How Do You Watch Sad Kids' Movies With Your Kid?

When I was a kid, I didn't watch violent movies (violent defined broadly -- I'm not talking about gore, I mean even a PG-13 action movie). It wasn't really a "rule" -- I just wasn't interested. I remember being reticent to watch Renaissance Man because it had army men on the box cover and I thought it'd be a war movie (turns out, it was a silly comedy, which was exactly my speed).

Once I became a teenager, I was a little shocked when I saw young kids being allowed to watch violent movies -- again not gory ones, but just your standard PG-13 action flick. Is that okay? Are they going to be okay, seeing all that?

But now that I have a kid, and I think about kids' movies ... yeesh. They're so sad! They're all about watching your parents brutally die (Bambi, The Lion King), or desperately trying to find your missing child (Finding Nemo--after said child watches the other parent brutally die), or being abandoned by the one who you thought was your forever friend (Toy Story). Honestly, I'd rather see some baddies get popped in Mission Impossible.

Now, to be clear, I'm not saying these movies are inappropriate for children. I read research saying that these sorts of movies teach important lessons to young kids (about empathy, for instance), Nor am I saying I don't want or won't let me kid watch them (said lessons are important to learn, and in any event one of my parenting rules is that I don't want to pass on my neurosis to my child).

But boy howdy, I don't want to watch them myself, because I will be inconsolable and I can't imagine that's going to do Nathaniel any favors. We might have to create a household rule that mom is the one who takes Nathaniel to movies like that. She's made of sterner stuff than me.

Pictured: A movie I never have and never will see, no matter what

The Impossibility of Bibi Agreeing To Peace

A hypothetical question for Israel supporters.

Suppose Israel was asked to craft the contours of a peace deal in Gaza. And suppose they were allowed to put any conditions they wanted into that deal, subject to just two limitations:

1. Palestinians cannot be compelled, directly or indirectly, to leave the Gaza Strip;
2. Palestinians must be given full citizenship and democratic rights in whatever sovereign nation agrees to control Gaza.

The first is essentially a rule against ethnic cleansing, the second a rule against apartheid.

Beyond those stipulations, Israel is allowed to put any conditions it likes into the deal.

I do not claim, to be clear, that so long as these conditions are met any agreement between Israel and Palestine would necessarily be just. Rather, I present these as the absolute, barest-of-the-bare minimum redlines that must be respected no matter how one-sided the remaining conditions are in Israel's favor. And the point of the exercise is that, so long as these minimums are acceded to, Israel can load up the "deal" as favorably as it wants.

Given that, my question is simple: could this Israeli government come up with a deal that meets these parameters?

And my suspicion is no, it couldn't. The "unthinkable thought" of 2019 is now a reality. And the impossibility of Israel agreeing to a peace deal that abides by even this extraordinary minimums is a large part of why Israel drags this war on and on and on.

Start with the second proviso. The framing is a requirement of equal citizenship in "whatever sovereign nation controls Gaza", and that ambiguity is intentional: it could encompass an independent Palestinian state, or it encompass Israeli annexation. But of course, this makes the dilemma apparent: Bibi and his coalition are dead-set against allowing an independent Palestinian state to exist, but they are also implacably opposed to incorporating Gaza Palestinians into the Israeli state (at least, on equal citizenship).

This (for Bibi) conundrum inspires increasingly desperate and fanciful efforts to escape the impossible bind -- for example, proposing that some other Arab state assume control of Gaza (for obvious reasons, nobody seems interested in stepping up). The increasingly open gestures towards full ethnic cleansing also can be understood through this "dilemma" -- the fewer Palestinians who remain in Gaza, the less daunting annexation looks.

And ultimately, the impossibility of resolving this problem makes all the other conditions we sometimes talk about moot. Questions about return of the hostages, demilitarization, right of return, reparations, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state -- I don't want to say they're unimportant, but while Bibi is in charge they're epiphenomenal. Even if Israel got what it says it wants along all these fronts (immediate return of the hostages, a demilitarized Palestinian state, rejection of right of return, compensation for 10/7, recognition), I genuinely don't think that this government could say "yes" to the deal if it meant either accepting an independent Palestinian state or incorporating Palestinians into Israel as full and equal citizens. Maybe if you loaded up some comically evil and implausible conditions ("reparations to the tune of $1 trillion/year") -- but that would just emphasize that the response of the Israeli government to this hypothetical would be to search frantically for a way to not make the deal.

