that of a different member who decried "Arab supremacy" in the context of speaking out against October 7 and criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood.

I read that sequence and thought "that's about as satisfactory an outcome as I could hope for." Whatever theoretical or academic justifications one can use to validate either "Jewish supremacism" or "Arab supremacy", if you want to take the temperature down in these sorts of settings you have to clamp down on that sort of thing. If one isn't okay, then the other isn't either. If anything, it is nicely convenient that both phrases were used, as it lets the coop leadership make clear that there position is one of principle, not a backdoor means of showing favoritism to one group at the expense of another.

But I knew my satisfaction would be another's ill-temper, and so it is here. I wasn't surprised, of course, to see that the coop's pro-Palestinian activists were going to the mat for their right to assail "Jewish supremacism." And unfortunately, I also wasn't surprised to see others complain that to condemn the phrase "Arab supremacy" may as well have nullified the condemnation of the phrase "Jewish supremacism".

For coop member Ramon Maislen, who condemned the comments allegedly made by Huarachi last week, Szladek’s email created a false equivalency between the two remarks.

[....] 

Maislen said he believed Szladek’s email “completely minimizes what Jewish people are feeling at the coop.”

“I don’t think there’s much coded language around Arab supremacy that I’m aware of,” Maislen said. “So I think it’s very, very disappointing when you see an email go out after such a mask-off moment for the hatred within the anti-Zionist movement, and to have the general coordinators basically, completely, make it some sort of like equality between the two statements.”

On Thursday, Coop4Unity, an anti-BDS coalition at the coop that Maislen serves as an organizer of, issued a press release calling on [coop General Manager Joe] Szladek to “issue an unequivocal condemnation of antisemitism,” arguing that his previous email created a “false moral equivalence that members say dilutes the gravity of what occurred.”

“In his statement, General Manager Szladek cited a separate member’s use of the phrase ‘Arab supremacy’ — offered in the context of referencing October 7th and the Muslim Brotherhood — and presented it as a parallel offense to the ‘Jewish supremacy’ remark that drew crowd applause,” the release read. “Coop4Unity argues this is a false equivalence that obscures rather than addresses what took place.”

Ah yes, "false equivalency" -- a sin most heinous. Except, that is, when one doesn't do it -- for then one is committing the equally grievous sin of being "one-sided". I wrote on this subject five years ago, and it remains resonant today. But unfortunately, I feel as if things have gotten worse rather than better. 

And -- morality aside -- this is such a dumb hill to die on. Is it really so important that one be able to rail about "Arab supremacy" that you'll risk undermining a condemnation of people going on about "Jewish supremacism"? Take the win! This whole logic is how you get backed into a corner of being mad at people for saying the JDL is bad, when what one should do is be delighted anytime someone says "JDL is bad" and be ecstatic at the opportunity to negatively polarize your constituency against them and their apologists. The Park Slope group had the opportunity to set the polarity of the debate as "mainstream coop members versus people who are livid that they can't hurl 'supremacist' charges at ethnic minorities", and they squandered it. Again, I think the ethics are bad here, but I'm almost madder at the tactical idiocy of it all.

Prosecuting Our Military When It Murders

The United States military continues to carry out illegal strikes on civilian boats allegedly engaged in drug trafficking.

The case that this is criminal is, in my view, not close. Contrary to the President's assertions, there is no serious argument that we are in the midst of an armed conflict with ... who exactly? Drug traffickers? Their behavior (if indeed the boaters are engaged in wrongful activity at all, which is hardly assured) is the epitome of criminal misconduct, which must be dealt with via criminal proceedings. We do not get to fire rockets at the vehicles of suspected criminals. And even if one could strain to argue that this falls under a military engagement, the follow-up strikes on shipwrecked sailors violates longstanding rules in the law of warfare. We literally sentenced Nazis to death for doing this.

There is a lot of enthusiasm for "prosecutions" amongst Democrats now. I share that enthusiasm. We must make clear that, if and when Democrats retake power, there will be consequences for the criminal activities that have run rampant through this administrative. And in many ways, this represents both an easy and an important case. 

It's easy because not only is the law incredibly clear, but there's no difficulty identifying the responsible party. This isn't a situation where we have to track down a masked unknown grunt who stood out for particularly brutal aggression (as in many of the ICE cases), or alternatively, where we have to do difficult work in tying said grunt's actions to specific orders from higher-ups. Here the military context makes command responsibility obvious, and the commanding General, Francis Donovan, is named in the Pentagon press releases bragging about the "operations".

