Friday, March 13, 2015
Thursday, March 12, 2015
Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt: Review
Jill and I finished Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt last night (we started on Saturday). I know what you're thinking: "13 episodes in 5 days -- what took you so long?" And while that is a slow pace for us, we had unusual obstacles: We were vacationing in Vegas and missed our normal Sunday TV, so we had a lot to catch-up on. Even a great new show has to yield when you're behind on Brooklyn Nine-Nine.
The most amazing thing about Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is how fresh it feels. This is particularly astounding when you turn over the constituent elements. The music and comedic beats are highly reminiscent of 30 Rock (unsurprising given the Tina Fey/Jeff Richmond nexus). Character-wise, Jane Krakowski (Jacqueline) is playing the same role she did in Thirty Rock, Carol Kane (Lillian) is playing the same role she is in Gotham, and Ellie Kemper (Kimmy) is (I'm told) playing the same role she did in The Office -- though I see more than a little Liz Lemon in her. Even Ki Hong Lee (Dong) feels like he's playing a character I've seen before, even though a quick IMDB search reveals no prospects.
Yet the concept feels like something that's genuinely new. Kimmy Schmidt escapes from a doomsday cult and, rather than going back to her old life in Indiana, decides to try and make it in New York. I'm pretty sure I came up with something similar in a New Year's Balderdash game, but it would not have anywhere near the polish. The closest cousin to Kimmy Schmidt might actually be Big Love (a great show in its own right). But Kimmy Schmidt is different in important ways, and not just because it is a sitcom. Kimmy was kidnapped in 8th grade -- she neither was a born-and-raised believer in the cult, nor is she completely unaware of the workings of the modern world. Plenty has changed in 15 years, but not so much that Kimmy is utterly lost -- she mostly doesn't know about contemporary slang ("troll the respawn, Jeremy") and pop stars. And she is not particularly conservative -- though she's understandably a bit stunted in her personal and romantic development, she is excited to have a boyfriend and kiss a boy. Kimmy has enough difficulties on her plate without the show going overboard and pretending like she doesn't know what a car is, and that restraint is greatly appreciated.
Another element that has to be remarked upon here is the incredible cast diversity. I give credit to Brooklyn Nine-Nine for being majority non-White male. But Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt might be unprecedented -- there isn't a single White dude in the main cast. The four largest roles are three White women (Kemper, Krakowski -- playing a passing Native American -- and Kane) and a gay Black man (Tituss Burgess as Titus Andromedon). There are a few recurring White male characters amongst Ellie's boyfriends, and of course Jon Hamm as the cult leader Rev. Richard Wayne Gary Wayne (and can I just say how lucky Jon Hamm is to have Mad Men? Because literally every other part I've ever seen him in he's been typecast as "charismatic idiot"). But they're firmly on the periphery.
But by far the most impressive attribute of Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is how it deals with the very real trauma Kimmy experienced. It manages to treat this in a manner that is realistic, sensitive, subtle, and hilarious -- a combination I would not have thought possible in advance, particularly in a comedy of this sort. The trick is that the "jokes" on this front blend in with the overall comedic rhythm of the show, but on closer examination they are obviously distinct. When Kimmy's colleague sneaks behind her to do a playful "guess who" and Kimmy whirls while screaming "I don't like that" (before immediately plastering back on her normal chipper face upon seeing who it was), that's the sort of gag that fits in well with the show's overarching run of jokes. But if one thinks about it, it is clear that this isn't part of Kimmy's normal personality. It's a product of the hell she went through for a decade and a half. She knows it and she wants to escape from it as best she can, and is taking impressive strides in that respect. But while Kimmy might be unbreakable, she is not unaffected, and the series shows that in surprisingly vivid (but not melodramstic) fashion.
And that's what Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is about, ultimately. It is about a bright and irrepressible girl who went through something terrible and is getting past it in her own way. The comedy is there but never at her expense, and underneath it all is a surprisingly poignant commentary on surviving. It really is an excellent show. Indeed, I think it's got a strong case to be the strongest original series Netflix has ever produced.
The most amazing thing about Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is how fresh it feels. This is particularly astounding when you turn over the constituent elements. The music and comedic beats are highly reminiscent of 30 Rock (unsurprising given the Tina Fey/Jeff Richmond nexus). Character-wise, Jane Krakowski (Jacqueline) is playing the same role she did in Thirty Rock, Carol Kane (Lillian) is playing the same role she is in Gotham, and Ellie Kemper (Kimmy) is (I'm told) playing the same role she did in The Office -- though I see more than a little Liz Lemon in her. Even Ki Hong Lee (Dong) feels like he's playing a character I've seen before, even though a quick IMDB search reveals no prospects.
Yet the concept feels like something that's genuinely new. Kimmy Schmidt escapes from a doomsday cult and, rather than going back to her old life in Indiana, decides to try and make it in New York. I'm pretty sure I came up with something similar in a New Year's Balderdash game, but it would not have anywhere near the polish. The closest cousin to Kimmy Schmidt might actually be Big Love (a great show in its own right). But Kimmy Schmidt is different in important ways, and not just because it is a sitcom. Kimmy was kidnapped in 8th grade -- she neither was a born-and-raised believer in the cult, nor is she completely unaware of the workings of the modern world. Plenty has changed in 15 years, but not so much that Kimmy is utterly lost -- she mostly doesn't know about contemporary slang ("troll the respawn, Jeremy") and pop stars. And she is not particularly conservative -- though she's understandably a bit stunted in her personal and romantic development, she is excited to have a boyfriend and kiss a boy. Kimmy has enough difficulties on her plate without the show going overboard and pretending like she doesn't know what a car is, and that restraint is greatly appreciated.
Another element that has to be remarked upon here is the incredible cast diversity. I give credit to Brooklyn Nine-Nine for being majority non-White male. But Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt might be unprecedented -- there isn't a single White dude in the main cast. The four largest roles are three White women (Kemper, Krakowski -- playing a passing Native American -- and Kane) and a gay Black man (Tituss Burgess as Titus Andromedon). There are a few recurring White male characters amongst Ellie's boyfriends, and of course Jon Hamm as the cult leader Rev. Richard Wayne Gary Wayne (and can I just say how lucky Jon Hamm is to have Mad Men? Because literally every other part I've ever seen him in he's been typecast as "charismatic idiot"). But they're firmly on the periphery.
But by far the most impressive attribute of Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is how it deals with the very real trauma Kimmy experienced. It manages to treat this in a manner that is realistic, sensitive, subtle, and hilarious -- a combination I would not have thought possible in advance, particularly in a comedy of this sort. The trick is that the "jokes" on this front blend in with the overall comedic rhythm of the show, but on closer examination they are obviously distinct. When Kimmy's colleague sneaks behind her to do a playful "guess who" and Kimmy whirls while screaming "I don't like that" (before immediately plastering back on her normal chipper face upon seeing who it was), that's the sort of gag that fits in well with the show's overarching run of jokes. But if one thinks about it, it is clear that this isn't part of Kimmy's normal personality. It's a product of the hell she went through for a decade and a half. She knows it and she wants to escape from it as best she can, and is taking impressive strides in that respect. But while Kimmy might be unbreakable, she is not unaffected, and the series shows that in surprisingly vivid (but not melodramstic) fashion.
And that's what Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is about, ultimately. It is about a bright and irrepressible girl who went through something terrible and is getting past it in her own way. The comedy is there but never at her expense, and underneath it all is a surprisingly poignant commentary on surviving. It really is an excellent show. Indeed, I think it's got a strong case to be the strongest original series Netflix has ever produced.
Tuesday, March 10, 2015
The Greater and the Lesser
Last week, the 8th Circuit ruled in an 8-3 en banc decision that a prisoner had not stated a viable claim against Missouri's lethal injection protocols. The Court also held (this time 7-4) that the prisoner had not stated a valid claim because his complaint only conceded in the abstract that alternative methods of execution were constitutional; he did not specifically say "X method of execution would be constitutional."
The dissenting opinion by Judge Bye begins as follows:
It does not seem wrong to me that government might have a certain power in the abstract but that other constitutional constraints make the practical means of carrying that power out a null set. The problem with the dissenters' position (shared by the majority) is that it distorts constitutional doctrine. The constitutionality of any individual execution protocol is a distinct question from the abstract constitutionality of the death penalty. If an execution protocol fails whatever specific 8th Amendment doctrine we have, it does not matter whether we can envision another procedure that would alleviate these concerns.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Bye begins as follows:
The constitutionality of the death penalty itself is not before us in this case, and we proceed on the assumption the death penalty is constitutional. While it follows there must be a constitutional means of carrying out a death sentence, it has not been determined that Missouri's current execution protocol is constitutional.Is this true (at least as a matter of logic)? I'm inclined to think not. It is perfectly sensible to me the opinion that the death penalty is constitutional in the abstract -- there is no constitutional problem with the state taking a person's life for certain heinous crimes -- and that as it turns out there is no method for carrying that sentence out that satisfies various constitutional constraints. The former question is one of pure legal principle, but the latter is about particular factual assessments about, e.g., the amount of pain and suffering caused by various execution methods and the "evolving standards of decency" that cause our society to reject certain types of punishment as intolerable under the 8th Amendment. Indeed, hasn't this been the functional position of Jewish law: The death penalty is okay in the abstract, but the secondary rules surrounding it interact in such a way as to make it practically impossible to carry out?
It does not seem wrong to me that government might have a certain power in the abstract but that other constitutional constraints make the practical means of carrying that power out a null set. The problem with the dissenters' position (shared by the majority) is that it distorts constitutional doctrine. The constitutionality of any individual execution protocol is a distinct question from the abstract constitutionality of the death penalty. If an execution protocol fails whatever specific 8th Amendment doctrine we have, it does not matter whether we can envision another procedure that would alleviate these concerns.
