Andrea Rubenstein has posted a very interesting outline for the majority set. It's entitled "How to be a Real Nice Guy," but I think it's better understood as a guideline for how people with privilege (Whites, Males, Christians, Heterosexuals, et al), should interact with those who don't. This is a topic that interests me, and I endorse most, but not all, of it. The blogosphere being what it is, I'll focus on my discontents, but don't let that mislead you--this is a valuable post and an important read.
My objection pops up along several of Ms. Rubenstein's points, but I think it can be grouped into a general point about intergroup relations. In several places, Rubenstein says (in so many words) that there are plenty of places in which to discuss "your" issues, so when interacting with minority groups, one should sit back and listen--hear their issues, concerns, opinions, and perspectives. I agree whole-heartedly that the minority voice is underserved and underheard in contemporary society--there aren't many soapboxes by which minority issues can get play amongst the mainstream. The problem is that I see a similar dearth of spaces to talk about how we interact together, across borders, as a community. In other words, the status quo already addresses "my" issues, and Rubenstein's plan would give space for "their" issues, but where is the dialogue on "our" issues--where minorities and majorities intersect?
This absence is important, and, I think, relatively unrecognized. We (by which I mean the majority) may, of course, discuss minorities in our own soapbox. But the opinions we express there and the information we gather there are qualitatively different than the insights and perspectives we'd synthesize in a truly multigroup discussion. This requires some tightrope walking--I don't want to make the discussion about me (there is indeed enough said about myself), but I do want to have at least some opportunity to discuss us. Any plan for majority/minority interaction that doesn't make some provision for the "inter" part of it is doomed to fail.
One might think that this synthesis will come naturally. Add the discourse about me, and the discourse about you, and you get "us." I don't think this is true. Look to academia. For decades now, we've adopted an academic model of ever-increasing specialization. Being a generalist is for chumps. Departments get smaller and smaller, articles become geared to an ever-shrinking pool of fellow travelers, trained in the (say) history of pre-Roman Iberian architecture. There is value to this, of course. But what we've discovered is that inter-disciplinary work can yield fascinating results. Think of what Jared Diamond has done, combining biology, genetics, history, and social science. I just took a whole class this last term entitled "Science & Society", exploring not how the two interacted, but how the two were inextricably intertwined. You can't understand either in isolation from the other. In other words, the product of a genuine intergroup dialogue is not the same as the product of the ingroup discourse and the outgroup discourse. If that's sounds familiar to leftist theorists, it should--it's closely related to the intersectionality hypothesis (the experience of, e.g., a black woman is not reducible to "woman" + "black").
The second issue I have is with the status of ingroup members in these conversations. I think there is a severe cognitive dissonance between what Rubenstein says our status is, and what ingroup perceive its status to be. She says, for example, that it is in fact okay for us to make mistakes, as long as we try and learn from them. But I think many ingroup members are under the distinct impression that one mistake can be fatal, and I think that folks versed in the literature of feminist, critical race, queer, and other related movements forget their own lessons when they dismiss these stories as a kind of "shrill craziness." Larry Summers, I think, might not be so quick to dismiss that some operate under a "one-strike, you're out" standard (recall that when he made his infamous "inherent ability" comment about women and math, Summers was summarizing other people's positions, not expressing his own, and that he promptly apologized when the uproar began). In Patricia Williams' superb book, "Seeing a Color-Blind Future: The Paradox of Race," she tells a story of just such a slip-up by a white friend, and her apology when it was pointed out. Williams uses the story to illustrate that a world of such apologies can be tiresome to those who constantly apologized too, and also that the apology that "she [the white woman] just didn't know" often comes off as a plea for Williams [the black woman] not to know either. However, in the midst of this critique, Williams stresses that she is not contesting the sincerity of the apology, "only its superficiality." But in her review of the book, Taunya Lovell Banks, another respected Critical Race Theorist at the University of Maryland, slams the white woman's "standard insincere apology." In other words, she takes Professor Williams' story, and replaces Williams' professed meaning with a contrary one of her own. In a paper I was writing, I rhetorically asked if this is how Professor Banks would treat a white student in her class: if she responded to a articulation of American racism by saying that "she just didn't know," would Professor Banks lambast her "insincere apology"? This is the fear the ingroups live in, and I think it's unfair to just assume they're hallucinating about its potency.
The point of all this is that there is a disjunction, I think, between how much forgiveness for errors that the minority group's say they are willing to give, and how much the ingroup members suspect they are likely to receive. In all likelihood, the chasm runs from both ends--minorities overestimate how forgiving they are, and majorities overestimate how much forgiveness they deserve. All of this, however, just plays into my prior plea for more intergroup dialogue, not less. We'll never bridge this gap without explicitly having a dialogue between the two camps. In isolation, the stories will never merge, and we'll never get anywhere.
Relatedly, ingroups have a right to know that in such conversations, they will not be ontologically wrong. Rubenstein says that when confronted by a member of an outgroup about one's behavior, the ingroup member should use the information to change his mind, not try to change the outgroup member's. I don't think it's fair to make that statement categorically. Simply put, it is quite possible that an ingrouper will be right about an issue, and an outgrouper will be wrong. There shouldn't be an obligation to accede to a viewpoint just because it's made from a disadvantaged person. The glaringly obvious issue for me is on Israel--if someone tells me that my support for Zionism makes me a racist, then you better be damn sure that I'm going to try and persuade them they're wrong. And I have every right to--differentiating my people's desire for full and equal membership in the international community in their native homeland from apartheid South Africa is crucial to my personhood and dignity as a human being. I think it is true that I should listen to such critiques with an open mind, and recognize that I may be hearing a perspective that I haven't heard before. But I can do that without having a prefigured opinion I have to come to. Besides, the standard is internally incoherent. If one black person tells me that my vocal opposition to affirmative action makes her feel like I think she doesn't belong at the university, and a second tells me that my now-vocal support of affirmative action makes her feel like a token at the university, I'm left without a platform to stand on. At some point, ingroups have to take stands--the litmus test should be hearing from other people, not agreeing with them. And of course, we all can learn from each other--the lessons a Palestinian could teach me about how the occupation negatively affects her life are undoubtedly many, as are the one's I could teach her about Jewish history, exile, oppression, and national yearning.
These suggestions shouldn't be seen as competitive with Ms. Rubenstein's, rather, they should be seen as to compliment it. I think that one can listen respectfully to minority perspectives, learn from them, agree with some parts of it, disagree with others, incorporate one's own perspective, and do it all civilly and productively, all at the same time. And I believe that we can do it now. In other words, I believe we can have a conversation. Let's start one.
[H/T: Alas, a Blog]
Sunday, March 19, 2006
Blunt Instruments
Not to go on a Powerline spree (that feels like it should be a pun, but I don't think it is), but I can't resist noting this incredible display of John Hinderaker's problem solving mentality. Referring to the group of Christian extremists who are protesting the funerals of American soldiers because our country encourages homosexuality, and a Minnesota law targetted at them, John laments
I'm actually inclined to agree here. Though I respect the Court's key role in protecting my rights as a person, it should not be our first resort. Alternative problem solving mechanisms--mediation, arbitration, or even simple conversations between persons of competing views--all are badly underutilized in our current state.
So what is John's non-legal proposal for dealing with these abhorrent characters?
Ah, yes. The "caveman" approach.
Blunt instruments indeed.
our culture's obsession with legal remedies. As a lawyer, I suppose I shouldn't complain; but as a citizen, I think it's ridiculous....One of the basic problems in our society is that nearly all informal sanctions have been forfeited, so that there is hardly any middle ground between passive acceptance of antisocial behavior and a felony prosecution. Legislation and criminal prosecution are blunt instruments that cannot be brought to bear against every deviancy that may arise.
I'm actually inclined to agree here. Though I respect the Court's key role in protecting my rights as a person, it should not be our first resort. Alternative problem solving mechanisms--mediation, arbitration, or even simple conversations between persons of competing views--all are badly underutilized in our current state.
So what is John's non-legal proposal for dealing with these abhorrent characters?
If a bunch of crazies show up waving signs at a funeral, the appropriate course is for an able-bodied man--there should be at least one at any funeral--to take a sign and break it over the ringleader's head.
Ah, yes. The "caveman" approach.
Blunt instruments indeed.
Outside Sources
John Hinderaker severely criticizes Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's defense of citing foreign law in American court opinions. My old mentor, Paul Mirengoff, echoes the claim and says that Ginsburg's actions (on the Court, presumably, not the speech itself) warrant impeachment.
In response, Jim Lindgren points to a new paper by Stephen Calabrisi and Stephanie Zimdahl on the history of foreign law citation in American Supreme Court opinions. To put it bluntly, it's a tradition that goes back to the early 19th century and not some new invention by liberal demons. So if we're talking about impeaching Ginsburg for citing to it, then we should be engaging in similar condemnation of Justices Joseph Story and Felix Frankfurter, two of the Justices Calabrisi and Zimdahl identify as most likely to have used foreign law in their opinions. This is doubly ironic, because Justice Frankfurter is the modern Godfather of the "judicial restraint" school of judicial interpretation--the very school that Mr. Mirengoff claims to want more of in our court system (of course, Kelo proved that judicial restraint, like all other legal theories popular on the political right, is only a conservative issue when it leads to conservative ends).
Calabrisi and Zimdahl do not explicitly endorse the citation to foreign law. Rather, they say that the case for it's use is strongest in 4th and 8th amendment cases, amendment's whose language includes vague and socially expansive terms like "unreasonable," "cruel," and "unusual." By contrast "citation to foreign law is least justifiable when the Court is asked to determine whether an unenumerated right is deeply rooted in American history and tradition, as was the case in Lawrence [v. Texas], or whether a federal statute violates American federalism rules, as it was asked to do in Printz v. United States."
Calabrisi and Zimdahl are both primarily conservative originalists, hence the importance to them and other fellow travelers of the long-standing tradition of citing to foreign law. To people who think the longevity of a rule of interpretation strongly relates to its merit, this fact should carry much weight. I, however, am not an originalist (see, e.g., here, here, and here), and thus cannot fall depend on the long tradition of foreign law citation to defend the practice. To quote from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV...and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." So what's my perspective on foreign law?