It's important because restoring the applicability of law of war principles to the U.S. military is of absolute existential importance for a nation with the most powerful military on the planet. Without downplaying the many, many breaches, there is a huge difference between a military that is internally committed to law of war rules and one that from the top decides to openly flout them. The latter situation is how you do start seeing what Trump wanted to do, but couldn't, in term 1 -- deploying the full might of the American military apparatus against the American citizenry to retain a dictatorial grip on power.

And on top of all that, of all the potential criminals one might find harbored by the Trump administration, General Donovan is probably among the most vulnerable. The president's pardon power does seem to extend at least partially into the realm of military justice (and in fact, Trump has already pardoned several war criminals). but it seems clear to me that the pardon power cannot completely obstruct a future Commander-in-Chief's power to drum out of service an officer whom the CinC lacks faith in as a legitimate holder of rank and service. Of everybody implicated in Trumpist crimes, those in the military are, formally speaking, probably the least insulated from facing accountability from a future administration.

But in spite of all that, I suspect that prosecuting General Donovan and his compatriots responsible for criminal actions on the high seas will be much more fraught and less popular than essentially any other prosecution a future administration might bring. The political gravity pulling against prosecuting members of the military -- regardless of the context -- is just going to be too strong. Rightly or wrongly, I suspect it will be insurmountable for any junior officers or enlisted men involved in the operation. And even for the senior leadership, I can't imagine it going over well even in a context where there is a significant demand to prosecute, say, ICE leaders or Trump associates found to have embezzled money.

I don't have a good answer for this because, again, the need to restore deterrence here is nothing short of existential. We've seen in the Israeli case -- it barely managed to limp across a conviction in 2016 when IDF soldier Elor Azaria shot an unarmed Palestinian, and just doing that nearly tore the country apart. That set the stage for the non-prosecution decision for soldiers accused of sexual abuse of Palestinian detainees ten years later -- a decision that again came on the heels of widespread government intervention (including joining in outright rioting) in support of the abusers. The culture of impunity that's developed in the intervening years no doubt plays no small role in the brutal devastation the IDF has wreaked against civilian infrastructure in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon (the soldiers punished for vandalizing a Jesus statute had every reasonable expectation of assuming they'd be let off scot-free were it not for the  bad fortune of angering one of the few foreign constituencies the Israeli government still cares about appeasing). As disastrous as that trajectory has been in the Israeli case, I don't think they're in any way unique -- most countries (and certainly our country) blanches at holding their uniformed military personnel accountable for misdeeds.

So I don't know. It might that these prosecutions, or other retributive measures, have to be a little less media-forward than others. They might not be political winners (and to be clear, I do think that going after corrupt Trump apparatchiks will, in general, very much be a political winner in addition to being the right thing to do). But it still needs to be done.

Seventh Circuit Accidentally Tells Truth About Voter ID Laws

There is no "right to vote" in the United States Constitution.

This is a fact that surprises many people, given the centrality of democracy to our national ethos. But it's true. The Constitution prohibits certain specific types of restrictions on the franchise -- for example, limits based on race (15th Amendment), sex (19th amendment), or, in federal elections, failure to pay a poll tax (24th Amendment). However, there is no general, textual protection for a right to vote.

That said, the Supreme Court has recognized some heightened scrutiny that applies to limitations on suffrage. The "interest of the State when it comes to voting," the Supreme Court held in 1966, "is limited to the power to fix qualifications." The Court in that case concluded that wealth was not a valid qualification the state could impose on the franchise -- the state has no interest in preventing an otherwise qualified voter from casting a ballot because of his or her income. The broader principle is that the state has no valid interest in voter suppression -- preventing validly qualified voters from casting ballots. By contrast, a law which is related to enforcing a legitimate qualification -- say that the voter who presents themselves at the poll is in fact who they say they are -- may be permissible.

This distinction has been critical in more recent litigation over voter ID laws. Critics say that these laws are about voter suppression -- they are attempts to prevent lawful and qualified voters from casting their ballots by throwing up extraneous and burdensome obstacles in their path. Proponents, at least officially, deny any such motive -- they contend that such laws are simply about ensuring "election integrity" by preventing fraudulent votes from being cast. Any resident who actually is a valid voter should still be able to cast their ballot (all they need to do is show a valid ID! How hard is that?).