Monday, March 09, 2015
Las Vegas Trip: Recap and Review
Jill and I, along with my parents and brother, all were in Las Vegas this weekend for a much-needed vacation. All of us love it -- which is amazing, because we're pretty different types of people. My dad and brother are into the traditional Vegas life (playing craps into the wee hours), while Jill and I (and my mom) aren't really gamblers at all. But for us there is great food and other fun activities, and we can keep ourselves amused with video poker without breaking the bank. Highlights:
* Gambling: As mentioned, I'm not a big gambler generally. Mostly I just play video poker, interspersed with some video blackjack. This trip, however, my brother discovered a video craps table and taught me how to play. I certainly see the appeal, and I even was able to fly solo for awhile (it looks more intimidating than it is). But even still, most of my time was spent doing video poker. And luckily for me, I had a bonanza Saturday (for me -- I don't bet large enough figures to actually have a true bonanza) which included hitting a straight flush. While I ended up giving all of the money back on Sunday, it was nice to play with house money for the majority of the trip.
* Boxing: This trip was not originally envisioned to be a "boxing" trip. But that ended up being somewhat of a theme. I found reasonably priced ring-side (fourth row) tickets for Friday Night Fights card at the MGM Marquee ballroom, so Jill, my father, and I all attended. It was a fun show (all but one of the fights ended in knockouts). There was also boxing on NBC Saturday -- putting all my wagers together on both evening's entertainment, I ended up $6 (hey, being up is being up). But in reality, my overall win/loss stat for this trip hinges entirely on a bet that remains pending. I put $60 on Mayweather by decision (technically, Mayweather and "will go" 11 1/2 rounds); a bet that will pay slightly over double if it hits. Getting 2:1 odds on Mayweather by decision? I'll take that action all day.
* Other sports: A few years ago, we were in Las Vegas for my brother's birthday. My gift was a bet on the Cowboys game, and we just hung out in the sports book watching the game with a rooting interest and chilling out. It was really nice. This year, Jill and I had some time to kill on Sunday, so we decided to do the same thing with the Maryland/Nebraska basketball game. I bet on Maryland to win (they were favored by 3), and Jill picked the "over" on points (123). It was a fun and exciting game that (in general and from the vantage of our bets) went to the wire. Final score: Maryland 64, Nebraska 61. My bet pushed, but with 125 points Jill collected on hers.
* Food: Since (despite what the last three entries indicate), I'm really not a huge gambler, the highlight of any Vegas trip for me is the food. This trip we mixed up some old favorites with some new entrants.
* Gambling: As mentioned, I'm not a big gambler generally. Mostly I just play video poker, interspersed with some video blackjack. This trip, however, my brother discovered a video craps table and taught me how to play. I certainly see the appeal, and I even was able to fly solo for awhile (it looks more intimidating than it is). But even still, most of my time was spent doing video poker. And luckily for me, I had a bonanza Saturday (for me -- I don't bet large enough figures to actually have a true bonanza) which included hitting a straight flush. While I ended up giving all of the money back on Sunday, it was nice to play with house money for the majority of the trip.
* Boxing: This trip was not originally envisioned to be a "boxing" trip. But that ended up being somewhat of a theme. I found reasonably priced ring-side (fourth row) tickets for Friday Night Fights card at the MGM Marquee ballroom, so Jill, my father, and I all attended. It was a fun show (all but one of the fights ended in knockouts). There was also boxing on NBC Saturday -- putting all my wagers together on both evening's entertainment, I ended up $6 (hey, being up is being up). But in reality, my overall win/loss stat for this trip hinges entirely on a bet that remains pending. I put $60 on Mayweather by decision (technically, Mayweather and "will go" 11 1/2 rounds); a bet that will pay slightly over double if it hits. Getting 2:1 odds on Mayweather by decision? I'll take that action all day.
* Other sports: A few years ago, we were in Las Vegas for my brother's birthday. My gift was a bet on the Cowboys game, and we just hung out in the sports book watching the game with a rooting interest and chilling out. It was really nice. This year, Jill and I had some time to kill on Sunday, so we decided to do the same thing with the Maryland/Nebraska basketball game. I bet on Maryland to win (they were favored by 3), and Jill picked the "over" on points (123). It was a fun and exciting game that (in general and from the vantage of our bets) went to the wire. Final score: Maryland 64, Nebraska 61. My bet pushed, but with 125 points Jill collected on hers.
* Food: Since (despite what the last three entries indicate), I'm really not a huge gambler, the highlight of any Vegas trip for me is the food. This trip we mixed up some old favorites with some new entrants.
* Noodles (Bellagio): My favorite Thai dish is Pad See Ew (or Gway Teow -- as best I can tell there is no real difference between them). The best Pad See Ew I've had in a place I've lived is at Amazing Thailand in Minneapolis, though Asia Nine in DC is a close second. Frankly, Berkeley should be ashamed at how badly it is losing this category. But anyway, the best Pad See Ew I've had anywhere is at Noodles. Just spicy enough to be perfectly flavorable, and delicious in every bite. Jill, Jason and I had been before and we nominated it for our first restaurant Thursday night. It was a hit with the parents as well. And when Jill and I had one more dinner before we left Sunday night, we thought about trying someplace new -- then decided we'd rather just close the show at Noodles again. And it was delicious. Again. I will, however, agree with everyone who says it is overpriced. 9/10.* Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt: This might get its own post, since it's not really Vegas-related except for the fact that Jill and I started watching it there. So all I'll say here is that (a) it rapidly shifted from "show we'll watch after we finish House of Cards" to "show that we'll finish binging before returning to House of Cards" and (b) we watched 9 episodes in 24 hours, including one in the back of the Planet Hollywood sports book waiting for the Maryland/Nebraska game to begin. It's really good.
* Burgr (Planet Hollywood): Another repeat for Jill and I, new to Jason and the parental units. This is a high-class burger joint, and the burgers were exceptional. Dad and I also shared a pudding shake (half traditional chocolate milkshake, half caramel pudding), which was excellent (and impressed dad with the novelty). French fries were wonderful -- I brought the extras back to my hotel and tried in vain to keep nomming on them (unfortunately, I was too stuffed from all the other meals). The only thing that didn't match the memory was the spiced "devil dogs". Though impressive in length -- at least 1.5 feet -- they weren't sauced with quite the kick I remember. 8/10.
* Crush (MGM Grand): This was the first newbie for us, which Jill and I attended late after the boxing match. We weren't super-hungry, so we kept it light -- a caesar salad for her, a bowl of french onion soup for me, and a margherita flatbread for us to share. Of the three, the caesar was genuinely bad with an overwhelmingly mustard flavor. The french onion soup was genuinely excellent -- savory with a perfect cheesy crouton on top. And the flatbread was fine but unspectacular. It's hard to screw up a flatbread. The highlight might have actually been the blackberry cocktail Jill ordered, which even non-alcoholic I thought was wonderful. 6.5/10.
Trevi (Caesar's): Jason recommended this one (I don't think I had been, though I admit it looked somewhat familiar. I have spent a lot of time in the Forum shops). Jason raved about it, but I was a little underwhelmed. The mozzarella fritta had virtually no flavor (and nowhere near enough marinara sauce to make up for it). Their specialty was a "lasagna pizza" that they graciously made with ground beef instead of ground pork. It was good, but nothing eye-popping. This was still a good meal under any objective metric, but given what one can find in Vegas I can't say I came away impressed. 6.5/10.
Mastro's Ocean Club (CityCenter): We always try to do one nice steakhouse, and the Ocean Club was this year's pick. Mom and Dad had been to the version in Scottsdale, but it was entirely new on the rest of us. I ordered a bone-in filet (I always get a filet), which was excellent. My dad kept insisting that the mac-n-cheese here was the greatest dish ever invented, but I can't say I shared his enthusiasm. Other sides (and the "butter cake" dessert) were right on par with the filet though. But the true highlight was Jill's "Kansas City Strip". If there was one dish this entire trip that knocked my socks off, this was it. And the thing is, a New York Strip (I checked -- they're the same thing) is by far my least favorite cut. Yet this rendition just melted in your mouth like butter. It was absolutely unbelievable. Also, I have to compliment the ambiance of the restaurant, which had this very cool inside balcony thing going on. On price points -- well, you're going to be paying a bit to eat here. The party behind us (15 people) reportedly racked up a $3700 bill. 8.5/10.
Gordon Ramsay Pub & Grill (Caesar's): Jill and I are big GR fans, and we had already been to Burgr and (on a previous trip) GR Steak. So we wanted to complete the Ramsay trifecta. While still quite enjoyable, Pub & Grill definitely ranks last of the three. For someone like me who doesn't eat pork or shellfish, the menu ended up being surprisingly limited (and even the pretzels we ordered as appetizers turned out to have bacon in them! They did take them off our bill). The ale onion soup was quite good, and the wings Jill got were delicious. But when you're up against Burgr and GR Steak, that's tough competition. Oh, and I think this is massively overpriced -- the pub burger, for example, is far more expensive than what you'd get at Burgr. What's the point of that? 7/10.
Bonus hearsay entry -- Tao (Venetian): This was the scheduled meal that got bumped for boxing. But my mom and brother still went, and they thought it was great. But they did say that it might not have been for Jill and I. It was absolutely for the bachelorette party that was knocking back sake bombs like there was no tomorrow.
Wednesday, March 04, 2015
Discovery of the Day: Indian Delegates to Congress
Today I learned an interesting historical tidbit about America's relationship with Indian tribes: In several early treaties, we offered Tribes a "delegate" to Congress. A treaty with the Delaware in 1778 offered "a representation in Congress" to a potential envisioned confederation between the Delaware and other tribes (with the Delaware presumed to be the head of that newly created state). Similarly, a 1775 treaty with the Cherokee allowed them "to send a deputy of their choice" to Congress. Both of these predate the end of the Revolutionary War, but the 1836 Treaty of New Echota between the United States and the Cherokee Nation contains similar language applicable to the modern Congress:
Still, it is an interesting fact of American and American Indian history that I was hitherto unaware of. The more you know!
The Cherokee nation having already made great progress in civilization and deeming it important that every proper and laudable inducement should be offered to their people to improve their condition as well as to guard and secure in the most effectual manner the rights guarantied to them in this treaty, and with a view to illustrate the liberal and enlarged policy of the Government of the United States towards the Indians in their removal beyond the territorial limits of the States, it is stipulated that they shall be entitled to a delegate in the House of Representatives of the United States whenever Congress shall make provision for the same.The Treaty of New Echota was the basis by which Congress justified removal of the Cherokee to present-day Oklahoma (the notorious "trail of tears"). And the delegate provision has never been implemented.
