Religious Men

I'm pretty much in agreement with Kevin Drum that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Letter to President Bush does not exactly look like a promising breakthrough. But I am mildly creeped out by all the religion talk in the letter. Isn't it indicative that when one of the world's most evil, psychotic dictators thought

"hmm...what do I have in common with George W. Bush? What would be the theme I could strike most likely to resonate with the man?"

he immediately jumped to Bush's evangelical Christianity?

Ahmadinejad's letter also offers up the idea that liberal democracy has failed and that theocracy should replace it. This occurs at a time when the Christian right also has expressed its distaste for liberal enlightenment norms. Is this why Ahmadinejad thought Bush would find his message compelling? What does that tell us?

Not Dead Yet

Okay, so when I said I'd be blogging at full strength this week, clearly I was lying. This week has been work-drenched. I'll let you know when things settle down.

Hey, That's My Idea!

Via Concurring Opinions, I see that the Yale Law Journal (which already did something surprisingly sharp and cutting edge with its Pocket Part) is putting out a call for debate-style papers. Two professors with opposing views submit somewhat incomplete papers, then "develop" their ideas in response to objections from their partner.

At the risk of being self-aggrandizing, let me point out that I had this idea over a year ago:

Perhaps an alternative would be recasting the norm about what "acceptable" (esp. for tenure review) scholarship is. If academia was changed to be more debate oriented, with the expectation that professors would not just construct arguments but also actively engage in debate with their philosophical opponents, that could help ... giv[e] an alternative path to academic success beyond just making new claims and blissfully ignoring the scathing criticism coming from the other side of the political divide.

Always on top of the latest trends here at The Debate Link.

PrawfsBlawg is offering itself as a gathering point for scholars to partner up with each other on the project. But one of their commenters made a sobering point: It's possibly (and very likely) that the YLJ will go after the highest-profile names possible, setting up battle-royale matches between titans in particular fields. This would undoubtedly be fun to read, but makes life difficult for young guns who saw this as an opportunity to get their foot in the YLJ.

Sigh--my own brainchild, leaving me outside its gates.

Cultural Roadblocks on the Route to Equality

Belle Lettre has an excellent post the contra-contraception movement, both personally and politically (which, as the cliche goes and this post powerfully proves, are not very far apart at all). As Belle makes clear, there is a strong and growing political constituency growing out of the Christian Right that wishes to enact legal barriers to contraceptive use. They obviously pose a threat, but I feel like the battle lines are sufficiently well-fortified on that particular debate. What I find most interesting is Belle's description of how her upbringing in a conservative, Asian-American home impacted her autonomy and accessibility on these counts.

I was a campus feminist. But I was (am) also an Asian-American woman, raised in a very strict Asian household with a domineering father. I was forbidden to socialize with men, much less date--even after I turned 18, even after I entered college. I lived at home during college, and it was easy for them to control my social life--and I had enough disinclination to hurt my parents that I for the most part obeyed their draconian rules. But I was not always so inclined to follow the rules, and despite their best efforts, I managed to date secretly, seriously my college sweetheart for three years. Despite my own "abstinence only" education and strict moral upbringing, I, like so many other young men and women, disobeyed and disregarded the rules. It happens. It has always been, and it will always be that young people will, despite your best efforts to guide them, make "mistakes," ignore your teachings, and find their own path in life--right or wrong. I'm glad that though I did stray from the path of my fathers, I was able to guide myself, and protect myself--because the teachings I abandoned were no long applicable, and could no longer protect me on this new autonomous path. I am glad that because I was able to protect myself, I could keep my private life private, and my body my own business. I am glad that I never had to face the consequences of my father finding out about my "betrayal" -- because I would have surely suffered at his hands, and I would have surely feared for my life. The pressures of growing up are enough without being denied the information, tools, and means with which to guide and protect ourselves as we make our own life choices. Never forget that it is your life, and your body. And though I am not an extreme moral relativist, I do believe that with regard to your body and heart, you should be your own moral guide. And never forget how much all of this "debate" is pure sexual politics, designed to rob you of that autonomy.

These attitudes are not as uncommon as many suspect. Even in my liberal Washington suburb, I had a friend (half-Dutch, half-Japanese) who was forbidden by her parents to socialize with boys at all--even platonically. This led to some amusing/tense moments when she did do stuff with male friends (she went on a "beach week" trip with our whole high school crew--girls and guys--that she said was girls only. This was slightly more difficult to pull off since I was helping plan the transportation part of the trip). But while it was something I and her primarily joked about in school, it really was no laughing matter when they'd confine her to her room because she dared talk to me over AIM, or withdrew her from her college because she refused to consent to an arranged marriage (!).

All of this reminds me of a piece that I read from Kimberle Crenshaw in for my Feminist Theory class in the fall (it was excerpted in a book I don't have with me anymore, but it might have been from Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. L.F., 139-67). It's not that no White women have domineering fathers. It's that particular cultural expectations can make certain strategies (on the sexual health issue and others) that work fine for one ethnic group fail utterly for another. A battered woman's shelter, for example, does little to help a woman who is primarily confined to the home and who has no clue how to navigate the outside world without escort. Abuse hotlines assume that the abused women can use the phone unsupervised. Many crucial issues relating to sexual health assume that the participant is sufficiently autonomous to disobey strict orders from her parents; this can be unrealistic given certain socialization techniques. It's really easy to say that any girl who can't show the requisite autonomy to learn about sexual health isn't mature enough to be engaging in sexual activity in the first place. That may be true to an extent, but that cut both ways--if we're going to demand social autonomy as a precondition for engaging in these activities, then we can't act all shocked and horrified when young women do strike out on their own and try and break free of the traditional constraints their parents place upon them. I'd go further: If social autonomy is our standard, then I (ala Bruce Ackerman) think society has a positive obligation to help provide the tools and information necessary for women to develop independent judgments on issues of sexual health and morality, regardless of what their parents think (it goes without saying that sexual abstinence and chastity are perfectly valid choices, so long as they are made independently and not by social fiat). And since the barriers which prevent the full assertion of autonomous judgment vary from person to person and cultural background to cultural background, this quest will unquestionably require a plurality of techniques to respond to particular situations.

I should note that Belle's piece was cross-posted onto Feminist Law Professors, where she is visiting. I always figured that visiting blogging stints are kind of like visiting professorships--a chance to get some heightened exposure at a more prestigious institution, and perhaps (if you're lucky) a bit of a look-see for a permanent hiring. But even if that's not the case, it's a good sign that a bigger fish in the pond is reading and enjoying your work. So congratulations, Belle!

Back From The Bnai Mitzvot

My twins Bnai Mitzvot was a blast, but I'm glad to back. Hotel internet was infuriatingly spotty, so I couldn't post while I was away. Next week will be fully functional (I promise).

Clear as Day

It's rare to see racist ideology presented as clearly in today's day and age as it is in this Mark Noonan post. Wowzers.

Before I begin, I want to stake out my position on the use of the terms "racist" and "racism." There are people (though far fewer than the Right would suggest) who throw at the label "racist" at any hint of anti-progressive ideology dealing with racial matters. There is also a section of academia which wants to expand the definition of racism so that it encompassing all acts which preserve racial hierarchy, while concurrently recognizing that not everybody who participates in such an act should be subjected to the type of social ostracism that typically accompanies being tagged "racist."

I subscribe to neither camp. I believe that the term "racist" should only be used in the most serious cases, either in terms of specific acts of hate, violence, or prejudice, or ideologies which overtly proclaim one race to be manifestly superior to others. I think that more "moderate" cases should still be addressed, and addressed seriously, but I think that they are best met with terminology other than "racist." Using racism to address the non-extreme cases, in my view, devalues the term and reduces the credibility of the anti-racial hierarchy movement. If you want more on this, check out Lawrence Blum's spectacular book: "I'm Not a Racist, But...".

So basically, I'm not a raving leftist who tags people as "racist" at a drop of the hat. When I use it, I take it seriously. And this definitely qualifies.

I'm just going to excerpt from the parts that are the most, well, insane. Which, to be perfectly frank, is just about all of it:

There was, though, a certainty in the world in ages past - a century ago, it was taken as a natural that Europeans (and their American and Australian offspring) had developed not just a high civilization, but the highest civilization - a civilization so manifestly superior to all others in existence that it must be the result of some special ability on the part of those who built it[....]

It had its good and bad points, as all human constructs do - the most glaring bad point, of course, was the disgraceful way it treated non-white people, and even those white people who didn't measure up to an alleged Anglo-Saxon ideal. The largest good point, however, has been lost entirely - what has been lost is a conviction that the civilization is fundamentally good. Confronted with the crimes of racism and imperialism and deformed by the monstrosities of communism and Nazism, that European - or white, if you will - civilization has entirely lost the ability to look at itself and see something good. This sort of attitude is more prevalent on the political left, but I think that nearly all white people feel it to some degree...some sense that we got from point A to point C only by walking all over people at point B. Our success, as it were, is ill-gotten and thus not something we should ask anyone to emulate...better, especially in the mind of the leftwing elite, if we just leave well enough alone and, indeed, pretend that we've something fundamental to learn from other civilizations whom we once oppressed.

