Since I won't be posting for the rest of today or tomorrow, here's a round-up to keep you busy in my absence.
A few days ago, there was some form of Israeli/Syrian skirmish over Syrian airspace, where an Israeli military plane was fired upon. Both sides, however, are keeping uncharacteristically mum about the circumstances surrounding the event. Daniel Levy's hypotheses are worth your time.
Both of these posts by Zuzu at KPMT are good in their own right, but I particularly found interesting her argument on how making someone into a "role model" often entails an assertion of ownership over them; as in, they have an "obligation" to behave in precisely the way you expect of them.
Bitch Ph.D hits the spot on the Latino voting demographic.
Apparently, someone hung a noose outside a Black student center at the University of Maryland.
What if we calculated total UFOs in America like we do total IED's in Iraq?
Michelle Cottle is deliberating over a new parenting method.
The Fix has the run-down on the now-open Nebraska Senate race. If Bob Kerrey jumps in, it has a good chance of being a Democratic pickup.
Amy Zegart is guest-blogging at the VC on 9/11 intelligence failures.
I have to admit, among all its sins (real and imagined), I never thought to blame Israel for global warming.
See y'all on the flip side!
Tuesday, September 11, 2007
Monday, September 10, 2007
Badgery
Responding to a part of my reading of Jouvenel, Mark Olson cites back to his own response to Covering (which I recommended he read) to argue that people "badge" more often than they "cover." (Go ahead, read that again to be sure you get the thread. I'll wait).
"Covering" is when people downplay (but do not necessarily deny) a part of their identity or presentment in order to better move within dominant social circles. For example, a Black person might straighten her hair, rather than wear it natural, because the law firm she works at associates the latter hairstyle with "ghetto" people and not professionals. This woman is not denying her Blackness, but she is covering it--making it less noticeable and more easily integrated within the White mainstream. The cost, most obviously, is that the woman cannot wear her hair as she likes or feels most comfortable with (even though hairstyles have no intrinsic connection to legal performance), and less obviously, often economic costs--buying straightening chemicals is time-consuming and far more expensive than natural styling would be.
"Badging", as Mark defines it, is when people voluntarily alter their appearance to signal their membership in a group. The Amazons of myth, who cut off their right breasts (to better string back their bows) might be an example, or perhaps a fraternal order which initiates its members be giving them a marking, uniform, or tattoo. Olson continues:
The distinction between "Covering" and "Badging" appears to lie on two axis. First, covering is done grudgingly and under (implied) threat of sanction, while badging is done voluntarily, "willingly if not eagerly" to signify membership in a group. I badge when I want to proudly announce my membership in a group; I cover when I need to minimize my membership in a group to move comfortably or effectively in a social arrangement. If I wear my kippah in Synagogue, I'm badging; if I take it off while going to the store in very-not-Jewish Northfield, I'm covering. Second, I'd argue that there is at least an implied difference in the originating point of a "badge" versus a "cover." The former should ideally stem from the bottom up--the people who are badged should, broadly speaking, determine that a badge is necessary and what the badge is. Covering demands, by contrast, tend to come from up on high. They are societal demands, not consented to by their targets, often the expectations of social elites or corporate executives. There are exceptions to this (an army uniform, perhaps), but by and large I think it holds. And even the army uniform I think may be better described a justifiable requirement to cover which is later adapted as a "badge" by the people it is imposed upon.
To start with, I'm not sure why Mark is so sure that people are more likely to badge than cover. Perhaps maybe upper-middle class White Christian heterosexual males are more likely to badge than cover, because there are likely to be fewer characteristics they possess that require covering in the circles they move in. However, I think it is facile to assert, without argument, that a Asian gay male professor is more likely to badge than cover--or that the benefits he gains from badging outweigh the harms he experiences from covering. To be frank, it displays a sort of arrogance for Mark to transpose his social position (in which the "badge" he wears to signify his membership in the cycling community--shaving--outweighs whatever covering he has to do) over and on top of the narrative of another whose life experience has made him cover more than badge. Mark simply has no way of knowing how badging versus covering affects people who are differently situated from him, and he's epistemologically wrong to assume that he knows, much less is so sure that he knows that he'll overwrite their own narratives with his own.
More importantly, "badge" seems to valorize presentation-altering requirements in a way that often just doesn't seem to fit. I had to wear a polo shirt and khakis when I went to work at a law firm. I presume (though never asked) that they expected me to keep relatively cut and short hair. To say the shirt, pants, and hair were a "badge" of my office rings less hollow than it rings ridiculous.
The paradigmatic case I use to illustrate the harms of covering is Jespersen v. Harrah's Casino, and it showcases this and the other problems with being too quick to replace "covering" with "badging." Decided by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals last year, the court held that Darlene Jespersen could be fired from her position as a bartender at Harrah's after 20 years of service because she refused to assent to a new requirement (for female bartenders only) to wear makeup. Specifically, Harrah's brought in "image specialists" that gave "make-overs" to each employee, creating a "personal best" picture which supervisors were told to compare the presentment of the employee to everyday. For women, this makeover invariably included makeup requirements. Jespersen tried wearing the makeup for awhile, but stopped, saying it made her feel "dolled up" and put a barrier between her and her customers. So she stopped, and in spite of 20 years of undisputed and continuing exemplary service, she was fired.
Let's start with the obvious: it would be absurd to call make-up a "badge" of Jespersen's job, just as much as it would be to call khakis a badge of being a Library Assistant at Williams & Connolly. To call either "badges" twists the meaning of the word so out of sync with common usage as to make it effectively meaningless. Next, we can note another problem elucidated by Jespersen's case, critical to the point I and Yoshino make but overlooked entirely by Mark: the possibility that presentment-altering requirements can be differentially imposed upon different social groups. In this case, only female bartenders were required to wear makeup. In fact, men were prohibited from wearing makeup at all. Two implications flow from this. First, forcing women to wear makeup isn't just a differential burden, it costs them extra money. Men had their own requirements as well, and its true that the bar on men wearing make-up imposes a covering burden on men as well, but eyeballing the schema Harrah's set up makes it pretty obvious that women will have to spend more to adapt to it than men. This is discriminatory on face--it makes it more expensive to be a woman and work at Harrah's than to be a man and work there. Second, the Harrah's case reminds us that sometimes, covering requirements can be premised upon subordinating perceptions of the "proper" position of a given social group. While women should be free to wear anything they like on their face if they so desire, the idea that women "need" to (literally in this case) "cover" their faces, whether with make-up or a veil, is emblematic itself of deep-seated misogyny. Indeed, while I strongly oppose states (or companies) which require woman to be veiled, there is at least somewhat of a glass house here that I wish Mark would recognize. We have an obligation to at least interrogate badging and covering requirements when they perpetuate racist, sexist, or otherwise subordinating ideologies.
