What Will Be the Democratic Party's Anti-Incumbent Keyes Number?

Way back in 2005 (20 years ago(!)) the blogosphere discovered the "Crazification Factor" of 27% -- the baseline percentage of Americans who will take an action for reasons that defy any rational explanation whatsoever. The background came in a discussion of President George W. Bush's cratering approval numbers, and a query as to how low they might go, and it's still fun to read to this day:

John: Hey, Bush is now at 37% approval. I feel much less like Kevin McCarthy screaming in traffic. But I wonder what his base is --

Tyrone: 27%.

John: ... you said that immediately, and with some authority.

Tyrone: Obama vs. Alan Keyes. Keyes was from out of state, so you can eliminate any established political base; both candidates were black, so you can factor out racism; and Keyes was plainly, obviously, completely crazy. Batshit crazy. Head-trauma crazy. But 27% of the population of Illinois voted for him. They put party identification, personal prejudice, whatever ahead of rational judgement. Hell, even like 5% of Democrats voted for him. That's crazy behaviour. I think you have to assume a 27% Crazification Factor in any population.

For this reason, the "Crazification Factor" is also known as the "Keyes Number". And though undoubtedly the product of significant cherry-picking, it was fun in the years that followed to find other crazy propositions that clustered around 27% support.

I was thinking about this nugget of blogger history upon reading about an announced primary challenge against incumbent Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) by progressive influencer Kat Abughazaleh. The announced basis for the challenge is general discontent with Democratic leadership and the "gerontocracy" not being aggressive enough in fighting the Trump administration. But the problem is that nobody -- not even Abughazaleh -- can point to any problems on that front for Schakowsky, specifically. Abughazaleh herself agrees that Schakowsky has been a good Democrat!

Beyond that, Abughazaleh has never held elected office, has no significant political experience, is from out-of-state (she voted in DC last election), and doesn't live in Schakowsky's district. In terms of traditional bases of support, Abughazaleh has literally nothing going for her other than "I am not a long-standing incumbent Democrat."

To be clear, I'm not saying one would have to be crazy to vote for Abughazaleh. Rather, what made the Keyes Factor notable was that the Keyes/Obama race helpfully isolated out every possible reason one might vote for a candidate aside from "I'm attracted to the crazy." Likewise, I'm pointing out that if Abughazaleh does end up facing off against Schakowsky (and the latter hasn't decided if she's seeking reelection), any support the latter gets will be purely, 100% attributable to people voting entirely on the basis of generalized anti-incumbent/anti-established Democrat rage, untethered either to any particular vices of the incumbent or any particular virtues of the challenger. It will, in other words, provide a useful baseline for seeing how powerful this sentiment is amongst the Democratic electorate, because it is a race that is uniquely free of other confounding variables. 

This race will not be like George Latimer beating Jamaal Bowman (an especially well-established challenger taking out a somewhat wounded incumbent, with clear ideological differences), or AOC beating Joe Crowley (a uniquely talented challenger ousting an incumbent asleep at the wheel). Here, the only impetus that might push a voter to pick Abughazaleh over Schakowsky is "Schakowsky is an old, long-tenured incumbent, and I don't like that." That's clearly a sentiment that has no small amount of force amongst Democrats right now -- but is it enough to actually win a race?

I don't think it is. My guess, assuming a head-to-head matchup between Schakowsky and Abughazaleh? I think the latter will end up pulling around 27%. We'll see if I'm right.

UPDATE: Erik Loomis writes a post on this race that I think pretty well encapsulates the dynamic I'm describing above. He opens by admitting he has no quarrel with Schakowsky or her performance in Congress; she has been a solid Democrat. Nonetheless, he finds Abughazaleh appealing because of grievances towards other Democrats that -- with the single exception of "she's old" -- he admits don't apply to Schakowsky.

This offers me a good opportunity to restate my general views on primaries:

(1) I will freely admit I default to being more "pro-incumbent" than a lot of my peers. This is because I view politics as a job and I think one gets better at it with experience (this is also why I oppose term limits). I am deeply skeptical of the populist "we just need some common-sense wisdom from outsiders in order to get things done in Washington" take. I also think primaries-for-the-sake-of-primaries are needlessly fratricidal and shunt energy that should be used to fight Republicans into D-on-D violence. Consequently, for me the burden of persuasion is always on the challenger to justify their primary challenge.

(2) That said, there are lots of good reasons that can justify a primary challenge! A substantially different ideological vision? Absolutely. Proof that the incumbent has gotten too cozy with Republicans and is selling out party priorities? Definitely (hello IDC!). Political heresies that can't be justified by the demographics of the district (fair or not, we have to give more leeway to Joe Manchin than to Dan Lipinski)? 100%. A serious scandal? Obviously. Indeed, where there is a good reason for antipathy towards a specific incumbent, then I think a primary challenge is the right way to push the party in a more positive direction. Nobody is entitled to keep their seat in absence of good performance.