As Mr. Steele points out, this has led to a bit of half-heartedness on the war - We are, in a sense, afraid to apply our full might because that would seem to be a bullying approach...and unfair way to deal with people from other civilizations which never managed to advance themselves until they were forced into modernity over the past century.

As it is, I believe in the civilization I belong to - I believe, indeed, that it is a dispensation granted to mankind by a benevolent Providence. Our civilization is designed, especially in its American form, to liberate and advance all of our brothers and isisters [sic] who continue to labor under oppression, ignorance and poverty. It is this belief of mine which sustains me through the difficult day to day of the War on Terrorism - just because my civilization is excellent, it doesn't mean that the barbarians don't have a trick or two up their slieeve [sic], but knowing that my civilizations produced civilized soldiers while their produces nothing by murderous villians, I am encouraged.

In reading Mr. Steele's piece I began, I think, to better understand my leftwing readers - at bottom, they simply must be of the opinion that we are not the best, that American civilization, far too tainted with guilty white people, simply cannot be correct, and thus anyone we fight must have right on their side. Its a default mental mode, and I don't think we'll be able to shake them out of it - but at least Mr. Steele has given us a way to understand them, and thus work around them if we can't work with them.

The emphasis is my own--the ellipsis not in brackets are Mr. Noonan's in the original.

There are really two types of idiocy present above--the blatantly racist stuff, and the shoddy argumentative maneuvering that supports it. They're interconnected, but distinct in that the first is a moral failing on Noonan's part, and the second is a logical failing.

I object to three specific claims by Noonan in the "moral" category. First:

Our civilization is designed, especially in its American form, to liberate and advance all of our brothers and sisters who continue to labor under oppression, ignorance and poverty

The problem with this statement is that it is empirically denied, rather harshly, by the facts of the last two centuries. I don't even need to make the radical claim that the War on Terrorism is just Western imperialism run amok (because I believe the exact opposite in fact). Let me just run through the list that nobody denies: Slavery, colonialism, lynching, Jim Crow, the Holocaust, the slave trade (which, given its likely 8-figure death toll, deserves independent recognition from slavery), communism, the My Lai massacre, fascism, anti-semitism, misogyny, spousal rape exemptions, segregation, the Native American genocide, reservations, the Dreyfuss affair, the eugenics movement, Japanese internment, and child labor. I could go on. All had relatively prominent roles in Western civilization at points in the last 200 years. This isn't to say that any given one of those wasn't present elsewhere. But it's just not intellectually plausible for Noonan to dismiss all of this as a historical footnote or aberration from Western civilization. We're talking about procedures of death and destruction that led to a body count well into the 9-figures. One can recognize positive contributions made by the West to the global community while still realizing that these horrors cast doubt on the West's claims to being designed for liberation (more on this later).

Second:

pretend that we've something fundamental to learn from other civilizations whom we once oppressed.

and

people from other civilizations which never managed to advance themselves until they were forced into modernity over the past century.

The former claim is almost too idiotic to address. I'll just give out a reading list: W.E.B. Du Bois, Alain Locke, Fredrick Douglass, Kenji Yoshino, Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. should get you started.

As to the latter, I'm tempted to just refer Noonan to W.E.B. Du Bois, but I'll chime in with a few points of my own (still--read Du Bois. You might learn something from a person we had oppressed). For starters, I don't know what "modernity" means in this context. I'm assuming that Noonan is referring to the Enlightenment philosophical model developed from the 17th through the 19th century, focusing on individualism, the autonomous self, and the rights of persons. If that is indeed what he's talking about, then he is probably right that South America didn't have was not "modern." But then I have two questions.

First, with the Enlightenment model under attack from both the right and the left as being philosophically insufficient, why are we so happy to claim it as a perk? Again, there are loads of good things about the Enlightenment, but as commentators from throughout the political spectrum have noted, there are problems too--the emasculation of religion, the devaluing of communities and traditions, the destruction of solidarity, the myth of an atomic self, the inability of negative rights to secure positive liberty, and the persistence of subordinating ideologies even amongst the most "enlightened" civilizations. Why are we proclaiming our owe for a philosophy we (Republicans and Democrats) are in the process of rejecting--or at least heavily modifying? That moves me to the second problem: sure, Zanzibar probably didn't have a full panoply of rights prior to European colonialism, but it didn't have them during it, nor after it. And more importantly, neither did we. America was not and cannot be described as a "liberal" (in the philosophical sense) state while in the throes of Jim Crow and segregation. The response is always "well, we were liberal except for that," as if the official political suppression of millions of American citizens was just some afterthought we can cast aside. I'm sorry, but there is no way that can be considered a compelling argument. At best, the enlightenment model is an ongoing project that nobody has come close to achieving. And listening to the voices of oppressed peoples, their stories and analysis, might teach you that.

Third:

knowing that my civilizations produced civilized soldiers while their produces nothing by [sic] murderous villians, I am encouraged

How on earth does Noonan justify this without admitting naked racism, I have no idea. "Nothing [but] murderous villians"? If racism is defined (and I think this is a pretty restrictive definition) as the belief that a given civilization as a whole is completely and totally inferior to one's own, then saying that other civilizations produce only murderous villians leaps the bar without trouble. It's not even clear if Noonan is restricting this sweeping generalization to only Arabs (if not, see the above list), but even if so it's hardly warranted. Ibn Khaldun springs immediately to mind, and Saladin was without question both less murderous and less villainous than his Crusader counterparts. I'm not an expert in Arab history, but I'm sure I could go on here as well with only a cursory review. But there is no justifying this statement. At all.

The logical failing is simply an inability to grasp a middle ground between "always being the best" and "always being wrong". It's present in several places throughout the piece, but this excerpt works particularly well because the slide occurs within a single sentence:

at bottom, [liberals] simply must be of the opinion that we are not the best, that American civilization, far too tainted with guilty white people, simply cannot be correct, and thus anyone we fight must have right on their side.

Let me spell it out. We aren't always "the best", which doesn't mean we "cannot be correct." I think we've been correct on plenty of issues--one of which, incidentally, is overthrowing oppressive regimes like Hussein's and the Taliban. We've also been wrong (incorrect) on plenty of cases--like enslaving millions of people. So I can applaud the introduction by the West of a canon of Universal Human Rights, while decrying their introduction of the ideology of scientific racism and the blueprints for gas chambers. Recognizing that we've been both right and wrong, liberals believe that American policies should be evaluated a) case-by-case, rather than just assuming that because America does it, it's correct and b) with humility, because (inter alia) six million Jews, over a hundred million of Blacks, and countless other peoples know what happens when we get it wrong.

Burke might call this sort of prudence and caution a virtue. But what would he know about conservatism?

This is the rare post of its type that left me, not angry, but horrified. Here's where a more partisan blogger would go into the "this represents the modern Republican party" rant. I won't indulge, because I don't believe that most Republicans fit this mold. I'm willing to believe that most Republicans, presented with this throwback to our most evil ideologies, would be quite willing to codemn it as immoral. I take a lot of flack from my liberal pals for being more willing than they to ascribe good motives to most conservatives, and their deep opposition to racism and racist ideology (even if I think their tactics on opposing it are misguided). I know conservatives read my blog, so I'd appreciate a chance for some confirmation. Prove me right, and my critics wrong.

Breaching the Dike

I thought my post on Shelby Steele's explanation of our Iraq failure (short version: we were too soft on them) was pretty good. But Hilzoy and Glenn Greenwald put me to shame.

What's amazing, as they point out, isn't the piece itself so much as the incredibly positive reaction Steele's argument has elicited in the conservative blogosphere. It's like a dam has finally broken, and the right can finally extract itself from the humanitarian rhetoric they've wrapped this war in ever since the WMD case fell apart. We failed in Iraq because we were too concerned with being humane (you really have to read the excerpts Hilzoy and Greenwald collect to get the full brunt of their argument here). If we had just blown apart a few cities, then we'd have won by now--but liberal political correctness doesn't allow it. Greenwald elaborates:

Looking at the bright side of this deranged rhetoric, it is, in a sense, refreshing to see that many of these war supporters, in their great frustration, are finally relinquishing their solemn concern for the Iraqi people and the tearful inspiration caused by the Purple Fingers. Instead, they are now just calling for some good old-fashioned carpet bombings and mass killings. As Jeff [Goldstein] tells us: "there are times when we really should turn off the 'smart' bombs."...
[...]
To sit and listen to people who have spent the last three years piously lecturing us on the need to stand with "the Iraqi people," who justified our invasion of that country on the ground that we want to give them a better system of government because we must make Muslims like us more, now insist that what we need to do is bomb them with greater force and less precision is really rather vile -- but highly instructive. The masks are coming off. No more poetic tributes to democracy or all that sentimental whining about "hearts and minds." It's time to shed our unwarranted white guilt, really stretch our legs and let our hair down, and just keep bombing and bombing until we kill enough of them and win. Shelby Steele deserves some sort of award for triggering that refreshingly honest outburst.