Moving forward, look at where the covering requirement originated from. Again, it's ludicrous to suggest that the make-up rules grew out some fraternal bonding initiative amongst the bartenders that Jespersen refused to accede to. This was a corporate policy, sent from on high, that had virtually no relation to Jespersen's ability to do her job but required her to make significant physical alterations at her own expense anyway. Nor was this requirement a reasonable expectation Jespersen could expect to have to endure as part of entering the bartending community. She had been their for twenty years, and executives unilaterally changed the rules on her to require her to mark herself as they liked. Finally, to act as if there is no costs (in a free labor market) to being fired from the job you've held for 20 years is absurd--particularly when the termination is for non-performance related reasons--and since she sued, she has to deal with the costs (monetary and non-) of that as well.
The moral of the story is that, while I sometimes badge and I sometimes cover, being coerced into covering is distressingly common, it's really bad when it happens, it's more likely to happen to already marginalized groups, and it has significant costs that remain worthy of address. By and large, we shouldn't force people to alter themselves so as to live happy, productive, socially tolerated lives. When we do require it, we need to ask why its justified, and we need a pretty good reason. Fostering fraternal bonds or social solidarity can be part of that reason, but it needs to be warranted--the demand for solidarity needs to outweigh the harm of the covering requirement, and the fraternity argument can only be used when solidarity is part of what's at issue (which, in Jespersen's case, it really obviously isn't). A critical view remains, as always, the best choice.
"Covering" is when people downplay (but do not necessarily deny) a part of their identity or presentment in order to better move within dominant social circles. For example, a Black person might straighten her hair, rather than wear it natural, because the law firm she works at associates the latter hairstyle with "ghetto" people and not professionals. This woman is not denying her Blackness, but she is covering it--making it less noticeable and more easily integrated within the White mainstream. The cost, most obviously, is that the woman cannot wear her hair as she likes or feels most comfortable with (even though hairstyles have no intrinsic connection to legal performance), and less obviously, often economic costs--buying straightening chemicals is time-consuming and far more expensive than natural styling would be.
"Badging", as Mark defines it, is when people voluntarily alter their appearance to signal their membership in a group. The Amazons of myth, who cut off their right breasts (to better string back their bows) might be an example, or perhaps a fraternal order which initiates its members be giving them a marking, uniform, or tattoo. Olson continues:
Most people don’t cover, they badge. We significantly alter our public persona, behavior and speech in order to signify joining, to willingly if not eagerly show our membership our assent and unity with various groups in our society. The missing part of Mr Yoshino’s dialectic is a recognition of the value men (and women) place on badging, for I found little if any recognition that badging forms a universal and important part of every culture.
The distinction between "Covering" and "Badging" appears to lie on two axis. First, covering is done grudgingly and under (implied) threat of sanction, while badging is done voluntarily, "willingly if not eagerly" to signify membership in a group. I badge when I want to proudly announce my membership in a group; I cover when I need to minimize my membership in a group to move comfortably or effectively in a social arrangement. If I wear my kippah in Synagogue, I'm badging; if I take it off while going to the store in very-not-Jewish Northfield, I'm covering. Second, I'd argue that there is at least an implied difference in the originating point of a "badge" versus a "cover." The former should ideally stem from the bottom up--the people who are badged should, broadly speaking, determine that a badge is necessary and what the badge is. Covering demands, by contrast, tend to come from up on high. They are societal demands, not consented to by their targets, often the expectations of social elites or corporate executives. There are exceptions to this (an army uniform, perhaps), but by and large I think it holds. And even the army uniform I think may be better described a justifiable requirement to cover which is later adapted as a "badge" by the people it is imposed upon.
To start with, I'm not sure why Mark is so sure that people are more likely to badge than cover. Perhaps maybe upper-middle class White Christian heterosexual males are more likely to badge than cover, because there are likely to be fewer characteristics they possess that require covering in the circles they move in. However, I think it is facile to assert, without argument, that a Asian gay male professor is more likely to badge than cover--or that the benefits he gains from badging outweigh the harms he experiences from covering. To be frank, it displays a sort of arrogance for Mark to transpose his social position (in which the "badge" he wears to signify his membership in the cycling community--shaving--outweighs whatever covering he has to do) over and on top of the narrative of another whose life experience has made him cover more than badge. Mark simply has no way of knowing how badging versus covering affects people who are differently situated from him, and he's epistemologically wrong to assume that he knows, much less is so sure that he knows that he'll overwrite their own narratives with his own.
More importantly, "badge" seems to valorize presentation-altering requirements in a way that often just doesn't seem to fit. I had to wear a polo shirt and khakis when I went to work at a law firm. I presume (though never asked) that they expected me to keep relatively cut and short hair. To say the shirt, pants, and hair were a "badge" of my office rings less hollow than it rings ridiculous.
The paradigmatic case I use to illustrate the harms of covering is Jespersen v. Harrah's Casino, and it showcases this and the other problems with being too quick to replace "covering" with "badging." Decided by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals last year, the court held that Darlene Jespersen could be fired from her position as a bartender at Harrah's after 20 years of service because she refused to assent to a new requirement (for female bartenders only) to wear makeup. Specifically, Harrah's brought in "image specialists" that gave "make-overs" to each employee, creating a "personal best" picture which supervisors were told to compare the presentment of the employee to everyday. For women, this makeover invariably included makeup requirements. Jespersen tried wearing the makeup for awhile, but stopped, saying it made her feel "dolled up" and put a barrier between her and her customers. So she stopped, and in spite of 20 years of undisputed and continuing exemplary service, she was fired.
Let's start with the obvious: it would be absurd to call make-up a "badge" of Jespersen's job, just as much as it would be to call khakis a badge of being a Library Assistant at Williams & Connolly. To call either "badges" twists the meaning of the word so out of sync with common usage as to make it effectively meaningless. Next, we can note another problem elucidated by Jespersen's case, critical to the point I and Yoshino make but overlooked entirely by Mark: the possibility that presentment-altering requirements can be differentially imposed upon different social groups. In this case, only female bartenders were required to wear makeup. In fact, men were prohibited from wearing makeup at all. Two implications flow from this. First, forcing women to wear makeup isn't just a differential burden, it costs them extra money. Men had their own requirements as well, and its true that the bar on men wearing make-up imposes a covering burden on men as well, but eyeballing the schema Harrah's set up makes it pretty obvious that women will have to spend more to adapt to it than men. This is discriminatory on face--it makes it more expensive to be a woman and work at Harrah's than to be a man and work there. Second, the Harrah's case reminds us that sometimes, covering requirements can be premised upon subordinating perceptions of the "proper" position of a given social group. While women should be free to wear anything they like on their face if they so desire, the idea that women "need" to (literally in this case) "cover" their faces, whether with make-up or a veil, is emblematic itself of deep-seated misogyny. Indeed, while I strongly oppose states (or companies) which require woman to be veiled, there is at least somewhat of a glass house here that I wish Mark would recognize. We have an obligation to at least interrogate badging and covering requirements when they perpetuate racist, sexist, or otherwise subordinating ideologies.
Moving forward, look at where the covering requirement originated from. Again, it's ludicrous to suggest that the make-up rules grew out some fraternal bonding initiative amongst the bartenders that Jespersen refused to accede to. This was a corporate policy, sent from on high, that had virtually no relation to Jespersen's ability to do her job but required her to make significant physical alterations at her own expense anyway. Nor was this requirement a reasonable expectation Jespersen could expect to have to endure as part of entering the bartending community. She had been their for twenty years, and executives unilaterally changed the rules on her to require her to mark herself as they liked. Finally, to act as if there is no costs (in a free labor market) to being fired from the job you've held for 20 years is absurd--particularly when the termination is for non-performance related reasons--and since she sued, she has to deal with the costs (monetary and non-) of that as well.