(3) But there does need to be a real reason. "The incumbent is old", without that manifesting in terms of incapacity or unwillingness to "fight", is not a reason. "I feel I deserve to be a bigger deal" is also not a reason (looking at you, Joe Kennedy). "It's time for new blood" is also not, on its own, a real reason.

(4) And finally, I think it is actually bad to challenge incumbents who have objectively good records. We want our politicians to be properly incentivized vis-a-vis good performance. When they misbehave, we should put a little fear into them (and a serious primary challenge is a great way to do that). But the corollary is that when they do well, they should be rewarded with political security. Do badly, get primaried; do well, keep your seat. But if doing the right thing doesn't yield electoral rewards, then the material incentive structure for politicians to do good things frays considerably, and we have to start relying on less reliable and more idiosyncratic mechanisms to get our representatives to vote in the appropriate fashion.

How To Lose a Primary, 2020-Style

So far in 2020, four House incumbents have lost renomination to their seats (five if you count New York Democrat Eliot Engel, though absentee ballots in New York haven't been tabulated). But there are ... differences between what causes a Republican and a Democrat to lose their own party's nomination.

For example, Rep. Dan Lipinski (D-IL) was one of the most conservative members of his caucus -- opposing abortion rights, gay rights, and Obmaa care -- despite representing a D+6 seat. If you're wondering how he got elected in the first place, the answer is that the seat was previously held by his own father who -- in classic machine fashion -- won renomination and then announced his retirement, inducing the local party to hand the nomination to his son. He was defeated by Marie Newman, who narrowly lost a challenge in 2018 and by all appearances is a perfectly normal Democrat. This is not at all abnormal.

Contrast that to what happened last night, where Rep. Scott Tipton (R-CO) was stunningly unseated by conservative activist Lauren Boebert. Nobody had the race on their radar because Tipton, who enjoyed Trump's endorsement, hardly seemed to have committed any sins against the conservative movement which would generate primary opposition (The Onion notwithstanding). So what was it about Boebert which caused her to surge to victory? Well, she's a qAnon-endorsing conspiracy theorist whose main claim to fame is running a bar called "Shooters" where the staff openly carries guns and which defied orders to shutdown in the midst of the coronavirus epidemic.

Of course, it's not always better when the incumbent loses because of their apostasies -- particularly when one considers what counts as "apostasy" in the modern GOP. Rep. Denver Riggleman (R-VA) also enjoyed Trump's backing, but lost renomination in a "drive-through convention" to far-right challenger Bob Good. Riggleman's wrongdoing? He officiated a same-sex wedding for two of his former staffers. That's enough to get you bounced in the 2020 Republican Party.

But I guess Republicans did manage to dislodge their most openly White supremacist member this  year -- so good on them for that.

The Consequences of Threatening Lifetime Sex Offender Registration To Juveniles

A federal judge has dismissed a lawsuit against a school which allegedly terrified a teenage student into suicide after threatening him with a lifetime of sex offender registration while investigating whether he had a video recording of a sexual encounter with a female classmate.

While finding that the district hadn't broken the law, Judge Andrea Wood did criticize the district's interrogation of the student:

The judge, however, made it clear she was not condoning the way the interview was conducted. While it may have been legal for authorities to make Walgren think he could end up on a sex offender registry, it was not necessarily right to do so.

“The court’s determination that the individual defendant’s actions, as pleaded, are not objectively unreasonable for purposes of a Fourth Amendment analysis should not be understood as an endorsement of those actions by this Court,” Wood wrote. “Registration as a sex offender entails severe restrictions on a sex offender’s liberty. … And in Illinois, a juvenile convicted on charges related to child pornography could potentially be forced to remain a registered sex offender for the rest of his or her life.”

I have no quarrel with Judge Wood taking the time to make this aside. I've actually suggested judges should do this more often.

But here, I think we should reflect on how this incident and our reaction to it should shake our confidence not just in how the district behaved but also in the underlying legal rules the district was communicating. My understanding is that the district was not incorrect in telling the student that the conduct he was being investigated for (having a video recording of a sexual encounter with another student, taken while they were both minors) could result in him being placed on the sex offender registry for life. That, as best I can tell, was indeed a potential consequence under Illinois law.

If we think that consequence is too draconian, then the solution can't just be to tell school districts not to (accurately) communicate the legal consequences. The solution is to amend the law.

Obviously, the issue of minors making, possessing, and sharing recordings of their own sexual exploits with other minors is a serious one (the article doesn't indicate whether the female partner here consented to the recording, but if she didn't then it's more serious still). It needs a real response.