Now, it's always been evident that the latter, "anti-fraud" justification was a lie. The alleged "fraud" was essentially non-existent; and demanding voter ID wouldn't generally even forestall the tiny amount of fraud that did occur. But when the Supreme Court later upheld laws like Indiana's voter ID statute in Crawford v. Marion County against a facial challenge, it relied on this distinction between wrongfully trying to disenfranchise qualified voters and the legitimate state authority to fix qualifications. Voter ID laws are permissible because they are not about blocking qualified voters from voting, they are about ensuring that only qualified voters vote.

Recently, Indiana modified its voter ID law to prevent student IDs (but not VA, military, or tribal IDs) from being used as "voter ID". A district court had enjoined the law, ruling that it would unconstitutionally suppress the votes of young Indianans (and to reiterate -- young Indianans who are entirely legitimate and valid voters in Indiana elections). Earlier today, though, the Seventh Circuit stayed that injunction under the so-called Purcell principle, which cautions against court injunctions that change election rules too close to election day (ballots in Indiana's primary elections have already been mailed out).

The district court analyzed Purcell but concluded it did not apply, given that Indiana had permitted student IDs as a valid form of ID for decades and so would have to do nothing more complicated than revert to the system it had been using in every election up to the present one. But the Seventh Circuit disagreed, and in doing so it said something very revealing:

We view the risk of disruption to Indiana’s primary election as very serious. In no uncertain terms, the district court’s injunction will alter who can cast a ballot in this election (emphasis added).

This is a very revealing line. In theory (very, very naive theory), Indiana's law should not "alter who can cast a ballot in this election." The students who were eligible to vote before the ID law was passed are still fully eligible to vote after the law was passed. All Indiana is doing is tightening up security to ensure that only eligible voters vote -- but these students are eligible voters. In practice, of course, the court is absolutely right: some voters -- qualified, eligible voters -- who would be able to satisfy Indiana's voter ID law with a student ID will no longer be able to do so under the new rules, and so will not be able to cast a ballot. The function of the law is not to simply fix legitimate qualifications -- it is to prevent eligible, lawful voters from voting. The critics were right all along. 

Worse, the court's logic here manifestly treats as an injury (a "serious" injury; a "disruption" demanding emergency judicial action) the inability of Indiana to suppress valid, legitimate votes. Indiana did not change who was formally eligible to vote in its elections, meaning that the class of voters whose ability to "cast a ballot in this election" will be altered is comprised entirely of legitimate, registered voters. That cannot be stressed enough. One could imagine Purcell analysis that goes entirely to the procedural difficulties of changing voter ID eligibility rules midstream (such an argument might be plausible given that ballots had already been mailed, though the district court found that all Indiana would have to do to come into compliance is delete a single line in its election guidance documents). But that's not what the panel said. The court's articulation of the problem here is not one of administrative strain. The court's problem, "in no uncertain terms", is that certain eligible, registered voters who would be prevented (in spite of their eligibility) from casting a ballot if the student ID prohibition was in effect would now be allowed to cast a ballot in the primary. People who are eligible to vote will now not be blocked from voting. In essence, the court treats voter suppression as tantamount to a compelling state interest -- a stunning perversion of even our meager "right to vote" jurisprudence.

One might say I am reading too much into a single line in a hastily-filed emergency ruling. But I would say the Seventh Circuit's opinion is the epitome of a judicial Kinsley gaffe. Everybody knew that voter ID laws were not about concocted concerns about "fraud" but rather about trying to suppress lawful votes from Democratic constituencies. The Seventh Circuit just finally got around to admitting it.

Things People Blame the Jews For, Volume LXXVIII: Lack of Pedophilic Incest Options

There is a paradox at the heart of this series. Its core premise is that if one looks hard enough (and honestly, not too hard), one can find someone blaming the Jews for anything. But precisely because of that, its almost uninteresting when the blamer is some complete internet rando. It's more "fun" when it's someone of at least marginal import or influence.

Our character today does have an X blue check, but that doesn't mean anything nowadays -- it's literally just an indicator that your content is paid promotion. So it probably is a complete rando. But some complete randos manage to transcend their humble origins and deserve their moment of spotlight. And so here, I present a man earnestly complaining that if it weren't for Israel, he'd have a baby sister he could groom.

