The Work of Law

 

The Supreme Court this morning ruled in Trump v. Anderson that states cannot enforce the insurrection provisions of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment against federal office-seekers. This part of the decision was 9-0,* and it rested largely on pragmatic grounds: state-by-state "enforcement" of Section 3 might lead to a patchwork of inconsistent state rulings and procedures, which would "sever the direct link that the Framers found so critical between the National Government and the people of the United States" and "could dramatically change the behavior of voters, parties, and States across the country, in different ways and at different times."

This pragmatic argument has purchase to it. This sort of "patchwork" was raised by many esteemed commentators, from all across the political spectrum. Many worried, for instance, that if Colorado was allowed to unilaterally disqualify Trump from the presidential ballot, then, say, Texas might do the same to Biden in response -- a tit-for-tat escalation that would throw the presidential election system into chaos.

To be sure, there also are certainly pragmatic arguments that push in the other direction. There is the practical need to ensure that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment is actually enforced, for instance. There's also the fact that our federal system already bakes in a patchwork system of state regulation over federal elections that leads to a host of manifest inconsistencies -- that may be a bad idea, but it's one we've long accepted and will continue to accept in other contexts after this decision. And the worry about retaliatory red state action boils down to "if Colorado disqualifies Trump based on a legally plausible rationale, Texas might do so for transparently spurious and bad faith reasons. Given the state of the modern GOP, this possibility cannot be gainsaid entirely, but it is pathetic that we've even come to that point.

In any event, I digress. The main point I wanted to flag is that the Court rests its decision not so much on "originalism" or "textualism" but based on a practical assessment of what is necessary to ensure the workability of our presidential electoral process. As a pragmatist, I cannot complain about that approach -- except that it is an approach the Court only takes when it is convenient. In a year or so when we get our next Dobbs or Bruen, we will again no doubt see the Court solemnly intone that we must interpret the text of the constitution strictly in accord with the original meaning of the framers, consequences be damned (that's "results-oriented judging"!), and it will be revealed (even more than it already was) as a transparent lie. Beyond the merits of formalism versus pragmatism, it is the cheerful oscillation between the two based on the needs of the moment that reveal the fundamental arbitrariness of the governing Supreme Court majority (my fantasy is that just once we get a dissent that opens with, "the majority begins, as it must occasionally deigns to do, with the constitutional text...." and then but see cite all the cases where this Court has blitzed past the text to reach a "practical" result).

"The work of law," Justice O'Connor famously advised, "is to make the law work." I've long liked that approach. But when the work of law is revealed to be a work, not a shoot, there's little reason to trust judicial decisions that purport to rest either on workability or strict formalism.

* The Court also held, 5-4, that only Congress (not the judiciary) can effectuate the enforcement of Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, based on the view that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment renders this exclusively a congressional prerogative. I don't have much to say on this, except to note that I just finished teaching Section 5 doctrine in my Constitutional Law class last week and my notes contain a line about how "one view of the meaning of Section 5 is that only Congress can 'enforce' the Fourteenth Amendment; courts have to stay out. But nobody seems to take that extreme view ...." Certainly, this robust and exclusive understanding of congressional power would be news to the Congress that saw the Voting Rights Act struck down by the Supreme Court because Congress' textual Section 5 authority needed to yield to the judiciary's invented and atextual "equal sovereignty of the states" doctrine.