But there's little question that our criminal policies on sexual offenses -- especially relating to "ancillary" consequences like the sex offender registry -- have blown way past anything that could justified as either valid retribution or proportional deterrence. There are consequences that can be imposed on juvenile offenders that are adequately severe given the alleged wrong that do not entail lifetime registration on the sex offender registry (with all the attendant restrictions on personal liberty that carries). Here, as in many other cases in the criminal justice system (especially when dealing with minors), we need to think creatively and break our reliance on extreme punitive measures, and we should reject the false dichotomy that says hyper-criminalization is the only way to get "serious" about these wrongs.

In short: tragedies like this happen because of the reality of the law, not because that reality was relayed. If this feels like a tragic case, then it's the law, not the communication of the law, that needs changing.

Illinois and Salaita Settle

The University of Illinois and Steven Salaita have settled their dispute over the former's "unhiring" of the latter, with Salaita to be paid over $800,000 in damages and attorneys fees. Since this looks to be the conclusion of the saga, I'll take the opportunity to one last time state my position: Yes, I think Salaita made anti-Semitic tweets, yes, I think his academic freedom was violated, no, clause "a" and clause "b" should not have anything to do with one another. Academic freedom includes the right to make anti-Semitic (or racist, or sexist, or whatever) statements; Salaita should not have been effectively stripped of his position for doing so; and he was entitled to (and I'm glad he received) a significant cash payout given that he detrimentally relied on Illinois' failure to adhere to basic academic freedom standards.

AAUP: Illinois Board's Rejection of Salaita Violates Academic Freedom

Their media release is here, the full report can be read here. The gist of their position is that, once Salaita had been offered and accepted a tenured position at Illinois, he was effectively a tenured member of the faculty and entitled to due process from "summary dismissal." The board approval was widely known to be pro forma, particularly in circumstances where their approval would come after Salaita would have already begun teaching. Chancellor Wise's invocation of "civility" as a reasonable standard for dismissing a tenured faculty member is vague and unworkable; who decides what is and isn't "civil"? Finally, in the press release, the AAUP Committee Chair emphasized something absolutely correct and worth reiterated:

e. "The issue in the case has never been the content of Salaita’s message. One may consider the contents of his tweets to be juvenile, irresponsible, and even repulsive and still defend Salaita’s right to produce them.”

Having read the release and skimmed the report, I have no objections to anything of substance. The AAUP is right on this issue. One can find Salaita's tweets to be hateful, repugnant, and anti-Semitic, and nonetheless think it has no bearing on the academic freedom issue his case presents. Salaita had for all intents and purposes already been hired by the University of Illinois. It made its bed and it should of had to lie in it, even if we think the appointment itself was a mistake or the result of poor judgment. We can criticize his scholarship, and we can even criticize the decision to hire him in the first place, but academic freedom is a constraint on remedies, and here it means that the remedy of dismissing (or "unhiring") Dr. Salaita in such a belated manner should have been off the table.

Silence and Salaita

I've pretty much said what I wanted to say about the case of Steven Salaita: Yes I think some of his statements were anti-Semitic; and no, that doesn't mean the withdrawal of his job offer isn't a violation of academic freedom. That's my position and I'm sticking to it.

But with the news that Salaita's appointment may in fact be forwarded to the Board, I got curious as to what major Jewish organizations were saying about that matter. After all, we all know that his un-hiring was the result of their devious influence and their reckless desire to squelch all dissent, right? Ready? Here we go:

ADL: Nothing.

AJC: Nothing.

AIPAC: Nothing.

ZOA (surely I can rely on them to be embarrassing): Nothing!

A whole lot of nothing.

Now, this doesn't mean that "pro-Israel" politics had nothing to do with Chancellor Wise's decision. It would hardly surprise me if some donor who considered him or herself to be pro-Israel made a fuss, and Wise thought that bringing Salaita on would be more headaches than it was worth. If that was her reasoning, of course, she gravely miscalculated. But even if she hadn't, the job of a Chancellor is to endure "headaches" such as that. Universities can survive a few loons on their faculty, but they can't survive donors interfering with their academic mission.

In any event, I bring up the silence of various prominent Jewish organizations not because they're owed any cookies -- maybe one thinks that they had an affirmative obligation to intercede on Salaita's behalf (though given that Salaita has queried whether the ADL should be labeled a hate group, it's doubtful whether he'd appreciate their backing). I only mention it because if Salaita's un-hiring stands, it won't be attributable to the "Israel Lobby" unleashing its terrible power. And by contrast if the decision is reversed, then it won't be a crippling blow to the previously indomitable Israel Lobby either. This is a fight that pro-Israel forces, at least in an institutional capacity, did not get involved in.