Still, it is an interesting fact of American and American Indian history that I was hitherto unaware of. The more you know!
Tuesday, March 03, 2015
Two Great Tastes!
British MP George Galloway is lashing out at critics who called him anti-Semitic on twitter, demanding that they pay him £5,000 and threatening a libel suit. Galloway's targets include everyone from major media publications to random individuals with less than 100 followers.
Fortunately, the English judiciary's free speech protections in the defamation context are matched only by their sensitivity to matters of anti-Semitism. So there's nothing to worry about it.
Fortunately, the English judiciary's free speech protections in the defamation context are matched only by their sensitivity to matters of anti-Semitism. So there's nothing to worry about it.
Sunday, March 01, 2015
Don't Say I Didn't Warn You
I think it is fair to say that Bibi's decision to come speak before Congress is the single most disastrous event for the state of pro-Israel sentiment in my lifetime. There's blame to go around, and one can make the case for (or rather, against) all sorts. Personally, I'm extremely skeptical of Ambassador Ron Dermer's influence given his background as a GOP political operative, but this ultimately falls on Bibi's head. Boehner, well, his job is to protect the interests of his caucus and he only cares about Israel insofar as it furthers that end, so I can't really "blame" him for playing politics.
But that's neither here nor there. I don't care who you blame, I don't care how you sequence the events -- the fact of the matter is that this seems to be the straw that broke the camels back for a lot of people, and there is no way that Bibi's speech could ever be sufficiently useful or influential regarding the Iran threat to justify that break. We should not be in a situation where a majority of Americans don't want to hear the Prime Minister speak. This is a full-blown catastrophe, and an avoidable one at that.
On that note, this Nathan Guttman article on anxieties at AIPAC is very well-taken. AIPAC, of course, was famously blind-sided by Bibi's speech decision. It announced its opposition to the address -- to no avail -- and has been on its heels ever since. It's easy to see why: AIPAC's MO from day one has been to cultivate bipartisan support for Israel without favor to either left or right. It takes positions on substantive issues, to be sure, but by far its most important priority is that Israel must not become a partisan issue.
And now? It is facing the teeth of that possibility. Because there is a significant cadre of conservative organizations that want to make it just that. And they are far more threatening to AIPAC's mission -- and the long-term security of Israel -- that left-ward critics like J Street ever could be.
But what's past is past. And the good news is that AIPAC, and the mainstream Jewish community generally, seems to be waking up as to where the real threat is. The objection to Bibi's speech is a good first step. The across-the-board condemnation of Boteach's ad is another good sign. Ditto the ADL speaking out against those who seek to cloak blatant Islamophobia in the guise of supporting Israel. Simply put, a world in which Americans associate "support for Israel" with "being a right-winger" is not a good world for Israel (even putting aside the fact that the manner in which right-wingers "support Israel" is ludicrously counterproductive). And, given the political proclivities of most Jews, it isn't a good world for Jews who want to retain influence over the state of pro-Israel discourse in America.
Now, I am more closely affiliated with the liberal Zionist groups than I am with AIPAC itself. And my advice to them is the same as my advice three years ago. Seize the center. Work with the more established Jewish and pro-Israel organizations, and leverage their dismay over how partisan right-wing hacks are damaging our crucial relationship. It was never the case that they were in the bag for the most irredentist wing of the Likud Party, and it's certainly and obviously not the case now. The great advantage the liberal Zionists have in America is that they really do represent the consensus Jewish position (not to mention the morally correct one). What divides them from the established organizations -- primarily matters of tone and focus -- are far less important than what they share in common. And what Ameinu and J Street share in common with AIPAC and the ADL and the AJC, and with the American people writ large, is that Israel must be preserved as a Jewish, democratic state in the context of two safe, secure, democratic states for two peoples. The right-wing critics do not share that vision, and so they do not belong in the tent.
AIPAC has been rattled by a threat that caught them unawares. Whether they should have seen it coming is now besides the point. It's time to stop cowering and to start fighting back. And the place to begin are those groups who care more about scoring a transient partisan advantage than they do about making sure that there is an Israel -- a Jewish, democratic Israel -- 30 years from now.
But that's neither here nor there. I don't care who you blame, I don't care how you sequence the events -- the fact of the matter is that this seems to be the straw that broke the camels back for a lot of people, and there is no way that Bibi's speech could ever be sufficiently useful or influential regarding the Iran threat to justify that break. We should not be in a situation where a majority of Americans don't want to hear the Prime Minister speak. This is a full-blown catastrophe, and an avoidable one at that.
On that note, this Nathan Guttman article on anxieties at AIPAC is very well-taken. AIPAC, of course, was famously blind-sided by Bibi's speech decision. It announced its opposition to the address -- to no avail -- and has been on its heels ever since. It's easy to see why: AIPAC's MO from day one has been to cultivate bipartisan support for Israel without favor to either left or right. It takes positions on substantive issues, to be sure, but by far its most important priority is that Israel must not become a partisan issue.
And now? It is facing the teeth of that possibility. Because there is a significant cadre of conservative organizations that want to make it just that. And they are far more threatening to AIPAC's mission -- and the long-term security of Israel -- that left-ward critics like J Street ever could be.
A new reality of overt partisanship has now tinged the U.S.-Israel relationship.I don't want to say I told you so, but ... I did. Repeatedly. These groups were never invested in the mainstream pro-Israel consensus, and our broad communal organizations should have moved to isolate them from the "pro-Israel" community with just as much vigor as they give to isolating groups like the JVP. It's not entirely their fault -- left groups that are still pro-Israel made a major strategic error of their own in not affirmatively aligning with the center, being too committed to wrongfully portraying AIPAC as a pure tool of conservative interests.
The brawl set off by Netanyahu’s speech has also emboldened other Jewish groups to challenge AIPAC’s own longtime status as the strategic center for pro-Israel activism in Washington. As the lobby kicks off its three-day extravaganza in Washington’s Convention Center, it faces the need to now prove to members of Congress and to supporters that AIPAC is still the main voice of pro-Israel activism, despite increasing challenges coming mainly from a growing right-wing flank.
“Enough with this bipartisan nonsense,” Jeff Ballabon, an Orthodox GOP activist told members of Conservative Political Action Committee convened in Washington just days before the pro-Israel lobby’s conference. “The real base of support for Israel,” he argued, will not be found among Democrats and liberals, but rather “here, at CPAC.”
A full-page New York Times ad sponsored by Rabbi Shmuely Boteach demonstrated how fractured the pro-Israel community has become when discussing Netanyahu’s visit.
Boteach, whose 2012 congressional run was heavily supported by right-wing donor Sheldon Adelson, ran an ad accusing national security adviser Susan Rice of having a “blind spot” when it comes to genocide.
[...]
Threats to AIPAC’s hegemony in past years came mainly from the dovish end of the spectrum, particularly with the appearance of the lobby J Street. But now much stronger competition is emerging from hawkish groups, like The World, that are less interested in bipartisanship. An important funder for several of these groups is the Republican mega-donor Adelson — a former AIPAC backer, who angrily stopped giving to the lobby several years ago, when it decided to announce it supported a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
But what's past is past. And the good news is that AIPAC, and the mainstream Jewish community generally, seems to be waking up as to where the real threat is. The objection to Bibi's speech is a good first step. The across-the-board condemnation of Boteach's ad is another good sign. Ditto the ADL speaking out against those who seek to cloak blatant Islamophobia in the guise of supporting Israel. Simply put, a world in which Americans associate "support for Israel" with "being a right-winger" is not a good world for Israel (even putting aside the fact that the manner in which right-wingers "support Israel" is ludicrously counterproductive). And, given the political proclivities of most Jews, it isn't a good world for Jews who want to retain influence over the state of pro-Israel discourse in America.
Now, I am more closely affiliated with the liberal Zionist groups than I am with AIPAC itself. And my advice to them is the same as my advice three years ago. Seize the center. Work with the more established Jewish and pro-Israel organizations, and leverage their dismay over how partisan right-wing hacks are damaging our crucial relationship. It was never the case that they were in the bag for the most irredentist wing of the Likud Party, and it's certainly and obviously not the case now. The great advantage the liberal Zionists have in America is that they really do represent the consensus Jewish position (not to mention the morally correct one). What divides them from the established organizations -- primarily matters of tone and focus -- are far less important than what they share in common. And what Ameinu and J Street share in common with AIPAC and the ADL and the AJC, and with the American people writ large, is that Israel must be preserved as a Jewish, democratic state in the context of two safe, secure, democratic states for two peoples. The right-wing critics do not share that vision, and so they do not belong in the tent.
AIPAC has been rattled by a threat that caught them unawares. Whether they should have seen it coming is now besides the point. It's time to stop cowering and to start fighting back. And the place to begin are those groups who care more about scoring a transient partisan advantage than they do about making sure that there is an Israel -- a Jewish, democratic Israel -- 30 years from now.
Don't Worry About Ted Cruz
If you're a Democrat and you're worrying about potential Republican presidential nominees, there's an interesting hydraulic relationship. Generally a moderate is both more worrying (because they're more electable) and less worrying (because they're, well, moderate). Hardliners have it in reverse -- it is terrifying to imagine them as President, but one calms down when it becomes clear they'll never be elected. The most worrisome, of course, are those who can successfully present as moderates while nonetheless actually being really conservative.
Scott Walker has concerned many Democrats for this very reason; he has managed to win several elections in a blue-tinted state even while being quite right-wing. Fortunately, there is now good evidence that Walker isn't exactly prime-time ready. Liberals were driven crazy by the media's refusal to acknowledge Paul Ryan as a creature of the far-right (and for acting as if he's handsome, when he is very clearly a White Walker). But I haven't heard a lot of buzz around Ryan this time around; maybe his moment has passed.
The current darling of the far-right is Texas Senator Ted Cruz. On the metric of "how would he do as President", he's an easy case -- the guy is a lunatic who would make for a catastrophe if placed in charge of the country. The question is whether there is anything that would make him more electable than his extremist profile would suggest. And after much thought, I've decided the answer is no.
