Saturday, April 04, 2015

California Court Upholds Yoga

A California appellate court unanimously upheld the teaching of Yoga courses in public schools, rejecting challenges that it was actually a form of Hinduism and thereby an Establishment Clause violation. I think this decision is exactly right and the opinion is well-reasoned and persuasive. While it is true that Yoga seems to have some religious roots, that is true of a great many elements of secular society. Religious concepts and ideals often percolate into surrounding society and become important for entirely non-sectarian reasons. This is why my public high school can teach the King James Bible in its English courses (as a piece of literature, not theology) -- the KJV is very important to our literary heritage in ways that extend beyond any religious or theological teaching. Other entities which have religious roots but no ongoing religious component include the days of the week (who do you think "Thursday" is named after?) and the sport of lacrosse. In this context, the court found that the Yoga courses in the school had no religious component, but were entirely secularized teachings focusing on mindfulness, flexibility, stress-relief, and other like concerns.

However, in my ongoing and futile crusade to police non-lawyers from too-eagerly making pronouncements about matters of law, I will cry foul on Jezebel's coverage of the decision -- particularly the following line:
The family plans to appeal the decision because simply opting out of ritualized prayers to the sun god yoga isn’t good enough.
No, no, no, no, no. The Yoga program is constitutional because its non-religious, not because it is non-compulsory. If it was religious, the existence of an opt-out provision would not and should not save it (as the court itself observes in a footnote). The reasons why should be immediately obvious if we substitute in a prayer event -- the Church/State harm wouldn't be resolved via an announcement that "all the people who don't love Christ, feel free to conspicuously refrain from participation". This is something the Supreme Court has be quite emphatic about, and rightly so. So while I appreciate the sense that the parents in this action are being hyper-sensitive (or perhaps more likely, concern-trolling), this is not actually a valid response to the claim (and again, the court here explicitly stated that the voluntary nature of the program was not a factor in its decision).

2 comments:

EW said...

Yeah: Vindication for the idea that the state may embrace an idea/practice for bona fide state purposes, even if the idea/practice had a religious origin.

Now, how about the flip-side: *Should* concerns about cultural appropriation discourage the state from adopting ideas/practices in a manner that is indifferent to the ideas'/practices' original purposes?

EW said...

Yeah: Vindication for the idea that the state may embrace an idea/practice for bona fide state purposes, even if the idea/practice had a religious origin.

Now, how about the flip-side: *Should* concerns about cultural appropriation discourage the state from adopting ideas/practices in a manner that is indifferent to the ideas'/practices' original purposes?