Blech.

This also demonstrates one of the oddities of this series, which is that sometimes the Jews are falsely "blamed" for something that's actually good. Way before this series ever started, I remember finding a quote by the President of Sudan blaming Jews for ... causing people to protest against the Darfur genocide. Probably not entirely attributable to us, but also, I wouldn't ashamed if it was. Likewise, I actually don't think the Jewish State is why this man can be an incestuous pedophile, but if you're going to give away the credit, hey, I'm not going to object too loudly.

Against the World on Abbott Elementary

*Spoilers for the most recent episode of Abbott Elementary*

So we need to talk about the big plotline on this week's episode of Abbott Elementary.

I'm talking, of course, about Melissa and her former student, Jonathan.

The basic thrust is that Jonathan has supposedly become a big New York City finance guy, much to Melissa's elation, as she remembers him as a smart kid from one of her first classes. She's eager to have him visit her class to deliver an inspirational message to her current students. Unfortunately, it turns out that Jonathan actually is facing prison time for being involved in a crypto scam, and he wants Melissa to write him a character letter for the judge.

Jonathan makes clear that he assumed Melissa would be on his side as a fellow hustler. She was the one who taught him that you had to take what was yours, that it was each of them against the world, that the system was rigged so why not play dirty, and so on. He assumes he was living out her lessons, so of course she would do her part to help bend the legal process in his favor.

As Melissa realizes what's going on, it's clear she's heartbroken but also a bit rattled. She limply tells Jonathan that he taught him to punch up, not down, and tries to remind him of the sweet boy she remembers teaching who genuinely did care for others. This all falls on deaf ears though, and ultimately Melissa refuses to write the letter.

There was something about this plotline that rubbed me the wrong way. Obviously, Jonathan is an adult, and it would be juvenile and simplistic to blame the parables of his third-grade teacher for his adult exploitative choices. However, what I wish we saw, but we didn't really, was a bit more reckoning and reflection from Melissa about what message she is sending her children when she delivers these "the system is out to get you, it's you against the world" sermons, because that narrative genuinely can breed a sort of egoism and nihilism of the sort adult-Jonathan embodies. Instead, the story beat lands more on "sometimes the kids just turn out bad, and you have to accept that", which is true, and heartbreaking, but it didn't inspire much in the way of growth. 

It helps that as the episode progresses, Jonathan becomes more and more cartoonishly sociopathic. His targets were confused seniors, the "lessons" he learned centered entirely around not getting caught, and he's already plotting his next scam even before his sentenced for the current one! (For what it's worth, I also felt they kind of went this direction with Draemon Winding, another former-student-turned-minor-antagonist). That Jonathan feels so irredeemable ultimately brings the episode in for a softer landing, since surely Melissa couldn't have had any role in such a bad egg (even though Melissa specifically recalls him being a sweet kid with a good heart).

I'll also add here that while one character suggests to Melissa that his efforts to play on their past relationship is simply scammers being scammers, I actually don't think that's (wholly) true. Whatever else may be the case, Jonathan to my eyes seems to genuinely believe that Melissa would respect his hustle and be on his side (if he didn't, he'd have fed her a much more conciliatory, "I was wrong but now I see the light" story). That's more powerful evidence that she really was a (bad) influence on him --  again, not to overstate her role or culpability, but suggesting that she really should reflect a bit on what lessons she's imparting on her kids. Certainly, I can see the value of imparting to disadvantaged kids a bit of a chip on their shoulder as a motivating tool. But that medicine has side effects, and maybe it would have been valuable if Melissa realized it needed some tempering.

The BlueSky discourse of the day is the finding that GenX is by far the most resiliently pro-MAGA generational cohort. Some folks have suggested this is ironic, given GenX's paradigmatic mistrust of authority should have made them resistant to authoritarianism. But I'm not surprised at this link. My Arendtian theory of the appeal of Trumpism is that Trump is most appealing precisely to the sort of person whose ignorant cynicism styles itself as sophisticated realism -- they know that all politicians (and the entire "system") are liars and corrupt and bullshitters, and so they are unperturbed to see someone whose only sin seems to be being a bit more brazen than most (indeed, isn't that very brazenness in a sense more honest? At least Trump doesn't hide who he is!). The drumbeat of messages to the effect of "both parties are the same", "every politician is bought", "everybody is lying to you" -- all versions of "the entire world is out to get you, so go get yours" -- this mentality is a breeding ground for political fascism and social scamming. Again, without discounting intervening causes and his own agency, Jonathan Pierce is a predictable product of that worldview. And I wish the show and the character realized that.