Let's dispense with one obvious possibility: Cruz's Latino heritage. I don't think this will meaningfully help him amongst Latinos. Despite what the media might think, Latinos, like Black people, are not retarded kittens -- they vote, the same as most of us, on the basis of a judgment regarding how a given candidate matches up with their political and policy priorities. Cruz's policies (especially on immigration) don't line up with most Latinos, and they know it.
As for everyone else, here is my proposition regarding Ted Cruz, on which I welcome your input:
Ted Cruz is a smart man who would make a terrible President. Fortunately, he'll make a terrible presidential candidate too.
Scott Walker has concerned many Democrats for this very reason; he has managed to win several elections in a blue-tinted state even while being quite right-wing. Fortunately, there is now good evidence that Walker isn't exactly prime-time ready. Liberals were driven crazy by the media's refusal to acknowledge Paul Ryan as a creature of the far-right (and for acting as if he's handsome, when he is very clearly a White Walker). But I haven't heard a lot of buzz around Ryan this time around; maybe his moment has passed.
The current darling of the far-right is Texas Senator Ted Cruz. On the metric of "how would he do as President", he's an easy case -- the guy is a lunatic who would make for a catastrophe if placed in charge of the country. The question is whether there is anything that would make him more electable than his extremist profile would suggest. And after much thought, I've decided the answer is no.
Let's dispense with one obvious possibility: Cruz's Latino heritage. I don't think this will meaningfully help him amongst Latinos. Despite what the media might think, Latinos, like Black people, are not retarded kittens -- they vote, the same as most of us, on the basis of a judgment regarding how a given candidate matches up with their political and policy priorities. Cruz's policies (especially on immigration) don't line up with most Latinos, and they know it.
As for everyone else, here is my proposition regarding Ted Cruz, on which I welcome your input:
Ted Cruz : Presidential nomination :: Robert Bork : Supreme Court nomination.Ted Cruz (like Robert Bork) is a very smart man. But he is also a supremely arrogant man. This distinguishes him from, say, Sarah Palin, who is supremely arrogant but also dumb as a post. But Cruz, like Bork, thinks so highly of himself that he can't even pretend to present himself as mainstream. Bork was successfully Borked mostly because he was allowed to hang himself -- Bork was so confident that his constitutional vision was correct that he presented it completely unadulterated, and Democratic Senators were happy to let him wax lyrical. The result was a nominee who was terrifying to the general public. I have no doubt Cruz will do the exact same thing. He is, I think, incapable of pivoting to the center even as a matter of image. His inflexibility on this is part of the reason why many in his own caucus hate him -- Cruz loves to get up on his grandstand and is happy to do so even when it hurts his own party. So far, it has helped him just fine, since he's in a solid red Senate seat. But when trying to appeal to voters in Virginia or Minnesota or Nevada? Yeah, best of luck.
Ted Cruz is a smart man who would make a terrible President. Fortunately, he'll make a terrible presidential candidate too.
Wednesday, February 25, 2015
Hebrew Letters in Berkeley
I have a t-shirt which says "Carleton College" in (transliterated) Hebrew letters. I put it on today, for no particular reason other than it rising to the top of the t-shirt drawer, before heading off to the post office for an errand.
While there, the post office clerk asked what my shirt said. I responded "Carleton College". "Oh, that's cool. Is it in Arabic?" "No, Hebrew." "Oh, that's cool." Both "that's cools" were said with enthusiasm and a warm smile.
And the tension in my gut dissipated, and I relaxed.
I got nervous when asked about my shirt. I got nervous because I knew the answer would reveal myself as Jewish -- and Jewish-identified. These I think are different, for the casual anti-Semite -- the difference between "being gay in private" and "throwing it in my face." I feel like people who have negative feelings about Jews have particularly negative feelings about Jews who consciously identify as Jewish, such that they wear a "Jewish shirt" out in public.
Now, I should say that I did not feel nervous because I predicted any sort of imminent physical threat -- "going postal" jokes notwithstanding, I didn't expect anything truly bad to happen at the post office. But I got nervous, because I didn't know what it would mean to "out" myself as Jewish. Not everyone, after all, thinks that "that's cool." Some people, and more people than there used to be, think it isn't cool it all.
This is quite saddening, less because I feel any serious risk of being violently attacked, and more because I used to be very excited when the topic of my Jewish identity became salient. At Carleton, where there weren't a lot of Jews, I generally thought of my Jewishness as an "interesting fact about myself," something I was happy to talk about and explain to other curious souls. This isn't to say there was never any awkward moments -- ask me about the time my Freshman-year floormates got me Schindler's List for my birthday -- but I felt happy at the opportunity to share about my Jewishness.
The recent set of journalistic projects wherein people walk through European streets (Malmo, Sweden; Paris, France) while identifiably Jewish make salient the reality of this worry. That is not to say it happens everywhere, or every time, and there will always be those who cry "fraud" (Rania Khalek would no doubt rather focus on "Jewish privilege"). But the point is that it is always there, in the back of my mind. I cannot just "be Jewish" in the world, I have to make continual conscious decisions about when and how I present my Jewishness in the world and when and how I hide it. That's a feeling that I didn't have, or didn't have to the same extent, even a few years ago. And it is a sad feeling.
While there, the post office clerk asked what my shirt said. I responded "Carleton College". "Oh, that's cool. Is it in Arabic?" "No, Hebrew." "Oh, that's cool." Both "that's cools" were said with enthusiasm and a warm smile.
And the tension in my gut dissipated, and I relaxed.
I got nervous when asked about my shirt. I got nervous because I knew the answer would reveal myself as Jewish -- and Jewish-identified. These I think are different, for the casual anti-Semite -- the difference between "being gay in private" and "throwing it in my face." I feel like people who have negative feelings about Jews have particularly negative feelings about Jews who consciously identify as Jewish, such that they wear a "Jewish shirt" out in public.
Now, I should say that I did not feel nervous because I predicted any sort of imminent physical threat -- "going postal" jokes notwithstanding, I didn't expect anything truly bad to happen at the post office. But I got nervous, because I didn't know what it would mean to "out" myself as Jewish. Not everyone, after all, thinks that "that's cool." Some people, and more people than there used to be, think it isn't cool it all.
This is quite saddening, less because I feel any serious risk of being violently attacked, and more because I used to be very excited when the topic of my Jewish identity became salient. At Carleton, where there weren't a lot of Jews, I generally thought of my Jewishness as an "interesting fact about myself," something I was happy to talk about and explain to other curious souls. This isn't to say there was never any awkward moments -- ask me about the time my Freshman-year floormates got me Schindler's List for my birthday -- but I felt happy at the opportunity to share about my Jewishness.
The recent set of journalistic projects wherein people walk through European streets (Malmo, Sweden; Paris, France) while identifiably Jewish make salient the reality of this worry. That is not to say it happens everywhere, or every time, and there will always be those who cry "fraud" (Rania Khalek would no doubt rather focus on "Jewish privilege"). But the point is that it is always there, in the back of my mind. I cannot just "be Jewish" in the world, I have to make continual conscious decisions about when and how I present my Jewishness in the world and when and how I hide it. That's a feeling that I didn't have, or didn't have to the same extent, even a few years ago. And it is a sad feeling.
Law Review Tales
It's law review submission season! Every one is angsting (obviously yours truly included), and PrawfsBlawg has a lovely thread in which all of us can vent our fears and frustrations. But I thought it would be more light-hearted to detail some standard experiences I think all law professors have had I've had and thereby extrapolate to all of my colleagues. Such as ....
(1) Submitting an article, then within 15 minutes frantically clicking refresh on your email despite the fact that any news that comes in the first 15 minutes could not possibly be good.
(2) Getting that first rejection three hours after the initial submission ("after careful review ....").
(3) Submitting two articles at around the same time (we'll call them "A" and "B"). A is clearly a better article than B. B gets three offers immediately and ends up placing in a solid journal. A languishes and isn't touched by anyone.
(4) Obsessing over comparisons between US News law school rankings versus Washington & Lee law review rankings (hint: if you're at the point where it's not obvious on face which journal you should pick, it doesn't matter).
(5) Obsessing over comparisons between flagship journals and speciality journals (hint: this comparison is impossible, but it's as impossible for tenure and/or hiring committees as it is for you).
(6) Getting your article rejected after you've already withdrawn it from a given journal ("you can't reject me, I reject you!").
(7) Getting your article accepted after you've already withdrawn it from a given journal (far more tragic than #6).
(8) Submitting an article, having it rejected, resubmitting next cycle with the single change of deleting "originalism" from the title, having it accepted by a top journal (technically this didn't happen to me. It happened by me, and my articles editor team, when I was a law review editor).
(9) Once the piece is accepted, being asked for a citation for "the law of supply and demand." Don't forget a parenthetical!
(10) It all turning out okay in the end.
(1) Submitting an article, then within 15 minutes frantically clicking refresh on your email despite the fact that any news that comes in the first 15 minutes could not possibly be good.
(2) Getting that first rejection three hours after the initial submission ("after careful review ....").
(3) Submitting two articles at around the same time (we'll call them "A" and "B"). A is clearly a better article than B. B gets three offers immediately and ends up placing in a solid journal. A languishes and isn't touched by anyone.
(4) Obsessing over comparisons between US News law school rankings versus Washington & Lee law review rankings (hint: if you're at the point where it's not obvious on face which journal you should pick, it doesn't matter).
(5) Obsessing over comparisons between flagship journals and speciality journals (hint: this comparison is impossible, but it's as impossible for tenure and/or hiring committees as it is for you).
(6) Getting your article rejected after you've already withdrawn it from a given journal ("you can't reject me, I reject you!").
(7) Getting your article accepted after you've already withdrawn it from a given journal (far more tragic than #6).
(8) Submitting an article, having it rejected, resubmitting next cycle with the single change of deleting "originalism" from the title, having it accepted by a top journal (technically this didn't happen to me. It happened by me, and my articles editor team, when I was a law review editor).
(9) Once the piece is accepted, being asked for a citation for "the law of supply and demand." Don't forget a parenthetical!
(10) It all turning out okay in the end.