Of course, this "outburst" is nonsense. It's not just that such a tactical effort wouldn't have worked, it's that it couldn't have. "Victory" over a smoldering crater is not a "win" under any moral standard America can rightly hold itself to. Hilzoy furthers:

[T]here is a difference between being hamstrung by guilt and being restrained by principle. The former is a sign of weakness; the latter is a sign of strength. Our principles are our own. We do not follow them because we are afraid of what someone else will say, but because we believe that they are right. The day we come to confuse our adherence to morality with timidity and fear will be the day we lose whatever virtue and strength we have, and forfeit our claim to anyone's respect.

Before we claim to be "winning", we need to take stock of what we've won. If we've crushed the Iraqi people into submission, but done it at the expense of our own soul, I think that's properly cast as defeat--defeat of a particularly tragic sort.

Ultimately, Greenwald gets the last word:

Escalating the use of military force in Iraq by indiscriminately killing civilians and eradicating whole cities would contradict every single statement we have made about why we are there, what we want to achieve, and what our plan is in that region. We're not refraining from those acts because of white guilt or a fear of what European diplomats will say about us. We're refraining from them because the wholesale indiscriminate slaughter of thousands or tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis -- all because we have grown impatient and annoyed with our pet little democracy-building project and just want to bomb the whole place into submission -- would be both morally reprehensible and, from the perspective of our own interests, an indescribably stupid thing to do.

Amen to that. Something ugly has been released in the hearts of the American right with this article. They better snap out of it, because what they're beginning to advocate now runs perilously close to utter depravity. Unlike what Jeff Goldstein says, we do not have to believe that the right actually "luxuriates" in the deaths of innocents to be appalled by their position. It's the indifference to the carnage, not the celebration of it, that is stunning. Wrapped under the guise of "professionalism" and "strength", this basic moral apathy represents a far greater degradation of one's ethical character than even active celebration of the deaths of terrorists. As Mirage said in The Incredibles: "Valuing life is not weakness, and disregarding it is not strength."

Stinking Water

I really don't know what to make of this.

Ike Brown is a legend in Mississippi politics, a fast-talking operative both loved and hated for his ability to turn out black voters and get his candidates into office.

That success has also landed him at the heart of a federal lawsuit that's about to turn the Voting Rights Act on its end.

For the first time, the U.S. Justice Department is using the 1965 law to allege racial discrimination against whites.

Brown, head of the Democratic Party in Mississippi's rural Noxubee County, is accused of waging a campaign to defeat white voters and candidates with tactics including intimidation and coercion. Also named in the lawsuit is Circuit Clerk Carl Mickens, who has agreed to refrain from rejecting white voters' absentee ballots considered defective while accepting similar ballots from black voters.
[...]
The Justice Department complaint says Brown and those working with him "participated in numerous racial appeals during primary and general campaigns and have criticized black citizens for supporting white candidates and for forming biracial political coalitions with white candidates."

Noxubee County - a rural area along the Alabama line named for a Choctaw word meaning "stinking water" - has a population of 12,500, 69 percent black and 30 percent white.

Whites once dominated county politics here, but now only one white person holds countywide office, and he says Brown tried to recruit an out-of-county black candidate to run against him three years ago.

I really detest racial appeals in voting, but as David Bernstein points out, I have no idea if they're illegal (or even if they are, whether such a legal interpretation would be consistent with the First Amendment). Also, of course, in cases like this there is always the question of whether or not the target is being selected for his political skill, rather than any violation of the law. And of course, there is serious concern that similar acts by white political operatives get the ol' wink and nod from the DOJ:

"The main concern we have in the civil rights community isn't necessarily that that DOJ brought this case," [Jack] Greenbaum says. "It's that the department is not bringing meritorious cases on behalf of African-American and Native American voters."

Justice Department records show the department's last voting-rights case alleging discrimination against black voters was filed in 2001. Since then, six cases have been brought on behalf of voters of Hispanic or Asian descent in five states -- plus the case involving white voters in Mississippi.
[...]
But [Brown's Defense Attorney, Black Republican Wilbur] Colom criticizes the Justice Department for filing a complaint against a black political consultant while ignoring similar behavior by white political operatives in Mississippi.

"It has overtones of politics and that's the wrong road for Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department," the attorney says. "It's going to destroy their credibility the next time they ask black people to listen to them."

Hmm...the last case alleging discrimination against Black voters was brought forth in 2001. What could have possibly engendered a major shift in DOJ policy in 2001? Coincidence, I'm sure.

In any event, assuming that these allegations are correct, I think such tactics are quite sleazy and deserve condemnation. Would that you'd ever see such condemnation when White political leaders engage in the activity, though.

What On Earth...?

Georgia History Professor James Cobb relates the following story:

After 34 years of college teaching, I thought I had heard just about every imaginable student complaint. Last week, however, a freshman in my 300-seat US History Since 1865 course came in to discuss her exam with one of the graders and proceeded to work herself into a semi-hissy over the fact that we had spent four class periods(one of them consisting of a visit from Taylor Branch) discussing the civil rights movement.

"I don't know where he's getting all of this," she complained, "we never discussed any of this in high school." One might have let the matter rest here as simply an example of a high school history teacher's sins of omission being visited on the hapless old history prof. had the student not informed the TA in an indignant postscript, "I'm not a Democrat! I don't think I should have to listen to this stuff!"

I don't even know what that complaint is supposed to mean. What exactly did you learn in high school history? Never mind, I probably don't want to know.

I might, in the humblest way possible, suggest that a through grounding in the successes and failures of the American civil rights movement is something that Americans of all political persuasions might benefit from.

H/T: Eric Muller

Just Another Honest Joe

Often times, when a big blogger links to a little guy (like myself), the recipient of the link feels a compulsion to acknowledge his benefactor (I do it here for Kevin Drum, for example). It's relatively commonplace, but it always seems to be linked to a big/small blogger dynamic. So when "My Election Analysis" welcomed my readers, I was understandably flattered. I'm a big blogger boy now!

But lo, even the titans have to pay proper respect. The Volokh Conspiracy is surely among the blogs which I would give a virtual welcome to, should they deign to recognize my humble internet homestead. But here is co-conspirator David Bernstein, welcoming readers from that insatiable beast, Instapundit! I guess even the largest bloggers are, on the inside, just like you and me (except Glenn Reynolds, who is apparently immortal).

It's a good post too (Bernstein's); giving an interesting update to a Penn State censorship controversy involving an art exhibit about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. You should go forth and read it.

And maybe (perchance, to dream?) Bernstein will give me you a warm welcome in deference to my patronage.

King of the Rubble Hill

Spencer Ackerman dissects the latest expression of irrational exuberance regarding Iraq, this time from conservative commentator Shelby Steele. Our problems in Iraq, Steele argues, stem from the fact that we are too restrained, a byproduct of "white guilt" toward our imperialist and racist past that makes us curiously unable to unleash the full brunt of American force and power against our enemies.

I too, am concerned about the concept of "White guilt" (albeit for wholly separate reasons than Steele), but this is ridiculous. Yes, we restrain ourselves from unleashing our full might--and it's a good thing too. Imagine the alternative! Ackerman writes:

Steele, in a meme that seems to be taking root on the right lately, suggests that we should apply "the full measure" of our non-nuclear military muscle to the insurgency. If this means anything, it means destroying cities like Falluja, Ramadi, Samarra, Baquba, Tal Afar, Mosul, and let's not forget Baghdad--in other words, anywhere insurgent-supporting Sunnis live. One can also imagine this means flattening anywhere Shia militias operate. Basically, in this telling, victory in Iraq means that anywhere south of Kurdistan ought to be a smoldering wasteland.

Aside from the fact that this awful tactics (what exactly are we "winning" if this is the upshot?), I can't really figure out how this wouldn't be a return to an imperialist and racist past. Invade a country, topple its government, occupy its territory, and then burn its towns to the ground? This is morally repugnant to civilized sensibilities. Thankfully, this isn't our policy or position right now. But heaven forbid it ever becomes it.

The point is that American power is not justified by its own exercise. It is justified when it falls within particular moral confines, both deontological and teleological. It has to create good consequences (which defeating Islamic radicalism surely qualifies as), but it also has to be constrained, yes constrained, by certain moral limitations. Among them: No targeted killings of civilians. No torture. No indefinite detention without showing of cause. No burning villages to the ground. No limitless occupations. No rampant human rights violations. We've mostly (though not entirely) managed to avoid these sins thus far. But there is no reason to assume that they are entirely beyond our capabilities--especially if we "take the gloves off."