I'd agree with Zimdahl and Calabrisi that foreign law is most applicable in cases where the constitutional text refers to vague and subjective value judgments (such as the 4th and 8th amendments), although I suspect I'd find more use for it in other opinions than either of them do. However, we should remember that the case where (to me at least) the clamor against foreign law citation really took off was Roper v. Simmons--an 8th amendment case. So even if you're more of Calabrisi-type than a Schraub acolyte, it should be somewhat clear that the latest batch of fury is motivated less by legal reasoning and more by partisan point-scoring. I'd probably go further than they would in asserting that in such cases, opinions from other places are crucial to our understanding of the clauses. You can't undertake an analysis of whether or not a punishment is "unusual" or not without at least noting that our country is one of only four that partakes in it--at least, not without distorting the constitutional text beyond recognition.
But back to the specific question. In the majority of situations, I think that considering foreign law is as useful as any other secondary source in crafting an opinion. Sure, a Swiss justice had no role in writing or ratifying the constitution? So what? Neither did nearly any commentator who wrote nearly any secondary source. A law review article can still be useful even if it was written post 1789--and citing one shouldn't be an impeachable offense. To be fair, the Supreme Court might take precisely this route under warrant--not the impeachment part, but the part about not citing to secondary sources. David Barron made this point to much chatter, although I think the jury is still out. But I think such a stance would be counter-productive to the goal of increased judicial accountability--we can't vote judges out, but we can at least expect them to pay attention to the recent scholarly commentary on their work and past work on parallel issues. A sequestered court is an unaccountable court.
Moreover, I think there are a lot of situations where a diversity of perspectives should be at least examined in order to answer a legal question. Calabrisi and Zimdahl say that foreign law is not particularly useful in determining whether or not a given right is "deeply rooted in our nation's traditions," a key standard for determining whether or not it is a fundamental right covered by the 9th amendment. I'd be inclined to agree. But what about whether it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," another crucial 9th amendment test? There, foreign law and opinion (actually, the whole field of philosophy in general), strikes me as quite relevant to the question. And to answer John's objection that citation to foreign law can just as easily lead to the influence of regressive Muslim state's versus progressive European ones, I think the answer is quite simple: there is no "liberty," ordered or otherwise, in these countries' legal system. Hence, their contribution is of little use to us.
In sum, as long as the foreign law is treated as advisory, not binding, I see no problem in seeing what other commentators had to say about the difficult questions that the Supreme Court has to face. Interpretation is a difficult endeavor--rarely is it as cut-and-dry as the armchair pundits would make it out to be. I would be hesitant, to say the least, of depriving the current manifestation of Justices a tool that they've used for hundreds of years to aid their decisions, solely on the ground that we dislike what they're saying now.
In response, Jim Lindgren points to a new paper by Stephen Calabrisi and Stephanie Zimdahl on the history of foreign law citation in American Supreme Court opinions. To put it bluntly, it's a tradition that goes back to the early 19th century and not some new invention by liberal demons. So if we're talking about impeaching Ginsburg for citing to it, then we should be engaging in similar condemnation of Justices Joseph Story and Felix Frankfurter, two of the Justices Calabrisi and Zimdahl identify as most likely to have used foreign law in their opinions. This is doubly ironic, because Justice Frankfurter is the modern Godfather of the "judicial restraint" school of judicial interpretation--the very school that Mr. Mirengoff claims to want more of in our court system (of course, Kelo proved that judicial restraint, like all other legal theories popular on the political right, is only a conservative issue when it leads to conservative ends).
Calabrisi and Zimdahl do not explicitly endorse the citation to foreign law. Rather, they say that the case for it's use is strongest in 4th and 8th amendment cases, amendment's whose language includes vague and socially expansive terms like "unreasonable," "cruel," and "unusual." By contrast "citation to foreign law is least justifiable when the Court is asked to determine whether an unenumerated right is deeply rooted in American history and tradition, as was the case in Lawrence [v. Texas], or whether a federal statute violates American federalism rules, as it was asked to do in Printz v. United States."
Calabrisi and Zimdahl are both primarily conservative originalists, hence the importance to them and other fellow travelers of the long-standing tradition of citing to foreign law. To people who think the longevity of a rule of interpretation strongly relates to its merit, this fact should carry much weight. I, however, am not an originalist (see, e.g., here, here, and here), and thus cannot fall depend on the long tradition of foreign law citation to defend the practice. To quote from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV...and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." So what's my perspective on foreign law?
I'd agree with Zimdahl and Calabrisi that foreign law is most applicable in cases where the constitutional text refers to vague and subjective value judgments (such as the 4th and 8th amendments), although I suspect I'd find more use for it in other opinions than either of them do. However, we should remember that the case where (to me at least) the clamor against foreign law citation really took off was Roper v. Simmons--an 8th amendment case. So even if you're more of Calabrisi-type than a Schraub acolyte, it should be somewhat clear that the latest batch of fury is motivated less by legal reasoning and more by partisan point-scoring. I'd probably go further than they would in asserting that in such cases, opinions from other places are crucial to our understanding of the clauses. You can't undertake an analysis of whether or not a punishment is "unusual" or not without at least noting that our country is one of only four that partakes in it--at least, not without distorting the constitutional text beyond recognition.
But back to the specific question. In the majority of situations, I think that considering foreign law is as useful as any other secondary source in crafting an opinion. Sure, a Swiss justice had no role in writing or ratifying the constitution? So what? Neither did nearly any commentator who wrote nearly any secondary source. A law review article can still be useful even if it was written post 1789--and citing one shouldn't be an impeachable offense. To be fair, the Supreme Court might take precisely this route under warrant--not the impeachment part, but the part about not citing to secondary sources. David Barron made this point to much chatter, although I think the jury is still out. But I think such a stance would be counter-productive to the goal of increased judicial accountability--we can't vote judges out, but we can at least expect them to pay attention to the recent scholarly commentary on their work and past work on parallel issues. A sequestered court is an unaccountable court.
Moreover, I think there are a lot of situations where a diversity of perspectives should be at least examined in order to answer a legal question. Calabrisi and Zimdahl say that foreign law is not particularly useful in determining whether or not a given right is "deeply rooted in our nation's traditions," a key standard for determining whether or not it is a fundamental right covered by the 9th amendment. I'd be inclined to agree. But what about whether it is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," another crucial 9th amendment test? There, foreign law and opinion (actually, the whole field of philosophy in general), strikes me as quite relevant to the question. And to answer John's objection that citation to foreign law can just as easily lead to the influence of regressive Muslim state's versus progressive European ones, I think the answer is quite simple: there is no "liberty," ordered or otherwise, in these countries' legal system. Hence, their contribution is of little use to us.
In sum, as long as the foreign law is treated as advisory, not binding, I see no problem in seeing what other commentators had to say about the difficult questions that the Supreme Court has to face. Interpretation is a difficult endeavor--rarely is it as cut-and-dry as the armchair pundits would make it out to be. I would be hesitant, to say the least, of depriving the current manifestation of Justices a tool that they've used for hundreds of years to aid their decisions, solely on the ground that we dislike what they're saying now.
Friday, March 17, 2006
I've Got An Idea!
Okay, I took a brief shot in my round-up post that it's the GOP that has no ideas, and Mark Olsen doesn't believe me. The original post Mark made dealt specifically with Iraq, which, as he points out, I'm not the best target for since I supported the war. I will point out, however, that his own example here wasn't exactly top-notch.
But this isn't a "new" idea, it's the same old idea (blow up the insurgents) we've been using for three years now. It didn't work in a vacuum then, there's no reason to assume it will start now. What is really needed is a strong focus on democratic institution building, especially restoring trusts between the Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Kurds. The good news is that's exactly what Ambassador Khalilzad has been focusing on recently (I'm a big Zalmay Khalilzad fan). The bad news is that it appears to be about a year or two too late. Whether or not it will do any good now is, at best, a toss-up.
Withdrawing from Iraq may or may be not be a better idea, but it is a new (in that it's a tactic we haven't tried yet) idea that has some plausibility. The line of reasoning goes that our forces are the primary point of friction for a significant portion of the population, so by setting a withdrawal point, we (a) take the wind out of the sails of at least a portion of the insurgency, and (b) put pressure on the various squabbling sects in the government to get their act together before we pull out. Do I buy this argument? Not yet, although it's certainly been growing on me since it was originally proposed. But I have a lot of trouble arguing why it isn't better than staying the with the same old tired, failing strategies the Bush administration has been pushing in the region. As for what we should have done instead of invading, the obvious answer is focus on rebuilding Afghanistan (remember when the Bush administration was so focused on Iraq it "forgot" to put in any money for the Afghani reconstruction? That's an example of what we call a bad PR move). A bird in hand, after all....
But, as I said, I'm the wrong guy to talk to when it comes to Iraq. So let's look at some other issues I see a greater distinction between my and my party's beliefs, and those of the GOP. Start with Social Security. Mark says that while this may be a bad solution, it's better than the Democratic claim that there's no problem at all. First of all, it's entirely plausible that Democrats are right: there might not be a problem. The estimates of Social Security solvency are always pessimistic--we've outperformed the market estimates they're based off every time. But even if Democrats are wrong, they're still right, because (a) Social Security running a deficit makes it no different from every other federal program, and (b) if the market actually is running that poorly, that may hurt the SS status quo, but it kills any market-based solution for fixing it. But second of all, I'm not sure how "not having a solution" comes off as comparatively disadvantageous for the Democrats anyway--why is nothing worse than a "solution" that exacerbates the problem? That's the other thing--I blogged previously on how privatization won't actually "solve" anything, because political reality mandates we still cover retirement losses, and the transaction costs will skyrocket our deficit to the point of making this administration look thrifty. If we have a spare 2-3 trillion dollars that we're just aching to spend, why can't we just use it to shore up the solvency deficit directly (I think I read that this amount of money would keep social security solvent well into the 22nd century), rather than embarking on some new and unknown program (whatever happened to the Burkean conservative?). I think it's a bit rich to give Republicans a pat on the back for coming up with a "solution" that doesn't even come close to addressing the actual problem. If that's our standard, fine, my "solution" is that we give Shetland ponies to every little girl when they turn seven years old. I have no idea how that will reduce our solvency deficit, but thankfully, that's no longer relevant to saying we've fixed the problem. Our party gives out ponies. Where's the GOP at?
On to health insurance, medicare, et al. Mark pretty much admits that the "reform bill" was a disaster, and proposes that we amend the constitution to prohibit the government giving insurance. This might be an interesting argument, but what national Republican is running these days on abolishing Medicaid? I must have missed that part of Bush's campaign speech. I'm kind of reminded of a line by Kevin Drum on the Federalist Society:
Again, it's a bit rich to give Republican's credit for an idea they're not actually proposing. Getting rid of the welfare state is not part of contemporary American politics--Republican or Democrat. So what's the Republican "idea" for fixing the healthcare crisis? Admittedly, perhaps Mark is right, and they don't actually care, and thus the Medicare reform bill was actually a very clever attempt to sabotage the massive mainstream support for the program. But I hardly think bait-and-switching the electorate is the type of "idea" we're talking about here, so I'm going to assume that the GOP congressional leadership honestly wants to fix the healthcare crisis.