For what it's worth, this toxic feature of Bibi and his cronies does I think mark out a tangible and meaningful difference between the current Israeli governing coalition and its realistic rivals. It's become popular to denigrate the belief (or "fantasy", as Ezra Klein said) among liberal Zionists that "Bibi is the problem" by observing that a core hostility to Palestinian rights and equality is shared among a much broader segment of Israeli society (including leading opposition figures) than many would care to admit. There is, regrettably, something to this critique -- but the hypothetical I'm pursuing here does I think suggest how it might be overstated, because I do think that the main opposition would be substantially different along these lines. They have no eagerness to create a Palestinian state, but it is not an immovable object for them; opposition to it does not lie at the center of their entire ideological being. It's not guaranteed or even easy, but given the right conditions, one can imagine them making a deal. With Bibi, one can't -- and that's a big difference.

But in the meantime, it is Bibi in control of Israel, and with Bibi in charge of Israel the impossibility of resolving this problem is a critical reason why the war continues. Agreeing on the contours of a peace deal only is relevant when peace is at hand. So long as Israel remains at war, it can delay having to decide an impossible choice. (The fact that once the war ends Bibi probably has to reckon with his criminal charges is also a factor, and a related one -- it goes to the point that Bibi wants the war to continue and is endangered by the prospect of it ending, no matter what the terms are).

In a different context almost 20 years ago, Ehud Olmert mocked those who obsessed over the exact acreage of a peace deal as having supposedly existential stakes for Israel's existence. 

“With them, it is all about tanks and land and controlling territories and controlled territories and this hilltop and that hilltop,” he said. “All these things are worthless.”

He added, “Who thinks seriously that if we sit on another hilltop, on another hundred meters, that this is what will make the difference for the State of Israel’s basic security?”

The hills don't matter, but pretending like the hills do matter, and matter so much that we couldn't possibly make a deal unless we are absolutely guaranteed to control these hills is a way of forestalling having to make a decision on the deal. And the same thing feels true in Gaza. All the talk about needing to destroy one more Hamas battalion, root out one more tunnel network, take out one more "second-in-command" -- who seriously thinks that is what will make the difference? They're delaying mechanisms -- so long as Israel can say "we still must do these military things", they can avoid having to commit to a choice on peace they're fundamentally unwilling to make. Like "airstrikes while you wait", it's something to do while you can't think of what else to do.

All that said, I open to being persuaded otherwise. Tell me a set of provisions -- I wouldn't even demand that they be realistic, so long as they aren't utterly absurdist -- that comports with the above two limitations that you think Bibi would accept, and I'll consider it. But I'm skeptical they exist.

Thomas Massie Opposes All Foreign Aid. Also, He's Antisemitic

The JTA has an article about the backlash AOC is experiencing for voting against an amendment that would defund Israel's "Iron Dome" defense system. It's interesting reading, and I'm curious whether the backlash will have the desired effect (pushing AOC to a more uncompromisingly anti-Israel position) or the exact opposite (convincing her that there is no pleasing these people and she's better off ignoring them).

But that's not the part I want to talk about. Rather, there was a tiny aside in the article that I suspect most of you didn't notice but which jumped out at me.

While AOC voted against the amendment, the article lists off the six House Representatives who voted in favor. The two sponsors, Marjorie Taylor Greene and Ilhan Omar, plus four others:

In addition to Omar and Greene, Democrats Al Green of Texas, Rashida Tlaib of Michigan and Summer Lee of Pennsylvania also supported it, as well as Thomas Massie, a Kentucky Republican who opposes all foreign aid.

Do you see it? It's that explanatory qualifier for Massie. The other five are implied to be motivated by anti-Israel hostility, but Massie is presented as operating on a larger isolationist principle. We shouldn't group him in with the other five.

The thing is, it's true that Massie opposes all foreign aid. But it's also true that he's one of the most antisemitic members of Congress, and his votes against Iron Dome should absolutely be read in that light. He was the sole vote against a resolution condemning antisemitism. He introduced a "Dual Loyalty Disclosure" bill clearly inspired by neo-Nazis who think Jews are secret Israeli agents, for crying out loud.

So why isn't that the relevant explanatory context? Yes, Massie is an isolationist, but there's a long history of paleo-conservative isolationists guzzling antisemitic broth, and Massie seems clearly to be of that ilk. Yet for some reason, the instinct is to elide that history -- no, worse, to actively obscure it. One could defend doing with him what JTA did with his three colleagues -- simply noting their votes without elaboration. But if one is going to single Massie out and say "this guy needs more context", it is absurd to offer a framing that is predominantly exculpatory to the guy who once tweeted about pitting "Zionism" against "American patriotism".

