While there is by now a relatively large contingent of Democrats opposing the sale of offensive weaponry to Israel, we're also seeing a growing push to try and forestall the sale of defensive weapons to Israel as well (most notably, the Iron Dome missile defense system). Iron Dome intercepts missiles and rockets being fired at Israel by groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and in doing so has saved countless civilian lives. Unsurprisingly, the endeavor to strip Israeli civilians of these protections is far more controversial than the effort to bar the sale of additional offensive weapons to Israel -- it seems to demarcate a clear difference between wanting to preserve Palestinian life versus wanting to extinguish Israeli lives.
So what is the argument against providing Israel with Iron Dome? This article in +972 provides an illustrative example of the case, which runs basically as follows: the existence of Iron Dome enables Israel to engage in military aggression without having to internalize the costs. Israel feels free to engage in military attacks basically at will, secure in the knowledge that any attempted reprisals will be blocked. By contrast, if Israel was more vulnerable to military attacks -- if it had to reckon with the reality that "the other side" really can hurt them too -- it would be more judicious about electing to commence its own military operations. An Israel which was forced to more tangibly endure the costs of the wars it started might be forced to consider other approaches to solving its various diplomatic (or even security) dilemmas beyond just bombing the problem away. And the hope is that, where all parties face real risk of injury or destruction, all parties will be more reluctant to resort to militarism in the first place.
There is a logic to this argument. But it isn't as straightforward as it sounds, and there is both a strategic and a moral objection one could level against it.
Start with the strategic objection. The above logic assumes that a country which is more vulnerable to external security threats will be less inclined to commence its own military operations (since doing so would risk triggering reprisals which, by stipulation, might cause it serious injury). Again, this logic is not implausible. But neither is it incontestable. Another story one could tell is that a country which faces substantial security vulnerabilities may become more aggressive, because the reality of a substantial security threat makes certain risks which might otherwise be tolerable become intolerable. If one gets intelligence that a militant group on your border is accumulating missiles, the way you respond if you're confident those missiles can be intercepted without causing significant harm is very different from the way you respond if those missiles pose a severe and substantial threat to your civilian population. The latter nation may be far more likely to attack preemptively in circumstances where the former country may not feel the need for an immediate proactive response.
In Israel's case, after all, the most concrete recent instantiation of Israel having to reckon with a significant security vulnerability -- a severe threat to its civilian population that it was unable to stop -- was October 7 itself. And no matter how one characterizes what happened next, the one thing that I think is entirely indisputable is that Israel reckoning with real and genuine security vulnerability did not cause it to pull back from militarism due to being forced to account for the possibility that the other side can really hurt them. Much the opposite: the concrete illustration of an acute security vulnerability made Israel lightyears more aggressive and more militaristic than it was before. A security situation it had previously thought it had "managed" now had revealed itself to be incalculably more dangerous than they realized, and the result of that realization was, to say the least, not a sober reassessment of the merits of military action.
Now, to be sure, I don't want to say that this argument is necessarily "right" either. Again, the initial critique has a logic to it as well; my suspicion is that the actual play-out will not vindicate either narrative without qualification. The point is simply to say that it is not self-evident, as it is sometimes presented to be, that taking away Iron Dome will yield a more cautious and less belligerent Israel.
But now let's go ahead and accept the premise. If we don't provide Israel with Iron Dome, it will be less militaristic, to the greater good of all. If one is in fact persuaded by this premise, I still think it is important to be very clear on what the core logic of this approach is. Clear away the rhetorical fog, and the argument here is simply this:
If more Israeli civilians were endangered or died, things would be better.
Again, I will reiterate: I accept there is an instrumental logic to this. The argument is not that Israeli deaths are good for their own sake, it's that they will prompt Israel to be more cautious and restrained, and ultimately reduce the net amount of conflict and warfare in the reason. My challenge above notwithstanding, this argument is not transparently absurd.
Nonetheless, we shouldn't obscure the point. The argument against Iron Dome is, by its nature, consciously attempting to leverage the endangerment of civilians for (noble) strategic ends. It is by no means the only argument that takes such a form: one need not venture far from Israel proper to hear other renditions of such a claim, that permitting greater endangerment of civilians will ultimately bring about peace faster. And all I will say to this is that there are good reasons why, bloodless strategic logic notwithstanding, progressives might want to draw a redline around arguments like this, and that if we do not draw such a line ourselves we cannot act too appalled when others don't draw redlines against other attempts to leverage the endangerment of civilians for good policy ends. For my part, I fully admit I lack the stomach to put innocent civilians at greater risk for the greater good, and I'm proud of my shortcoming in that respect.
I'll be honest though -- my gut sense is that the driving force behind those who want to take away Iron Dome is not any sort of assessment of the strategic debate I outlined above at all. It is a more primal rebellion against the perceived unfairness of it all: that Israel can wreak so much death and destruction on its neighbors and face comparatively little in return. I don't doubt that, for most of these people, the genuine hope really is a reduction in violence and death for everyone. But my strong suspicion is that, if that doesn't come to pass, a tolerable second-best outcome would be if Israeli civilian deaths rose to approach those of their neighbors. If it turns out that the elimination of Iron Dome does other than get a bunch more Israeli civilians killed -- it does not make Palestinians safer, it perhaps even puts them in more immediate peril -- well, we still have a karmic retribution if nothing else, and that's worth it on its own. And while I guess I can wrap my head around the egalitarian sentiment behind this, once again, I lack the stomach to engineer greater civilian death, even under as noble a rubric as "fairness".
Of course, not everybody is me. But if you are inclined towards opposing Israel having the Iron Dome based on the sketch provided above, I would ask that you have the courage to own your conviction. You are okay with leveraging civilian endangerment in order to achieve your desired policy ends. You of a kind with many other people, of many other ideological persuasions and of many other partisan loyalties across many other conflicts, that hold similar beliefs. Take note of the company you keep.
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