Academic Freedom versus Academic Legitimacy: The Case of Steven Salaita

Earlier this year, I published a short piece in the Florida International University Law Review's microsymposium on academic freedom titled "Academic Freedom versus Academic Legitimacy." The piece unfortunately isn't available online (UPDATE: here it is!), but it's short so I'll just repost it below:

What does it mean when a university department invites a person to speak? It clearly does not mean is that the department endorses the speaker’s views. Persons are regularly invited to speak in a university setting whose views are opposed by many if not most of their audience—often including the very people who invited them. Rather, the invitation indicates that the department believes the speaker is academically legitimate: their contribution is one that, whether right or wrong, usefully advances scholarly discussion. It is probable that most members of a university community believe that both Newt Gingrich and David Duke are “wrong”, but only one’s views are illegitimate.

Academic freedom and academic legitimacy map imperfectly onto one another. Academic freedom is content-neutral: it does not attempt to distinguish between “correct” and “incorrect” views. Academic legitimacy, by contrast, is very concerned with content: it asserts that certain views should not be considered valid entrants into a productive scholarly discussion. But these two concepts are often conflated. A university facing criticism over a controversial speaker will often respond by invoking “academic freedom.” This is a valid response at one level: academic freedom implies that even a David Duke cannot be barred from speaking if invited by an authorized member of the university community. But at another level, it misses the point entirely. The problem is not that Duke was allowed by some higher university authority to speak, the problem is that he was invited in the first place; that a department or research center or student group believed his views were academically legitimate. To structure the question in terms of academic freedom—should he be banned—misstates the good being pursued. The demand is not for formal barriers against such horrible views but to not need such barriers at all.

To see why this distinction matters, consider another obvious truth: David Duke is not invited to speak at colleges. This is not because “academic freedom” is being systematically breached, but rather because the academic community has voluntarily decided that Duke’s views do not make any useful scholarly contribution. And that we’ve made that decision is a very good thing—we would rightly worry about the caliber of an academic community that could not come to a general intersubjective agreement that Duke’s views are illegitimate.

But what happens when this consensus doesn’t exist? Efforts to restrict allegedly malign ideologies are assumed to be a tool of the strong, but often they are a tactic of the weak—people who are not confident that their community will unify in agreement that the ideology is in fact oppressive. That there now is massive intersubjective agreement that overt White supremacist ideology is illegitimate gives people of color nothing more than what Whites long enjoyed effortlessly, and if that consensus were threatened minority students would be rightly concerned.

Many controversies labeled as ones of “academic freedom” are actually about academic legitimacy. Is Pat Robertson properly analogized to David Duke? Is Gilad Atzmon? The Black Panthers? BDS activists? David Horowitz? What about “scientific” creationists or climate change denialists? It is fair game to argue that a well-functioning university community would not view any or all of these persons as academically legitimate, and that position itself is perfectly consistent with believing that agreements regarding academic legitimacy cannot be enforced through explicit bans or sanctions. That is all that “academic freedom” contributes to the discussion: a constraint on remedies. Enlisting it to do more confuses two distinct questions and sidesteps the true nature of many academic controversies.

David Schraub, Academic Freedom versus Academic Legitimacy, 9 FIU L. Rev. 71 (2013)

Today I read the story of Steven Salaita, whose offer to teach at the University of Illinois was rescinded after review of "uncivil" tweets about Israel, Jews, and anti-Semitism (Salaita previously taught at Virginia Tech). Corey Robin is appalled; he labels this "a symptom of the effects of Zionism on academic freedom, how pro-Israel forces have consistently attempted to shut down debate on this issue, how they 'distort all that is right.'" Salaita provides an "unapologetic defense of the rights of Palestinians", while some of his tweets may "jar or shock a tender sensibility", that's part and parcel of writing on social media. The overall theme of the post is that Salaita is a sometimes brash but valuable contributor to scholarly discourse who is being "punished" for being critical of Israel.

And then we read some of the tweets in question. I'll focus on two of the most egregious:

"By eagerly conflating Jewishness and Israel, Zionists are partly responsible when people say antisemitic shit in response to Israeli terror."

"Zionists, transforming 'antisemitism' from something horrible into something honorable since 1948."

Calling anti-Semitism "honorable"? Yeah, I think we're a bit beyond "uncivil" here. The fact that it is couched in a "critique" of a particular sector of Jewish experience and comes with a healthy dose of victim-blaming hardly changes the analysis: if I wrote "Al Sharpton, transforming 'racism' from something horrible into something honorable since 1991," I would not simply be criticizing the National Action Network. One would hope we'd have little trouble understanding the racism latent in such a statement (though admittedly I suspect a significant segment of the American political right would fervently deny there is any such racism in that statement. Needless to say, emulating the right-wing definition of racism as "Klan members, and then only if they are chanting 'White Power' while actually lynching someone" is hardly a ringing endorsement).