Monday, February 23, 2015
Energy Lobbying, Environmental Costs, and Zero-Sum Competition
Exelon Corporation, one of the largest energy companies in the United States, has come out in favor of the EPA's Clean Power Plan and has even asked for a carbon pricing schema. This stands out, as one does not typically expect to see large energy companies endorsing aggressive carbon regulation. And I should hasten to add that what follows is not a specific speculation on Exelon's motives. Exelon might have any number of reasons for the position it's taking, not the least of which could be a fear that absent their intervention the EPA plan could end up being more environmentally protective (and thus more economically burdensome). Nonetheless, in general it does seem a little odd: why would an electricity company support EPA rules that almost certainly would place greater costs on its line of business.
The answer might lie in the difference between competitive and monopoly electricity markets. In the former there are multiple firms competing for customers and market share. In the latter, there is a single firm with a guaranteed franchise and customer base. These two models have been struggling for primacy in the electricity sector for the past several decades -- as it stands, we have competition in the generation and wholesale sectors, whereas most (but not all) states have maintained a retail electricity monopoly. At first glance, though, this different market structure is unrelated to support of greater environmental regulations. For either it increases costs, and we can stipulate (though this may or may not be true) that it equally increases costs for firms operating in a competitive versus a monopoly context. It is therefore unlikely that any firm will unilaterally adopt superior environmental restrictions (with some allowance for trying to gain public goodwill or carve out a unique market share). And so it seems unlikely that any firm would lobby to put in place a regulatory regime which increases these costs.
But look a little closer. For the monopoly firm, a policy proposal which increases its costs is an unmitigated bad. The cost increase may be minor, in which case it will be moderately opposed, or significant, in which case it will be significantly opposed, but there is never a corresponding benefit to the cost increase. But in a competitive world, things are different because there is also the opportunity to take over one's competitor's turf. Here, cost increases can be a good thing if one is in a position to better ride them out than one's adversaries. Imagine Company A has already significantly invested in renewable energy infrastructure such that new carbon mandates are likely to only cause a small price increase. Company B, by contrast, is less prepared to handle these new mandates and would be forced to increase prices quite a bit. Company A may well lobby for the regulatory shift because it would give it the opportunity to gobble up market share currently held by B.
This matters because it suggests that, in a competitive context, there is sometimes a business incentive for firms to lobby on behalf of cost-increasing environmental regulation where it feels it can better absorb the costs compared to other companies in the field. To the extent that environmental regulation often in practice needs business buy-in to be effective, this is an avenue worth exploring.
I said that this was not a speculation on the Exelon situation, particularly, and it isn't. That said, I did notice that the speaker who delivered this missive to FERC was described as "Exelon’s senior vice president of federal regulatory affairs and wholesale market policy." If Exelon's wholesale division (remember that wholesale electricity is a competitive sector) thinks that it is better positioned than its rivals to meet EPA carbon requirements, then that would explain why it would come out in support of this initiative even though in absolute figures it probably will raise its cost of doing business.
The answer might lie in the difference between competitive and monopoly electricity markets. In the former there are multiple firms competing for customers and market share. In the latter, there is a single firm with a guaranteed franchise and customer base. These two models have been struggling for primacy in the electricity sector for the past several decades -- as it stands, we have competition in the generation and wholesale sectors, whereas most (but not all) states have maintained a retail electricity monopoly. At first glance, though, this different market structure is unrelated to support of greater environmental regulations. For either it increases costs, and we can stipulate (though this may or may not be true) that it equally increases costs for firms operating in a competitive versus a monopoly context. It is therefore unlikely that any firm will unilaterally adopt superior environmental restrictions (with some allowance for trying to gain public goodwill or carve out a unique market share). And so it seems unlikely that any firm would lobby to put in place a regulatory regime which increases these costs.
But look a little closer. For the monopoly firm, a policy proposal which increases its costs is an unmitigated bad. The cost increase may be minor, in which case it will be moderately opposed, or significant, in which case it will be significantly opposed, but there is never a corresponding benefit to the cost increase. But in a competitive world, things are different because there is also the opportunity to take over one's competitor's turf. Here, cost increases can be a good thing if one is in a position to better ride them out than one's adversaries. Imagine Company A has already significantly invested in renewable energy infrastructure such that new carbon mandates are likely to only cause a small price increase. Company B, by contrast, is less prepared to handle these new mandates and would be forced to increase prices quite a bit. Company A may well lobby for the regulatory shift because it would give it the opportunity to gobble up market share currently held by B.
This matters because it suggests that, in a competitive context, there is sometimes a business incentive for firms to lobby on behalf of cost-increasing environmental regulation where it feels it can better absorb the costs compared to other companies in the field. To the extent that environmental regulation often in practice needs business buy-in to be effective, this is an avenue worth exploring.
I said that this was not a speculation on the Exelon situation, particularly, and it isn't. That said, I did notice that the speaker who delivered this missive to FERC was described as "Exelon’s senior vice president of federal regulatory affairs and wholesale market policy." If Exelon's wholesale division (remember that wholesale electricity is a competitive sector) thinks that it is better positioned than its rivals to meet EPA carbon requirements, then that would explain why it would come out in support of this initiative even though in absolute figures it probably will raise its cost of doing business.
Wednesday, February 18, 2015
Motivated Reasoning: Social Mobility Edition
I've become more and more interested in the research on motivated cognition -- the processes by which we interpret evidence in a biased manner and reason directionally to our preferred ends. This literature is equal parts fascinating and depressing: fascinating as a window into our modes of thinking, depressing in that it has grim implications for both how much we should trust our learned intuitions and for the ability for evidence and facts to move our mental needles towards more accurate appraisals.
Today, I read an interesting study by John R. Chambers, Lawton K. Swan, and Martin Heesacker entitled Perceptions of U.S. Social Mobility Are Divided (and Distorted) Along Ideological Lines (forthcoming in Psychological Science). The study, as the name suggests, explores how people perceive facts relating to social mobility in the United States. They asked two main questions: First, they asked participants to provide their views on social mobility directly, by asking them to predict how many people who grew up in the bottom, middle, and top third of income brackets end up (as young adults) in the bottom/middle/top brackets (high social mobility would suggest that people move brackets regularly -- a society in which one's origins played no role in economic outcomes would see an even 33/33/33 split; low social mobility would suggest that people generally stay in the income bracket of their parents). Second, they asked people to appraise whether social mobility opportunities had increased or declined over time (they could say it increased a lot, a little, hadn't changed, decreased a little, or decreased a lot).
The results?
Everybody underestimated social mobility (that is, they thought our society was less socially mobile than it was). And likewise, people thought that we had experienced a decline in social mobility opportunities over the past few decades (in reality, social mobility rates have remained flat). But on both points, liberals were further from the mark than conservatives. The authors suggest that this is because liberals are generally pessimistic about the state of economic and social opportunity in America, and so they are motivated to belief that social mobility is worse than it is. Conservatives, by contrast, are more optimistic about America's meritocratic and egalitarian nature, and so (though they underestimated our social mobility too) ended up closer to the right figures.
I bring this up not because it means that social mobility is not a problem. After all, social mobility could simultaneously be more common than we thought and still too low, and indeed there are other western countries which dramatically out-perform America on this front. Rather, I mention these findings because, as the authors note, sometimes motivated cognition is perceived to be a conservative problem ("that's why they don't believe in global warming! They're just cognitively biased!"), and in reality it is a problem shared by all (I assume most of my readers are liberals and thus could use the reminder; conservatives preparing to gloat should know there are plenty of cases where the right is the party led astray). After all, if I'm being honest I can say I was surprised to find that most people underestimated social mobility (which is, of course, exactly what the study would predict would be my response). It's hard for me -- now knowing the data -- to say with confidence how I would have answered the study questions in my naive state, but I suspect at the very least I would have marked that social mobility was slightly worse off than it had been in decades past, and that would have been wrong. And the most likely explanation for its wrongness is that I have certain ideological priors that predispose me to having certain beliefs about the fairness of the American system.
Now, if one wanted to fight the data, there are ways to go about it. Perhaps while social mobility generally has remained unchanged (and is better than we thought), it might be the case that for particular subgroups (over-represented amongst liberals?), social mobility has decreased. There is some evidence pointing in that direction, and this could cause certain people to misperceive social mobility for the polity writ large based on the particular experience of their own group. Another possibility is that the abolishment of Jim Crow, and the resulting opportunities gains for racial minorities, had an upward-social mobility effect that canceled out other factors which generally reduced such mobility -- but that the former is perceived as a one-time "low-hanging fruit" situation while the latter are viewed as more permanent. But, these arguments are, as I said, fighting the data -- it seems likely that the general conclusion (that, for motivated ideological reasons, liberals underestimate the amount of social mobility in America) is accurate. And as a liberal, it's always worth remembering my own fallibility.
Today, I read an interesting study by John R. Chambers, Lawton K. Swan, and Martin Heesacker entitled Perceptions of U.S. Social Mobility Are Divided (and Distorted) Along Ideological Lines (forthcoming in Psychological Science). The study, as the name suggests, explores how people perceive facts relating to social mobility in the United States. They asked two main questions: First, they asked participants to provide their views on social mobility directly, by asking them to predict how many people who grew up in the bottom, middle, and top third of income brackets end up (as young adults) in the bottom/middle/top brackets (high social mobility would suggest that people move brackets regularly -- a society in which one's origins played no role in economic outcomes would see an even 33/33/33 split; low social mobility would suggest that people generally stay in the income bracket of their parents). Second, they asked people to appraise whether social mobility opportunities had increased or declined over time (they could say it increased a lot, a little, hadn't changed, decreased a little, or decreased a lot).
The results?
Everybody underestimated social mobility (that is, they thought our society was less socially mobile than it was). And likewise, people thought that we had experienced a decline in social mobility opportunities over the past few decades (in reality, social mobility rates have remained flat). But on both points, liberals were further from the mark than conservatives. The authors suggest that this is because liberals are generally pessimistic about the state of economic and social opportunity in America, and so they are motivated to belief that social mobility is worse than it is. Conservatives, by contrast, are more optimistic about America's meritocratic and egalitarian nature, and so (though they underestimated our social mobility too) ended up closer to the right figures.