The moral of the story is that, while I sometimes badge and I sometimes cover, being coerced into covering is distressingly common, it's really bad when it happens, it's more likely to happen to already marginalized groups, and it has significant costs that remain worthy of address. By and large, we shouldn't force people to alter themselves so as to live happy, productive, socially tolerated lives. When we do require it, we need to ask why its justified, and we need a pretty good reason. Fostering fraternal bonds or social solidarity can be part of that reason, but it needs to be warranted--the demand for solidarity needs to outweigh the harm of the covering requirement, and the fraternity argument can only be used when solidarity is part of what's at issue (which, in Jespersen's case, it really obviously isn't). A critical view remains, as always, the best choice.
Due Process for Bin Laden
You won't hear me complaining: I can't think of a better contrast between the rule of law America represents and the theocratic despotism Bin Laden wishes to install than to hold a massive, public trial explicating all his crimes. And now I have a major Presidential contender backing me up: Fred Thompson.
Steve Benen gets snarky on all the right-wing pundits who called for Howard Dean's head when he said the same thing in 2004. And perhaps he's right. But credit where credit is due: this is not likely to be a popular position amongst the right-wing base, and I'm not sure I see an angle for Thompson taking it. Which means I give him credit for taking the right position whilst in the line of political fire.
Not too much credit, mind you:
I'm especially concerned that "milk", in this context, is fraught with implications. And the "rules" we apply to other Guantanamo detainees aren't exactly that much to shout at. But hopefully, some reforms will be pushed through, and even saying the words "due process" next to "Bin Laden" is a step up from most Republicans. It's not like I disagree that high-value intelligent assets like Bin Laden require different sort of treatment than a common-criminal--I just don't think that these differences justify chucking all of the rule of law out a ninth story window. And, in some small way, perhaps Thompson doesn't either. So, minor kudos all the same (or perhaps my expectations are too low?).
Steve Benen gets snarky on all the right-wing pundits who called for Howard Dean's head when he said the same thing in 2004. And perhaps he's right. But credit where credit is due: this is not likely to be a popular position amongst the right-wing base, and I'm not sure I see an angle for Thompson taking it. Which means I give him credit for taking the right position whilst in the line of political fire.
Not too much credit, mind you:
Later, a Thompson spokesman explained that Thompson meant "the same rules ought to apply to him as to everyone at Guantanamo Bay, and there ought to be due process thru a special military court or commission."
"For anyone to suggest that we shouldn't squeeze out every last bit of intelligence information has absolutely no understanding how to fight a long term global war on terrorism," spokesman Todd Harris said. "It would be very dangerous for the long-term security of our country to not try to milk bin Laden for every ounce of information he has."
I'm especially concerned that "milk", in this context, is fraught with implications. And the "rules" we apply to other Guantanamo detainees aren't exactly that much to shout at. But hopefully, some reforms will be pushed through, and even saying the words "due process" next to "Bin Laden" is a step up from most Republicans. It's not like I disagree that high-value intelligent assets like Bin Laden require different sort of treatment than a common-criminal--I just don't think that these differences justify chucking all of the rule of law out a ninth story window. And, in some small way, perhaps Thompson doesn't either. So, minor kudos all the same (or perhaps my expectations are too low?).
Blog as Flash Memory Card
I've realized that a major function of this blog is to serve as an external memory drive for my brain. I blog interesting stories or anecdotes, then, when I want to retrieve them, I just run a search (tragically, I have very little confidence in the blogger search tool, but it works well enough I guess). The upshot is that I often blog little tidbits that may not be of interest to others, just because I want to make sure I can access them some day (a lot of times my "quotes of the day" are serving this purpose). The other major impact is that I rarely write big, substantive posts at The Moderate Voice, for the simple reason that I want them to be here in three months when I go looking for them. Well, and because my ego likes the traffic I get when I direct TMVers to come here. But the first answer is far more legitimate, so let's go with that.
The Defector
Is there any blogger who has had a more extreme makeover during the last few years than John Cole? Read this post and then recall that up until recently, Cole probably would have called himself a Republican (albeit a moderate one). He voted for Bush in 2004. And now listen to him. He makes me look tame.
One thing that the media has never quite grasped when writing about the "angry" left blogosphere is that a great many of us didn't start off angry, or even all that far left, and only became so when pushed by innumerable prevarications and provocations by the Bush administration. Even back in my pro-war days, I recognized the degree to which erstwhile moderates had grown furious with the way a far-right President with no principles and no respect for alternative views was running the nation into the ground. It's not like Cole is an outlier here. Andrew Sullivan and Daniel Drezner are other Republicans who turned against the administration, and hard. Kevin Drum would have been considered "center-left" once upon a time, and TNR's Jonathan Chait, he who wrote a two-part series on his hatred of Bush, is probably still considered center-left. Even the all-powerful Kos is a former GOPer. The left-wing bloggers are made, not born fellas. And we're made not because we've got a mental imbalance. It's a reaction to particular policies and particular attitudes by a particular administration that makes good people of all political persuasions justifiably angry.
One thing that the media has never quite grasped when writing about the "angry" left blogosphere is that a great many of us didn't start off angry, or even all that far left, and only became so when pushed by innumerable prevarications and provocations by the Bush administration. Even back in my pro-war days, I recognized the degree to which erstwhile moderates had grown furious with the way a far-right President with no principles and no respect for alternative views was running the nation into the ground. It's not like Cole is an outlier here. Andrew Sullivan and Daniel Drezner are other Republicans who turned against the administration, and hard. Kevin Drum would have been considered "center-left" once upon a time, and TNR's Jonathan Chait, he who wrote a two-part series on his hatred of Bush, is probably still considered center-left. Even the all-powerful Kos is a former GOPer. The left-wing bloggers are made, not born fellas. And we're made not because we've got a mental imbalance. It's a reaction to particular policies and particular attitudes by a particular administration that makes good people of all political persuasions justifiably angry.
Sunday, September 09, 2007
Multiple Choice Mitt!
I doubt this endorsement will end up on Romney's website any time soon:
Yikes.
I'm back to seeing Romney as the least poisonous president in the GOP field, simply because he's unprincipled enough to not try anything ambitious.
Yikes.
Quote of the (Sun)day
"I contend that we have not integrated privilege in the racializing process. We have explored and documented the effects of oppression on its victims and they have, in turn, borne powerful testimony to their injuries and resilience. We have yet to chronicle how those who oppress make sense of their power in relationship to those they have injured. We are all potentially oppressors given that having power over others varies from context to context and is primarily determined by race, class, gender, and sexuality. Yet, we lack an elaborate language to speak about those who oppress -- how they feel about, think about, react to, make sense of, come to terms with, maintain privilege over, and ultimately renounce the power to oppress. Missing in the puzzle of domination is a reflexive mechanism for understanding how we are all involved in the dirty process of racializing and gendering others, limiting who they are and who they can become."