It's often suggested that Republicans think they have a get-out-of-antisemitism-free card so long as they are "pro-Israel", and too many Jewish institutions accept that card as fair currency. But I really think the rot runs deeper than that -- there's just a deep, fundamental resistance to identifying Republican antisemitism at all. Massie is a clear case -- he's certainly not "pro-Israel" under any normal definition, but even he gets favorable framing of the sort that would never be extended to the Ilhan Omars of the world (even though I think Massie's "Zionism" vs "patriotism" tweet is far more egregiously antisemitic than, say, Omar's "Benjamins" remarks). I'm not going to say it's impossible to overcome -- Greene's "Jewish Space Lasers" bit seems to have penetrated -- but it seems that even anti-Israel Republicans still benefit from the halo that assumes, against all evidence and logic, that Republicans who might appear to be acting on hostility to Jews must have some nobler or more reasonable excuse behind their actions.

Timeless Pop

The Wall Street Journal has an article about the faltering art market. Of course, they're talking about the ultra-high end -- "sales of $10 million-plus paintings" -- which is completely irrelevant to the art I'm interested in. I caught myself trying to caveat that with some logic like "except that it nudges higher-end collectors downward to the sorts of pieces I could afford, pushing their prices up," but the truth is even that's delusional. There are many, many levels between me and the sort of collector who might even consider an $80 million sculpture.

But there was one line in the article that interested me:

Art is vulnerable to shifts in taste. Baby boomers who favor abstract expressionists and pop art may find it hard to offload their collections to younger buyers. Millennial and Gen Z collectors aren’t showing interest in the same artists. Cultural signals have moved on: Warhol’s screen prints of Jacqueline Kennedy or Marilyn Monroe may not carry the same potency for coming buyers.

I like pop art, and I'd certainly be delighted if the heavies came down. Of course, the last art auction I followed saw a Lichtenstein ("Blonde", from the surrealist series) go for double the pre-auction estimate, so, you know, maybe not quite falling to pieces yet (to be clear: "Blonde" is a print, and so it's worth nowhere near the mega-millions paintings talked about in the WSJ article).

But this passage did make me think that we're probably at a pivot point for 20th century art, including pop. Specifically, I think we're approaching the point of post-speculation. It's less and less of a question "who are the (very few) figures who are genuinely going to stand the test of time as THE artists of their generation?" The pecking order might shuffle a little bit, but not by all that much. And so there's less bubble pressure buying someone in the hopes that they'll be "the next big thing". Yes, there's always revisitations and attempts to pull up someone unappreciated in their time, but odds are if someone hasn't broken through by now, they're probably not going to.

For pop, if you ask me who the consensus "THE artists" are, I'd say the convergence is on Lichtenstein and Warhol. And from that vantage point, the above quoted passage suggests a potential vulnerability in the latter compared to the former. Warhol's cachet is tied to cultural icons whose potency, I suspect, is rapidly fading. This is the risk of pop -- its whole point is to comment on the ephemeral nature of popular culture, and little of popular culture, even that which seems immortal, is truly timeless (see also: Elvis).

Lichtenstein, by contrast, I think is much better positioned simply because he isn't as tied to such period-specific figures. His cachet is tied to comics, a medium rather than an icon, and that gives him more staying power, I think. The short version of this is that in 2065, I think society is much more likely to still be interested in comics than it is to be interested in Marilyn Monroe.

Dick Fallon RIP

I saw yesterday the sad news that Harvard Law Professor Dick Fallon had passed away from cancer at age 73. Apparently the cancer diagnosis came relatively suddenly; most people did not know he was sick.

I certainly did not know Dick as well as many of those eulogizing him. But I did have one significant occasion to interact with him. 

In 2019, I was writing my "Sadomasochistic Judging" article technically as a book review of Fallon's "Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court", though a review in the "law journal" style of book review where the book is a thinly-veiled excuse to talk about things I already wanted to talk about.