Oh, and apparently Gregory and Janine are on the rocks? So you can talk about that too, if you want.

"Everybody Knew" vs. "Not My Story To Tell"

Earlier this week, a flurry of sexual misconduct allegations emerged against Democratic Rep. (and California gubernatorial candidate) Eric Swalwell, including at least one woman (a former staffer) who alleges that Swalwell raped her while she was intoxicated.

I don't think there's any question that Swalwell must drop his campaign for Governor and resign from the House. Testimony is evidence, and a bunch of people have now come forward to testify as to a pattern of misconduct by Swalwell. In a court of law, it's possible that more evidence would be necessary to secure a conviction, but the assignment of political power and opportunities does not and should not obey the federal rules of evidence. I have no interest in dwelling on this point beyond that.

Shortly after the story broke, I saw several journalists and DC insiders immediately chime in with some version of "open secret" or "everybody knew". And that, in turn, caused many people to emit the "hmm" emoji, since if all these journalists and insiders already knew ... why wasn't the story ever reported? To that, the counternarrative I heard (ironically, from someone who was giving "hmm" vibes but also was trying to cabin it) was a variation of "not my story to tell." The women in question had told the stories, but in confidence; they had made clear (up until now) that they did not want to go public, and the persons they told it to felt obliged to respect that choice. 

And so we face a quandary: when nobody talks about what everybody knows, therein lies the space for known abusers to run free. But to take it upon oneself to override the wishes of the victim and put them and their trauma under an inevitably horrible spotlight -- that is a great and terrible thing to do. I don't think the confidant's silence can be chalked up always or solely to a desire to preserve an omerta protecting the powers-that-be. There's more to it than that.

So how do we resolve that quandary? What are our instincts as between the competing force of "everybody knew" and "not my story to tell"? Kate Manne in her work has written about her own experience being abused by a powerful older man, how she begged those she confided in not to pursue, and how now, in hindsight, she wishes that her confidants had not listened to her and spoken out. That instinct, perhaps, is what motivates mandatory reporting laws (such as the ones professors like myself are often subject to). Without necessarily disagreeing with her stance, the issues no doubt land differently for the victim in the moment or in hindsight versus the confidant they report to.

Anyway, I'm curious what others think on this, and how it should be resolved.

Iron Dome and the Leveraging of Civilian Death

While there is by now a relatively large contingent of Democrats opposing the sale of offensive weaponry to Israel, we're also seeing a growing push to try and forestall the sale of defensive weapons to Israel as well (most notably, the Iron Dome missile defense system). Iron Dome intercepts missiles and rockets being fired at Israel by groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and in doing so has saved countless civilian lives. Unsurprisingly, the endeavor to strip Israeli civilians of these protections is far more controversial than the effort to bar the sale of additional offensive weapons to Israel -- it seems to demarcate a clear difference between wanting to preserve Palestinian life versus wanting to extinguish Israeli lives.

So what is the argument against providing Israel with Iron Dome? This article in +972 provides an illustrative example of the case, which runs basically as follows: the existence of Iron Dome enables Israel to engage in military aggression without having to internalize the costs. Israel feels free to engage in military attacks basically at will, secure in the knowledge that any attempted reprisals will be blocked. By contrast, if Israel was more vulnerable to military attacks -- if it had to reckon with the reality that "the other side" really can hurt them too -- it would be more judicious about electing to commence its own military operations. An Israel which was forced to more tangibly endure the costs of the wars it started might be forced to consider other approaches to solving its various diplomatic (or even security) dilemmas beyond just bombing the problem away. And the hope is that, where all parties face real risk of injury or destruction, all parties will be more reluctant to resort to militarism in the first place.

There is a logic to this argument. But it isn't as straightforward as it sounds, and there is both a strategic and a moral objection one could level against it.