In which case, the idea (and it is pretty much singular) is Health Savings Accounts. Only Republicans could see a polity where millions lack insurance, and say "this is horrible! We need to create another tax shelter!" It honestly defies belief, but I think it warrants my claim of the GOP being tax cut obsessed. Health Savings Account, it hardly needs mentioning at this point, are another "give a pony" solution to a problem that has nothing to do with ponies. Besides the fact that the folks who are currently not insured tend not to overlap with the folks who can afford to set-aside $2000 in discretionary income each year, even if we manage to get past that, it still doesn't fix the major problem, which is coverage of catastrophic healthcare scenarios. Your $2000/year layaway is lovely, but it ain't going to do jack if you come down with cancer. Still, until then, more places to hide your income from the tax boys is a nice perk (for those who can afford it).
The Democrats, by contrast, have Universal Health Insurance as their answer. Mark can't figure out who would support this besides "healthcare professionals" (God forbid we listen to Doctors on healthcare policy!). I think there's a rather obvious group #2 we can add...the uninsured. Presumably, they'd prefer having health coverage, to, um, not having it. Group #3 is big business. They're finally coming around to universal healthcare, because they want to get what is turning into a massive liability off their backs. The amount of money they put out on healthcare puts them at a huge competitive disadvantage compared to European firms who get it governmentally subsidized. And the ones who did commit to giving health benefits are suffocating from them (remember when Mark wanted to let the entire American auto industry go bankrupt?). In fact, the only major constituency group opposed to UHC is the Health Insurance industry, because it ruins the racket they've got going.
UHC solves the healthcare crisis in several ways. First, it obviously fixes the problem that millions can't afford private health insurance. I've never seen the GOP even pretend to try and solve for these people. Second, it solves for catastrophic health concerns because it pools risk. Most of us won't come down with cancer, and those who do can draw from a much larger pool of resources than they could with their puny HSAs. Third, it restores competitive balance between American and Europe, by removing our largest corporate liability. Fourth, it saves costs by allowing for price negotiations, and removing the inefficiencies latent in our current hodgepodge mix of HMOs, PPOs, employer insurance, private insurances, ER attacks, etc.. Are there some kinks to work out? Probably. But at least this solution actually addresses the problem at hand, which is more than you can say for HSAs. And contra what Mark says, this sort of long-term thinking is perfectly feasible for politicians (and I'm a cynic!). Saying "I've just ended your insecurity about health expenses" is certainly competitive with "I'm going to cut your taxes until my eyes bleed." And insofar as it isn't, that's primarily because Republican's have perfected making the "tax cuts now, pay for them later, let the others eat cake" argument win votes. To then say that the government shouldn't do insurance because it's too concerned with the short-term is like the guy who kills his parents, then asks the court for mercy because he's an orphan. I'm sorry, but you can't claim advantages from a problem of your own creation. Just because Republicans haven't seen a future-interest they won't sell out for short-term political gain doesn't mean all politicians do it. Otherwise, why are so many Democratic politicians pushing for these longterm benefit plans?
As for the rest: in every case where there's been a conflict, the modern-day GOP has sacrificed it's purported policy objectives for tax cuts. Every. Time. NCLB? Left underfunded. Pay-as-you-go? Threatens further tax cuts, so it's out. Homeland Security programs? Bush threatened veto because he was afraid the price tag would threaten his latest batch of tax cuts. Deficit hawks? Please--we've raised the debt ceiling again and again to accommodate a ballooning deficit. Iraq war? When the Senate tried to pay for it by repealing a few upper-income cuts, Bush threatened veto again. It never ends.
Well ... the Administration and the military seem to have plenty of ideas [of what to do in Iraq right now]. [H]e wrote this during a major anti-terrorist operation north of Badghad which is interesting for its contrasts with the force that had been requied in Falluja (and who is now doing the majority of the operations, i.e., Iraqis).
But this isn't a "new" idea, it's the same old idea (blow up the insurgents) we've been using for three years now. It didn't work in a vacuum then, there's no reason to assume it will start now. What is really needed is a strong focus on democratic institution building, especially restoring trusts between the Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Kurds. The good news is that's exactly what Ambassador Khalilzad has been focusing on recently (I'm a big Zalmay Khalilzad fan). The bad news is that it appears to be about a year or two too late. Whether or not it will do any good now is, at best, a toss-up.
Withdrawing from Iraq may or may be not be a better idea, but it is a new (in that it's a tactic we haven't tried yet) idea that has some plausibility. The line of reasoning goes that our forces are the primary point of friction for a significant portion of the population, so by setting a withdrawal point, we (a) take the wind out of the sails of at least a portion of the insurgency, and (b) put pressure on the various squabbling sects in the government to get their act together before we pull out. Do I buy this argument? Not yet, although it's certainly been growing on me since it was originally proposed. But I have a lot of trouble arguing why it isn't better than staying the with the same old tired, failing strategies the Bush administration has been pushing in the region. As for what we should have done instead of invading, the obvious answer is focus on rebuilding Afghanistan (remember when the Bush administration was so focused on Iraq it "forgot" to put in any money for the Afghani reconstruction? That's an example of what we call a bad PR move). A bird in hand, after all....
But, as I said, I'm the wrong guy to talk to when it comes to Iraq. So let's look at some other issues I see a greater distinction between my and my party's beliefs, and those of the GOP. Start with Social Security. Mark says that while this may be a bad solution, it's better than the Democratic claim that there's no problem at all. First of all, it's entirely plausible that Democrats are right: there might not be a problem. The estimates of Social Security solvency are always pessimistic--we've outperformed the market estimates they're based off every time. But even if Democrats are wrong, they're still right, because (a) Social Security running a deficit makes it no different from every other federal program, and (b) if the market actually is running that poorly, that may hurt the SS status quo, but it kills any market-based solution for fixing it. But second of all, I'm not sure how "not having a solution" comes off as comparatively disadvantageous for the Democrats anyway--why is nothing worse than a "solution" that exacerbates the problem? That's the other thing--I blogged previously on how privatization won't actually "solve" anything, because political reality mandates we still cover retirement losses, and the transaction costs will skyrocket our deficit to the point of making this administration look thrifty. If we have a spare 2-3 trillion dollars that we're just aching to spend, why can't we just use it to shore up the solvency deficit directly (I think I read that this amount of money would keep social security solvent well into the 22nd century), rather than embarking on some new and unknown program (whatever happened to the Burkean conservative?). I think it's a bit rich to give Republicans a pat on the back for coming up with a "solution" that doesn't even come close to addressing the actual problem. If that's our standard, fine, my "solution" is that we give Shetland ponies to every little girl when they turn seven years old. I have no idea how that will reduce our solvency deficit, but thankfully, that's no longer relevant to saying we've fixed the problem. Our party gives out ponies. Where's the GOP at?
On to health insurance, medicare, et al. Mark pretty much admits that the "reform bill" was a disaster, and proposes that we amend the constitution to prohibit the government giving insurance. This might be an interesting argument, but what national Republican is running these days on abolishing Medicaid? I must have missed that part of Bush's campaign speech. I'm kind of reminded of a line by Kevin Drum on the Federalist Society:
[they] talk[] about whether or not genuine originalists should overturn New Deal opinions from the 40s, which strikes me as sort of like arguing over whether or not Superman could kick Green Lantern's butt: harmless, to be sure, but hardly part of the real world. If Federalist Society members are convinced that...what's really needed is someone who will vote to repeal the Social Security Act, they're just fantasizing, not discussing real-life issues.
Again, it's a bit rich to give Republican's credit for an idea they're not actually proposing. Getting rid of the welfare state is not part of contemporary American politics--Republican or Democrat. So what's the Republican "idea" for fixing the healthcare crisis? Admittedly, perhaps Mark is right, and they don't actually care, and thus the Medicare reform bill was actually a very clever attempt to sabotage the massive mainstream support for the program. But I hardly think bait-and-switching the electorate is the type of "idea" we're talking about here, so I'm going to assume that the GOP congressional leadership honestly wants to fix the healthcare crisis.
In which case, the idea (and it is pretty much singular) is Health Savings Accounts. Only Republicans could see a polity where millions lack insurance, and say "this is horrible! We need to create another tax shelter!" It honestly defies belief, but I think it warrants my claim of the GOP being tax cut obsessed. Health Savings Account, it hardly needs mentioning at this point, are another "give a pony" solution to a problem that has nothing to do with ponies. Besides the fact that the folks who are currently not insured tend not to overlap with the folks who can afford to set-aside $2000 in discretionary income each year, even if we manage to get past that, it still doesn't fix the major problem, which is coverage of catastrophic healthcare scenarios. Your $2000/year layaway is lovely, but it ain't going to do jack if you come down with cancer. Still, until then, more places to hide your income from the tax boys is a nice perk (for those who can afford it).
The Democrats, by contrast, have Universal Health Insurance as their answer. Mark can't figure out who would support this besides "healthcare professionals" (God forbid we listen to Doctors on healthcare policy!). I think there's a rather obvious group #2 we can add...the uninsured. Presumably, they'd prefer having health coverage, to, um, not having it. Group #3 is big business. They're finally coming around to universal healthcare, because they want to get what is turning into a massive liability off their backs. The amount of money they put out on healthcare puts them at a huge competitive disadvantage compared to European firms who get it governmentally subsidized. And the ones who did commit to giving health benefits are suffocating from them (remember when Mark wanted to let the entire American auto industry go bankrupt?). In fact, the only major constituency group opposed to UHC is the Health Insurance industry, because it ruins the racket they've got going.
UHC solves the healthcare crisis in several ways. First, it obviously fixes the problem that millions can't afford private health insurance. I've never seen the GOP even pretend to try and solve for these people. Second, it solves for catastrophic health concerns because it pools risk. Most of us won't come down with cancer, and those who do can draw from a much larger pool of resources than they could with their puny HSAs. Third, it restores competitive balance between American and Europe, by removing our largest corporate liability. Fourth, it saves costs by allowing for price negotiations, and removing the inefficiencies latent in our current hodgepodge mix of HMOs, PPOs, employer insurance, private insurances, ER attacks, etc.. Are there some kinks to work out? Probably. But at least this solution actually addresses the problem at hand, which is more than you can say for HSAs. And contra what Mark says, this sort of long-term thinking is perfectly feasible for politicians (and I'm a cynic!). Saying "I've just ended your insecurity about health expenses" is certainly competitive with "I'm going to cut your taxes until my eyes bleed." And insofar as it isn't, that's primarily because Republican's have perfected making the "tax cuts now, pay for them later, let the others eat cake" argument win votes. To then say that the government shouldn't do insurance because it's too concerned with the short-term is like the guy who kills his parents, then asks the court for mercy because he's an orphan. I'm sorry, but you can't claim advantages from a problem of your own creation. Just because Republicans haven't seen a future-interest they won't sell out for short-term political gain doesn't mean all politicians do it. Otherwise, why are so many Democratic politicians pushing for these longterm benefit plans?