Aida Hurtado, "The Trickster's Play: Whiteness in the Subordination and Liberation Process," in Race, Identity, and Citizenship: A Reader, Rodolfo D. Torres, Louis F. Miron, & Jonathan Xavier Inda, eds. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp.225-243, 244.
Jouvenel: Who Will Guard the Guards?
Awhile back, I recommended that my old blog comrade Mark Olson read Kenji Yoshino's Covering and Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism by Jody Armour (now permanent on BlackProf, fyi). In exchange, he suggested that I read Bertrand de Jouvenel: Conservative Liberal and the Illusions of Modernity and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: The Ascent from Ideology, both by Daniel J. Mahoney.
I have checked both out from the library, though given the crunch of this term (LSATs, applications, and my senior thesis), I may not be able to read them as closely as I'd like. And since I can't even guarantee I'll have time to read both, I decided to start with the book on Jouvenel, on the simple grounds that if I read the book about him, I may stop confusing him with the Roman poet Juvenal whenever Mark mentions him (I've definitely done it several times now).
So, here are my thoughts about a third of the way through. But first, a preface. Though this book is about Jouvenel, it is written by Mahoney, a professor at Assumption College. Though it isn't slavish, Mahoney is definitely writing an apologia for Jouvenel, and from a relatively conservative slant. This can make it difficult to determine just how much of what I'm reading is "pure" Jouvenel and what is Mahoney's gloss. This isn't a knock on the professor--it'd be impossible to write a book like this and not provide such a sheen. But, for example, when Mahoney attempts to rebut critics by "softening" some of Jouvenel's positions, I have no way of evaluating whether the move is legitimate or not. Similarly, in any given position, I have no idea how much of my reaction is to what Jouvenel actually wrote, versus Mahoney's spin on it. So when I say I'm making a response to "Jouvenel", it's based on the assumption that Mahoney is perfectly mirroring what Jouvenel actually wrote or thought--an assumption that is not possible to make.
But anyway. Jouvenel certainly seems to be an intriguing thinker, and his work on power in the enlightenment state especially struck me as worthy of attention. However, at several key points he seems to make serious errors in assessing the dynamics of power in western democratic society. Jouvenel argues that the state always seeks to maximize its power, and as far as possible it does not tolerate other branches of society from exercising power. It wants to exercise a monopoly. This isn't unique to the modern state, but what is different is that the democratic process is said to give legitimacy to any state action, hence justifying the power grab and thus posing a fundamental threat to liberty. Conceding that the state has an important role to play in safeguarding our liberties, Jouvenel worries that the modern system has obliterated any natural restraint on the scope and power of the state. So, despite not being my lovely Roman poet, the large question Jouvenel asks is, in fact, that of Juvenal: Who will guard the guards?
Jouvenel's response advocates creating and nourishing alternative poles of power--"barons", in the book--who can serve as a check on the state. He does not think these institutions should supplant the state, and according to Mahoney recognizes that the state must act to restrain the barons as much as the reverse. But what Jouvenel worries about is a state, rationalized by its democratic legitimacy and shorn of any external constraint, riding roughshod over the liberty of its citizens.
Certainly, it is true that an unrestrained state is a scary thing, and I fully agree that society needs to develop both internal and external constraints to maintain its freedom. However, Jouvenel seems to assume that there is a marked separation between the interests of the state and the interest of the barons. Ironically enough, given that he argues that atomization is one of the ways the state breaks the influence of competing social institutions, Jouvenel himself assumes a complete and pre-existing split between the state and the elites. But as any observer can readily see, to a large extent the interest of these two parties are in accord--indeed, often times they construct each other. The military-industrial complex is one famous example of this; the lobbying "iron triangle" is another. This leads to a serious descriptive inaccuracy in Jouvenel's assessment--far from jealously guarding power from being exercised by any other party, democratic states often willing allow alternative bodies to exert significant power over the people. Ironically enough, it is Yoshino's Covering that explains why, noting how people are forced to significantly alter their public persona, behavior, and speech due to some external pressure (if that isn't power, what is?). Sometimes these are governmentally mandated, and sometimes they are "just" social norms, but often times they are the function of "private" entities like corporations, run by the very barons Jouvenel (descriptively) believes the state should be suppressing the power of, and (normatively) should be working to counter the power of the state. Yet, what we see instead is state organs explicitly sanctioning serious corporate restrictions on the activities and presentment of their employees. Some companies could fire me for writing this blog, others for wearing my hair in a certain ways. Even the supposedly liberal 9th Circuit has held that a women who is otherwise excellent at her job (as a bartender) can be fired for not wearing make-up. That these encroachments come in areas where the state has historically asserted its supremacy in determining the boundaries of restriction (speech, discrimination) makes it stand in even starker contrast to how Jouvenel says the world should be behaving. In a sense, the outsourcing of power from the states to the elites is what Jouvenel wants the state to do, unfortunately, this has proven to increase rather than decrease the total danger to liberty.
Another questionable move is how Jouvenel treats the masses versus the elite barons as potential checks against the state. The former is seen to be dangerous--the democratic legitimacy it grants is the threat Jouvenl is trying to diffuse. The latter is the potential savior, the counterbalance that preserves the liberty of all. I already noted how Jouvenel vastly overstates the degree of differentiation between the elite caste and the state. The simple fact that elites and states often work in tandem with each other cripples their potential as a check at the outset. He may be deceived by the democratic character of the states he is examining, but even here the elites tend to call the shots. As Rodney Peterson explains:
Indeed, we can describe the core flaw in Jouvenel's reasoning as assuming that, in a democratic polity, the state is reflective of the interests of regular people, and that elites need to be brought in to counterbalance. But in reality, the state remains largely in thrall to the elites, and alternate voices struggle to break through to have their opinions heard.
The irony is that the non-elite, non-dominant groups which Jouvenel so fears actually are better suited to the checking task he envisions than are the elites he assigns to it. Gerald Torres and Lani Guinier's "Miner's Canary" argument is emblematic here--because they are more likely to feel the effects of it early, marginalized groups are the "miner's canary" that can warn of incipient threats to our liberty and give us time to head them off. Because the interests of these groups are likely to be at odds with the state's, there is the genuine clash of values and tension that creates social restraint. As a result, Jouvenel's worries would counsel towards dramatically increasing the weight and value we place on the perspective of these marginalized groups as a barrier against despotism.
I have checked both out from the library, though given the crunch of this term (LSATs, applications, and my senior thesis), I may not be able to read them as closely as I'd like. And since I can't even guarantee I'll have time to read both, I decided to start with the book on Jouvenel, on the simple grounds that if I read the book about him, I may stop confusing him with the Roman poet Juvenal whenever Mark mentions him (I've definitely done it several times now).