I bring this up not because it means that social mobility is not a problem. After all, social mobility could simultaneously be more common than we thought and still too low, and indeed there are other western countries which dramatically out-perform America on this front. Rather, I mention these findings because, as the authors note, sometimes motivated cognition is perceived to be a conservative problem ("that's why they don't believe in global warming! They're just cognitively biased!"), and in reality it is a problem shared by all (I assume most of my readers are liberals and thus could use the reminder; conservatives preparing to gloat should know there are plenty of cases where the right is the party led astray). After all, if I'm being honest I can say I was surprised to find that most people underestimated social mobility (which is, of course, exactly what the study would predict would be my response). It's hard for me -- now knowing the data -- to say with confidence how I would have answered the study questions in my naive state, but I suspect at the very least I would have marked that social mobility was slightly worse off than it had been in decades past, and that would have been wrong. And the most likely explanation for its wrongness is that I have certain ideological priors that predispose me to having certain beliefs about the fairness of the American system.
Now, if one wanted to fight the data, there are ways to go about it. Perhaps while social mobility generally has remained unchanged (and is better than we thought), it might be the case that for particular subgroups (over-represented amongst liberals?), social mobility has decreased. There is some evidence pointing in that direction, and this could cause certain people to misperceive social mobility for the polity writ large based on the particular experience of their own group. Another possibility is that the abolishment of Jim Crow, and the resulting opportunities gains for racial minorities, had an upward-social mobility effect that canceled out other factors which generally reduced such mobility -- but that the former is perceived as a one-time "low-hanging fruit" situation while the latter are viewed as more permanent. But, these arguments are, as I said, fighting the data -- it seems likely that the general conclusion (that, for motivated ideological reasons, liberals underestimate the amount of social mobility in America) is accurate. And as a liberal, it's always worth remembering my own fallibility.
Tuesday, February 17, 2015
Verbal and Conceptual Blockbusting
Today's quote of the day* comes from Columbia Law Professor Patricia Williams:
This relates to something I've been thinking about for awhile, concerning the drift in meaning of certain terms or concepts related to marginalized groups and discrimination. The obvious example is the shift from Colored to Negro to Black to African-American as the polite or respectful term of reference. Each one was offered as an alternative to the stigmatized other, only to become loaded with negative valence itself and eventually be shunted aside for the next one in line. I've always thought that this maneuver illuminated a fundamental mistake in our thinking: the problem wasn't with the words, it was with the attitudes. If people have negative attitudes towards people of color, then any term that is predominantly associated with said people will progressively take on baggage. I suspect one sees a similar phenomenon with respect to concepts or strategies -- as they become associated with political action by a group we don't like, they will become coded as inappropriate, small-minded, short-sighted, radical, or otherwise illegitimate (this could explain the Washington/Du Bois double-bind I've talked about).
In any event, Williams' description of this as "verbal blockbusting" was particularly evocative, so I wanted to share (and preserve it).
* Quotes not necessarily provided daily.
I feel as if I am on a linguistic treadmill that has gradually but unmistakably increased its speed, so that no word I use to positively describe myself or my scholarly projects last for more than five seconds. . . . The moment I find some symbol of my presence in the rarefied halls of elite institutions, it gets stolen, co-opted, filled with negative meaning. As integration became synonymous with assimilation into whiteness, affiramtive action became synonymous with pushing out more qualified whites, and of course multiculturalism somehow became synonymous with solipsistically monocultural privilege.Patricia J. Williams, The Rooster's Egg: On the Persistence of Prejudice 27-28 (Harvard UP 1997).
While constant rejuvenation is not just good but inevitable in some general sense, the rapid obsolescence of words even as they drop from our mouths is an increasingly isolating phenomenon. In fact, it feels like a form of verbal blockbusting. I move into a large meaningful space, with great connotations on a high floor with lots of windows, and suddenly all the neighbors move out. My intellectual aerie becomes a known hangout for dealers in heresy and other soporific drugs, frequented by suspect profiles (if not actual suspects) and located on the edge of that known geological disaster area, the Slippery Slope
This relates to something I've been thinking about for awhile, concerning the drift in meaning of certain terms or concepts related to marginalized groups and discrimination. The obvious example is the shift from Colored to Negro to Black to African-American as the polite or respectful term of reference. Each one was offered as an alternative to the stigmatized other, only to become loaded with negative valence itself and eventually be shunted aside for the next one in line. I've always thought that this maneuver illuminated a fundamental mistake in our thinking: the problem wasn't with the words, it was with the attitudes. If people have negative attitudes towards people of color, then any term that is predominantly associated with said people will progressively take on baggage. I suspect one sees a similar phenomenon with respect to concepts or strategies -- as they become associated with political action by a group we don't like, they will become coded as inappropriate, small-minded, short-sighted, radical, or otherwise illegitimate (this could explain the Washington/Du Bois double-bind I've talked about).
In any event, Williams' description of this as "verbal blockbusting" was particularly evocative, so I wanted to share (and preserve it).
* Quotes not necessarily provided daily.
Monday, February 16, 2015
Caring Equally
Yesterday, I was preparing to write a Facebook status that would have said something like the following: "What I want is for everyone who posts about Copenhagen to also post about Chapel Hill, and everyone who posts about Chapel Hill to also post about Copenhagen." It was meant to be responsive to a trend I had perceived on Facebook, which is that people who were talking about one tended to have nothing to say about the other. Now to be clear, I don't mean that people who were on the ramparts about Chapel Hill were pooh-poohing the idea that there was an emergent anti-Semitism problem, or vice versa. For the most part, that wasn't it at all -- and I'm sure that if asked directly they would say pretty much exactly what one would want to hear. It's the silence that was the issue -- and it was an issue both sides picked up on. One person on Twitter noted what he perceived as the muted reaction to the Copenhagen attack and wondered if we've all just decided "this is a thing that happens now." Another person on Facebook complained that there was little attention outside particular social media circles to a series of anti-Islam attacks that had recently occurred in the West. And I related to that -- when I saw people who would post lots and lots about attacks on Muslims, but scarcely a word about attacks on Jews, it made me feel like I wasn't a part of their campaign -- that defending Jews wasn't something that motivated them, or worse, that they viewed it as a "hard case". I have to imagine the same thoughts go through the minds of persons in the Muslim community when they read friends who talk a ton about Charlie Hebdo and the Jewish deli massacre but have little to say about when Muslims are killed for their faith in our own backyard.
I never actually wrote the post. And even as I thought it I began to second-guess myself. Would I meet my own prescription? Technically no, but not for the reasons one might think -- I had put something up about Chapel Hill but not (that I recall) Copenhagen. Still, I think few people would accuse me of being too inattentive to global anti-Semitism. And in general, while I write and blog about a range of topics, it is obvious that I devote disproportionate attention to anti-Semitism compared to other issues.
Why do I do that? Is that because I think anti-Semitism is objectively "more important" than other like -isms. I don't think so, though if someone was to argue that I have a subconscious bias in that direction due to the fact that anti-Semitism threatens me personally I would not have much room to argue. Is it because anti-Semitism is the only anti-racism campaign I care to campaign on? I don't think so; and hopefully my academic work is enough to disabuse that. If I was to give an answer, it's that anti-Semitism is an area where I think I have something particular and useful to say. I have skin the in game, yes, but also expertise -- I feel (rightly or wrongly) like I can make a unique and helpful contribution here. Other issues I feel more confident that others can and will say whatever I would have.
It is a cliche, but an accurate one, to say that nobody can devote care and attention (much less equal care and attention) to everything. We all have to make choices. We all know that on the production end, and yet when on the (non-)receiving end we still feel that pang of exclusion -- that we're not important enough to rouse others to action. So what do we do?
I don't have a good answer. Certainly, I think we should all be curious consumers about what our fellows are saying. If a group in my society feels marginalized or scared or hurt or wounded, I want to know that because making our community -- our entire community -- a safe, welcoming and inclusive space is part of my campaign, and the only way I can know that there is a problem is listening to people talk about it. But listening, though well and good, is still a silent activity. As for speaking up, well, I'll try to remember that we don't always have to have cutting-edge commentary or novel insights to offer. When someone is shot in North Carolina or beheaded in Syria or stabbed in France, it is perfectly okay to simply acknowledge the horror of it. That's worth something too. It's not a bad thing that I have a comparative advantage in talking about anti-Semitism, and I don't apologize for leveraging that. But I will do my best to at least make clear to others that, yes, I have their back as well. Because I know how it feels when I don't feel that way about myself, and it isn't a good feeling.
I never actually wrote the post. And even as I thought it I began to second-guess myself. Would I meet my own prescription? Technically no, but not for the reasons one might think -- I had put something up about Chapel Hill but not (that I recall) Copenhagen. Still, I think few people would accuse me of being too inattentive to global anti-Semitism. And in general, while I write and blog about a range of topics, it is obvious that I devote disproportionate attention to anti-Semitism compared to other issues.
Why do I do that? Is that because I think anti-Semitism is objectively "more important" than other like -isms. I don't think so, though if someone was to argue that I have a subconscious bias in that direction due to the fact that anti-Semitism threatens me personally I would not have much room to argue. Is it because anti-Semitism is the only anti-racism campaign I care to campaign on? I don't think so; and hopefully my academic work is enough to disabuse that. If I was to give an answer, it's that anti-Semitism is an area where I think I have something particular and useful to say. I have skin the in game, yes, but also expertise -- I feel (rightly or wrongly) like I can make a unique and helpful contribution here. Other issues I feel more confident that others can and will say whatever I would have.
It is a cliche, but an accurate one, to say that nobody can devote care and attention (much less equal care and attention) to everything. We all have to make choices. We all know that on the production end, and yet when on the (non-)receiving end we still feel that pang of exclusion -- that we're not important enough to rouse others to action. So what do we do?