As for the rest: in every case where there's been a conflict, the modern-day GOP has sacrificed it's purported policy objectives for tax cuts. Every. Time. NCLB? Left underfunded. Pay-as-you-go? Threatens further tax cuts, so it's out. Homeland Security programs? Bush threatened veto because he was afraid the price tag would threaten his latest batch of tax cuts. Deficit hawks? Please--we've raised the debt ceiling again and again to accommodate a ballooning deficit. Iraq war? When the Senate tried to pay for it by repealing a few upper-income cuts, Bush threatened veto again. It never ends.
Thursday, March 16, 2006
Chutzpah Roundup
Brief overview of who's showing some balls on the web (or pointing out others who are).
Sirhan Sirhan, Robert Kennedy's assassin, is denied parole. He claims that Mr. Kennedy would not have wanted him to remain in prison. Jim Lindgren responds: "I suppose that it is just Sirhan's bad luck that somebody killed Robert Kennedy."
San Diego Law Professor Larry Alexander has a new paper arguing that "academic freedom" should not extend to professors when they are not doing an academic duty--e.g., politicizing their classroom. I only half-buy that argument anyway (I agree with it the context of a professor politicizing his Chemistry class, but disagree if it target's a professor expressing radical views in a "private," non-academic speech), but more importantly these endeavors always seem to boil down to trying to censure professors one disagrees with, irrespective of whether they are behaving inappropriately or not. And sure enough, Professor Alexander lays the blame directly at the feet of those favored whipping boys, the practicioners of "identity politics" and "crude post-modernism," making me suspicious that this is just one more salvo in the ongoing war between the liberal and conservative wings of the professoriate (and their respective allies). Thanks to Rick Garnett with the heads-up.
In California, a man wants the city to pay for damage done to his truck when a city dump truck crashed into it. The problem? The same guy was driving the dump truck at the time.
A family is suing its doctor because he didn't discover signs of likely birth defects in a developing fetus. The family claims that had they known of them, they may have chosen to abort.
Michael Froomkin reports that a slim plurality of Americans support Senator Feingold's censure motion--primarily due to surprisingly high numbers from Republicans. The FRC accuses Feingold (and presumably, the plurality of Americans who support his motion) of treason. As for me, I think intimidating dissenters into silence is far more treasonous to American ideals than holding a President accountable for breaking the law.
According to Kevin Drum, the most common word people associate with George W. Bush is "incompetent." Followed immediately by "idiot" and "liar."
Professor Bainbridge (with a cool new site design) still supports the retailiatory reaction against Justice David Souter for his Kelo vote. I still think he's wrong. So does Ann Althouse.
Mark Olsen says Democrats have no ideas (on Iraq). Jonathan Chait says Republicans are out of ideas (on everything). While on Iraq I don't think anyone has any idea (a state of affairs which can partially be laid at the feet of this administration, for so badly mismanaging the war that no option appears to be a good option), on other issues I side with Chait (stunning, I know). But seriously, what's been the last big idea from Republicans on any major issue of policy that's even been mildly popular? Social Security privitization bombed, the medicare "reform" is widely recognized to be a disaster, their only solution to the healthcare crisis are the crackpot "Health Saving Accounts," which aren't actually a solution even if one thinks they'll work exactly as planned (which they won't). As far back as a year and a half ago I was already claiming that Republicans had absolutely no agenda besides cutting taxes until the government went bankrupt. I think I've been vindicated.
Sirhan Sirhan, Robert Kennedy's assassin, is denied parole. He claims that Mr. Kennedy would not have wanted him to remain in prison. Jim Lindgren responds: "I suppose that it is just Sirhan's bad luck that somebody killed Robert Kennedy."
San Diego Law Professor Larry Alexander has a new paper arguing that "academic freedom" should not extend to professors when they are not doing an academic duty--e.g., politicizing their classroom. I only half-buy that argument anyway (I agree with it the context of a professor politicizing his Chemistry class, but disagree if it target's a professor expressing radical views in a "private," non-academic speech), but more importantly these endeavors always seem to boil down to trying to censure professors one disagrees with, irrespective of whether they are behaving inappropriately or not. And sure enough, Professor Alexander lays the blame directly at the feet of those favored whipping boys, the practicioners of "identity politics" and "crude post-modernism," making me suspicious that this is just one more salvo in the ongoing war between the liberal and conservative wings of the professoriate (and their respective allies). Thanks to Rick Garnett with the heads-up.
In California, a man wants the city to pay for damage done to his truck when a city dump truck crashed into it. The problem? The same guy was driving the dump truck at the time.
A family is suing its doctor because he didn't discover signs of likely birth defects in a developing fetus. The family claims that had they known of them, they may have chosen to abort.
Michael Froomkin reports that a slim plurality of Americans support Senator Feingold's censure motion--primarily due to surprisingly high numbers from Republicans. The FRC accuses Feingold (and presumably, the plurality of Americans who support his motion) of treason. As for me, I think intimidating dissenters into silence is far more treasonous to American ideals than holding a President accountable for breaking the law.
According to Kevin Drum, the most common word people associate with George W. Bush is "incompetent." Followed immediately by "idiot" and "liar."
Professor Bainbridge (with a cool new site design) still supports the retailiatory reaction against Justice David Souter for his Kelo vote. I still think he's wrong. So does Ann Althouse.
Mark Olsen says Democrats have no ideas (on Iraq). Jonathan Chait says Republicans are out of ideas (on everything). While on Iraq I don't think anyone has any idea (a state of affairs which can partially be laid at the feet of this administration, for so badly mismanaging the war that no option appears to be a good option), on other issues I side with Chait (stunning, I know). But seriously, what's been the last big idea from Republicans on any major issue of policy that's even been mildly popular? Social Security privitization bombed, the medicare "reform" is widely recognized to be a disaster, their only solution to the healthcare crisis are the crackpot "Health Saving Accounts," which aren't actually a solution even if one thinks they'll work exactly as planned (which they won't). As far back as a year and a half ago I was already claiming that Republicans had absolutely no agenda besides cutting taxes until the government went bankrupt. I think I've been vindicated.
...Versus a Four-Year Old Child
I want to thank everyone who commented on my query of when "life" begins. I received many erudite responses, all of which helped clarify the position in my eyes. I am sufficiently convinced to take as a provisional position that a fetus is endowed with moral personhood at the commencement of higher brain activity. This seems like a suitable brightline, and is intellectually coherent as it seems to actually correspond to a feature we feel importantly distinguishes humans from other creatures. This does raise interesting questions about the non-health-related abortion of a fetus whose higher-brain function has begun (I gather this happens around the 3rd trimester). I think some commenters were too glib in saying that even these abortions should be left entirely between a women and her doctor, but it's a tough issue. I also want to note a provocative argument made by philosopher Judith Jarvis Thompson (cited by Lindsay Beyerstein):
It's an interesting claim. But that's not what I want to go into right now.
What actually has been nagging at me is the example I gave to show why "life begins at conception" isn't really a viable position. I'm going to modify it slightly to provide some symmetry for the point I'm going to be making, but I don't think it really changes the base analysis:
The point of the question is that I'd clearly save the four-year old. And I would not feel the slightest bit guilty about it. By contrast, if the blastulae were equally "persons" to the child, I'd presumably be obligated to save the blastulae (there being more of them), and leave the child. I can't imagine any person with a soul actually doing that though.
The problem, though, is that on further reflection, the argument may prove too much. Consider this modified scenario:
Here's where the problem lies, because I'd still probably save the four year old. I'd feel incredibly guilty about it, but I cannot imagine I'd turn away from a child crying for help in the face of a few infants. I'm just guessing my visceral reaction here, but I really think I'd do it. However, I don't think that infants are not full moral human beings, and I don't think they can be generally deprived of their rights as persons.
At first, I was willing to chalk this up to my predisposition to linking moral personhood to enhanced brain activity--four-year olds top infants on that score. Problem number one with that approach is that it ruins my brightline--I dislike stupid people, but I definitely don't think they deserve fewer rights, so creating a sliding scale of protection linked to brain function is problematic. Problem number two is that the analogy falls apart in the face of the next scenario:
Uh-oh. Even here I can easily see myself saving the child. Again, with lots of guilty feelings, but that's my gut. Why is that? It's hard to think of a rational reason. I think that we have a deep-set aversion to letting children come to harm. It seems that at least part of that sentiment stems from the feeling that a child's gifts have not had time to develop, the potential they hold within them is still untapped. Oh God, the potential argument! I thought we got rid of that back in the last post, when responding to the point that a fetus was a "potential" human being. But, like a video game boss character, it has re-emerged from the dead, in far stronger form than when we last battled. Whereas the mere potential of a fetus to become a human being does not intuitively drive me to recognize its full rights as a person, the potential of a toddler to become a great poet or brilliant scientist leads me to give it considerably enhanced protection compared to other persons.
Of course we give additional protection to small children all the time, for a variety of reasons. But none seems particularly applicable here. Small children are comparatively more helpless than adults, but then, so are fetuses (and blastulae). Society has a special interest in developing the talents of its young, but generally "special interests" don't extend to letting many people die so that one can live. Nor is this a triage situation; the child is no more or less likely to survive the fire than the accountants, should you choose to rescue her.
I'm not even precisely sure how this relates back to the abortion debate (if it does at all). But it's a moral dilemma that's been troubling me for some time. Am I entirely off-base here? Or is there some justification for my decision to over-protect four-year olds over other people?
What does this all mean?
In a famous paper the pro-choice philosopher Judith Jarvis Thompson assumes the full human rights of fetuses for the sake of argument and goes on to make a very strong argument for the permissibility of abortion. This is a radical view, even among pro-choicers. Normally we don't think that the right to bodily sovereignty entitles us to kill another person who is impinging intextricably upon your person but who is not directly threatening your life....[However,] Thompson doesn't say that the woman's right to control her own body simply overrides the fetus's right to life. Rather, she maintains that an innocent person's right to life doesn't include the right not to be killed if that person should inadvertently end up parasitizing another person's body against their will.