Anyway, that fall he happened to be keynoting the Loyola Constitutional Law Colloquium, which I attend each year and where I was going to be presenting a draft of my article. I was a total nobody at the time -- still in grad school at Berkeley -- but Dick attended my talk and gave warm feedback. Since it was technically a review of his book, I remember specifically asking him whether he felt I had presented his views fairly, he responded by saying that as a rule he tries "to avoid comment on other people’s readings of [his] work," because once "it is out in the public domain, I have no more expertise than anyone else about how my words ought to be read or interpreted." It was, I told him, a genuinely principled non-originalist position!

Non-comment notwithstanding, he was very complimentary about the project and clearly just a warm and inviting figure. I'm sorry I didn't get to know him better. May his memory be a blessing.

Making ... Friends ... Is .... Important

Jill and I made new friends recently.

This was a big deal because, if I'm being honest, I had kind of given up on making new friends.

That's a slight exaggeration. A closer truth was that I was kind of waiting until Nathaniel started going to school and/or daycare, where we'd presumably make friends with other parents. But relying on your six-month-old to make friends for you seems kind of pathetic.

Although, effectively, that's what happened anyway. We were out on a walk with Nathaniel where we serendipitously ran into some neighbors doing the same thing with their kiddo. She is a little older than Nathaniel is, but still in his basic age range, and in a rare burst of extroversion I decided I was not going to let this opportunity go to waste. We made small talk, exchanged numbers, and invited them over to our house for dinner and board games. And fortunately, we seem to have hit it off. Friendship unlocked.

I am not the first to observe that\ making friends as an adult is hard. You're playing the game on easy while in school -- surrounded by people around your age and chock full of common experiences. Out in the real world, you have to put some elbow grease into friendship. Work can be a substitute, but for someone like me whose workplace doesn't include many age peers, it's not really a parallel. What you really need to do is go out and do activities, which never was really my jam (here marrying my best friend is a disadvantage -- why would I expend time and effort into going out to do things with other people when my favorite person is already next to me on the couch?).

Nonetheless, friends are important. I am worried about social isolation and the decaying of social bonding opportunities. I don't have macro-solutions for it, so I'll just pat myself on the back for actually going out and making friends.

Abstaining on Mamdani

Even after his upset primary win a few weeks ago, there have been some Democrats who have been trying to rally an "independent" candidate to beat Democratic Socialist Zohran Mamdani in the general election. It's an endeavor I view as scurrilous, for the same reason I found third party protest voting in 2024 or 2020 or 2016 scurrilous: Democrats should support the results of the Democratic primary, and certainly should not risk letting in a reactionary because their heart just isn't moved by the Democratic nominee. There may be extraordinary exceptions to this rule, but Zohran Mamdani is not one of them. If Joe Walsh gets it, the rest of us can too.

But to be honest, I view this as a bit of a moot point, because the attempt to rally an anti-Mamdani seems to be sputtering.  As the Wall Street Journal puts it, the anti-Mamdani initiative suffers from missing a few key ingredients, such as "a positive message" and "a candidate" and "enough votes to win." Seems problematic.

This broader fizzling out has, I think, a more specified Jewish parallel. Reports of Jewish loathing of Mamdani are wildly overstated, but there's no doubt many have concerns, and some of those concerns are legitimate. While I think the criticisms of his condemnations of the Colorado and DC attacks are wildly unfair, his statement immediately following 10/7 was genuinely bad, and Jews are allowed to find worrisome his support for BDS and his refusal to denounce the slogan "globalize the intifada."

Yet while there's been a lot of media froth about these issues, my sense is these concerns haven't actually manifested in widespread Jewish backlash to Mamdani. There are concerns, but not panic. And more often than not, it seems, many NYC Jews are just not venturing that loud of an opinion at all, even where they do disagree with Mamdani, on issue areas that in years past we might have really seen a widespread blowup. What's going on?

My mind returns to a post I wrote at the very tail-end of the Obama administration, following his decision to, for the first and only time, abstain from voting on or vetoing an anti-Israel UN Security Council resolution reaffirming that the Israeli settlements in the West Bank were unlawful (you might remember the abstention as the one Tim Walz voted to condemn).

The usual suspects on the right went ballistic about the Obama administration's "betrayal of Israel". And for my part, I was well-familiar with all the arguments against enabling such UN resolutions -- the general bias of the institution, its naked double-standards where Israel was concerned, specific language in the resolution itself that seemed to downplay legitimate Jewish connection to Jerusalem. But my post was about why, in spite of all that, I just could not bring myself to get mad about it.