Steele concludes his piece with the following statement:

Possibly white guilt's worst effect is that it does not permit whites--and nonwhites--to appreciate something extraordinary: the fact that whites in America, and even elsewhere in the West, have achieved a truly remarkable moral transformation. One is forbidden to speak thus, but it is simply true. There are no serious advocates of white supremacy in America today, because whites see this idea as morally repugnant. If there is still the odd white bigot out there surviving past his time, there are millions of whites who only feel goodwill toward minorities.

This is a fact that must be integrated into our public life--absorbed as new history--so that America can once again feel the moral authority to seriously tackle its most profound problems. Then, if we decide to go to war, it can be with enough ferocity to win.

He just doesn't get it, does he. The "goodwill" Whites have managed to find for minorities (I'd prefer an actual respect for their dignity as human beings, rather than just vague positive wishes, but whatever) stems directly from the fact that we no longer are willing to treat them ferociously in service of our external ends--moral or not. Break down that moral barrier, and the whole edifice will come crashing down.

Slightly Less Than Wonderful News

Ethan Leib links to a piece in the New York Review of Books that claims Hamas' political wing might take the following positions:

- Members of Hamas's political directorate do not preclude significant changes over time in their policies toward Israel and in their founding charter, including recognition of Israel, and even mutual minor border adjustments. Such changes depend on Israel's recognition of Palestinian rights. Hamas will settle for nothing less than full reciprocity.

- Hamas is not opposed to negotiations with Israel, provided negotiations are based on the provision that neither party may act unilaterally to change the situation that prevailed before the 1967 war, and that negotiations, when they are resumed, will take the pre-1967 border as their starting point.

- Hamas will not renounce its religious belief that Palestine is a waqf, or religious endowment, assigned by God to Muslims for all time. However, this theological belief does not preclude accommodation to temporal realities and international law, including Israel's statehood.

- Hamas is prepared to abide by a long-term hudna, or cease-fire, which would end all violence. Here again, complete reciprocity must prevail, and Israel must end all attacks on Palestinians. If Israel agrees to the cease-fire, Hamas will take responsibility for preventing and punishing Palestinian violations, whether committed by Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Intifada, or its own people. Hamas understands that it cannot demand recognition as the legitimate government of Palestine if it is not prepared to enforce such a cease-fire, in the context of its responsibility for law and order.

- Hamas's first priority will be to revitalize Palestinian society by strengthening the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, the separation of powers between various branches of government, and the professionalizing and accountability of the security services. It will aim to end corruption in government and implement new economic and social initiatives that are appropriate to the Palestinians' present circumstances. (My Hamas informant told me that well before the recent legislative elections, Hamas had commissioned teams of experts to prepare detailed plans for the economic and social recovery of Palestinian society; he said that the implementation of these plans would be Hamas's highest priority, but he did not discuss their content.)

- Hamas will not seek to impose standards of religious behavior and piety on the Palestinian population, such as the wearing of the veil or the abaya, although Hamas believes that certain standards of public modesty--but not of religious observance--should be followed by everyone.

Leib calls the agenda "heartening." Maybe I'm just ornery, but I find it difficult to get too excited over this. For one, the caveats Leib notes, that the Hamas official outlining these points refused to go on the record, that the status of Jerusalem under pre-1967 borders is likely a no-go for Israel--as well as one that he doesn't note, that this is the political wing of Hamas, which has not shown any interest in restraining its military wing--seem to absorb a lot of the benefits I might otherwise take from this.

But also, I'm kind of underwhelmed by this proposal even at face value. This point, in particular, grabbed me:

Hamas will not renounce its religious belief that Palestine is a waqf, or religious endowment, assigned by God to Muslims for all time. However, this theological belief does not preclude accommodation to temporal realities and international law, including Israel's statehood.

Is this supposed to be comforting? First of all, theology's record at accommodating temporal realities for more than a small period of time is spotty at best. Second, I don't like the mix of theology into political negotiation. Jews can stake an equal theological claim to all of Palestine, and while I wouldn't presume to tell any religion what it's theological stances should be, I don't think Israel should put that position as a "caveat" to its secular bargaining. Third, the rhetoric is really scary here. It does not guarantee Israel's existence, it merely will "accommodate" its existence as long as a notoriously weak (and hostile) international legal schema requires it. Israel is reasonably strong now, and has enough powerful friends to keep its enemies at least at arms length (except maybe the growing sociopathic demon that is Iran), but there is no guarantee that this will always be the case. I read this statement as only a commitment to delay Israel's destruction, not abandonment of the principle. How is this something upon which long-term security can be staked?

A brief counterpoise, if you'll indulge me: A 16 year old American citizen is in critical condition after being caught in the Tel Aviv suicide bombing. Both the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade and Islamic Jihad, which claimed responsibility, was thrilled that Daniel Wultz was injured, though it expressed regret that he wasn't killed. From Islamic Jihad:

"The meaning and the goal of our lives is to fight the devil spiritually and physically. The Jews are the expression of both kinds of devil. No mercy for devils."

[Islamic Jihad Leader]Abu Ayman expressed regret Wulz [sic] wasn't killed in last week's terror attack.

"The only sorrow that I feel is that the Jewish parents of this Daniel Wultz did not suffer like an average Palestinian family who lost its child. Maybe if their child was killed they and the Americans would have to pay attention to the suffering of thousands of Palestinian families who lost their children."

And from the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade, affiliated with the "moderate" Fatah:

"I want to use this occasion of speaking to the American people to tell them that the unfair support of your people to Israel is the reason that you are targeted almost everywhere in the world. Second, I want to bring to your knowledge that the most cruel settlers are those who came from America. It is known that the Jews are sly and not honest, and they are leading into this trap of the Middle East in order to carry out their plan of controlling the world."

Oh yeah. This is going to turn out great.

Computer Update and Reading Material

I brought in the laptop to the Student Computer Service today. I was wildly over-optimistic--they said to expect it to be fixed by the end of the week.

Ugh.

Printed off Sumi Cho's article "Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption," 40 B.C. L. Rev. 73 (1998), which I will (hopefully) read today. It's very long, but I'm really only interested in the second half of it. Also, I wrote an 8 page introduction to Critical Race Theory on Thursday, in case anybody is interested in getting a background on the subject so near and dear to my heart. It's too long to blog, but I'd be happy to email a copy of it to anybody who wants one.

Boycotting as Tactics

I've been vaguely supportive of the May 1st "Day Without Immigrants" protest as a concept. The intelligentsia knows that our economy depends on these immigrants, so watching things go *splat* without them should act as a wakeup call for the rest of the country. But a recent post by Kevin Drum raises doubts. He quotes Marc Cooper, a veteran of the protest and activism movement:

With the Senate back in session and struggling to agree on liberalized bipartisan reform, with President Bush finally (but still not forcefully enough) bringing some of his clout to bear, with public opinion polls showing new majorities in favor of much of what immigrant advocates have been lobbying for, I can't think of a worse time to stage a confrontational boycott like that planned for May 1.

There is a definite time and place for this sort of tactic, and it isn't here or now. Boycotts are powerful and volatile weapons used as a last resort to bust open dams of dogged resistance. You don't use them when the political tide is even vaguely flowing in your direction.
[...]
That's why the larger institutional players in the pro-immigrant movement prefer an after-school (and after-work) rally over an intentionally punitive boycott and walkout. They argue that such an escalation could alienate lawmakers and the public just when political sentiment is shifting more toward immigrants. The positive message of demanding inclusion in the United States would be replaced by a more negative and divisive signal.

Hmm...maybe. I mean, I can definitely see where he's coming from. On the other hand, I have two questions:

1) How will this "backlash" ignore the economic price that this boycott will bring into sharp relief? Can that many Americans really act on emotion when the punishment to the pocketbook is so clear?

2) What does Cooper think of the Darfur rallies going on today? On the one hand, one could argue that on the legislative front, Darfur might be stuck in a logjam that needs to be broken. On the other, it seems like "the political tide" is at least vaguely (Cooper's words) flowing in our favor.

Still, it's a legitimate point. I hope Cooper's wrong though.

Update on my computer situation: I'm hoping it will be up and running by Tuesday. Basically, the techie folk here sent me a nice email telling me that I had a virus, had been temporarily removed from the network, and that they'd be happy to fix my computer anytime from 9-5, Monday through Friday. The problem was that they sent this email at 5:30 Friday afternoon. Grr. And since this weekend is mid-term break, the computing service probably won't be open on Monday. So assuming this clean up won't take crazy-long time, Tuesday is my target date.

Curse You Mandy

A friend of mine gave my laptop a virus, so now its been suspended from the Carleton network. It looks like I won't be able to fix it until at least Monday.