I don't have a good answer. Certainly, I think we should all be curious consumers about what our fellows are saying. If a group in my society feels marginalized or scared or hurt or wounded, I want to know that because making our community -- our entire community -- a safe, welcoming and inclusive space is part of my campaign, and the only way I can know that there is a problem is listening to people talk about it. But listening, though well and good, is still a silent activity. As for speaking up, well, I'll try to remember that we don't always have to have cutting-edge commentary or novel insights to offer. When someone is shot in North Carolina or beheaded in Syria or stabbed in France, it is perfectly okay to simply acknowledge the horror of it. That's worth something too. It's not a bad thing that I have a comparative advantage in talking about anti-Semitism, and I don't apologize for leveraging that. But I will do my best to at least make clear to others that, yes, I have their back as well. Because I know how it feels when I don't feel that way about myself, and it isn't a good feeling.
Sunday, February 15, 2015
Outward Bound
Last week, a former colleague of mine from Illinois emailed me about a German decision where torching a synagogue was not anti-Semitic, just "criticism of Israel" (not the first time I've heard that argument). And earlier this week, a law school classmate sent me an Austrian prosecutor's conclusion that putting up a picture of Hitler captioned with "I could have annihilated all the Jews in the world, but I left some of them alive so you will know why I was killing them..." was likewise just a means of exposure displeasure with Israel. Seriously, this argument has to be bounded somewhere, yes?
Oh, and half of all racist attacks in France are directed at Jews, who constitute one percent of the population. Makes me glad to have the #JewishPrivilege of living in the United States, where we're only the second most common (per capita) victim of hate crimes.
Oh, and half of all racist attacks in France are directed at Jews, who constitute one percent of the population. Makes me glad to have the #JewishPrivilege of living in the United States, where we're only the second most common (per capita) victim of hate crimes.
Friday, February 13, 2015
Inferring from Non-Participation
Imagine that a small democratic body (a town, a county, a college campus, whatever) is holding two referendums. The first concerns whether the institution should build a new road. Out of 10,000 eligible voters, only 10% vote -- they break down 60% in favor, 40% opposed. The referendum passes.
The second referendum asks that the body officially boycott Coke products (a hobby-horse I remember from my own undergraduate days). Again, it turns out that only 1,000 of the 10,000 voters show up at the polls, and of those voting the referendum passes by a 60/40 margin.
In either case, the lack of participation could be thought to have a negative impact of the democratic legitimacy of the referendum -- it might constrain our ability to say "this is what the people want." However, my instincts tell me there is a significant difference between the two cases above.
In the road referendum, I don't have any intuitive thoughts on the views of the non-participants -- which is to say, I have no reason to think that their distribution of views on the road differ from the voting population. That might change if the road was particularly beneficial to a specific subset of the population who was motivated to get to the polls (and it puts aside any issues about differential access to the polls by various social groups, which is no small thing), but otherwise there doesn't seem to be anything in particular that I can infer about the non-participants. And that (to me at least) dissipates a good portion of the democratic legitimacy threat.
In the boycott Coke referendum, by contrast, my intuition strongly suspects that most of the non-voters would (if pressed) vote against. It seems to me (and maybe I'm just wrong here) that if you're the sort of person who supports something like boycotting Coke, then you're the sort of person who will be sufficiently motivated to go to the polls and vote for it. Likewise, of the group who thinks this issue isn't such a big deal (not enough of a motive to go to the polls), it's hard to imagine many of them lean in favor of boycotting Coke. If I'm right, in this case we can infer opposition (albeit not passionately felt opposition) from non-participation. And in that case, the vote tally doesn't necessarily stand in for the "what the people want."
What do we make of this? I'm not sure. It is not even intuitively obvious that it is a bad thing that a passionate minority beat out a largely indifferent majority. Maybe turnout gives us a proxy for preference-intensity that is valuable. If John cares strongly about building a new bridge and Jane doesn't really care but is mildly against it, and that disjuncture causes more John-types than Jane-types to head to the polls, is it bad if the bridge gets built notwithstanding there being more Janes than Johns amongst eligible voters? On the other hand, that is really the positive way of framing special interest capture. You can tell similar stories about why all sorts of small and well-organized groups beat out diffuse majorities, and in many cases the results will feel like democratic failings rather than success stories.
I don't have any big sweeping thoughts about this. I am curious about what circumstances or conditions cause us to believe that non-voters likely would fall on a particular side of a controversy versus those where their views can be assumed to roughly mirror those of the voting population.
The second referendum asks that the body officially boycott Coke products (a hobby-horse I remember from my own undergraduate days). Again, it turns out that only 1,000 of the 10,000 voters show up at the polls, and of those voting the referendum passes by a 60/40 margin.
In either case, the lack of participation could be thought to have a negative impact of the democratic legitimacy of the referendum -- it might constrain our ability to say "this is what the people want." However, my instincts tell me there is a significant difference between the two cases above.
In the road referendum, I don't have any intuitive thoughts on the views of the non-participants -- which is to say, I have no reason to think that their distribution of views on the road differ from the voting population. That might change if the road was particularly beneficial to a specific subset of the population who was motivated to get to the polls (and it puts aside any issues about differential access to the polls by various social groups, which is no small thing), but otherwise there doesn't seem to be anything in particular that I can infer about the non-participants. And that (to me at least) dissipates a good portion of the democratic legitimacy threat.
In the boycott Coke referendum, by contrast, my intuition strongly suspects that most of the non-voters would (if pressed) vote against. It seems to me (and maybe I'm just wrong here) that if you're the sort of person who supports something like boycotting Coke, then you're the sort of person who will be sufficiently motivated to go to the polls and vote for it. Likewise, of the group who thinks this issue isn't such a big deal (not enough of a motive to go to the polls), it's hard to imagine many of them lean in favor of boycotting Coke. If I'm right, in this case we can infer opposition (albeit not passionately felt opposition) from non-participation. And in that case, the vote tally doesn't necessarily stand in for the "what the people want."
What do we make of this? I'm not sure. It is not even intuitively obvious that it is a bad thing that a passionate minority beat out a largely indifferent majority. Maybe turnout gives us a proxy for preference-intensity that is valuable. If John cares strongly about building a new bridge and Jane doesn't really care but is mildly against it, and that disjuncture causes more John-types than Jane-types to head to the polls, is it bad if the bridge gets built notwithstanding there being more Janes than Johns amongst eligible voters? On the other hand, that is really the positive way of framing special interest capture. You can tell similar stories about why all sorts of small and well-organized groups beat out diffuse majorities, and in many cases the results will feel like democratic failings rather than success stories.
I don't have any big sweeping thoughts about this. I am curious about what circumstances or conditions cause us to believe that non-voters likely would fall on a particular side of a controversy versus those where their views can be assumed to roughly mirror those of the voting population.
Wednesday, February 11, 2015
The Train Has No Brakes
It's been a while since we last checked in on the state of Jews in South Africa. We've seen government officials pull out of an event hosted by the country's umbrella Jewish organization ("Celebrating 20 years of South Africa’s Freedom"), because the BDS movement does not target Jews. We saw another official call for "eye for an eye" retaliation against the Jewish community for deaths in Gaza, because the BDS movement does not target Jews. We saw yet another ANC official not even receive a reprimand for telling Facebook that "Hitler was right", because the BDS movement does not target Jews. And of course, there was the top COSATU official who was sanctioned by the South African Human Rights Commission for hate speech after he said he wished to "convey a message to the Jews in South Africa" and threatening them that it "will be hell", because the BDS movement does not target Jews.
And so it is today that we get another entry it what is becoming an increasingly dangerous pattern: the Student Representative Council at the Durban University of Technology, supported by the Progressive Youth Alliance, has submitted a demand that the University expel all of its Jewish students. Mqondisi Duma, Secretary of the Student Representative Council, was quite blunt: "As the SRC, we had a meeting and analysed international politics. We took the decision that Jewish students, especially those who do not support the Palestinian struggle, should deregister." Because the BDS movement does, in fact, target Jews.
There will be no calls to boycott DUT (and there shouldn't be; the University administration has made clear that the demands are "totally unacceptable"). There will be no resolutions in solidarity with the Jewish students targeted for expulsion. There will be no recognition of this as part of a pattern. There most certainly will be someone who complains that the Council is being unfairly maligned; it only wished to criticize Israel.
The train has no brakes. People climb aboard at their (which is to say, our) peril.
UPDATE: If you think you want to see the DUT student council's "apology," trust me, you don't (though I do wonder whether Fatima Hajaig ghost-wrote it). As in most of these "apologi[es] without reservation", there are quite a few reservations, and the amount of time reflecting on how they came to call for the expulsion of Jews qua Jews is nil (the time they spend reiterating their support for the global BDS movement is quite a bit more than nil). "Our campuses will not be breeding grounds for Apartheid" -- some might say "too late."
And so it is today that we get another entry it what is becoming an increasingly dangerous pattern: the Student Representative Council at the Durban University of Technology, supported by the Progressive Youth Alliance, has submitted a demand that the University expel all of its Jewish students. Mqondisi Duma, Secretary of the Student Representative Council, was quite blunt: "As the SRC, we had a meeting and analysed international politics. We took the decision that Jewish students, especially those who do not support the Palestinian struggle, should deregister." Because the BDS movement does, in fact, target Jews.
There will be no calls to boycott DUT (and there shouldn't be; the University administration has made clear that the demands are "totally unacceptable"). There will be no resolutions in solidarity with the Jewish students targeted for expulsion. There will be no recognition of this as part of a pattern. There most certainly will be someone who complains that the Council is being unfairly maligned; it only wished to criticize Israel.
The train has no brakes. People climb aboard at their (which is to say, our) peril.
UPDATE: If you think you want to see the DUT student council's "apology," trust me, you don't (though I do wonder whether Fatima Hajaig ghost-wrote it). As in most of these "apologi[es] without reservation", there are quite a few reservations, and the amount of time reflecting on how they came to call for the expulsion of Jews qua Jews is nil (the time they spend reiterating their support for the global BDS movement is quite a bit more than nil). "Our campuses will not be breeding grounds for Apartheid" -- some might say "too late."
Birthday: It's the Final Countdown
Happy birthday to me! I turn 29 today, for what I suspect will not be the last time. I have no real desire to experience being 30, I have to say.