But here's the thing -- this observation doesn't change Robin's analysis either. And that's what I find frustrating. This debate seems to be, on the one hand, "Salaita's views are abhorrent and therefore Illinois was right to rescind his offer" versus "Salaita is a valuable contributor to scholarly discourse who is being wrongfully punished for his unpopular views." In other words, both sides are conflating Salaita's academic freedom -- the freedom not to be punished in the academic context due to one's political opinions -- and his academic legitimacy -- whether his statements should be considered in-bounds when we think about what positions are valid in political discussion. The right answer, it seems to me, is that "Salaita has said some horrifying, anti-Semitic stuff, but Illinois made its bed and now it has to lie in it." Academic freedom still protects people who say racist or anti-Semitic trash. I can say from my time teaching at Illinois, no less, that I was the periodic recipient of blast emails from a tenured faculty member who liked to go on about the Zionist Fascist Neo-Con Straussian Rockefeller Evangelical conspiracy of war and world domination. Tenure is a beautiful thing. The point being, said faculty member had the right to say those things, but one would hope that everyone else recognized him as a lunatic (which they did). It wasn't scary that he wasn't fired, but it would have been very scary if most other faculty members thought he had a point.

Turning back to Salaita's case, if one wanted to there are ways to distinguish it from the "academic freedom" paradigm. The tweets in question are not part of any scholarly discussion, they were mere social media outbursts. For obvious reasons though I have no interest in seeing academics targeted due to their social media postings, so as far as I'm concerned that's out. Another difference is that Salaita was only not hired at Illnois, he was not fired for his positions. That would be a valid distinction, I think, had this decision been made at the department level. I addressed this issue previously in the context of supposed "discrimination" against faculty candidates who oppose LGBT rights:

Being a law professor is an academic, policy-oriented position. The question of LGBT rights is a normative, political question. It goes to the heart of what a professor does. If someone gets that question "wrong", is there any reason why I can't evaluate them more harshly on the merits of their candidacy? How else is one supposed to evaluate it? This gets to the deep tension within academia: academic freedom means letting people take whatever position they like and pursue any line of inquiry they desire; academic merit necessarily requires judging those positions and inquiries as good or bad. I don't mean to discount the possibility that somebody can take a position that I think is wrong while conceding that they argue for it in a powerful and sophisticated fashion. I do mean to say that the deeper ingrained a particular commitment is, the less likely that one will believe the dispute to be one of reasonable disagreement, rather than simply the other side making a profound moral error.

Indeed, I think this gets at a large part of the discomfort over Salaita's hiring -- that functionally in hiring Salaita they're saying (at least in part) that viewing anti-Semitism as an honorable calling is a valid, legitimate position in the constellation of academic debate, just one of many positions that we might have political disagreements about. That judgment is a concerning one. Whether or not a professor could get hired if she had written that "Hamas has made Islamophobia something honorable" or "Louis Farrakhan has made racism something honorable", I'd certainly hope that she wouldn't be -- that we would view that position as outside the bounds of good legitimate scholarly debate. That distinguishes the decision to hire from the decision to fire -- it is well-known and agreed that not firing an academic for his or her appalling opinions does not signal any endorsement of the validity of those views. By contrast, making the affirmative step of hiring an academic inevitably contains some such endorsement. Consequently, one has to wonder how it is that viewing anti-Semitism as "honorable" rather than "horrible" for the past 65 years has come to be a position smart, well-connected academics are willing to endorse.

So on the one hand, if Salaita had written this after already having been hired at Illinois, it would be both protected by academic freedom and abhorrent. If the hiring committee had decided they didn't want to hire him because they didn't think viewing anti-Semitism as "honorable" was up to their standards of merit, they'd be equally justified (and right). Salaita is somewhere in the middle given that he had been offered the job but had not yet formally gotten upper-administration approval; but I'm inclined to agree that this was too late. It is well-known that this approval is pro forma; like Salaita I too announced my departure from my prior job before getting final approval by the Chancellor (or whoever) for my position having relied upon the offer from the folks at the law school. Nobody views the chancellor's approval of the hiring decision as an endorsement; it is a rubber-stamp. That's why anyone inside the academic community views this as having taken something away from Salaita, which in turn raises academic freedom concerns. And since, to reiterate, racist, sexist, and anti-Semitic views are as protected by academic freedom as any other, this should in no way stop anyone from recognizing the anti-Semitism in Salaita's writings.

