More on Hegemony

Some more arguments on hegemony I've recently stumbled upon:

Aggressive US "imperialist" interventions designed to remake other countries in the US's image have bad results.
John Judis, Visiting Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace writes in the July/August 2004 edition of Foreign Policy:
"Neoconservative intellectuals candidly acknowledge that the United States was on an imperial mission, but insist, in the words of neoconservative Stanley Kurtz, that imperialism is 'a midwife of democratic self-rule.' Yet, in the Philippines in 1900, South Vietnam in 1961, or Iraq today, imperialism has not given birth to democracy, but war, and war conducted with a savagery that has belied the U.S. commitment to Christian civilization or democracy. Abu Ghraib was not the first time U.S. troops used torture on prisoners; it was rampant in the Philippines a century ago. Although nothing is inevitable, the imperial mindset sees the people it seeks to civilize or democratize as inferior and lends itself to inhumane practices. The British used poison gas in Iraq well before the idea ever occurred to Saddam Hussein." (emphasis added)

Downfall of United States polarity will likely lead to "apolarity" which will devastate the world (think of the Stephen Rosen analysis I referenced in my first hegemony post which can be found in my archive here)
Niall Ferguson, Herzog Professor of History at NYU's Stern School of Business writes in the July/August 2004 edition of Foreign Policy:
"Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of 'apolarity,'; if you will) is hardly encouraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean an anarchic new Dark Age: an era of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves."
For debaters, the impacts that Ferguson draws are tremendous:
"The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? "

One argument I loved running when I debated was that the US should encourage the rise of a second great power (preferably Europe) that would provide a "second solution" to global problems. For example, America could take on problems that needed a firm, military solution, and Europe could tackle problems that required a more subtle, diplomatic tact. Unfortunately, direct support for this argument was difficult to find. However, Parag Khanna of the Brookings Inst. wrote an interesting article in (of course) the July/August 2004 FP outlining the strength of Europe's unique approach (he amusingly terms it "metrosexual") to international problems. He writes:
"The United States conceives of power primarily in military terms, thus confusing presence with influence. By contrast, Europeans understand power as overall leverage. As a result, the EU is the world's largest bilateral aid donor, providing more than twice as much aid to poor countries as the United States, and it is also the largest importer of agricultural goods from the developing world, enhancing its influence in key regions of instability. Through massive deployments of 'soft power' (such as economic clout and cultural appeal) Europe has made hard power less necessary. After expanding to 25 members, the EU accounts for nearly half of the world's outward foreign direct investment and exerts greater leverage than the United States over pivotal countries such as Brazil and Russia. As more oil-producing nations consider trading in euros, Europe will gain greater influence in the international marketplace. Even rogue states swoon over Europe's allure..."
"From environmental sustainability and international law to economic development and social welfare, European views are more congenial to international tastes and more easily exported than their U.S. variants. Even the Bush administration's new strategy toward the 'Greater Middle East' is based on the Helsinki model, which was Europe's way of integrating human rights standards into collective security institutions. Furthermore, regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Mercosur, and the African Union are redesigning their institutions to look more like the EU. Europe's flashy new symbol of power, the Airbus 380, will soon strut on runways all over Asia. And the euro is accepted even where they don't take American Express."

US (or anyone else's) intervention in foreign conflicts tends to prolong the conflicts and make peace less likely.
Edward Luttwak, Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Strategic Studies, writes in the July/August 1999 issue of Foreign Affairs (ooh, a change up!)
"[A] cease-fire tends to arrest war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents
reconstitute and rearm their forces. It intensifies and prolongs the struggle
once the cease-fire ends-and it does usually end. This was true of the
Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, which might have come to closure in a matter
of weeks if two cease-fires ordained by the Security Council had not let
the combatants recuperate. It has recently been true in the Balkans. Imposed
cease-fires frequently interrupted the fighting between Serbs and Croats
in Krajina, between the forces of the rump Yugoslav federation and the
Croat army, and between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. Each
time, the opponents used the pause to recruit, train, and equip additional
forces for further combat, prolonging the war and widening the scope of
its killing and destruction. Imposed armistices, meanwhile-again, unless
followed by negotiated peace accords-artificially freeze conflict and perpetuate
a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences
of refusing to make concessions for peace. " (emphasis added)
This is an article I think everyone should read. It isn't long, its superbly warranted, and it really makes you think.