Way back in 2005 (20 years ago(!)) the blogosphere discovered the "Crazification Factor" of 27% -- the baseline percentage of Americans who will take an action for reasons that defy any rational explanation whatsoever. The background came in a discussion of President George W. Bush's cratering approval numbers, and a query as to how low they might go, and it's still fun to read to this day:
John: Hey, Bush is now at 37% approval. I feel much less like Kevin McCarthy screaming in traffic. But I wonder what his base is --
Tyrone: 27%.
John: ... you said that immediately, and with some authority.
Tyrone: Obama vs. Alan Keyes. Keyes was from out of state, so you can eliminate any established political base; both candidates were black, so you can factor out racism; and Keyes was plainly, obviously, completely crazy. Batshit crazy. Head-trauma crazy. But 27% of the population of Illinois voted for him. They put party identification, personal prejudice, whatever ahead of rational judgement. Hell, even like 5% of Democrats voted for him. That's crazy behaviour. I think you have to assume a 27% Crazification Factor in any population.
For this reason, the "Crazification Factor" is also known as the "Keyes Number". And though undoubtedly the product of significant cherry-picking, it was fun in the years that followed to find other crazy propositions that clustered around 27% support.
I was thinking about this nugget of blogger history upon reading about an announced primary challenge against incumbent Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) by progressive influencer Kat Abughazaleh. The announced basis for the challenge is general discontent with Democratic leadership and the "gerontocracy" not being aggressive enough in fighting the Trump administration. But the problem is that nobody -- not even Abughazaleh -- can point to any problems on that front for Schakowsky, specifically. Abughazaleh herself agrees that Schakowsky has been a good Democrat!
Beyond that, Abughazaleh has never held elected office, has no significant political experience, is from out-of-state (she voted in DC last election), and doesn't live in Schakowsky's district. In terms of traditional bases of support, Abughazaleh has literally nothing going for her other than "I am not a long-standing incumbent Democrat."
To be clear, I'm not saying one would have to be crazy to vote for Abughazaleh. Rather, what made the Keyes Factor notable was that the Keyes/Obama race helpfully isolated out every possible reason one might vote for a candidate aside from "I'm attracted to the crazy." Likewise, I'm pointing out that if Abughazaleh does end up facing off against Schakowsky (and the latter hasn't decided if she's seeking reelection), any support the latter gets will be purely, 100% attributable to people voting entirely on the basis of generalized anti-incumbent/anti-established Democrat rage, untethered either to any particular vices of the incumbent or any particular virtues of the challenger. It will, in other words, provide a useful baseline for seeing how powerful this sentiment is amongst the Democratic electorate, because it is a race that is uniquely free of other confounding variables.
This race will not be like George Latimer beating Jamaal Bowman (an especially well-established challenger taking out a somewhat wounded incumbent, with clear ideological differences), or AOC beating Joe Crowley (a uniquely talented challenger ousting an incumbent asleep at the wheel). Here, the only impetus that might push a voter to pick Abughazaleh over Schakowsky is "Schakowsky is an old, long-tenured incumbent, and I don't like that." That's clearly a sentiment that has no small amount of force amongst Democrats right now -- but is it enough to actually win a race?
I don't think it is. My guess, assuming a head-to-head matchup between Schakowsky and Abughazaleh? I think the latter will end up pulling around 27%. We'll see if I'm right.
UPDATE: Erik Loomis writes a post on this race that I think pretty well encapsulates the dynamic I'm describing above. He opens by admitting he has no quarrel with Schakowsky or her performance in Congress; she has been a solid Democrat. Nonetheless, he finds Abughazaleh appealing because of grievances towards other Democrats that -- with the single exception of "she's old" -- he admits don't apply to Schakowsky.
This offers me a good opportunity to restate my general views on primaries:
(1) I will freely admit I default to being more "pro-incumbent" than a lot of my peers. This is because I view politics as a job and I think one gets better at it with experience (this is also why I oppose term limits). I am deeply skeptical of the populist "we just need some common-sense wisdom from outsiders in order to get things done in Washington" take. I also think primaries-for-the-sake-of-primaries are needlessly fratricidal and shunt energy that should be used to fight Republicans into D-on-D violence. Consequently, for me the burden of persuasion is always on the challenger to justify their primary challenge.
(2) That said, there are lots of good reasons that can justify a primary challenge! A substantially different ideological vision? Absolutely. Proof that the incumbent has gotten too cozy with Republicans and is selling out party priorities? Definitely (hello IDC!). Political heresies that can't be justified by the demographics of the district (fair or not, we have to give more leeway to Joe Manchin than to Dan Lipinski)? 100%. A serious scandal? Obviously. Indeed, where there is a good reason for antipathy towards a specific incumbent, then I think a primary challenge is the right way to push the party in a more positive direction. Nobody is entitled to keep their seat in absence of good performance.
(3) But there does need to be a real reason. "The incumbent is old", without that manifesting in terms of incapacity or unwillingness to "fight", is not a reason. "I feel I deserve to be a bigger deal" is also not a reason (looking at you, Joe Kennedy). "It's time for new blood" is also not, on its own, a real reason.
(4) And finally, I think it is actually bad to challenge incumbents who have objectively good records. We want our politicians to be properly incentivized vis-a-vis good performance. When they misbehave, we should put a little fear into them (and a serious primary challenge is a great way to do that). But the corollary is that when they do well, they should be rewarded with political security. Do badly, get primaried; do well, keep your seat. But if doing the right thing doesn't yield electoral rewards, then the material incentive structure for politicians to do good things frays considerably, and we have to start relying on less reliable and more idiosyncratic mechanisms to get our representatives to vote in the appropriate fashion.