Long story short -- academic freedom protects anti-Semitic statements such as the claim that anti-Semitism has become "honorable." Viewing that statement as anything other than an abhorrent view that is nonetheless protected by academic freedom is frightening. That people on both sides of the debate over Salaita's hiring continue to conflate these two concepts blurs both of these important conclusions.

UPDATE: The Illinois AAUP committee on academic freedom has released a statement supporting Salaita. It's mostly unobjectionable, but it does fall into the trap I outlined above. Salaita's statements were less a "plea to end the violence" so much as to redirect it ("Jeffrey goldberg’s story should have ended at the pointy end of a shiv."; "I wish all the fucking West Bank settlers would go missing" -- said in the aftermath of the kidnapping of three Jewish teenagers in the West Bank who were later found dead). And the end paragraph, which expresses concern "if a university would void a contract of a professor exercising a right of citizenship in protesting actions of another country that much of the global community including the U.N. Secretary General and even the U.S. State Department have found 'disgraceful,'" is another entry in the long history of conflating everything from "anti-Semitism is honorable" to tactical critiques of military operations into an indistinguishable glob known as criticism of Israel.

None of which alters the broader point -- but again, I don't know why it is so hard for people to defend academic freedom without affirmatively arguing that the speech in question is actually great. That's not what academic freedom is about.

I'm Your Wing, Vector One

One of the stranger things about my time in Champaign was the phonecalls I'd receive aimed at former denizens of my office. One of my colleagues, for example, had an apartment in Chicago, and so ADT was constantly calling me to say the alarm had gone off.

I'm not in Champaign anymore, but my voicemail is still linked to my email address and so I'm still forwarded the messages. Only now these emails come with an attempt to transcribe the message into text. The results are glorious.

Good afternoon this is ADT SECURITY everything is in regards to berg alarm we received only room ocean front [name, almost gotten right!] residents [phone number] yeah I got that they have provided to be sunset divide it up 40 they've and I wanted 3 foot notified them if you have any question please and take it easy vector one.

"Take it easy, Vector One" is my new AALS motto. It makes me feel like an X-Wing pilot going off on a mission.

Children of the Corn

Everybody around here is sniffly and stuffy -- myself included. Apparently, it's not a virus. Rather, it's the ongoing corn harvest, which supposedly sets off allergies left and right. Including, it seems mine -- worse even than I had in Minnesota (where I believe my New Student Week group was worried I would actually keel over and die while working in St. Paul).

Now, I'm allergic to many things. Some of them (grass, cats) I've even managed to nail down. Mostly, it's a mystery when my eyes suddenly start running water or my skin breaks out in hives. But I'm pretty sure I'm not allergic to corn. I mean, I eat corn all the time. Corn syrup is in literally 85% of the food I eat. How could a corn harvest set off an allergic reaction.

Oh whatever. At least it will be over in ... a month? It takes a month to harvest all the corn.

God damnit. I miss Chicago.

Hey, Wanna See Something Cool?

Say hello to David Schraub, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law.

Champaign Versus Chicago: The Early Evaluation

My comparison of Chicago versus Champaign is very strange. Chicago is a huge city. Champaign is a small town. Yet Champaign has the early edge in "big city" characteristics, and while Chicago is winning on "small town" things.

For example, there are more good restaurants in close walking distance of our Champaign Apartment. And the Chinese delivery we've gotten is much better. On the other hand, our downtown Chicago apartment was very quiet and peaceful, while we're on top of two beer gardens in Champaign, one of which decided to bring out a live brass band to play at 12:30 in the morning.* I also had more of a "community feel" in Chicago than I do here, though that's a little unfair of a metric.

In any event, so far the noise in the beer garden has dropped off by around 1:30 each night. And other than that, I'm a happy camper.

* I'm already plotting my counterattack to this. Since we're in downtown, a noise complaint probably won't fly. So instead, I'll just fight fire with fire -- blast out the most obnoxious rap and heavy metal I can think of out my second-story window. I can just imagine the ensuing complaint:

"What the hell are you doing?"

"Playing music. What are you doing?"

Moving On In

Greetings from glorious Champaign, Illinois (and courtesy of the coffee shop located directly below my feet, whose Wi-Fi I have liberated until I regrettably return to Comcast's clutches). The new apartment is fantastic, and one of the three rooms even looks reasonably inhabitable (the other two still have packed and unpacked boxes strewn about with reckless abandon).

Today is, in a particularly real (or perhaps particularly metaphorical) way, the first day of the rest of my life.

Game on.

Living Like a Prof Star

I spent the day in Champaign today, visiting the University of Illinois (and my to-be apartment) for the first time. It was great. I got picked up by the Associate Dean in his BMW convertible, taken out to lunch, shown around the school, showered with Cristal (okay, not that last part). And everyone was really nice. The overall effect was to sort of hit home that yes, this is actually happening. And that's very exciting!