But I just can't bring myself to be angry. I read the usual suspects falling over themselves in histrionic rage -- Mort Klein ranting that "Obama’s anti-Semitism runs so deep that he also apparently needed to drive one more knife into Israel’s back," Netanyahu saying he "colluded against Israel", David French fulminating against the supposed "50 years of foreign policy" undone by a single abstention -- and I just can't do it. I can't.

The ADL -- which murmurs empty platitudes about the President's right to implement policy when picking avowedly anti-two-stater David Friedman for Ambassador -- suddenly is "incredibly disappointed" that the Obama administration followed consistent American policy in opposition to the settlements? The JFNA -- which (and this was forwarded to me by an AIPAC-attending friend of mine) "has not said ONE THING about Islamophobia and anti-Semitism from Trump and his appointees" -- sure found its voice on this one.

[....]

Will this resolution do any good? I doubt it. It's empty words from a body whose words deservedly carry little credit. Still, much of international diplomacy is the art of using empty words to send messages. Maybe the message here is that breathless hysterics about Obama selling Israel out! over and over and over again won't carry the day forever. Certainly that's a message I can get behind, regardless of whether anyone pays attention to the substance of the resolution.

I just can't take seriously anymore people who simultaneously decry America's policy towards Syria as being naught but words, while breathlessly characterizing one -- one -- abstention on a UN resolution that is consistent with longstanding American policy towards Israel as an act of "aggression". One would think that those "mere words" would pale in comparison to $38 billion in aid America will be giving Israel thanks to Obama's leadership. The UN is not the only entity whose words carry little credit these days. I've completely lost whatever confidence I had in mainline Jewish groups to maintain a sense of proportion and principle when it comes to defending a secure, democratic, Jewish state of Israel.

The UN resolution won't accomplish anything. Perhaps its only tangible impact is that it is felt as a rebuke by the Israeli government. Given their behavior over the past eight years towards the Obama administration and the American Jewish community writ large, I can't even be mad about that. You're not getting everything you want, all the time, from your "friends"? Welcome to the club.

So I abstain on this fight. Why shouldn't I? If I believe -- and I do -- that the settlements are "a" (not "the") obstacle to peace, and I believe -- and I do -- that Israeli settlement on territories in the West Bank should be contingent on a final, negotiated status agreement with the Palestinians, and I believe -- and I do -- that part of any remotely plausible peace plan means that not everyone will get to live on the precise acre of land that they wish, why should I muster up any outrage on this resolution? Because its verbiage isn't perfect? When is it ever? Because the UN is biased? Of course it is, but so what? Because the Netanyahu administration is trying its level best to negotiate a two-state solution and this throws a wrench in their delicate plans? Don't make me laugh.

Fast forward to today, and I think a lot of people are feeling something similar to this. A simple way of putting it would be that the comportment of the Israeli government over the past (at least) 18 months has been so abysmal that it has made many of us considerably more tolerant of anti-Israel criticism than we might have been in years past. Even the criticisms we don't personally agree with, don't seem so far out-of-bounds -- they might not be what we believe, but they're not wildly out of range of what we believe.

But things run deeper than that. Part of what we're seeing is an exhaustion over being asked to go to the mat for an Israeli government that we know -- we know -- would never lift a finger for us in return. They view people like us with the utmost contempt, even as they scream at us to show good Jewish solidarity and back them to the hilt. The post-10/7 story has been Jewish liberals patiently extolling the need to understand military necessity and holding complexity and remembering the hostages, with the Israeli government responding by openly promising to starve out Gazans while selling out the hostages, all to keep the war going as long as possible in order to save Netanyahu's political skin and satisfy the far-right's expansionist agenda of ethnic cleansing. Virtually every narrative of justice that could have been mustered on Israel's behalf in the wake of 10/7 has, by Israel's own hand, been made out to be a cruel joke. Jay Michaelson got it exactly right: they've made us feel like freiers -- sucks, fools, saps.

At some point, one just doesn't want to do it anymore. What's the point? Again, it's not that we don't have reasonable concerns. But after the 50th iteration of having a reasonable concern about someone's 10/7 tweet transmogrified by right-wing extremists into "hell yeah, we should cut all of Columbia's funding and deport the students to South Sudan!", one eventually learns to keep quiet.

So that's what I think we're seeing. Partially, it's a greater tolerance for sharper criticisms of Israel than might have been accepted in year's past. But partially, it's just a decision to abstain -- to withdraw from the one-sided bargain where American Jews serve as Israel's defense attorney and Israel thanks us by spitting in our food and calling us suckers. Enough is enough.