Boo. Posting will be reduced accordingly until then.

Inertia Is A Property Of Matter

There was something about how that phrase popped up randomly in the theme song to "Bill Nye, The Science Guy" that made it always stick with me.

Anyway, a new study by The Institute for Marriage and Public Policy purports to show that, even where gay marriage is legalized, many gay people are not partaking in the institution. The rate is lowest in Europe (1-5%) and highest in Massachusetts (16.7%).

The study itself does not make normative conclusions based on the data (though the IMPP is definitively anti-gay marriage). However, Minnesota Law Professor Dale Carpenter is almost definitely right to say that this information will make its way into the debate. Conservatives might use it to say that gay people don't even want gay marriage, liberals will respond that this has absolutely no bearing as to whether the small proportion that do deserve the full benefits of the institution. In any event, the classic conservative argument against gay marriage is that the change in definition alone somehow harms the institution, which is utterly divorced from the number of people who enter into the arrangement (no pun intended).

Carpenter also notes that there seems to be a correlation in the data between places that a stronger marriage culture generally, and rates of gay marriage. Marriage is a much healthier institution in Massachusetts than in Europe, and consequently gay marriage rates are far higher there. I'm not sure what it means, but it seems interesting.

I'd just add to this analysis that we might be jumping the gun a bit here. Gay marriage has been legal for a total of four years at the longest (in The Netherlands), and less than that in the one state that currently allows it in America. I think it's a bit facile to expect gay couples to immediately jump into a marriage the moment it is recognizable. The prohibition against gay marriage probably discouraged the formation of long-term, monogamous relations (not that it obliterated them, just made them less likely), and at the very least it reduced the need for the type of long-term commitment that the prospect of marriage always holds on the horizon. It shouldn't surprise us that there might be a transistion period. And of course, continued prejudice against homosexuals, a desire within the community for differentiation, and plain old cultural barriers all factor into this data. Four years simply isn't a lot of time when you're starting from point zero. After all, 35 years after Loving v. Virginia the interracial marriage rate was stuck at 2.9%. Social integration after centuries of oppression takes time.

UPDATE: Professor Carpenter explores why gay couples aren't getting married yet. I think he hits the nail on the head.

"Controversial" and "Idiot" Don't Have To Be Synonymous

Inside Higher Ed has an article about college inviting "controversial speakers" for lectures. In sum, they say that college's should not shy away from controversy and should recognize the importance of providing alternative perspectives. Which is right. But the article also includes a comment arguing the following:

The problem that isn't being addressed here is that provocateurs like Moore and Coulter are brought in as speakers in the first place. They command high fees to present recycled tedious, predictable polemical rants that lack intellectual depth and rigor. They substitute cleverness and wordplay for genuine argument, and they offer little or nothing that is new or imaginative.

The money would be better spent on bringing in genuine scholars and intellectuals (our college has recently hosted W.S. Merwin and Seamus Heaney, for instance), in which case the need for this sort of policy would vanish.

Which is also right. The reason that Ann Coulter and Michael Moore shouldn't be invited isn't because they are too controversial for our tender ears. It's because they are morons. I like having interesting speakers at Carleton, from all sides of the political divide (we had, among others, Jonah Goldberg and Derrick Bell this year). Frothing polemics are "interesting" only in the way a car wreck is.

Via Daniel Solove.

It Pays To Be Diverse

Via Feminist Law Profs, the benefits of diversity in the workplace:

New research from Tufts University indicates that diverse groups perform better than homogenous groups when it comes to decision making and that this is due largely to dramatic differences in the way whites behave in diverse groups--changes that occur even before group members begin to interact.

"Traditional arguments in favor of diversity often focus on ethics, morality and constitutionality," said Samuel R. Sommers, Ph.D., assistant professor of psychology in the School of Arts and Sciences at Tufts University. "I wanted to look at the observable effects of diversity on performance."

In a study involving 200 participants on 29 mock juries, panels of whites and blacks performed better than all-white groups by a number of measures. "Such diverse juries deliberated longer, raised more facts about the case, and conducted broader and more wide-ranging deliberations," said Sommers. "They also made fewer factual errors in discussing evidence and when errors did occur, those errors were more likely to be corrected during the discussion."

Surprisingly, this difference was primarily due to significant changes in white behavior. Whites on diverse juries cited more case facts, made fewer mistakes in recalling facts and evidence, and pointed out missing evidence more frequently than did those on all-white juries. They were also more amenable to discussing racism when in diverse groups.

I'm not sure why the "surprising" part was surprising. I guess the stereotype is about all the benefits them crazy Black folk will get from being exposed to rational, civilized White guys. But as it turns out, it's White people whose performance needs a shot in the arm. Go figure [/sarcasm].

That aside, studies like this are absolutely, positively critical for pushing integration in American society. First of all, Court's are more likely to uphold diversity-enhancing programs when there is empirical data showing that such programs lead to meaningful benefits for the entity that organized them (i.e., higher productivity in an office, or better grades at a university). Second, such studies help break down racist mentalities that present Blacks as a drain on their communities, contributing little of value to society, and generally of being practically worthless. Third, if one believes that White people will only work to improve the status of racial minorities when it is in their interest, then the more data out there that shows the benefits for Whites of interaction with Blacks, the more better. I'll admit this holds risks--my first thought upon writing that scenario was of Blacks-as-steroids: "Just inject Black people for increased performance!" But ultimately, I think the positives outweigh the negatives.

Don't! It's a Trap!

Crooked Timber has the skinny on an interesting program by the Ayn Rand Institute:

The financial support arrangements and tuition waivers are rather generous.

If any CT readers want to apply for a grant from the Ayn Rand Institute the form is here. Although I suppose this may be a trick; if you apply for a grant you thereby prove yourself to be unworthy of one.

Devious folks, those Objectivists.

Yom HaShoah

It's Holocaust memorial day, and I concur with Ampersand: the best way to remember the Shoah is to put your name behind the message of "Never Again."

Belle of D'Blog

Belle Lettre of "Law and Letters" makes the blogroll, because her posts are fascinating, because her analysis is trenchant, and because she has an official degree in Critical Race Theory, which is uber-cool.

Calling me the "most ambitious and crazily well-read pre-law sophomore in the blogosophere" is also appreciated, but not required.

Torture in Tennessee

Once the dike has been breached...

The Agitator has the transcript and audio tape (warning: very explicit) of a brutal case of what can only be described as torture by the police of a drug suspect:

The police are attempting to get the illiterate man to sign an admission of guilt without telling him what it says. They beat him, over and over, hook electrodes up to testicles and shock him, threaten to kill him, and threaten to go after his family. Early news accounts reported that the torture continued well beyond the end of the recording. After the tape ran out, the same deputies apparently repeatedly submerged the guy's head in a fish tank and a bath tub, threatening to drown him unless he confessed.

How have we sunk to such depths? Listening to the audio was like putting an earpiece to a Soviet gulag. And that's not a comparison I make lightly.

If it wasn't for the extraordinary audio tape, this barbarism probably would never have been dealt with:

It's worth keeping in mind when you read about a case in which a suspect claims his confession was beaten out of him, and police, to a man, keep to a remarkably tight story stating otherwise (as they did in Siler's [the victim's] case, before the audio came out).

The transcript bears this claim out--the officers tell their victim what "happened"--that they came in, he first fled then resisted arrest, nearly beat them up, so they had to fight back (by electrocuting his testicles, obviously).

May they rot in jail for the rest of their miserable lives.

Via Sebastian Holsclaw.

Remember: Bullies Always Win

This deserves to be saved for posterity:

The Leader

He's a green guy with a big brain. He's the Hulk's arch-enemy. Kind of obvious, really. Hero: Big green dumb strong guy. Villain: Small green smart weak guy. It's not really dripping with creativity, and the moral ends up being "clever planning and logic can never win against the sheer physical brutality of a guy who barely even knows where he is." This is not a moral that your average comic book reader wants to hear.

From The Book of Ratings: Marvel Supervillians.

The Power Within

Lawrence Kaplan in The New Republic (also The LA Times) contrasts the behavior of college activists regarding the Iraq war ("Immoral! Bring the troops home!") and Darfur ("Moral obligation! Intervene already!").

As their criticism of the particulars of the Iraq war has hardened into a broader indictment of U.S. foreign policy, the mostly progressive voices calling for action in Darfur have become caught in a bind of their own devising. Even as they demand intervention in Sudan, they excoriate Washington for employing U.S. military power without due respect to the opinion of the international community and against nations that pose no imminent threat to our own--which is to say, precisely the terms under which U.S. power would have to be employed in the name of saving Darfur.

Kaplan isn't really speaking to me here, because I supported Iraq and support Darfur. But while I do see this dynamic somewhat, I think he overstates the case. In fact, the college students calling for Darfur intervention have varied and interesting perspectives on Iraq.