So, here are my thoughts about a third of the way through. But first, a preface. Though this book is about Jouvenel, it is written by Mahoney, a professor at Assumption College. Though it isn't slavish, Mahoney is definitely writing an apologia for Jouvenel, and from a relatively conservative slant. This can make it difficult to determine just how much of what I'm reading is "pure" Jouvenel and what is Mahoney's gloss. This isn't a knock on the professor--it'd be impossible to write a book like this and not provide such a sheen. But, for example, when Mahoney attempts to rebut critics by "softening" some of Jouvenel's positions, I have no way of evaluating whether the move is legitimate or not. Similarly, in any given position, I have no idea how much of my reaction is to what Jouvenel actually wrote, versus Mahoney's spin on it. So when I say I'm making a response to "Jouvenel", it's based on the assumption that Mahoney is perfectly mirroring what Jouvenel actually wrote or thought--an assumption that is not possible to make.
But anyway. Jouvenel certainly seems to be an intriguing thinker, and his work on power in the enlightenment state especially struck me as worthy of attention. However, at several key points he seems to make serious errors in assessing the dynamics of power in western democratic society. Jouvenel argues that the state always seeks to maximize its power, and as far as possible it does not tolerate other branches of society from exercising power. It wants to exercise a monopoly. This isn't unique to the modern state, but what is different is that the democratic process is said to give legitimacy to any state action, hence justifying the power grab and thus posing a fundamental threat to liberty. Conceding that the state has an important role to play in safeguarding our liberties, Jouvenel worries that the modern system has obliterated any natural restraint on the scope and power of the state. So, despite not being my lovely Roman poet, the large question Jouvenel asks is, in fact, that of Juvenal: Who will guard the guards?
Jouvenel's response advocates creating and nourishing alternative poles of power--"barons", in the book--who can serve as a check on the state. He does not think these institutions should supplant the state, and according to Mahoney recognizes that the state must act to restrain the barons as much as the reverse. But what Jouvenel worries about is a state, rationalized by its democratic legitimacy and shorn of any external constraint, riding roughshod over the liberty of its citizens.
Certainly, it is true that an unrestrained state is a scary thing, and I fully agree that society needs to develop both internal and external constraints to maintain its freedom. However, Jouvenel seems to assume that there is a marked separation between the interests of the state and the interest of the barons. Ironically enough, given that he argues that atomization is one of the ways the state breaks the influence of competing social institutions, Jouvenel himself assumes a complete and pre-existing split between the state and the elites. But as any observer can readily see, to a large extent the interest of these two parties are in accord--indeed, often times they construct each other. The military-industrial complex is one famous example of this; the lobbying "iron triangle" is another. This leads to a serious descriptive inaccuracy in Jouvenel's assessment--far from jealously guarding power from being exercised by any other party, democratic states often willing allow alternative bodies to exert significant power over the people. Ironically enough, it is Yoshino's Covering that explains why, noting how people are forced to significantly alter their public persona, behavior, and speech due to some external pressure (if that isn't power, what is?). Sometimes these are governmentally mandated, and sometimes they are "just" social norms, but often times they are the function of "private" entities like corporations, run by the very barons Jouvenel (descriptively) believes the state should be suppressing the power of, and (normatively) should be working to counter the power of the state. Yet, what we see instead is state organs explicitly sanctioning serious corporate restrictions on the activities and presentment of their employees. Some companies could fire me for writing this blog, others for wearing my hair in a certain ways. Even the supposedly liberal 9th Circuit has held that a women who is otherwise excellent at her job (as a bartender) can be fired for not wearing make-up. That these encroachments come in areas where the state has historically asserted its supremacy in determining the boundaries of restriction (speech, discrimination) makes it stand in even starker contrast to how Jouvenel says the world should be behaving. In a sense, the outsourcing of power from the states to the elites is what Jouvenel wants the state to do, unfortunately, this has proven to increase rather than decrease the total danger to liberty.
Another questionable move is how Jouvenel treats the masses versus the elite barons as potential checks against the state. The former is seen to be dangerous--the democratic legitimacy it grants is the threat Jouvenl is trying to diffuse. The latter is the potential savior, the counterbalance that preserves the liberty of all. I already noted how Jouvenel vastly overstates the degree of differentiation between the elite caste and the state. The simple fact that elites and states often work in tandem with each other cripples their potential as a check at the outset. He may be deceived by the democratic character of the states he is examining, but even here the elites tend to call the shots. As Rodney Peterson explains:
As political pressure groups from different segments of the citizenry assemble to negotiate, the result is often a compromise skewed in favor of those who were most successful at using their bargaining strengths. Success is often based on the amount of persons a bargainer represents and the property and wealth backing the bargainer. Those with most political influence are often those with most economic advantage. Once both have been acquired, they reciprocate and reinforce each other, especially if the property holders are active in the political arena, pressuring to get laws passed for their benefit, or to gain privileges, subsidies, and favors for themselves. [Rodney D. Peterson, Political Economy and American Capitalism, (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 37]
Indeed, we can describe the core flaw in Jouvenel's reasoning as assuming that, in a democratic polity, the state is reflective of the interests of regular people, and that elites need to be brought in to counterbalance. But in reality, the state remains largely in thrall to the elites, and alternate voices struggle to break through to have their opinions heard.
The irony is that the non-elite, non-dominant groups which Jouvenel so fears actually are better suited to the checking task he envisions than are the elites he assigns to it. Gerald Torres and Lani Guinier's "Miner's Canary" argument is emblematic here--because they are more likely to feel the effects of it early, marginalized groups are the "miner's canary" that can warn of incipient threats to our liberty and give us time to head them off. Because the interests of these groups are likely to be at odds with the state's, there is the genuine clash of values and tension that creates social restraint. As a result, Jouvenel's worries would counsel towards dramatically increasing the weight and value we place on the perspective of these marginalized groups as a barrier against despotism.
Friday, September 07, 2007
No Aid Will Come
Taken entirely from Balkinization (apologies, but there is no way to condense this):
I am increasingly frightened by what we are becoming as a nation.
Jean Améry, on the experience of having been tortured by the Nazis in the late 1930s, from At the Mind's Limits (1964):Not much is said when someone who has never been beaten makes the ethical and pathetic statement that upon the first blow the prisoner loses his human dignity. I must confess that I don't know exactly what that is: human dignity....I don't know if the person who is beaten by the police loses human dignity. Yet I am certain that with the very first blow that descends on him he loses something we will perhaps temporarily call 'trust in the world.'...
The expectation of help, the certainty of help, is indeed one of the fundamental experiences of human beings, and probably also of animals.... The expectation of help is as much a constitutional psychic element as is the struggle for existence. Just a moment, the mother says to her child who is moaning with pain, a hot-water bottle, a cup of tea is coming right away, we won't let you suffer so! I'll prescribe you a medicine, the doctor assures, it will help you. Even on the battlefield, the Red Cross ambulances find their way to the wounded man. In almost all situations in life where there is bodily injury there is also the expectation of help; the former is compensated by the latter. But with the first blow from a policeman's fist, against which there can be no defense and which no helping hand will ward off, a part of our life ends and it can never again be revived.