Unfortunately, my train back isn't for another three hours, so I'm hanging at a coffee shop to kill time until I go back to the train station (I may stop for a bite to eat first). Nothing to do but browse the internet and sip hot chocolate.

Wait a minute -- what's "unfortunate" about that?

The Big Announcement

So, I feel I've been teasing you with promises of news for awhile. It wasn't intentional, I swear -- I really was consistently on the edge of being able to announce stuff, and events kept transpiring to put it off. But now, I can finally reveal the entire story -- as well as my employment for the next two years.

This past September, I was offered and accepted a clerkship for the 2012-2013 term with Judge Diana Murphy on the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, Minneapolis.

And next year, I will be a visiting professor in the Academic Fellows program at the University of Illinois law school.

These are both incredibly exciting opportunities. Judge Murphy and I really clicked in the interview -- I can't tell you how much I am looking forward to getting a chance to work with her (and Jill isn't displeased with getting to go back to the old homestead for a year).

But the Illinois position -- which I just found out about today -- represents the attainment of a dream I've been pursuing for nearly a decade. Obviously, it's not permanent, and there's a lot of things I still need to do. But starting next August, I will be able to say that I am a law professor.

The story of how this all came about is, I think, worth recounting -- and hopefully will justify the slow-roll of the news. My interview with Judge Murphy was at 7:30 AM on the first Thursday that "on-plan" federal judges could conduct interviews. It was, as I said, going fantastically -- we really seemed to click in a way that I can honestly say has never happened (at least so smoothly) in any job interview I've ever had.

Unfortunately, Judge Murphy had already finished hiring for 2011-12 term at 7 AM (yeah, I thought 7:30 was a prime slot too). But she immediately made me an offer for the following term (2012-13).

This presented a problem, for Covington had recently revised their clerkship policy such that attorneys could no longer start with the firm, then leave to clerk. We could graduate, clerk, and then begin with the firm, but they didn't want a situation where incoming attorneys got a few months of training and then, just when they began to be integrated into cases and clients, they left again.

That was the original reason why I couldn't announce the clerkship -- without something for the 2011-12 year, I couldn't accept Judge Murphy's offer without running afoul of Covington's new policy. So I immediately set to work trying to find something -- another clerkship or, preferably, a teaching fellowship, to fill the gap year so I could stay in harmony with Covington's policy.

Once it became apparent that a different clerkship wasn't on the table, the first candidate was a teaching fellowship at the University of Chicago -- specifically, the Kauffman Fellowship. And it looked good -- I met with a dean, and he said that assuming the funding was renewed, he saw no reason not to hire me. And as for the funding, he didn't know what the foundation was waiting for, but he thought maybe if he told them that he had a excellent candidate lined up for next year, that would shake loose a few dollars so they could formalize things.

That was the second iteration of nearly-having news. But as you might have guessed, it didn't pan -- despite our best efforts, the funding didn't happen. So it was back to the drawing board.

Meanwhile, there was some good news -- Covington had reversed its clerkship policy (albeit with a stated preference that we not start-then-leave), meaning I could accept Murphy's offer and return to Covington next year. That was, at least, a load off my shoulder. But it did impose a November 1st deadline to accept Covington's offer. On the theory that the Kauffman fellowship should be forthcoming, I managed to secure an extension until December 1. But once the Kauffman fell through, I had to beg for more time.

I was all amped up to actually beg -- I basically had a speech prepared and everything. After the initial pleasantries, I started into my spiel, beginning with "So some things have come up, and it's looking like I won't hear anything until February/March...." and before I got any further, the legal recruiting director brightly remarked "oh, so we won't hear from you until March? Great, I'll mark it down!" I was so prepared to have to plead my case that I don't think I really processed that, and basically continued with the begging as if she hadn't said anything, which I have to imagine sounded incredibly strange until I finally managed to restore a grip on myself and thank her.

And in that extra space of time, I applied for and received this offer at Illinois -- thus bringing my long, chaotic autumn to a close.

Speaking of Covington, I do need to give them specific thanks for being so flexible with deadlines. They extended their timeline twice to accommodate me, and if they hadn't done that, I wouldn't have been able to secure this opportunity. I am so grateful for that. I also need to thank my recommenders, but in particular Lisa Bernstein, who shepherded me through this process like a pro. And of course, everyone else -- my friends, family, Jill, the whole crew -- who was so patient with me throughout this whole ordeal. I'm sure I was more than a bit manic at times, and they kept me sane.