First, I'd note that the leadership for the anti-Iraq and the pro-Darfur groups aren't really the same. I know many of the top guns in our college chapter of STAND (Students Taking Action Now: Darfur), and while I suspect that most of them are not supporters of the Iraq war, they aren't and haven't been focusing their activist energies on the subject. And insofar as they are opposed to the Iraq war, it is generally a more sophisticated opposition than the shrill refrain of the partisans.

That moves me to the second point: Often times, pro-Darfurites use the genocide as a reason against the Iraq war. The case basically boils down to a zero-sum argument: if we weren't in Iraq, we could be in Darfur by now. This also cuts nicely against my argument in favor of the Iraq intervention on humanitarian grounds; if I was really serious about human rights, why didn't I dedicate my energies to a far more serious ethical catastrophe? For these people, a military solution is not just grudgingly accepted, but actively demanded. I don't really think foreign policy is zero-sum like they say, and in any event Darfur was barely on the radar in 2003. Besides, Kaplan is right that an immediate withdrawal from Iraq would yield a bloodbath that would be unacceptable from a humanitarian perspective.

I've heard complaints about tactics, and how the Bush administration mislead us in the run-up, and that it was a poor strategic move. What I'm not hearing is the reflexive aversion to US power or unilateralism that would make a Darfur intervention logically incoherent.

Although Kaplan starts his piece out talking about college students, he very rapidly moves to policy makers, pundits, and national organizations. Perhaps the argument he makes is stronger for these people. But at least here at Carleton, we take the stakes of this conflict seriously. We know that Darfur can only be saved by aggressive US action utilizing military force. In a dramatic reversal of 2003, in 2006, Iraq is the blip on the ethical radar compared to the murderous titan in Africa.

You Don't Belong Here

According to Crooked Timber, The Netherlands is considering a law that would allow the deportation of young Dutch citizens of Caribbean descent back to their country-of-origin for petty crimes. Again, we're talking about "citizens" here. The bill specifically applies to people age 16-24 who come from Dutch-controlled islands in the Caribbean (Netherlands Antilles and Aruba). If they commit a crime, they can be sent back to those islands and not allowed back into Holland proper. That makes the issue a little more complex, but not much: it's like forcing a Native American who commits a crime to return to the Reservation and never be allowed to return to mainstream America, or a native Hawaiian to go back to the islands.

Details here (PDF). Sketchy stuff. I'm so glad no American legislator would call for expelling American citizens from America.

Oh gosh, did I just indulge in classic leftist Blame America Firstism?

Bad Blogger!

Sounds Like Abstinence Plus To Me

Via Mirror of Justice (the Catholic Legal Theory blog) comes a really interesting statement by several top Catholic officials on abortion and condom usage.

On abortion, [Cardinal Carlo Maria] Martini firmly upheld the moral teaching of the church, but acknowledged the complexity of writing it into public policy.

"It seems to me difficult [to imagine] that, in situations like ours, the state would not distinguish between acts that are punishable in a penal fashion, and acts for which a penal solution doesn't make sense," he said. "That doesn't mean a 'license to kill,' but that the state doesn't intervene in every possible case. Its efforts should be to reduce the number of abortions, to impede them with every means possible (above all after a certain period from the beginning of the pregnancy), to reduce the causes of abortion, and to take precautions so that women who decide to take this step, especially during the period when it's not illegal, do not suffer grave physical damage or have their lives placed at risk."

Martini noted that the risk of serious physical injury is especially grave in the case of clandestine abortions, and hence said that, all things considered, Italy's abortion law -- which permits abortion during the first trimester -- has had the positive effect of "contributing to the reduction and, eventually, elimination" of back-alley procedures.

In a case in which a fetus threatens the life of the mother, Martini said "moral theology has always sustained the principle of legitimate defense and of lesser evil," in order to justify a procedure that would save the life of the mother while terminating the pregnancy.

That's good rhetoric, and I think a "realistic" position that many Americans who feel ambivalent about abortion would subscribe to. But the real important stuff, from my view, comes with regard to condom usage:

Similarly, asked about the use of condoms to combat the spread of HIV/AIDS, Martini responded: "Certainly the use of prophylactics can, in some situations, constitute a lesser evil," mentioning the case of a couple where one partner is infected and the other isn't.

The problem, Martini said, isn't really the ethical analysis. The problem is the PR headaches that follow whenever a church official says this out loud. To put it bluntly, anytime a senior church official says that use of a condom might be a "lesser evil" in the context of a deadly disease, the next day's headlines trumpet "Church okay with condoms," which is not the same message.

"The question is really if it's wise for religious authorities to propagandize in favor of this method of defense [from HIV/AIDS], almost implying that other morally sustainable means, including abstinence, are put on a lower level," Martini said. "The principle of a 'lesser evil,' applicable in all the cases covered by ethical doctrine, is one thing; another thing is who ought to express these judgments publicly."

In upholding the moral tolerability of condoms as a "lesser evil" in the context of HIV/AIDS, Martini joins Cardinal George Cottier, theologian of the Papal Household under John Paul II; Cardinal Godfriend Danneels of Belgium; Cardinal Javier Lozano Barragan, President of the Pontifical Council for Pastoral Health; Cardinal Cormac Muphy-O'Connor of Westminster, England; and Bishop Kevin Dowling of South Africa.

In 2004, the Indian bishops launched an awareness campaign about HIV/AIDS that includes information on condoms, and in 2005, a spokesperson for the Spanish bishops said that condoms might be justified in some circumstances to combat the disease.

Msgr. Angel Rodriguez Luño, an Opus Dei priest, a professor at Santa Croce University in Rome, and a consultor for the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, has said there's actually not much debate over the theology; most moralists, he said, believe the argument for condoms as a lesser evil is fairly clear. The question is how to explain that conclusion in a way that doesn't seem to offer a free pass for irresponsible sexual behavior.

"The problem is, anytime we try to give a nuanced response, we see headlines that say, 'Vatican approves condoms,' Rodriguez Luño told The Washington Post Jan. 23, 2005.

"The issue is more complicated than that. From a moral point of view, we cannot condone contraception. We cannot tell a classroom of 16-year-olds they should use condoms. But if we are dealing with someone or a situation in which persons are clearly going to act in harmful ways, a prostitute who is going to continue her activities, then one might say, 'Stop. But if you are not going to, at least do this.'"

First, recall the affiliation of Msgr. Luno. I'm very skeptical that Opus Dei is the evil conspiratorial organization depicted in The Davinci Code, but I think it is fair to surmise they are quite conservative. Now, look at how he says condom use shoud be dealt with: "Stop. But if you are not going to, at least do this."

Isn't that exactly what "abstinence plus" education is?

Admittedly, Luno says that we shouldn't tell a classroom of 16-year-olds that they should use condoms. But the question is how we read that former statement in relation to the latter. If X person is going to engage in potentially harmful sexual activity (as both teenage sex and prostitution qualify as), the first goal of the Church (and by extension, the schools) should be to say "stop." But if X is definitely going to continue, then the next goal should be to minimize harm, via condom use.

The trick is how to bring up condoms without endorsing them. And seeing how the media loves to slap misleading headlines on issues, I really can sympathize with the Church's plight here. But I do think that "abstinence plus" toes this line pretty well. For all the talk about Catholic dogmatism, the religion is a lot more pragmatic than many people give it credit for. And I think that intelligent liberals can very easily make common cause with this strand of Catholic thought.

Drinking and Culpability

Of importance to the Duke rape case, Michelle Anderson points us to an interesting study about how alcohol affects people's perceptions of culpability in rape cases.

How will intoxication of the parties affect an assessment of blame? Studies on the issue are fascinating. In a 1982 study (Richardson & Campbell, The Effect of Alcohol on Attributions of Blame for Rape, 8 Per. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 468 (1982)), participants read a story about a college student raped at a party. Some students read a story in which the attacker was drunk and some read a story in which the victim was drunk. The male attacker was held less responsible for the rape when he was intoxicated than when he was sober. By contrast, the female victim was held more responsible when she was intoxicated than when she was sober.

In a 1997 study (Stormo et al., Attributions about Acquaintance Rape: The Role of Alcohol and Individual Differences, 27 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 279 (1997)), participants assessed rape scenarios involving two college students who meet at an off-campus party. Students read stories that varied the level of alcohol consumption by the perpetrator and victim. The study indicated:

Results of the present investigation support and extend previous research indicating that intoxicated behavior differentially influences the degree to which responsibility and blame are attributed to the victim and perpetrator depicted in a rape scenario. Whereas the bottle may grant a pardon to the perpetrator, it tends to hold greater blame for the victim.

The study continued, "When portrayed as moderately or highly intoxicated, the victim was assigned significantly more responsibility/blame and the perpetrator significantly less." It noted, "At the same time, perpetrators were held less responsible and blamed less when portrayed as moderately or highly intoxicated."