From the formal Declaration of U.S. Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency of the United States of America; January 2003:DIA is aware that Padilla has had extensive experience in the United States criminal justice system and had access to counsel when he was being held as a material witness. These experiences have likely heightened his expectations that counsel will assist him in the interrogation process. Only after such as Padilla has perceived that help is not on the way can the United States reasonably expect to obtain all possible intelligence information from Padilla. . . . Because Padilla is likely more attuned to the possibility of counsel intervention than most detainees, I believe that any potential sign of counsel involvement would disrupt our ability to gather intelligence from Padilla. Padilla has been detained without access to counsel for seven months -- since the [Department of Defense] took control of him on 9 June 2002. Providing him access to counsel now would create expectations by Padilla that his ultimate release may be obtained through an adversarial civil litigation process. This would break -- probably irreparably -- the sense of dependency and trust that the interrogators are attempting to create.
I am increasingly frightened by what we are becoming as a nation.
I'm Not Dead, Just Sleeping
And sleep is a wonderful thing.
But to prove I'm not dead (as if this post isn't sufficient), here's some stuff I've been reading over the past few days.
The DSCC has announced its bumper sticker for the '08 elections. It's actually pretty good. Although Michelle Cottle is right that watching James Carville in this context is just awful.
Republican Presidential "hopeful" Duncan Hunter on Guantanamo Bay:
Beach-front property, good security, low crime....I wonder how the public schools are in the area? Although, I do wonder if we should be bragging that most Americans have significantly worse health care than what's available at Gitmo.
Kenneth Waltz, one of the doyens of the foreign policy realist school, on power: "To say that militarily strong states are feeble because they cannot easily bring order to minor states is like saying that a pneumatic hammer is weak because it is not suitable for drilling decayed teeth."
Sweetner as Feminist History (via FLP, originally from Overheard in New York
There's a bunch of great posts over at De Novo, but this argument PG puts out on Richard Sander's proposed study of how affirmative action affects bar passage rates is my favorite.
Post-law school salary curve. It's actually interesting--particularly the big gap in the $80,000 range.
But to prove I'm not dead (as if this post isn't sufficient), here's some stuff I've been reading over the past few days.
The DSCC has announced its bumper sticker for the '08 elections. It's actually pretty good. Although Michelle Cottle is right that watching James Carville in this context is just awful.
Republican Presidential "hopeful" Duncan Hunter on Guantanamo Bay:
They've got health care that's better than most HMOs. And they got something else that no Democrat politician in America has: They live in a place called Guantanamo, where not one person has ever been murdered.
Beach-front property, good security, low crime....I wonder how the public schools are in the area? Although, I do wonder if we should be bragging that most Americans have significantly worse health care than what's available at Gitmo.
Kenneth Waltz, one of the doyens of the foreign policy realist school, on power: "To say that militarily strong states are feeble because they cannot easily bring order to minor states is like saying that a pneumatic hammer is weak because it is not suitable for drilling decayed teeth."
Sweetner as Feminist History (via FLP, originally from Overheard in New York
There's a bunch of great posts over at De Novo, but this argument PG puts out on Richard Sander's proposed study of how affirmative action affects bar passage rates is my favorite.
Post-law school salary curve. It's actually interesting--particularly the big gap in the $80,000 range.
Wednesday, September 05, 2007
Back to School
I'm heading back to college tomorrow (senior year -- very scary). This week has been a nightmare of packing and travel plans, and presumably the next few days will show similar anarchy before I can truly settle into the dorm. I'll try to get back to posting as soon as I can.
Tuesday, September 04, 2007
Stress Fractures
In conversations with my friends, I've been very confident that Democrats will win the Presidency in 2008. Our candidates are far stronger, we're far more energized, the environment is too favorable, and the running disaster that has been the Bush administration marks 2008 as another perfect storm year for the Democratic Party. It's obviously too early to declare anything a lock or rest on my laurels, but things are looking very optimistic.
One thing that could derail a Democratic victory before the campaign season even starts is a faux-reform proposal by partisan Republican activists in California seeking to change the way the state allocates its electoral votes. Currently, like every state but Nebraska and Maine, California gives its 55 electoral votes in a winner-takes-all fashion. The ballot proposal would change that so the winner of each Congressional District gets one electoral vote. So, even though California is a pretty safe Democratic state, this shift would change its electoral vote allocation from 55-0 to something like 36-19--a free 19 electoral votes for the GOP. Since the effort (needless to say) isn't being pushed in red states like Texas or Indiana, it basically is an effort to rig the election playing field for Republicans (incidentally, even if the plan was adapted nationwide, it'd still be a bad idea--gerrymandering Congressional Districts is bad enough without it implicating Presidential politics). It's worth noting that a similar proposal was pushed in Colorado in 2004, but Democrats refused to support it and it didn't pass.
One thing that continues to amaze me about this country is just how little disorder there was in the wake of the disputed 2000 election. It can be difficult to remember just how raw emotions were then. Democrats genuinely felt cheated out of an election they won, fair and square. The Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore aroused some of the most bitter emotions that institution has ever seen--apparently, Justice Souter was ready to resign over it. And yet, aside from the "Brooks Brothers Riot," there was no real violence, and the concept of our democracy never truly felt threatened. Folks just regrouped and got ready to fight again. Many--most--other democratic nations would not have been able to accomplish that. And that is an incredible testament to the power of our constitutional covenant.
But 2000 was the year we cashed in our democratic credit, accrued over centuries of building representative institutions that, though sometimes flawed, were widely seen as fair, open, and most importantly, reflective of neutral procedures that produced the actual, legitimate winner. We drew on that credit to move past 2000. But if something like that happens again, in the form of this bogus and nakedly illegitimate California referendum, to swing the election away from the winner of the popular vote (and unlike in 2000, if the California proposal passes a Democrat could win a popular landslide and still lose the electoral college), I genuinely don't think our democracy will be able to handle the stress. There will be disorder, and protests, and potentially rioting.
The California proposal was deliberated placed on a June ballot where turn-out is expected to be low--the better to sneak it in under the noses of voters for whom it is made out to be an innocent election reform. It cannot pass. There have been a lot of political dirty tricks in the past couple of years; a tragic many of them done with the explicit or implicit support of the governing party. But none has the potential to threaten the very foundations of the republic the way this scam does. It cannot be allowed to pass. And while I applaud Governor Schwarzenegger for coming out against in, the national Republican Party needs to call its boys off and either get this thing off the ballot, or make sure it goes down in crushing defeat. This is their baby, and thus their responsibility.
One thing that could derail a Democratic victory before the campaign season even starts is a faux-reform proposal by partisan Republican activists in California seeking to change the way the state allocates its electoral votes. Currently, like every state but Nebraska and Maine, California gives its 55 electoral votes in a winner-takes-all fashion. The ballot proposal would change that so the winner of each Congressional District gets one electoral vote. So, even though California is a pretty safe Democratic state, this shift would change its electoral vote allocation from 55-0 to something like 36-19--a free 19 electoral votes for the GOP. Since the effort (needless to say) isn't being pushed in red states like Texas or Indiana, it basically is an effort to rig the election playing field for Republicans (incidentally, even if the plan was adapted nationwide, it'd still be a bad idea--gerrymandering Congressional Districts is bad enough without it implicating Presidential politics). It's worth noting that a similar proposal was pushed in Colorado in 2004, but Democrats refused to support it and it didn't pass.