It's an interesting claim. But that's not what I want to go into right now.
What actually has been nagging at me is the example I gave to show why "life begins at conception" isn't really a viable position. I'm going to modify it slightly to provide some symmetry for the point I'm going to be making, but I don't think it really changes the base analysis:
If a fire breaks out in a fertility clinic and you can only save a petri dish with three blastulae or a four-year old child, who do you save if all are equally persons?
The point of the question is that I'd clearly save the four-year old. And I would not feel the slightest bit guilty about it. By contrast, if the blastulae were equally "persons" to the child, I'd presumably be obligated to save the blastulae (there being more of them), and leave the child. I can't imagine any person with a soul actually doing that though.
The problem, though, is that on further reflection, the argument may prove too much. Consider this modified scenario:
If a fire breaks out in a hospital and you can only save three newly born, 5-week old triplets, or a four-year old child, who do you save if all are equally persons?
Here's where the problem lies, because I'd still probably save the four year old. I'd feel incredibly guilty about it, but I cannot imagine I'd turn away from a child crying for help in the face of a few infants. I'm just guessing my visceral reaction here, but I really think I'd do it. However, I don't think that infants are not full moral human beings, and I don't think they can be generally deprived of their rights as persons.
At first, I was willing to chalk this up to my predisposition to linking moral personhood to enhanced brain activity--four-year olds top infants on that score. Problem number one with that approach is that it ruins my brightline--I dislike stupid people, but I definitely don't think they deserve fewer rights, so creating a sliding scale of protection linked to brain function is problematic. Problem number two is that the analogy falls apart in the face of the next scenario:
If a fire breaks out in an office building, and you can only save three fifty-year old accountants, or a four-year old child, who do you save if all are equally persons?
Uh-oh. Even here I can easily see myself saving the child. Again, with lots of guilty feelings, but that's my gut. Why is that? It's hard to think of a rational reason. I think that we have a deep-set aversion to letting children come to harm. It seems that at least part of that sentiment stems from the feeling that a child's gifts have not had time to develop, the potential they hold within them is still untapped. Oh God, the potential argument! I thought we got rid of that back in the last post, when responding to the point that a fetus was a "potential" human being. But, like a video game boss character, it has re-emerged from the dead, in far stronger form than when we last battled. Whereas the mere potential of a fetus to become a human being does not intuitively drive me to recognize its full rights as a person, the potential of a toddler to become a great poet or brilliant scientist leads me to give it considerably enhanced protection compared to other persons.
Of course we give additional protection to small children all the time, for a variety of reasons. But none seems particularly applicable here. Small children are comparatively more helpless than adults, but then, so are fetuses (and blastulae). Society has a special interest in developing the talents of its young, but generally "special interests" don't extend to letting many people die so that one can live. Nor is this a triage situation; the child is no more or less likely to survive the fire than the accountants, should you choose to rescue her.
I'm not even precisely sure how this relates back to the abortion debate (if it does at all). But it's a moral dilemma that's been troubling me for some time. Am I entirely off-base here? Or is there some justification for my decision to over-protect four-year olds over other people?
What does this all mean?
Wednesday, March 15, 2006
Etz Chaim
David Bernstein compares the Federalist Society to Conservative Judaism (which, as some of his commenters now have been made aware, is quite different from conservative Judaism. Capitalization matters, folks!).
The Federalist Society: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be."
Conservative Judaism (as expressed by Rabbi Kenneth Cohen): "[T]he role of the rabbi is not to decide what the law should be, but rather what the law is."
But wait! Follow up on that Cohen quote:
A tree of life? Sounds like a living constitution to me!
People often forget how legalistic Judaism is (indeed, that was one of Jesus' early critiques, was it not?). It is definitely a law based religion. So all of those later texts that are so important to us--the Talmud, the Mishnah, Responsa, etc.--all are essentially legal interpretations, akin to court rulings. That's why examining the Jewish tradition can yield such fascinating insights on legal thought. We've got thousands of years of experience dealing with a fluid and flowering tradition.
The Federalist Society: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be."
Conservative Judaism (as expressed by Rabbi Kenneth Cohen): "[T]he role of the rabbi is not to decide what the law should be, but rather what the law is."
But wait! Follow up on that Cohen quote:
Nevertheless, there are always new situations which were not clearly anticipated in the classical literature. For instance, rabbis have always insisted that smoking is prohibited on Shabbat. But recent health data might compel a rabbi to rule that smoking is prohibited altogether. Although this is an innovation, it is in conformity with the Torah injunction to preserve life. Similarly, our understanding of human sexuality has undergone remarkable changes in recent years. This information needs to be considered sensitively when applying Jewish law.
Halacha has never been determined in an ivory tower, removed from the "real world." It has always reflected the environment in which it thrived. The Torah is an "etz chaim - a tree of life" with solid and ancient roots but also with branches and leaves which continue to grow.
A tree of life? Sounds like a living constitution to me!
People often forget how legalistic Judaism is (indeed, that was one of Jesus' early critiques, was it not?). It is definitely a law based religion. So all of those later texts that are so important to us--the Talmud, the Mishnah, Responsa, etc.--all are essentially legal interpretations, akin to court rulings. That's why examining the Jewish tradition can yield such fascinating insights on legal thought. We've got thousands of years of experience dealing with a fluid and flowering tradition.
Tuesday, March 14, 2006
Cut Some Slack
Orin Kerr (over at his new blog! Check it out!) writes about so-called "good driver stops." Basically, if a cop sees you showing good driving ettiquite, they pull you over, but instead of giving you a ticket, they give you tickets...to a sports game. Or some other fabulous prize!
The tragedy is, according to Professor Kerr, that these stops may be unconstitutional. To be fair, there are good reasons to be wary. Kerr notes that:
Once someone is pulled over in a traffic stop, if the police officer sees something that tips him off that another crime may have occurred (a marijuana joint on the passanger seat, for example), he can search the vehicle for that purpose too.
That concern troubles me too, but I'd like to think we can find a way out of it--if for no other reason than I like people being nice to each other, and giving me free baseball tickets is a nice thing to do.
It seems like we must be drawing this line in some contexts anyway with Terry stops though. The police can "stop and frisk" me if they have reasonable suscpicion I'm either committing or am about to commit a crime. Fine. And if I live in a small town, where I know the local beat cop, he might come up to me for no other reason than to say hi, chat about my family and school, etc.. If he sees a gun-like bulge in my jacket pocket, can he stop and frisk me just off that? I think probably--but I'm not sure I think that's a problem either. It seems weird to say the original conversation with the cop is a 4th amendment violation. And maybe my friendly neighborhood cop is a distinct situation from a traffic cop--its more of an imposition to be stopped while driving, for example. But at the same time, clearly we have to have mechanisms that let police officers be nice people and good community members without implicating the 4th amendment.
Kerr also does not believe that this program encourages good driving either, but I'm still undecided on the subject: presumably that depends on how many good driver awards are given out. Eventually you get a panoptican effect (but in the nice, fuzzy, Santa Claus way). But even if the odds are low, people might driver safer anyway. After all, people buy lottery tickets based on much lower odds (admittedly, a much higher payoff too). And even beyond that, just the news of the program and the stories might exert subtle pressure on people to drive more safely--benefits which might exceed marginal.
I'm not so invested in these programs that I want to preserve them at all costs. If "good driver stops" mean the 4th amendment becomes effectively meaningless on the highways, then I'll let it go. But I'd like to think that we can get around this. Can good cops be good neighbors too?
The tragedy is, according to Professor Kerr, that these stops may be unconstitutional. To be fair, there are good reasons to be wary. Kerr notes that:
Another reason the programs run into constitutional difficulty is the juxtaposition of the programs with the permissive rule of Whren v. United States. Whren offered a bright line rule: Probable cause to believe that a person has violated a traffic regulation justifies a traffic stop, even if the stop is pretextual (that is, the officer really has no interest in enforcing the traffic laws). If "good driver" stops are constitutional and co-exist with Whren, you end up with what strikes me as a pretty remarkable result. Unless I'm missing something, the police would be able to pull over pretty much any one at any time. Any driver who is violating any traffic regulation could be pulled over under Whren, and any driver who is not violating a traffic regulation could be pulled over under the "good driver" program.
Once someone is pulled over in a traffic stop, if the police officer sees something that tips him off that another crime may have occurred (a marijuana joint on the passanger seat, for example), he can search the vehicle for that purpose too.
That concern troubles me too, but I'd like to think we can find a way out of it--if for no other reason than I like people being nice to each other, and giving me free baseball tickets is a nice thing to do.
It seems like we must be drawing this line in some contexts anyway with Terry stops though. The police can "stop and frisk" me if they have reasonable suscpicion I'm either committing or am about to commit a crime. Fine. And if I live in a small town, where I know the local beat cop, he might come up to me for no other reason than to say hi, chat about my family and school, etc.. If he sees a gun-like bulge in my jacket pocket, can he stop and frisk me just off that? I think probably--but I'm not sure I think that's a problem either. It seems weird to say the original conversation with the cop is a 4th amendment violation. And maybe my friendly neighborhood cop is a distinct situation from a traffic cop--its more of an imposition to be stopped while driving, for example. But at the same time, clearly we have to have mechanisms that let police officers be nice people and good community members without implicating the 4th amendment.
Kerr also does not believe that this program encourages good driving either, but I'm still undecided on the subject: presumably that depends on how many good driver awards are given out. Eventually you get a panoptican effect (but in the nice, fuzzy, Santa Claus way). But even if the odds are low, people might driver safer anyway. After all, people buy lottery tickets based on much lower odds (admittedly, a much higher payoff too). And even beyond that, just the news of the program and the stories might exert subtle pressure on people to drive more safely--benefits which might exceed marginal.
I'm not so invested in these programs that I want to preserve them at all costs. If "good driver stops" mean the 4th amendment becomes effectively meaningless on the highways, then I'll let it go. But I'd like to think that we can get around this. Can good cops be good neighbors too?
Sunday, March 12, 2006
Use It or Lose It
I've had these links sitting on my computer for awhile, and kept planning on writing an insightful and fascinating blog post about them. Alas, that never materialized. So now, I just want to get them down so I don't lose them forever. They're reviews of two books on the Jewish community in India. Very interesting.
The first is of the book "Who Are The Jews of India", and the second is of "Burnt Bread and Chutney: Growing Up Between Cultures--A Memoir of an Indian Jewish Girl". The former got a great review, the latter got a more lukewarm reception. But in general, the topic is one I find fascinating.