Hence, his inebriation tends to taint her and exonerate him. Likewise, her inebriation tends to taint her and exonerate him. Boys will be boys. Girls had better not be drunken sluts.

The double standard has an exception, however. The 1997 study indicated that, if the victim was perceived as more inebriated than the perpetrator, he was perceived to be more blameworthy. "This suggests," researchers wrote, that participants "placed additional blame on the perpetrator when he seemed to be taking advantage of someone more incapacitated than he."

One thing that I wish the studies included (or maybe they did and Professor Anderson didn't include them) was if the gender of the study participants meaningfully impacted there response. Such data would definitely help refine some of the issues I raised in "Rape for the Perspective of its Victims."

But in spite of that, I think this sort of mentality is important to keep in mind as we evaluate the Duke case. The role of alcohol is definitely going to come up as the trial continues, and it's important that, when evaluating it as a factor, we do not do so in a discriminatory manner.

Who?

I stumbled across this while doing research for my Philosophy Professor overlord boss.

Chndran Kukathas, "Cultural Rights Again: A Rejoinder to Kymlica," Political Theory 20 (Nov. 1992): 674-680

In the early 1950s, social scientists began a comprehensive poll of Indian villages to determine how many were aware that British rule had ended in 1947. The survey was abandoned when it was discovered that most villagers did not know the British had arrived (680 n.1).

That tickles me.

The Hate Speech Ruling Crits Were Waiting For

The 9th Circuit has just issued a 2-1 decision in Harper v. Poway Unified School District. The majority opinion (linked above) was by Stephen Reinhardt, Judge Alex Kozinski dissented here.

First, the facts. Stephen Harper is a student in the Poway Unified School District who, following the "National Day of Silence" in which gay and gay-friendly students refuse to talk in protest of discrimination and prejudice, wore an anti-gay t-shirt to school. Specifically, the shirt said "BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED" on the front, and "HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL" on the back. The school had experienced tensions between homosexual and homophobic students before, including several physical altercations in the previous year. It was also subject to a lawsuit by gay students complaining of a pervasive attitude of harassment that the school did not act meaningfully to stop (a jury agreed with the students). In this context, the school asked Harper to remove the t-shirt. When he refused, he spent the day in the principal's office but was not otherwise punished.

This opinion is sure to be controversial. And it should be--the case is undoubtedly a tough call. Schools are permitted far more latitude in regulating student speech than is the norm in American society--Harper's t-shirt would surely be permissible if he wore it on the street. There are several reasons for this, but they boil down to the fact that schools play very special roles in society. Ultimately, there goal is to provide an equal opportunity for education for all, and speech which runs counter to that goal is at least more likely to be within the school system's regulatory purview. The question is whether this restriction in this context is permissible. I think Judge Reinhardt makes several important points in favor on this point.

First, he musters impressive evidence on the very real impact such hostile speech has on the education of gay students:

Speech that attacks high school students who are members of minority groups that have historically been oppressed, subjected to verbal and physical abuse, and made to feel inferior, serves to injure and intimidate them, as well as to damage their sense of security and interfere with their opportunity to learn. The demeaning of young gay and lesbian students in a school environment is detrimental not only to their psychological health and well-being, but also to their educational development. Indeed, studies demonstrate that "academic underachievement, truancy, and dropout are prevalent among homosexual youth and are the probable consequences of violence and verbal and physical abuse at school." One study has found that among teenage victims of anti-gay discrimination, 75% experienced a decline in academic performance, 39% had truancy problems and 28% dropped out of school. Another study confirmed that gay students had difficulty concentrating in school and feared for their safety as a result of peer harassment, and that verbal abuse led some gay students to skip school and others to drop out altogether. Indeed, gay teens suffer a school dropout rate over three times the national average. In short, it is well established that attacks on students on the basis of their sexual orientation are harmful not only to the students' health and welfare, but also to their educational performance and their ultimate potential for success in life (21-23, internal citations and footnotes omitted).

It is overwhelmingly obvious to me that speech which causes these sorts of problems runs contrary to--indeed, overtly sabotages--the educational mission of the school. At the very least, it shows that this is not the stereotypical whine of a thin-skinned minority that wants to live a life free from criticism. Justice Kozinski is too trite when he writes: "Any speech code that has at its heart avoiding offense to others gives anyone with a thin skin a heckler's veto" (dis. op. at 35). This is hardly about "avoiding offense."

The next issue is how one distinguishes a shirt which says "Jews Will Burn In Hell" from the shirt present here. Reinhardt argues:

It is simply not a novel concept, however, that such attacks on young minority students can be harmful to their self-esteem and to their ability to learn. As long ago as in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court recognized that "[a] sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn." 347 U.S. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted). If a school permitted its students to wear shirts reading, "Negroes: Go Back To Africa," no one would doubt that the message would be harmful to young black students. So, too, in the case of gay students, with regard to messages such as those written on Harper's Tshirt.

In other words, there are, I'm pretty sure, messages targeted at minority groups in which it is not controversial that the school can restrict. Why isn't this one of them? The clearest objection is that the moral status of homosexuality is politically contested, while racism is fringe (Kozinski makes this argument in dissent). Reinhardt dispatches with this argument rather neatly:

The dissent takes comfort in the fact that there is a political disagreement regarding homosexuality in this country. See dis. op. at 12. We do not deny that there is, just as there was a longstanding political disagreement about racial equality that reached its peak in the 1950's and about whether religious minorities should hold high office that lasted at least until after the 1960 presidential election, or whether blacks or Jews should be permitted to attend private universities and prep schools, work in various industries such as banks, brokerage houses, and Wall Street law firms, or stay at prominent resorts or hotels. Such disagreements may justify social or political debate, but they do not justify students in high schools or elementary schools assaulting their fellow students with demeaning statements: by calling gay students shameful, by labeling black students inferior or by wearing T-shirts saying that Jews are doomed to Hell. Perhaps our dissenting colleague believes that one can condemn homosexuality without condemning homosexuals. If so, he is wrong. To say that homosexuality is shameful is to say, necessarily, that gays and lesbians are shameful. There are numerous locations and opportunities available to those who wish to advance such an argument. It is not necessary to do so by directly condemning, to their faces, young students trying to obtain a fair and full education in our public schools (26-28).

Can I just highlight this statement, by the way? "Perhaps our dissenting colleague believes that one can condemn homosexuality without condemning homosexuals. If so, he is wrong." That is very powerful language--rare to see in a Court opinion. It also is absolutely right, and in many ways the crux of the analysis Reinhardt is making. This line of reasoning may be uncomfortable for many, but I think that they are the ones who should be doing some soul-searching if they can't find a meaningful distinction between anti-gay and anti-Semitic or racist speech (see below).

I'd note that Kozinski seems willing to bite this point, admitting at the end of his dissent that:

There is surely something to the notion that a Jewish student might not be able to devote his full attention to school activities if the fellow in the seat next to him is wearing a t-shirt with the message "Hitler Had the Right Idea" in front and "Let's Finish the Job!" on the back. This t-shirt may well interfere with the educational experience even if the two students never come to blows or even have words about it (36-37).

I admire his intellectual consistency, but this seems to be the point where nearly every American will depart. I do not find it controversial in the slightest that a school can prevent students from praising the Holocaust without breaching the constitution.

I'd add to Reinhardt's analysis that prohibiting only speech that is no longer "politically controversial" strikes me as far closer to impermissible viewpoint discrimination than banning speech that specifically targets a "discrete and insular minority", speech which empirically affects their ability to learn and grow as students. The latter is a prima facia compelling state interest, the latter isn't.

Admittedly, the school allowed a "Day of Silence", which is (at least Harper argues) a "pro-gay sentiment. Isn't it viewpoint discrimination to allow this view, but not the anti-gay view? Not particularly--unless a school must balance "religious tolerance" messages with "Muslims are evil sub-human" messages. Reinhardt elaborates:

Part of a school's "basic educational mission" is the inculcation of "fundamental values of habits and manners of civility essential to a democratic society." For this reason, public schools may permit, and even encourage, discussions of tolerance, equality and democracy without being required to provide equal time for student or other speech espousing intolerance, bigotry or hatred. As we have explained, supra pp. 28-29, because a school sponsors a "Day of Religious Tolerance," it need not permit its students to wear T-shirts reading, "Jews Are Christ-Killers" or "All Muslims Are Evil Doers." Such expressions would be "wholly inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school education." Similarly, a school that permits a "Day of Racial Tolerance," may restrict a student from displaying a swastika or a Confederate Flag. In sum, a school has the right to teach civic responsibility and tolerance as part of its basic educational mission; it need not as a quid pro quo permit hateful and injurious speech that runs counter to that mission (37-38, internal citations omitted).