One thing that continues to amaze me about this country is just how little disorder there was in the wake of the disputed 2000 election. It can be difficult to remember just how raw emotions were then. Democrats genuinely felt cheated out of an election they won, fair and square. The Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore aroused some of the most bitter emotions that institution has ever seen--apparently, Justice Souter was ready to resign over it. And yet, aside from the "Brooks Brothers Riot," there was no real violence, and the concept of our democracy never truly felt threatened. Folks just regrouped and got ready to fight again. Many--most--other democratic nations would not have been able to accomplish that. And that is an incredible testament to the power of our constitutional covenant.
But 2000 was the year we cashed in our democratic credit, accrued over centuries of building representative institutions that, though sometimes flawed, were widely seen as fair, open, and most importantly, reflective of neutral procedures that produced the actual, legitimate winner. We drew on that credit to move past 2000. But if something like that happens again, in the form of this bogus and nakedly illegitimate California referendum, to swing the election away from the winner of the popular vote (and unlike in 2000, if the California proposal passes a Democrat could win a popular landslide and still lose the electoral college), I genuinely don't think our democracy will be able to handle the stress. There will be disorder, and protests, and potentially rioting.
The California proposal was deliberated placed on a June ballot where turn-out is expected to be low--the better to sneak it in under the noses of voters for whom it is made out to be an innocent election reform. It cannot pass. There have been a lot of political dirty tricks in the past couple of years; a tragic many of them done with the explicit or implicit support of the governing party. But none has the potential to threaten the very foundations of the republic the way this scam does. It cannot be allowed to pass. And while I applaud Governor Schwarzenegger for coming out against in, the national Republican Party needs to call its boys off and either get this thing off the ballot, or make sure it goes down in crushing defeat. This is their baby, and thus their responsibility.
Professor President
Jason Zengerle objects to Barack Obama listing "constitutional law professor" as part of his experience in "public service." Personally, I love that Obama was a law professor (technically a lecturer, since he wasn't tenure-track, but I've heard from U.Chicago sources that he had a tenure-track position whenever he wanted it--which he didn't). As I've relayed to many of my friends, after eight years of being run by an over-promoted fraternity leader, I could stand for a little brilliance in the Oval Office. And while, as an aspiring law professor, I've often joked with my friends that there are few people who would call training new lawyers a "public service," in all seriousness I think the scholars who are trying to illuminate our collective understanding of the law, and set budding attorneys on the right path, are truly doing a great deed for the American people, and deserve to be lauded for it.
Fortunately, virtually all the comments in Zengerle's post agree with me, so I'm not alone here.
Fortunately, virtually all the comments in Zengerle's post agree with me, so I'm not alone here.
Monday, September 03, 2007
College of Marin?
Recently, I've been getting a steady trickle of hits from a website affiliated with the College of Marin, a two-year college out of California, all heading to the archived posts of the last week of July, 2005. Unfortunately, the site they're coming from is for students only, so I don't know what they're doing here.
So if any of y'all are reading this, just slake my curiosity: what assignment brings you to my neck of the woods?
Thanks. Oh, and happy labor day!
So if any of y'all are reading this, just slake my curiosity: what assignment brings you to my neck of the woods?
Thanks. Oh, and happy labor day!
Discrimination Hurts
The Financial Times has a really interesting article on the large quantities of skilled professionals who leave their companies due to discrimination, prejudice, and stereotyping.
DC Are You With Me?
Why DC rocks:
Via Yglesias.
I end up writing the essays anyway (in the form of my blog), but the point still stands.
Every day you can meet someone who turns out to be the smartest, most well-informed person you’ll ever know on a given subject. It’s like living in the best university in the world but without all those essays to write.
Via Yglesias.
I end up writing the essays anyway (in the form of my blog), but the point still stands.
Sunday, September 02, 2007
Hoodies
I must be slipping if Dale Carpenter caught a racial reference that completely slipped by me in the Larry Craig case. I mean, for heaven's sake, Carpenter's a Republican! And he's out CRTing me? I got to get my act together.
Anyway, this is from the tape recording of the police officer who arrested Senator Larry Craig:
Carpenter queries what work "the guy we get out of the hood" does in this context:
Many commentators have tried to argue that "hood" is a race-neutral term. It is true that "hood" sometimes refers to whatever neighborhood you hail from, and moreover some White people live even on blocks that we'd commonly refer to as "hood." Nonetheless, the predominant association of "hood" is referring to heavily minority, poor areas of the inner city. And unless it is used in a specific ironic or quasi-ironic context (as in a White rapper looking to gain credibility by talking about his 'hood), it is fair to assume that the image it is meant to evoke is of such a neighborhood (and someone "we get out of the hood" is a Black man). The folks spinning circles about how "hood" could mean anything seem to be missing the point. Carpenter concurs:
Another issue being raised as a diversion to the main point is whether the cop himself is racist. Folks are saying that--even granting a racial connotation--this statement doesn't "prove" that he is. I agree, and I'm rather uninterested in whether the cop is "racist" in the classical sense of coming home from work to attend his weekly cross burning. This statement is meaningful not because it gives folks an opportunity to tag a person a "racist", it matters because it illustrates a broader societal racist perception or mien that associates Black ("ghetto", "hood") with criminality, worthlessness, and lack of respectability. Precisely because it is a social perception, individual persons can float in those waters and simply absorb the standpoint without actively identifying as a racist (and probably consciously disavowing possessing any racist beliefs).
I think it's really important to separate these out. There can be racism without racists, in the sense that there can be widespread, socially salient perceptions, behaviors, or policies that act to disadvantage certain people on basis of race, without a significant proportion of people who actively believe that people should, in fact, be disadvantaged on basis of race. If it is to have any meaningful bite, "racism" is the existence of forces which subordinate certain people on basis of race--not the belief that people should be so subordinated. Certainly, regardless of what we call it, the former is the real problem while the latter is just contributory, and since "racism" is our general-purpose word for identifying harms of a racial variety, I call these forces "racism." Others prefer "White supremacy", "structural racism," "institutional racism", or any number of other terms. Tomato, to-mah-to.
Fighting against racism (or whatever we end up calling it--"the problem"), in such an environment, means attacking these negative perceptions, behaviors, and policies wherever they crop up--but that doesn't mean that the people who espouse them are "racists" in the sense defined above. The split is important because, in theory, people are more receptive to remedying a racist perception than they are to admitting that they, themselves are racist.
I have noticed, however, that folks anxious to defend policy that perpetuate racism in America are very keen on redefining the attack on the policy to an attack on the person, complaining that "you're calling me a racist" and thus draping themselves in the cloak of victimology (the very banner they claim to despise). In response (because I'm a nice guy), I phrase the linkage in ever more attenuated fashion (e.g., from "people who support racist policies" to "people who support policies that perpetuate racism"), but it really doesn't seem to do much good, which leads me to believe that the folks making the "are you calling me a racist" defense secretly like it because it serves as a shield from having to grapple with the actual substance of the critique. The irony is that, in doing so, it actually strengthens (doesn't prove, but strengthens) the case that these folks are actually racist(-as-persons)--albeit ambivalently so--because they are laboring so hard to evade the question that what might otherwise be chalked up to a general social milieu has to be seen as at least somewhat self-conscious.