Particularly interesting was the relative lack of anti-Semitism against Jews in India (compared to the murderous violence they faced in Europe and the Middle East). Several hypothesis have been forwarded for this fact--India's polyglot nature being more tolerant of diversity in general, the lack of Abrahamic roots in either Buddhism or Hinduism checking against minor theological disputes turning into holy wars, or more generally the polytheistic nature of Hinduism allowing for other Gods to co-exist in peace. Irregardless, the Jewish community in India is a relatively happy story for our people, and proof positive that being in the diaspora does not have to mean either assimilation or persecution.
I'll admit I know very little about the Indian Jewish community. I did know it existed, and I knew that it's presence had heavily contributed to the thawing of India/Israeli relations after the cold war, as well as the burgeoning tourism industry in India catering to Israeli civilians. If I get time, I'd love to pick these two books up.
The first is of the book "Who Are The Jews of India", and the second is of "Burnt Bread and Chutney: Growing Up Between Cultures--A Memoir of an Indian Jewish Girl". The former got a great review, the latter got a more lukewarm reception. But in general, the topic is one I find fascinating.
Particularly interesting was the relative lack of anti-Semitism against Jews in India (compared to the murderous violence they faced in Europe and the Middle East). Several hypothesis have been forwarded for this fact--India's polyglot nature being more tolerant of diversity in general, the lack of Abrahamic roots in either Buddhism or Hinduism checking against minor theological disputes turning into holy wars, or more generally the polytheistic nature of Hinduism allowing for other Gods to co-exist in peace. Irregardless, the Jewish community in India is a relatively happy story for our people, and proof positive that being in the diaspora does not have to mean either assimilation or persecution.
I'll admit I know very little about the Indian Jewish community. I did know it existed, and I knew that it's presence had heavily contributed to the thawing of India/Israeli relations after the cold war, as well as the burgeoning tourism industry in India catering to Israeli civilians. If I get time, I'd love to pick these two books up.
Rite of Passage
Guess what! I got my first hate-comment on my blog today! On my "On the Shelf" post, "A Goyim" wrote in the comments:
Part of me feels like I should be upset, but I'm not. Honestly, it feels like a rite of passage. Once you get your first piece of hate mail, that's when you know you've made it.
So I guess the fact that I've been blogging almost two years now without getting a message like could be seen as an indicator that I'm still a minor player in the blogosphere. But I prefer to see it as a sign of just how wonderful the folks who comment regularly on my blog are. You know who you are. I see other blogs and know how lucky I am that we have virtually no trolls and no flame wars here. That's a blessing. And both when you agree with me and when you don't, I love your input and thank you for your patronage.
Zionism is disgusting.
Don't pass the buck. The billions and billions of bucks and nuclear secrets, Mr. Moneybag Israelite.
What do I think when I look at a list of fascistcorporate CEOs and see Steinbergs, Bernstiens, Cohens, Wolfowitzs, etc? Sure, What a bunch of evil Christians! You f--king twit.
Christianity doesn't even exist in todays world, except as ZIONISM, it is a dead religion.
Part of me feels like I should be upset, but I'm not. Honestly, it feels like a rite of passage. Once you get your first piece of hate mail, that's when you know you've made it.
So I guess the fact that I've been blogging almost two years now without getting a message like could be seen as an indicator that I'm still a minor player in the blogosphere. But I prefer to see it as a sign of just how wonderful the folks who comment regularly on my blog are. You know who you are. I see other blogs and know how lucky I am that we have virtually no trolls and no flame wars here. That's a blessing. And both when you agree with me and when you don't, I love your input and thank you for your patronage.
Friday, March 10, 2006
Darfur Meltdown
The UN has announced its cutting its aid budget to Darfur in half. Its stated reason? The area has gotten so dangerous that UN workers can't utilize most of the resources at their disposal. To me, that's an excellent tip-off that hey, maybe the time has past for just sending in aid workers, and it's time to send in some blue helmets instead. But alas, that appears not be the case.
The AU has just extended its mission in Sudan so that there still might be some troops (ill-equipped and undermanned as they are) in Darfur while the UN and other international actors continue to delay sending in their own forces. Sudan has vigorously opposed any UN intervention, going as far as to threaten terrorist strikes if UN boots hit the ground in Darfur. It's a vicious cycle--the AU knows that it is in way over it's head and wants the UN to relieve it, but the UN desparately wants to avoid any tangible action and thus wants to act as if the AU mission is succeeding.
But it's not all bad news! Check out this offer by the Sudanese government:
Reinforce or "reinforce"? I'm sure the Darfur refugees feel safer already, with at least 5,000 troops from the government dedicated to their extermination arriving on the scene.
It would be funny if it weren't so genocidal.
The AU has just extended its mission in Sudan so that there still might be some troops (ill-equipped and undermanned as they are) in Darfur while the UN and other international actors continue to delay sending in their own forces. Sudan has vigorously opposed any UN intervention, going as far as to threaten terrorist strikes if UN boots hit the ground in Darfur. It's a vicious cycle--the AU knows that it is in way over it's head and wants the UN to relieve it, but the UN desparately wants to avoid any tangible action and thus wants to act as if the AU mission is succeeding.
But it's not all bad news! Check out this offer by the Sudanese government:
Sudan said earlier Friday it would reinforce African Union troops in Darfur with 10,000 men, half of them Sudanese armed forces and half former southern Sudanese rebel SPLA soldiers who have been integrated into the Sudanese army.
Reinforce or "reinforce"? I'm sure the Darfur refugees feel safer already, with at least 5,000 troops from the government dedicated to their extermination arriving on the scene.
It would be funny if it weren't so genocidal.
The Sound and The Fury
Ex-Justice Sandra Day O'Connor lashes out at the anti-judicial right. She sounds furious. Regarding Tom DeLay's rants after the Schiavo rulings:
And regarding Senator Jon Cornyn:
Retirement seems to suit Sandra. It's about time members of the judiciary started standing up for themselves in the face of an unrelenting assault on their dignity and character from the right.
In related news, the FRC endorses impeaching judges who issue rulings they disagree with (note: the FRC's site is notoriously fickle--I have no idea if this URL will point to the same site I witnessed).
"This was after the federal courts had applied Congress' one-time-only statute about Schiavo as it was written--not as the Congressman might have wished it were written. The response to this flagrant display of judicial restraint was that the Congressman blasted the courts..."
And regarding Senator Jon Cornyn:
"It doesn't help when a high-profile senator suggests there may be a connection between violence against judges and decisions that the senator disagrees with."
Retirement seems to suit Sandra. It's about time members of the judiciary started standing up for themselves in the face of an unrelenting assault on their dignity and character from the right.
In related news, the FRC endorses impeaching judges who issue rulings they disagree with (note: the FRC's site is notoriously fickle--I have no idea if this URL will point to the same site I witnessed).
Racist Faucets
Nick Schulz's rant against auto-flushers didn't blow me away, but I loved this anecdote:
Ah...structural racism at work.
Hands-free toilets and faucets are certainly smarter now than when they first came on the market. Pete DeMarco told me that when automatic fixtures first got popular in the early 1990s, they had difficulty detecting dark colors, which tended to absorb the laser light instead of reflecting it back to the sensor. DeMarco remembers washing his hands in O'Hare Airport next to an African-American gentleman. DeMarco's faucet worked; the black man's didn't. The black guy then went to DeMarco's faucet, which he had just seen working seconds before; it didn't work. This time DeMarco spoke up, telling him to turn his hands palm side up. The faucet worked.
Ah...structural racism at work.
Thursday, March 09, 2006
Life Begins At...?
I'm not a big abortion blogger. It seems most people view abortion in terms of black and white. It's either akin to slaughtering babies, or it's a key aspect of woman's rights. And since the arguments seem to devolve into these simplistic terms rather quickly (even more so than in most political arguments), I remain confused.
One important question in this debate is when life begins. Pro-lifers have a very simple answer: at conception. Pro-choicers have a bevy of objections to this. Some are pragmatic (""If a fire breaks out in a fertility clinic and you can only save a petri dish with five blastulae or a two-year old child, which do you save if all are equally persons?"). Others are theoretical--it is fair to argue that even if life begins biologically at conception, one does not have moral personhood until some later part of development (incidentally, the Catholic Church used to abide by this through the doctrine of "ensoulment", which did not happen "at conception" but (I believe) two months into pregnancy. But I digress). Peter Singer essentially believes this--he says that a fertilized egg is unquestionably alive, and unquestionably part of homo sapiens, so its a bit peculiar to say its not a "living human." He continues to argue that something else besides being biologically alive is required before one has complete human rights. Unfortunately, Professor Singer also defends infanticide, a position most pro-choice people would rather disassociate themselves from. On the flip side, some people say that it is illogical to assert even "biological life" begins at conception. PZ Myers takes this view, arguing that the privileging of fertilization over other stages of fetal (and human) development is completely arbitrary.
Thus, I'll group the objections to the "life begins at conception" (LBAC) claim in the following categories: it's (a) practically untenable, (b) based on falsely replacing moral personhood with biological personhood, and/or (c) biologically arbitrary.
All fair objections, and I find them compelling. But we still need to answer the question: when does life begin--if for no other reason than we think killing "people" is generally bad, so we need to establish who "people" are so we can avoid killing them. If one believes that "In a free society a woman would be able to terminate with absolute ease an unwanted pregnancy for any reason that strikes her fancy" (and I realize that not all self-identified "pro-choice" people sign on to that statement), then one needs to create a definition of life that precludes a fetus at any stage from being included. Because if a fetus is a full human (or at least as fully human as an infant) at any point in its development, then abortion "for any reason" becomes morally untenable. So I give an open question to pro-choice bloggers out there: when does life begin?
The answer should avoid the objections that are lodged against LBAC if it's going to be valid. One can object to LBAC on any or all of these grounds, but to be even-handed one kind of has to make sure one's own definition doesn't fall into the same trap. If the only objection is practicality, then why wouldn't "life begins at viability" be a valid response (which would sanction many abortions)? That seems practical in most cases, and while there are cases where it runs into trouble (life of the mother, for example), that problem also manifests itself in certain cases with post-natal children (a child with a severe medical deficiency born to a family with no health insurance bankrupting them). If the objection is based on "moral personhood", then when does one receive moral personhood--and will that definition also sanction killing newborns and/or the severely disabled (or even the elderly)? If the objection is based on biological arbitrariness, then explain why your standard is less biologically arbitrary than conception.
Again, I'm not taking a position as to any of these. As I pointed out, LBAC has serious flaws that I think preclude it from being a sensible standard for the abortion debate. But I do think it is valuable to explicate when full human life begins if not at conception. So have at it, pro-choicers--my comment boards (and/or trackbacks, if that's what you prefer) are yours.