Okay, cool. So where is the dividing line, then? Reinhardt answers this in his footnote 27, which is the part crits will love:

The dissent suggests that our decision might somehow allow a school to restrict student T-shirts that voice strongly-worded opposition to the war in Iraq. See dis. op. at 12. That is not so. Our colleague ignores the fact that our holding is limited to injurious speech that strikes at a core identifying characteristic of students on the basis of their membership in a minority group. The anti-war Tshirts posited by the dissent constitute neither an attack on the basis of a student's core identifying characteristic nor on the basis of his minority status (30 n.27, emphasis added).

This is the type of standard that makes the Crit in me swoon. Not only is it actually workable, but it recognizes the difference in status that minority groups face with relation to majority groups. He continues in footnote 28:

Our dissenting colleague worries that offensive words directed at majority groups such as Christians or whites will not be covered by our holding. See dis. op. at 21. There is, of course, a difference between a historically oppressed minority group that has been the victim of serious prejudice and discrimination and a group that has always enjoyed a preferred social, economic and political status. Growing up as a member of a minority group often carries with it psychological and emotional burdens not incurred by members of the majority. In any event, any verbal assault targeting majorities that might justify some form of action by school officials is more likely to fall under the "substantial disruption" prong of Tinker or under the Fraser rule permitting schools to prohibit "plainly offensive" speech (31 n.28).

Both the points Reinhardt makes here are worth emphasizing. First, that it is illogical and wrong to just group minorities and majority as needing to be treated "the same." They aren't similarly situated, so treating them similarly leads to unequal results. Second, and perhaps more importantly, is Reinhardt's implication that speech offensive to the majority is far more likely to be bannable in the status quo. Even if one does not think that any "offensive" t-shirt (e.g., "Hitler was right") can prohibited, I think virtually anyone with a mind believes that speech that is causing substantial disruption to the school can be stopped. This is far more likely to happen for speech offensive to the majority (because there are more of them and thus a higher probability that a) the speech will seem absolutely beyond the pale and b) that someone will take their anger too far). This implies that not adopting Reinhardt's standard is actually the discriminatory stance, since it would de facto prohibit actions against hate speech targeted at minorities while allowing such actions against speech the majority dislikes. This is doubly ironic, given that minorities should (given the first point) enjoy greater protection, but instead they'd be getting reduced protection. I should note that I do think that speech which targets the moral personhood of a majority member can also be restricted in schools (all of this analysis, I remind you, only applies to schools), I just think that a) the standards are different in that case and b) we have alternative mechanisms for addressing said speech.

The final thing I want to point out (and again, this is something Crits will love) is the intensively fact-based opinion Reinhardt wrote. Unlike Kozinski in the dissent, Reinhardt was not willing to gloss over the manner in which these sort of displays materially affect the lives of gay students. Kozinski virtually mocks the situation, citing to a variety of movies and books to show that going off-task in class is normal in school, and that "tense situations" are to be expected when people debate politics passionately. Maybe, but one's very personhood is not normally at stake in "normal politics." In any case, this type of experience-based jurisprudence highlights the importance of how the narrative of events are constructed in a judicial opinion. Comparing the overview of facts in Judge Reinhardt versus Judge Kozinski's opinions, one cannot help but feel the difference in how the case "feels." Same situation, two storytellers, two different conclusions.

A round-up of other views on the case:

Dale Carpenter and Eugene Volokh both comment over at the VC with substantive legal analysis. Both think the ruling was wrong, though Carpenter wonders if Tinker v. Des Moines should be modified so the ruling could be right. Orin Kerr smells cert.

Alexandra von Meltzen writes that defenders of the ruling (like myself, I guess) are "all conveniently confused about the First Amendment." She also gives the lethal epithet: PC. I supposed being "confused" is better than being an "oppressor", which is what Hoystory labels my ilk. Blue Crab Boulevard makes the same "confused about the First Amendment" claim.

Doc's Home says this is all about protecting the "professionally offended" from having their self-esteem hurt. So does Rovian Conspiracy. And Plus Ultra. Dmaetzon says the case stands for the principle that free speech ends if someone is offended. This parroted line of argument disturbs me, because it just brushes aside as irrelevant the court's documentation of the concrete harms gay students by just calling it an issue of "self-esteem." That demeans what is assuredly a complicated question. It's like dismissing a fraud claim by saying: "Oh, look, the Court is saying that the first amendment doesn't apply when naive people get upset! Boohoo!" At the point where the court identifies an empirically measurable harm, I think opponents have to do more with the argument than just dismiss it as a case of "self-esteem" gone wild.

Sister Toldjah can't conceptualize about what right could possibly be violated here. Allow me to quote Brown v. Board "In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." And again, given two pages of empirical data showing that these types of slurs create an unequal learning environment for gay students, I think the right outlined in Brown is breached. Toldjah claims that the school should bar both the "day of silence" and these shirts. If she can find any credible evidence that shows those actions had empirically measurable impacts on Harper's ability to learn, then I'll take her seriously. Barring that, I still believe that a school can have a day promoting racial harmony without allowing the Klan to stop by for lunch.

This is the underlying fallacy--Colossus of Rhodey makes it too. The standard the Court set was when speech attacks the moral personhood of a community member. Rhodey says this is an "easy argument." I agree (though I don't think that "easy" equates "bad"). The First Amendment protects "disagreeable speech." But as our prohibitions on libel, fraud, and slander (among other things) establish, words that cause a harm ("words that wound") are not so protected. Insofar as the opinion relatively clearly established a harm in Harper's speech (that doesn't exist in the gay students speech), that strikes me as a perfectly logical place to line draw. That isn't to say that this is an "easy" case--it isn't--but the Court's linedrawing decision strikes me as a sound one to make.

A couple of surprising concurrences for my side, from Outside the Beltway and (possibly) Ann Althouse. Feministe's agreement is less surprising (and very close to mine own opinion). I don't know Betsy's Page.

Phew!

Segregated Spaces

The Nebraska state legislature has approved a plan to split the Omaha school district in three--one district predominantly White, one predominantly Black, one predominantly Latino (the tax base of the district will be pooled, however). What makes this case interesting is that the single Black member of the Nebraska legislature, Ernie Chambers, voted for the plan, explaining that he wanted the Black community to be in charge of its own schools.

Jack Balkin has a great post exploring some of the dangers of such a proposal. But the real gold in them thar hills was written by Heather Gerken, who explores the consequences of labeling the Omaha plan "segregation", and makes a call for more complex vocabulary to talk about the issue (a position that I hold near and dear to my heart regarding race generally). All I can say is go read.

Gaze Into Infinity

Lance Mannion parses the conservative myth of what once was:

This is the Right Wing Kulturkampf ur-myth restated. Once upon time we were all good and well-behaved, if plagued by demons and temptations within. You know, back in the day, when lynching was a spectator sport, children were worked to death in factories and mineshafts, and employers thought nothing of hiring goons to beat and kill workers who dared strike for safer working conditions and decent pay.

Then came the Fall, and with it moral relativism, post-modernism, Freudianism, Marxism, feminism, birth control, Roe v. Wade, situation comedies that make dad into a buffoon, and black people who expect to live in our neighborhoods and send their kids to our schools...whoops, did we say that last one out loud? We meant entitlements, the nanny state, and the culture of dependence brought about by Welfare.

The temptation when things are bad now is to drop back into a mythologized history, one that never existed. As Mannion points out, this history isn't just about barbecues and social order--it has aspects we cannot in good conscience try and bring ourselves back to. Slightly more sophisticated indulgers might admit to the horrors of the past, but say they can be excised from the revival--we can bring back the community feeling of the 50s without also resurrecting the "segregated" part of said community. I applaud these people for at least recognizing that their collective past was not, in fact, idyllic, but it still misses the point: the whole schema of these time periods were intricately tied together--good and bad. This feeling of "community" that is so exalted, for example, was sustainable because it was socially permissible to exclude mistrusted minorities from the endeavor. It's easy to be friendly and neighborly when your entire neighborhood is of one race, class, religion, and mindset.

The root of this falsification is nothing too complex: It's just easier. This is liberalism's strategic (not moral) flaw. It's asks people to run an endless marathon. History is an endless struggle for moral progress (though there is no guarantee that at any given moment we are moving forward instead of backwards). There is no place on the horizon where we can rest and say "We're here. We've reached paradise." Justice being an ideal, chasing it is like chasing infinity. Not only that, but liberalism has to always pick at its own scab. We have to constantly emphasize the failings of the present, constantly remind the people that the journey continues.

This isn't a moral indictment of liberalism. The search for Eden may be fruitless, but it is still a worthwhile quest. And just because we can never get to the end doesn't mean we haven't made progress--real progress. But the gaze out into infinity can be paralyzing; is it any wonder that some wish to grasp something concrete and say "this, this was what the world should have been"?

H/T: Feministe