Anyway, to close out, it seems like such a milestone in my life should have at least some impact on my blog. And you'll note at the top that I have a new tagline. It's a bit premature -- I'm not a professor yet -- but I told myself as soon as I got my first teaching gig, I'd make the change.

The 800

I just hope none of these kids ever has an ill word for affirmative action.

Blago's Choice

Rod Blagojevich has announced his appointment for Barack Obama's vacant Senate seat: former Illinois AG Roland Burris. Kagro X has a good run-down of the various issues in play here, including Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid's insinuation that he might not be seated. Burris, as far as I can tell, is a clean politician (both generally and specifically with regards to this controversy), but of course, he's tainted by the mere fact that he's associated with Blagojevich. The appointment also puts Democrats in a tight spot, as they may be faced with trying to deny seating to the man who would be the sole Black Senator in the entire body (for some reason, I imagine Republicans will find this significantly less awkward).

Ad Watching

My vote went out in the mail weeks ago, and was exactly for who you thought it would be in a state where it couldn't have made even a remote difference even if I had gotten a bit nifty. But here in Chicago, I've started to see a few political ads. One for Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL), who is up for re-election here and is sure to win it. One ad attacking Barack Obama for his affiliation with Jeremiah Wright -- obviously the GOP was going to go there eventually, and even if it is from an "independent" group I imagine the subtlety will be lost on the swath of swing voters who find those sorts of attacks distasteful. And there was one ad for Antoine Members, who is running against Rep. Bobby Rush (D-IL), and though you wouldn't know it from the ad or his campaign site, is a Republican. I imagine even the most entrenched Senate incumbents put out a few ads re-introducing themselves to the crowds, and national ads put out in Chicago undoubtedly hit the Northwestern Indiana region, so I'm going to pin down Members' ad as the most futile expenditure I've seen so far (the 1st District generally gives Democrats around 80% of the vote).

The Media's Third Toxic Story

TalkLeft links to a Times (London) article purporting to show Obama's "third toxic mentor." The first was Tony Rezko (not a mentor), the second was Rev. Wright (okay), and the third is Illinois State Senate President Emil Jones. Like Rezko, Jones, we are told, has some ethics problems. Okay, that's bad. But the article tells us (buried eight paragraphs deep) that none of them have any link to Obama. That's good, yes? Well, apparently, it's irrelevant, because he "can ill afford another scandal related to his former Chicago allies."

Look, there's a lot of corruption in Illinois. And in Washington, for that matter. If every Republican who had ever counted Rick Renzi, Duke Cunningham, Tom DeLay, Mark Foley, Larry Craig, Richard Pombo, Bob Ney, or hey, John McCain (remember the Keating Five?) as a colleague was permanently disqualified from higher office, we'd have a problem. We need to crack the culture of corruption. If Jones is guilty on that charge, then by all means, take him down. But this guilt by association -- particularly on issues outside of the policy arena -- trick the media has been on is getting out of hand.

Rep. Davis Claims Racial Profiling

Illinois Representative Danny Davis (D) is claiming he was racially profiled by the Chicago Police after being pulled over early one morning while driving three Black colleagues (guests on his radio show) home.

Two white police officers pulled over the Democratic congressman early Monday morning, according to spokeswoman Tumia Romero.

"He thinks he was pulled over because of his race," Romero said Thursday. "He was not speeding, had a valid driver's license, wasn't swerving, but was pulled over anyway."

She said Davis had been working on his radio show until around midnight Sunday. He was driving home three of his guests -- all African-Americans -- when Chicago police officers pulled his vehicle over around 1 a.m. Monday.

The only reason the congressman can see for being stopped was that there were "four black men in the car," Romero said.

Certainly, this is not the first time the Chicago PD has stood accused of racial profiling. While I obviously don't wish this on anyone, part of me is gleeful that the police appeared to profile the wrong Black guy -- if it were anyone else this side of Barack Obama, they'd get away with it like they always do. Of course, they might anyway, but a U.S. Congressman might have a bit more heft than your average Black man would in this sort of situation.

Alternatively, of course, Davis might have been pulled over entirely legitimately. But while one might argue that he could claim racial profiling to cover his transgression, I find that very doubtful -- it's hardly worth the scrutiny over a minor traffic violation.

UPDATE: While I love comments as much as the next blogger, I'm getting real close to shutting them down on this post. Many of the comments are fine, and a few I find distasteful, but still well within acceptable bounds. A few, however, clearly have crossed the line into out-and-out racism. Please don't make generalized stereotypes about Black people -- what "they" always do or what type of cars "they" all drive. It's just ignorant. And remember that we're talking about a US Congressman here. Absent specific evidence about his behavior or attitude (like there was for ex-Rep. Cynthia McKinney), I think he's entitled to a presumption of respect.