But today has gone great so far. Jill got me a t-shirt featuring some of the best sayings of my internet boyfriend. We went out to lunch and I had a delicious breakfast burrito, then went used book shopping (I got two Emil Fackenheim books and one by Patricia Williams). Then we picked up a smoothie and started walking home, and wouldn't you know it if there is a stormtrooper standing outside a local comic book store. There will be some great pictures of me grinning like an idiot on Facebook soon. Tonight is a steak dinner (not the easiest thing to pull off in Berkeley) with friends, and then we'll probably just chill and binge-watch YouTube videos.
Year 29 is off to a pretty good start.
But today has gone great so far. Jill got me a t-shirt featuring some of the best sayings of my internet boyfriend. We went out to lunch and I had a delicious breakfast burrito, then went used book shopping (I got two Emil Fackenheim books and one by Patricia Williams). Then we picked up a smoothie and started walking home, and wouldn't you know it if there is a stormtrooper standing outside a local comic book store. There will be some great pictures of me grinning like an idiot on Facebook soon. Tonight is a steak dinner (not the easiest thing to pull off in Berkeley) with friends, and then we'll probably just chill and binge-watch YouTube videos.
Year 29 is off to a pretty good start.
Monday, February 09, 2015
Equal Opportunity Discrimination
An American-residing Israeli woman (with an Israeli passport) is suing Kuwait Airlines after it refused to board her on a flight from New York to London. Kuwaiti law prohibits allowing Israeli citizens to travel on the airline.
The airline's defense rang odd to me:
The airline's defense rang odd to me:
The airline’s attorney John Maggio told the newspaper that the suit has no merit because the policy is based on citizenship, not religion. He said that a Muslim with an Israeli passport also would not be allowed on the plane.I mean, okay, but then how is this not just an example of national origin discrimination instead? Am I just missing something obvious?
Saturday, February 07, 2015
The Platonic Ideal of Wrong
I just read a very short essay by Bruce Robbins that purports to respond to an article by Doron Ben-Atar relating the latter's attempt to fight back against the American Studies Association's boycott of Israel (he claimed the boycott was anti-Semitic; a fellow faculty member was so aggrieved by the suggestion that she filed a harassment complaint against him). Robbins is the Old Dominion Foundation Professor in the Humanities at Columbia University. I provide Robbins' title because my initial assumption on reading it was that it was the misbegotten work of a doomed graduate student (in which case I wouldn't be picking on the poor fellow, but Robbins is in the position to take a few lumps). Though I came across the article on academia.edu, I later discovered it had also been published on Mondoweiss. This is not remotely surprising.
Robbins has written an essay that really deserves to be read in the original crayon. If ever there was a crystelline encapsulation of the wrongs I've been trying to get at in Playing with Cards and my general writing on anti-Semitism, it would be here. It is just the gift that keeps on giving. Arguably, it's too perfect -- one might think that the only wrongdoers are those who embrace the mistakes with Robbins' gleeful abandon. But I can't help but share. There's a kind of beauty in its perfection.
For example, one of my arguments in Playing with Cards is that people elevate the gravity of racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, etc., as a defensive maneuver to remove actual extant cases from its ambit and impose heightened obligations on claimants who, after all, are leveling a very "serious" charge. Take it away Robbins!
What's next? Oh of course, our favorite old chestnut:
To his credit, though, Robbins doesn't rely on Ben-Atar's lack of qualification on matters of anti-Semitism. No, he proceeds to make a much bolder claim -- one I cannot help but applaud for its forthrightness:
Unsurprisingly, Robbins doesn't say, and one gets the distinct sense that the answer is that no one has the "right" to decide that anything is anti-Semitic. Gosh, how convenient. I've heard of folks saying that anti-Semitism is so serious that nothing can possibly be anti-Semitic; I had until now never heard the claim that anti-Semitism is so serious that nobody even has the right to adjudicate claims of anti-Semitism.
Well, not no one. Certainly, Bruce Robbins' right to make definitive declarations on the matter is unimpeachable:
And then we get to our inevitable conclusion. The real problem is not with anti-Semitism itself. It is that people are just too gosh-darn willing to believe Jews when they make obviously outrageous anti-Semitism claims:
Elsewhere, in his piece, Robbins makes his thesis quite clear: "The real issue here is anti-Semitism; that is, accusing people of it". Note he doesn't say "falsely" or "baselessly" or "groundlessly". These terms are, for him, redundant. Any accusation of anti-Semitism is a false one, an obviously false one, a so-clearly false one that it's irresponsible to even make the insinuation one. Normally, people making this argument at least have the grace to throw up a perfunctory cloud of dust to mask the obvious untenability of the claim. Robbins has done us all a great service in taking the quiet parts and blasting them out with a megaphone, and for that I am truly grateful.
Robbins has written an essay that really deserves to be read in the original crayon. If ever there was a crystelline encapsulation of the wrongs I've been trying to get at in Playing with Cards and my general writing on anti-Semitism, it would be here. It is just the gift that keeps on giving. Arguably, it's too perfect -- one might think that the only wrongdoers are those who embrace the mistakes with Robbins' gleeful abandon. But I can't help but share. There's a kind of beauty in its perfection.
For example, one of my arguments in Playing with Cards is that people elevate the gravity of racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, etc., as a defensive maneuver to remove actual extant cases from its ambit and impose heightened obligations on claimants who, after all, are leveling a very "serious" charge. Take it away Robbins!
But to call someone an anti-Semite is a very serious charge. It is an accusation that can produce a great deal of personal unhappiness, destroying friendships and careers. No one has the right to make such a charge lightly or irresponsibly. Whether or not it counts as harassment in a court of law, anyone falsely accused of anti-Semitism has a non-negligible claim to have been victimized. So there really is reason to ask: who is persecuting whom?It should be obvious to anyone why presenting discrimination claims (even ones we disagree with) as harassment (or, worse yet, "persecution") sets a dangerous precedent -- and if it's not obvious, plug in popular conservative discourse on false rape accusations or the dreaded "race card". That Robbins so merrily chirps along with this line of argument is astonishing; and the suggestion that it is even up for debate whether such claims should be viewed "as harassment in a court of law" puts him well past the outer bounds of all but the most delusional MRAs.
What's next? Oh of course, our favorite old chestnut:
In his article, Ben-Atar claims to possess professional competence on the issue of anti-Semitism. It is true that he has published on the subject. But the suggestion that any criticism of Israel can only be anti-Semitic casts some doubt on his scholarly acumen.Now I'll make a confession -- I'm unfamiliar with Ben-Atar's work on anti-Semitism, so I suppose that it is possible that he has in fact argued that "any criticism of Israel" is anti-Semitic. But Robbins does not provide any citation or quotation to this effect, in fact, he does not cite or link to anything at all. And given the pervasiveness of this particular assertion -- conflating calling particular instances of "anti-Israel criticism" anti-Semitic with saying that any criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic -- I feel confident that it's Robbins who's in the wrong here.
To his credit, though, Robbins doesn't rely on Ben-Atar's lack of qualification on matters of anti-Semitism. No, he proceeds to make a much bolder claim -- one I cannot help but applaud for its forthrightness:
And even if he [Ben-Atar] had all the acumen in the world, he would not have the right to decide who is and who is not an anti-Semite.Now that's a new one, even on me. Even Jews who are conceded experts on the matter do not "have the right to decide who is and who is not an anti-Semite." Which raises the question: who does? The Jewish community writ large, as expressed through our communal institutions? Presumably not; they agree with Ben-Atar on the moral status of the ASA resolution. The broader Fordham community? Because if there's anyone more qualified to opine on anti-Semitism than the Jews, it's the Jesuits.
Unsurprisingly, Robbins doesn't say, and one gets the distinct sense that the answer is that no one has the "right" to decide that anything is anti-Semitic. Gosh, how convenient. I've heard of folks saying that anti-Semitism is so serious that nothing can possibly be anti-Semitic; I had until now never heard the claim that anti-Semitism is so serious that nobody even has the right to adjudicate claims of anti-Semitism.
Well, not no one. Certainly, Bruce Robbins' right to make definitive declarations on the matter is unimpeachable:
Consider the fate of Steven Salaita and the Reverend Bruce Shipman. Their victimhood is not open to doubt. Real victims like them suffer every time someone cries victim when nothing has been done to them.I'll spot Robbins Salaita -- not because he's right, but because understanding why he's wrong at least requires thinking multiple thoughts (Salaita is a victim not because his tweets weren't anti-Semitic -- they were -- but because their anti-Semitism is irrelevant to the academic freedom question). But Reverend Shipman is no victim -- no matter how fervently Reverend Shipman believes he is. Not only did he not hold an academic position in the first place, the idea that there is something wrong with suggesting (as Shipman did) that the remedy for beating up Jews is for the Jews to behave better is not actually that hard of a call.
And then we get to our inevitable conclusion. The real problem is not with anti-Semitism itself. It is that people are just too gosh-darn willing to believe Jews when they make obviously outrageous anti-Semitism claims:
The fear of even appearing to tolerate anti-Semitism is so great that institutions will not always stop and check to see whether the particular grievances have any justification whatsoever. There are too many irresponsible charges of anti-Semitism out there, blackening the names of individuals and institutions as well as shutting down legitimate and much-needed debate about Israeli policies.Really? Really? Inquiring whether a boycott that targets the world's only Jewish state and nowhere else might be anti-Semitic lacks "any justification whatsoever"? Is not just contestable on its merits, but so clearly wrong as to be "irresponsible" to even entertain? Ditto, "Zionists, transforming 'antisemitism' from something horrible into something honorable since 1948"? And ditto Rev. Shipman's contention that the onus is on Jews to be more critical of Israel if they don't want to be beaten on the streets? These claims aren't just wrong, but obviously, flagrantly, unquestionably so? And we're the one's with the supposed inability to think critically?
Elsewhere, in his piece, Robbins makes his thesis quite clear: "The real issue here is anti-Semitism; that is, accusing people of it". Note he doesn't say "falsely" or "baselessly" or "groundlessly". These terms are, for him, redundant. Any accusation of anti-Semitism is a false one, an obviously false one, a so-clearly false one that it's irresponsible to even make the insinuation one. Normally, people making this argument at least have the grace to throw up a perfunctory cloud of dust to mask the obvious untenability of the claim. Robbins has done us all a great service in taking the quiet parts and blasting them out with a megaphone, and for that I am truly grateful.
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