Start with the strategic objection. The above logic assumes that a country which is more vulnerable to external security threats will be less inclined to commence its own military operations (since doing so would risk triggering reprisals which, by stipulation, might cause it serious injury). Again, this logic is not implausible. But neither is it incontestable. Another story one could tell is that a country which faces substantial security vulnerabilities may become more aggressive, because the reality of a substantial security threat makes certain risks which might otherwise be tolerable become intolerable. If one gets intelligence that a militant group on your border is accumulating missiles, the way you respond if you're confident those missiles can be intercepted without causing significant harm is very different from the way you respond if those missiles pose a severe and substantial threat to your civilian population. The latter nation may be far more likely to attack preemptively in circumstances where the former country may not feel the need for an immediate proactive response.

In Israel's case, after all, the most concrete recent instantiation of Israel having to reckon with a significant security vulnerability -- a severe threat to its civilian population that it was unable to stop -- was October 7 itself. And no matter how one characterizes what happened next, the one thing that I think is entirely indisputable is that Israel reckoning with real and genuine security vulnerability did not cause it to pull back from militarism due to being forced to account for the possibility that the other side can really hurt them. Much the opposite: the concrete illustration of an acute security vulnerability made Israel lightyears more aggressive and more militaristic than it was before. A security situation it had previously thought it had "managed" now had revealed itself to be incalculably more dangerous than they realized, and the result of that realization was, to say the least, not a sober reassessment of the merits of military action.

Now, to be sure, I don't want to say that this argument is necessarily "right" either. Again, the initial critique has a logic to it as well; my suspicion is that the actual play-out will not vindicate either narrative without qualification. The point is simply to say that it is not self-evident, as it is sometimes presented to be, that taking away Iron Dome will yield a more cautious and less belligerent Israel.

But now let's go ahead and accept the premise. If we don't provide Israel with Iron Dome, it will be less militaristic, to the greater good of all. If one is in fact persuaded by this premise, I still think it is important to be very clear on what the core logic of this approach is. Clear away the rhetorical fog, and the argument here is simply this:

If more Israeli civilians were endangered or died, things would be better.

Again, I will reiterate: I accept there is an instrumental logic to this. The argument is not that Israeli deaths are good for their own sake, it's that they will prompt Israel to be more cautious and restrained, and ultimately reduce the net amount of conflict and warfare in the reason. My challenge above notwithstanding, this argument is not transparently absurd.

Nonetheless, we shouldn't obscure the point. The argument against Iron Dome is, by its nature, consciously attempting to leverage the endangerment of civilians for (noble) strategic ends. It is by no means the only argument that takes such a form: one need not venture far from Israel proper to hear other renditions of such a claim, that permitting greater endangerment of civilians will ultimately bring about peace faster. And all I will say to this is that there are good reasons why, bloodless strategic logic notwithstanding, progressives might want to draw a redline around arguments like this, and that if we do not draw such a line ourselves we cannot act too appalled when others don't draw redlines against other attempts to leverage the endangerment of civilians for good policy ends. For my part, I fully admit I lack the stomach to put innocent civilians at greater risk for the greater good, and I'm proud of my shortcoming in that respect.

I'll be honest though -- my gut sense is that the driving force behind those who want to take away Iron Dome is not any sort of assessment of the strategic debate I outlined above at all. It is a more primal rebellion against the perceived unfairness of it all: that Israel can wreak so much death and destruction on its neighbors and face comparatively little in return. I don't doubt that, for most of these people, the genuine hope really is a reduction in violence and death for everyone. But my strong suspicion is that, if that doesn't come to pass, a tolerable second-best outcome would be if Israeli civilian deaths rose to approach those of their neighbors. If it turns out that the elimination of Iron Dome does other than get a bunch more Israeli civilians killed -- it does not make Palestinians safer, it perhaps even puts them in more immediate peril -- well, we still have a karmic retribution if nothing else, and that's worth it on its own. And while I guess I can wrap my head around the egalitarian sentiment behind this, once again, I lack the stomach to engineer greater civilian death, even under as noble a rubric as "fairness".

Of course, not everybody is me. But if you are inclined towards opposing Israel having the Iron Dome based on the sketch provided above, I would ask that you have the courage to own your conviction. You are okay with leveraging civilian endangerment in order to achieve your desired policy ends. You of a kind with many other people, of many other ideological persuasions and of many other partisan loyalties across many other conflicts, that hold similar beliefs. Take note of the company you keep.