UPDATE: A brief clarification, because I think I'm being misunderstood. Several people have said that the important question is not when life begins, but when we begin to protect life. In other words, the claim that moral personhood, not biological personhood, is the kicker question. That's lovely--I'd be inclined to agree with it myself. But that just shifts the question back a notch--when does moral personhood begin? If that's the position you take, then that's the question you have to answer, in lieu of "when does life begin," because I suspect the pro-lifers would argue that moral personhood is endowed at the same moment biological personhood is--I.E., at conception.
One important question in this debate is when life begins. Pro-lifers have a very simple answer: at conception. Pro-choicers have a bevy of objections to this. Some are pragmatic (""If a fire breaks out in a fertility clinic and you can only save a petri dish with five blastulae or a two-year old child, which do you save if all are equally persons?"). Others are theoretical--it is fair to argue that even if life begins biologically at conception, one does not have moral personhood until some later part of development (incidentally, the Catholic Church used to abide by this through the doctrine of "ensoulment", which did not happen "at conception" but (I believe) two months into pregnancy. But I digress). Peter Singer essentially believes this--he says that a fertilized egg is unquestionably alive, and unquestionably part of homo sapiens, so its a bit peculiar to say its not a "living human." He continues to argue that something else besides being biologically alive is required before one has complete human rights. Unfortunately, Professor Singer also defends infanticide, a position most pro-choice people would rather disassociate themselves from. On the flip side, some people say that it is illogical to assert even "biological life" begins at conception. PZ Myers takes this view, arguing that the privileging of fertilization over other stages of fetal (and human) development is completely arbitrary.
Thus, I'll group the objections to the "life begins at conception" (LBAC) claim in the following categories: it's (a) practically untenable, (b) based on falsely replacing moral personhood with biological personhood, and/or (c) biologically arbitrary.
All fair objections, and I find them compelling. But we still need to answer the question: when does life begin--if for no other reason than we think killing "people" is generally bad, so we need to establish who "people" are so we can avoid killing them. If one believes that "In a free society a woman would be able to terminate with absolute ease an unwanted pregnancy for any reason that strikes her fancy" (and I realize that not all self-identified "pro-choice" people sign on to that statement), then one needs to create a definition of life that precludes a fetus at any stage from being included. Because if a fetus is a full human (or at least as fully human as an infant) at any point in its development, then abortion "for any reason" becomes morally untenable. So I give an open question to pro-choice bloggers out there: when does life begin?
The answer should avoid the objections that are lodged against LBAC if it's going to be valid. One can object to LBAC on any or all of these grounds, but to be even-handed one kind of has to make sure one's own definition doesn't fall into the same trap. If the only objection is practicality, then why wouldn't "life begins at viability" be a valid response (which would sanction many abortions)? That seems practical in most cases, and while there are cases where it runs into trouble (life of the mother, for example), that problem also manifests itself in certain cases with post-natal children (a child with a severe medical deficiency born to a family with no health insurance bankrupting them). If the objection is based on "moral personhood", then when does one receive moral personhood--and will that definition also sanction killing newborns and/or the severely disabled (or even the elderly)? If the objection is based on biological arbitrariness, then explain why your standard is less biologically arbitrary than conception.
Again, I'm not taking a position as to any of these. As I pointed out, LBAC has serious flaws that I think preclude it from being a sensible standard for the abortion debate. But I do think it is valuable to explicate when full human life begins if not at conception. So have at it, pro-choicers--my comment boards (and/or trackbacks, if that's what you prefer) are yours.
UPDATE: A brief clarification, because I think I'm being misunderstood. Several people have said that the important question is not when life begins, but when we begin to protect life. In other words, the claim that moral personhood, not biological personhood, is the kicker question. That's lovely--I'd be inclined to agree with it myself. But that just shifts the question back a notch--when does moral personhood begin? If that's the position you take, then that's the question you have to answer, in lieu of "when does life begin," because I suspect the pro-lifers would argue that moral personhood is endowed at the same moment biological personhood is--I.E., at conception.
On The Shelf
It's finals season here in Northfield, and I'll admit to being swamped. Today was a big day in that respect--my last Hebrew test ever was taken, and I sent in my 15 page case note for Constitutional Law. On the horizon remains the final draft of a 10 page Hebrew research paper (due next Wednesday), my Hebrew oral exam (Friday), my Constitutional Law final exam (Monday or Tuesday), a 5 page Science and Society paper (Tuesday), and a 12 page Science and Society research paper (Tuesday). So yeah, blogging may take a back seat.
But even in the depths of soul-crushing work, I still make time to read. I'm in the middle of Notes of a White Black Woman: Race, Color, Community, by Judy Scales-Trent. It's quite good (though not as awe-inspiringly amazing as Kenji Yoshino's "Covering", which I finished a few weeks ago. Best book I've read in ages). Also on my laptop are two SSRN downloads: "The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and Their History" by Bernadette Meyler (H/T: Rick Garnett), and "An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics" by Susan Pace Hamill (H/T: Dan Filler). The former just plays off a generic taste I have for Religion Clause jurisprudence. The latter holds interest to me because I've skimmed its prequel article, "An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics." The latter article was written by Professor Hamill in support of a plan to overhaul Alabama's insanely regressive tax structure so that it was fairer to the poor. Needless to say, I support that goal. However, as frequent readers of the blog know, anytime I read "Judeo-Christian" my stomach ties in knots, and in fact I first found this article when composing a scholarly critique of "Judeo-Christian." In her overview of the impact "Judeo-Christian" arguments had on American political development, she cites almost entirely to Christian actors, with a single reference to Rabbis supporting the Civil Rights movement buried at the end of a footnote. And unfortunately, this new article (which I am only part way through) appears to suffer from the same flaw--a lot of analysis on "Christian" ethics, with a "me-too" citation to a single Jewish scholar at the end of each point (at least the scholar--Elliot Dorff--is a name I know and respect on the subject).
This isn't to be too hard on Professor Hamill--I'd suspect that the Jewish tradition would, in fact, be appalled by the Bush administration's tax policy, though perhaps for different reasons. But I still can't shake the feeling that the "Judeo" is present in these arguments less for the independent perspective the tradition provides on difficult moral questions, and more to add faux-diversity to a single-sect argument. Basically, saying that something is justified by "Christian ethics" seems narrow and provincial, while saying its justified by "Judeo-Christian ethics" seems to add at least some degree of cultural pluralism. But we're being used, people--if it turned out that the Jewish perspective was incontestably different from the Christian one, I suspect Professor Hamill would not change her article in the slightest--she'd just drop the "Judeo" pretense entirely and focus entirely on "Christian ethics." And why not? It fulfills her stated goals just as well--by her own admission, nearly 80% of America identifies as Christian (with around 2% claiming to be Jewish)--in Congress, that number rises to over 90%. If the objective is to show the powers that be that they aren't adhering to their own stated value systems, then Jews are a pretty small player in the game. I like seeing Jewish arguments on topics of moral importance as much as the next guy, but I'd rather they be presented as independently valuable, as opposed to Christianity's ethnic doppelganger.
But even in the depths of soul-crushing work, I still make time to read. I'm in the middle of Notes of a White Black Woman: Race, Color, Community, by Judy Scales-Trent. It's quite good (though not as awe-inspiringly amazing as Kenji Yoshino's "Covering", which I finished a few weeks ago. Best book I've read in ages). Also on my laptop are two SSRN downloads: "The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and Their History" by Bernadette Meyler (H/T: Rick Garnett), and "An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics" by Susan Pace Hamill (H/T: Dan Filler). The former just plays off a generic taste I have for Religion Clause jurisprudence. The latter holds interest to me because I've skimmed its prequel article, "An Argument for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics." The latter article was written by Professor Hamill in support of a plan to overhaul Alabama's insanely regressive tax structure so that it was fairer to the poor. Needless to say, I support that goal. However, as frequent readers of the blog know, anytime I read "Judeo-Christian" my stomach ties in knots, and in fact I first found this article when composing a scholarly critique of "Judeo-Christian." In her overview of the impact "Judeo-Christian" arguments had on American political development, she cites almost entirely to Christian actors, with a single reference to Rabbis supporting the Civil Rights movement buried at the end of a footnote. And unfortunately, this new article (which I am only part way through) appears to suffer from the same flaw--a lot of analysis on "Christian" ethics, with a "me-too" citation to a single Jewish scholar at the end of each point (at least the scholar--Elliot Dorff--is a name I know and respect on the subject).
This isn't to be too hard on Professor Hamill--I'd suspect that the Jewish tradition would, in fact, be appalled by the Bush administration's tax policy, though perhaps for different reasons. But I still can't shake the feeling that the "Judeo" is present in these arguments less for the independent perspective the tradition provides on difficult moral questions, and more to add faux-diversity to a single-sect argument. Basically, saying that something is justified by "Christian ethics" seems narrow and provincial, while saying its justified by "Judeo-Christian ethics" seems to add at least some degree of cultural pluralism. But we're being used, people--if it turned out that the Jewish perspective was incontestably different from the Christian one, I suspect Professor Hamill would not change her article in the slightest--she'd just drop the "Judeo" pretense entirely and focus entirely on "Christian ethics." And why not? It fulfills her stated goals just as well--by her own admission, nearly 80% of America identifies as Christian (with around 2% claiming to be Jewish)--in Congress, that number rises to over 90%. If the objective is to show the powers that be that they aren't adhering to their own stated value systems, then Jews are a pretty small player in the game. I like seeing Jewish arguments on topics of moral importance as much as the next guy, but I'd rather they be presented as independently valuable, as opposed to Christianity's ethnic doppelganger.
Tuesday, March 07, 2006
The Terror Check
Giving more ammo to the realist case for Darfur intervention, Restless Mania points to a column by Darfur expert Eric Reeves. He writes that Sudan has been threatening any potential intervention force with the prospect that al-Qaeda fighters will materialize in the country to fight the UN troops.
This argument is an almost exact parallel of the "don't let China check" argument. That argument basically said that if a country becomes a Chinese client state, and we let Chinese opposition stop an intervention in the event of a massive human rights catastrophe (like genocide), then other oppressive regimes will get the idea that they should enter the Chinese umbrella to slaughter their citizens with impunity. Sudan is ground-zero for this theory, since it is a major ally of China and China has been working to scuttle international intervention efforts. Apparently, Khartoum is experimenting with terror in the same way. And similarly, if other countries see that becoming a quiet al-Qaeda host acts as a deterrent to foreign intervention, we give a massive incentive for hostile nation's to encourage the growth of terror infrastructure in their borders. That would turn the "war on terror" into a farce.