See also ebogjonson and Alternet
Anyway, this is from the tape recording of the police officer who arrested Senator Larry Craig:
Karsnia: I just, I just, I guess, I guess I’m gonna say I’m just disappointed in you sir. I’m just really am. I expect this from the guy that we get out of the hood. I mean, people vote for you.
Carpenter queries what work "the guy we get out of the hood" does in this context:
It seems to me that the phrase, “the guy that we get out of the hood,” is an implied racial reference. It refers specifically to blacks, though one could say the officer meant to refer only to young black men from the ghetto who, in the officer's view, are prone to commit crimes.
Either way, it’s still race-specific in a case that otherwise has no obvious racial dimension. To shame Craig into telling the truth, the officer could have used a different example, like, “I expect this from some punk we get off the street.” Or, “I expect this from some low-life, but not a Senator.” It’s also fairly clear from the context that the officer is not associating blacks with bathroom cruising, but with dishonesty and "disrespect" toward the police.
Why would Karsnia use a race-specific reference in this context? First, the officer may associate blacks in general, or at least those from “the hood,” with bad conduct. In the heat of the exchange, this particular example is the one that first comes to his mind because black men from poor neighborhoods are the kind of people he would most associate with dishonesty and disrespectful behavior.
Second, the officer may have expected that Craig would immediately understand the reference and be especially shamed by it as a law-abiding white person. “Not only were you engaged in this tawdry behavior but now you’re acting like a black thug who lies to a police officer about it," he seems to be saying. I doubt the officer would have used the “hood” reference if he’d been talking to a suspect who was black. It simply wouldn’t have worked against a black suspect, whether that suspect was from "the hood" or not. It would have backfired even if used against, say, a wealthy black lawyer in a business suit. Further, in the presence of a black person the officer would have been sensitized to using a racial reference. It only works as a shaming technique if it’s one white person speaking to another, with no blacks around to object.
The whole thing passed by unnoticed in their conversation; one of the interesting things about it was how matter-of-fact it was. Craig had no audible reaction to the comment except to insist that he is "respectable" — unlike those people from "the hood." The officer made no other racial reference, and of course used no blatantly racist slur, which would be unacceptable in senatorial company.
Many commentators have tried to argue that "hood" is a race-neutral term. It is true that "hood" sometimes refers to whatever neighborhood you hail from, and moreover some White people live even on blocks that we'd commonly refer to as "hood." Nonetheless, the predominant association of "hood" is referring to heavily minority, poor areas of the inner city. And unless it is used in a specific ironic or quasi-ironic context (as in a White rapper looking to gain credibility by talking about his 'hood), it is fair to assume that the image it is meant to evoke is of such a neighborhood (and someone "we get out of the hood" is a Black man). The folks spinning circles about how "hood" could mean anything seem to be missing the point. Carpenter concurs:
Some commenters suggest that because "the hood" can have non-racial meanings, the cop must not have intended to refer to inner-city blacks here. But coded race references work, when they're used, precisely because they can have non-racial meanings; in a society that condemns overt racism, they provide deniability.
I agree that the reference to "the hood" can mean lots of things. I've heard gay people refer to predominantly gay neighborhoods as the hood. The language of hip-hop has seeped into popular culture and has been appropriated to refer to lots of things, depending on context. But the question is, what's the most likely meaning of "the hood" when a white cop is interrogating a 65-year-old white suspect and trying to shame him into a confession? That he's lying like the people in a poor white neighborhood? Like the people who live in crime-prone neighborhoods in general? I doubt it....
Another issue being raised as a diversion to the main point is whether the cop himself is racist. Folks are saying that--even granting a racial connotation--this statement doesn't "prove" that he is. I agree, and I'm rather uninterested in whether the cop is "racist" in the classical sense of coming home from work to attend his weekly cross burning. This statement is meaningful not because it gives folks an opportunity to tag a person a "racist", it matters because it illustrates a broader societal racist perception or mien that associates Black ("ghetto", "hood") with criminality, worthlessness, and lack of respectability. Precisely because it is a social perception, individual persons can float in those waters and simply absorb the standpoint without actively identifying as a racist (and probably consciously disavowing possessing any racist beliefs).
I think it's really important to separate these out. There can be racism without racists, in the sense that there can be widespread, socially salient perceptions, behaviors, or policies that act to disadvantage certain people on basis of race, without a significant proportion of people who actively believe that people should, in fact, be disadvantaged on basis of race. If it is to have any meaningful bite, "racism" is the existence of forces which subordinate certain people on basis of race--not the belief that people should be so subordinated. Certainly, regardless of what we call it, the former is the real problem while the latter is just contributory, and since "racism" is our general-purpose word for identifying harms of a racial variety, I call these forces "racism." Others prefer "White supremacy", "structural racism," "institutional racism", or any number of other terms. Tomato, to-mah-to.
Fighting against racism (or whatever we end up calling it--"the problem"), in such an environment, means attacking these negative perceptions, behaviors, and policies wherever they crop up--but that doesn't mean that the people who espouse them are "racists" in the sense defined above. The split is important because, in theory, people are more receptive to remedying a racist perception than they are to admitting that they, themselves are racist.
I have noticed, however, that folks anxious to defend policy that perpetuate racism in America are very keen on redefining the attack on the policy to an attack on the person, complaining that "you're calling me a racist" and thus draping themselves in the cloak of victimology (the very banner they claim to despise). In response (because I'm a nice guy), I phrase the linkage in ever more attenuated fashion (e.g., from "people who support racist policies" to "people who support policies that perpetuate racism"), but it really doesn't seem to do much good, which leads me to believe that the folks making the "are you calling me a racist" defense secretly like it because it serves as a shield from having to grapple with the actual substance of the critique. The irony is that, in doing so, it actually strengthens (doesn't prove, but strengthens) the case that these folks are actually racist(-as-persons)--albeit ambivalently so--because they are laboring so hard to evade the question that what might otherwise be chalked up to a general social milieu has to be seen as at least somewhat self-conscious.
See also ebogjonson and Alternet
Friday, August 31, 2007
"Excess of Testicular Fortitude"
PG protests my affirmation of the argument that--given the prevalence of street harassment against women--heterosexual guys who are publicly propositioned for sex by gay men need to "grow a pair". She says that since most men who are propositioned in the Craig-way (foot tapping in the stall) aren't running to the cops, I'm being unnecessarily insulting. In comments, I respond that:
I'm content to let the debate play out in the comments. But a quick google search reveals no hits for "excess of testicular fortitude", so I'm using this post to stake a claim to it myself.
Because really. That's an evocative turn of phrase, you have to admit.
I think the reason guys aren't leaving the stalls and calling the cops isn't because they have an excess of testicular fortitude--it's because they didn't recognize the signal in the first place.
I'm content to let the debate play out in the comments. But a quick google search reveals no hits for "excess of testicular fortitude", so I'm using this post to stake a claim to it myself.
Because really. That's an evocative turn of phrase, you have to admit.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