[I]f there are indeed al-Qaeda elements in Khartoum ("people in Khartoum who were not in Khartoum before"), it is because the National Islamic Front has permitted them to be there, and almost certainly encouraged them to be there. The NIF hosted Osama bin Laden from 1991-1996---the formative years for al-Qaeda. And even when bin Laden departed for Afghanistan in 1996, extremely close ties were preserved through, and after, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Khartoum's ruthlessly efficient Mukhabarat certainly knows the whereabouts in Sudan of terrorist elements; and any decision to allow them to remain is a deliberate, carefully calibrated threat directed against the possibility of a UN peacekeeping force, and more generally the international community. Khartoum is willing, in short, to use the threat of terrorism---which it can certainly control---as a means of forestalling international actions that might halt genocide.
If the international community yields to this threat, it will become a precedent well noted in other quarters in Africa and elsewhere around the world.
This argument is an almost exact parallel of the "don't let China check" argument. That argument basically said that if a country becomes a Chinese client state, and we let Chinese opposition stop an intervention in the event of a massive human rights catastrophe (like genocide), then other oppressive regimes will get the idea that they should enter the Chinese umbrella to slaughter their citizens with impunity. Sudan is ground-zero for this theory, since it is a major ally of China and China has been working to scuttle international intervention efforts. Apparently, Khartoum is experimenting with terror in the same way. And similarly, if other countries see that becoming a quiet al-Qaeda host acts as a deterrent to foreign intervention, we give a massive incentive for hostile nation's to encourage the growth of terror infrastructure in their borders. That would turn the "war on terror" into a farce.
Monday, March 06, 2006
Cross Purposes
Ah, competing forces at work. On the one hand, we have The Family Research Council announcing a presentation on "The Authentic Pro-life Tradition of Judaism". It purports to chronicle Judaism's pro-life ways, then "unmasks the attack launched against it by Jewish liberals in the latter half of the Twentieth Century." The speaker is one Richard Nadler, whose expertise in this complex area of Talmudic law is well set out in this biography the FRC provides:
Yep, chock full of theological expertise. By which I mean, none that is apparent aside from writing the book around which his talk is based. In absence of that, I'm going to stick with the article by Rabbi David M. Feldman, "This Matter of Abortion," in Contemporary Jewish Ethics: A Reader (Elliot N. Dorff & Louis E. Newman, eds., New York: Oxford UP 1995): 382-391. Rabbi Feldman is the author of Birth Control in Jewish Law and Health and Medicine in the Jewish Tradition. It's a complex and nuanced argument, but what it comes down to is that abortion is nearly universally not considered to be murder in Jewish tradition, and that a "principle in the Jewish view...is...that her [the mother's] welfare, avoidance of her pain, comes first." Though I hesitate to pass judgment on Mr. Nadler without hearing his argument, I'd be very interested to see how he deals with the significant amount of historical (well before the middle of the 20th century--we're talking Rashi here) support Rabbi Feldman musters for his position.
On the other side of things, the Grey Lady reports that the Conservative Jewish movement (whom I affiliate with) is considering lifting its ban on homosexual marriage and rabbinic ordination (H/T: MoJ). Obviously, I support this move, and the article makes it seem like the proposal is in good shape--because of Judaism's pluralistic tradition, the opinion only needs 6 votes in the 25 member committee to become a valid legal opinion.
Judaism's flexibility and tolerance for a diverse array of perspectives has always been one of its greatest strengths. I hope that my denomination's leaders will make me proud to be a Conservative Jew when this issue comes to a vote.
Richard Nadler is a free lance journalist and policy analyst. A co-founder of the American Shareholders Association, he authored The Rise of Worker Capitalism (Cato Institute, Nov. 1, 1999), and The Influence of Intensity Factors on the Political Opinions of Investors (Dean Witter Foundation, Jan. 12, 2001). Mr. Nadler co-authored The Kyoto Protocol and U.S. Agriculture (Heartland Institute, Oct. 1, 1998) and Republican Issue Advertising in Black and Hispanic Population Areas: A Meta-Study of the 2002 Mid-Term Elections (Access Communications Group, Feb. 2003). He is the author of political biographies on Sen. Phil Gramm and commentator Pat Buchanan, and a frequent contributor to such publications as National Review, Policy Review, Insight Magazine, Education Reform News, and Human Life Review.
Yep, chock full of theological expertise. By which I mean, none that is apparent aside from writing the book around which his talk is based. In absence of that, I'm going to stick with the article by Rabbi David M. Feldman, "This Matter of Abortion," in Contemporary Jewish Ethics: A Reader (Elliot N. Dorff & Louis E. Newman, eds., New York: Oxford UP 1995): 382-391. Rabbi Feldman is the author of Birth Control in Jewish Law and Health and Medicine in the Jewish Tradition. It's a complex and nuanced argument, but what it comes down to is that abortion is nearly universally not considered to be murder in Jewish tradition, and that a "principle in the Jewish view...is...that her [the mother's] welfare, avoidance of her pain, comes first." Though I hesitate to pass judgment on Mr. Nadler without hearing his argument, I'd be very interested to see how he deals with the significant amount of historical (well before the middle of the 20th century--we're talking Rashi here) support Rabbi Feldman musters for his position.
On the other side of things, the Grey Lady reports that the Conservative Jewish movement (whom I affiliate with) is considering lifting its ban on homosexual marriage and rabbinic ordination (H/T: MoJ). Obviously, I support this move, and the article makes it seem like the proposal is in good shape--because of Judaism's pluralistic tradition, the opinion only needs 6 votes in the 25 member committee to become a valid legal opinion.
Judaism's flexibility and tolerance for a diverse array of perspectives has always been one of its greatest strengths. I hope that my denomination's leaders will make me proud to be a Conservative Jew when this issue comes to a vote.
Bolt of Lightening
Regarding my previous post on the evangelical movement and progressivism, two great articles are in the latest edition of the Washington Monthly. Amy Sullivan has a piece entitled "When Would Jesus Bolt," and it should provide a hopeful note to the pessimistic tone my post set. She claims that the new leaders of the evangelical movement is getting increasingly pissed at the old guard's complete state of servitude to the Republican party, and is more and more willing to look toward the Democratic party as an alternative. That's a signal of the institutional shift I said wouldn't happen. But my analysis was predicated on the partisan loyalties of the current evangelical leadership--if we're approaching a changing of the guard there, the whole situation changes. Kevin Drum is a bit more cautious, but thinks its an avenue worth pursuing. I concur, and think this is a superb place to wedge the GOP. We won't rollup the whole religious votes, but I think we can make an impact, and in many places that's all that matters. We'll probably always disagree on abortion, on gay marriage, on contraception, and issues of that sort. But that shouldn't stop us from making common cause on AIDS research, on humanitarian intervention, and on human rights.
The second article is on the Prince of the Christian Right, Ralph Reed. It's not anything too new, but it does buttress the point made in the first. Reed has completely sold out his evangelical supporters (if he ever truly supported them in the first place). An out-and-out Abramoff clone, Reed shares both the lobby mafiaso's vices and lack of virtues. When the last temptation of Reed is revealed, it's going to be a backbreaker for that wing of the Christian Right.
Maybe I wouldn't give you all this, but Rachel Sullivan said she liked the post. And I'm happy to follow up on posts people like. That's the customer service you expect from The Debate Link!
The second article is on the Prince of the Christian Right, Ralph Reed. It's not anything too new, but it does buttress the point made in the first. Reed has completely sold out his evangelical supporters (if he ever truly supported them in the first place). An out-and-out Abramoff clone, Reed shares both the lobby mafiaso's vices and lack of virtues. When the last temptation of Reed is revealed, it's going to be a backbreaker for that wing of the Christian Right.
Maybe I wouldn't give you all this, but Rachel Sullivan said she liked the post. And I'm happy to follow up on posts people like. That's the customer service you expect from The Debate Link!
Sunday, March 05, 2006
Free Expression
This is actually an interesting story about Hamas' response to al-Qaeda's call for continued Palestinian violence against Israel, but for me it's all overshadowed by this statement:
Hamas: Fighting for political liberalism since five hours ago.
The source is the Daily Times of Pakistan--I'm not sure how credible they are. But the quote itself comes from AFP, which is credible, so I feel comfortable running it.
The main thrust of the story, anyway, is that Hamas will do whatever it feels is in the interest of Palestine, regardless of whether al-Qaeda likes it or not. The Hamas official's position also seemed quite positive:
I'm still putting my money on the peace rhetoric being political posturing, coming as it did while a Hamas delegation was visiting Russia (Putin shows once more why he's not ready to join the West). But the brush-off of al-Qaeda I think may be more genuine. I think Hamas has no interest in becoming a subsidiary of al-Qaeda's war on the West, seeing its conflict as separate and also seeing itself as a far more effective organization at achieving its ends than al-Qaeda ever will be.
Anyway, interesting stuff.
Asked whether the timing of the appeal to Hamas from the network led by Osama Bin Laden had made Hamas leaders uncomfortable, Nazzal said only that Zawahiri "has the right to express his opinion".
"We believe in free thinking and free opinion," he said. "We can't suppress any opinion against our own opinion."
Hamas: Fighting for political liberalism since five hours ago.
The source is the Daily Times of Pakistan--I'm not sure how credible they are. But the quote itself comes from AFP, which is credible, so I feel comfortable running it.
The main thrust of the story, anyway, is that Hamas will do whatever it feels is in the interest of Palestine, regardless of whether al-Qaeda likes it or not. The Hamas official's position also seemed quite positive:
We are saying 'yes' to peace. We are saying 'yes' to building relations with the international community. We are saying 'yes' to anything we feel will be in the interest of the Palestinian people.
I'm still putting my money on the peace rhetoric being political posturing, coming as it did while a Hamas delegation was visiting Russia (Putin shows once more why he's not ready to join the West). But the brush-off of al-Qaeda I think may be more genuine. I think Hamas has no interest in becoming a subsidiary of al-Qaeda's war on the West, seeing its conflict as separate and also seeing itself as a far more effective organization at achieving its ends than al-Qaeda ever will be.
Anyway, interesting stuff.
On The Up And Up
It's bragging time. The nationally distributed college magazine I'm an editor for just won 2nd place in the Associated Collegiate Press' Newspaper of the Year award. Given that this was our first edition ever, I'd call this a big deal. So go us.
You can access The Lens online here, featuring an article by yours truly.
You can access The Lens online here, featuring an article by yours truly.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
