Grieving Choices Not Made

The big diplomatic news of the week is the rush of longtime Israel-supporting countries -- Canada,  France, Australia, and the UK among them -- announcing their formal recognition of Palestine as a state. Israel and its supporters have sought to discredit this move as "rewarding" Hamas for its 10/7 terror initiative. To that, my semi-sardonic response has been to say that it is indeed very important that initiatives like these not be presented as "rewarding Hamas" -- they must instead be framed as "punishing Israel". Punishing Israel for its intransigence, for its hyper-aggressiveness, and for its brazen acts of sabotage towards the possibility of a two-state solution.

In all seriousness, I think that is a more plausible description of what is going on. These countries have no interest in elevating Hamas -- indeed, they've presented their recognition as in explicit opposition to Hamas (and the PA, for admittedly self-centered reasons, affirms the same). What has motivated them to action is a complete (and completely justified) collapse in any faith that Israel is operating in good faith -- that it harbors any serious commitment to securing a just peace with the Palestinians, that its campaign in Gaza is remotely compatible with the laws of war or even is (at the point) significantly motivated by a desire to see the hostages return, and that the far-right racist extremists in Netanyahu's government aren't entirely running the show. This collapse in confidence is reflected here too -- a dramatic shift in public opinion against Israel, not just amongst Democrats but (younger) Republicans as well, that threatens to leave Israel as a super-Sparta Hermit Kingdom.

I think there are a lot of Jews who look at these developments, look at how they are the bitter harvest of Israel's own choices, and think "I wish they would have chosen differently." Why did they have to go down this route? Why did they have to choose the path of the most bloodshed, the most extremism, the most intransigence, the most of everything awful?

And "choose" is critical here. Anyone who has spent time in Zionist circles is familiar with the old complaint that the world acts if the Palestinians lack agency -- as if none of the current situation is the result of their decisions, it's all just thrust upon them by the big bad Israel. Yet right now, I think it is the Israel apologists who are refusing to reckon with the concept of agency -- they act as if there was nothing (or only the most marginal tweaks) that Israel could have done differently post-10/7: it had to fight Hamas this way, it had to use starvation as a weapon of war, it had to kowtow to settler extremists launching pogroms, it had to publicly announce that blocking the formation of a free Palestinian state was the government's raison d'etre.

No. It did not have to do anything of these things. It chose them, and what we are seeing is the consequence of choices that could have been made differently.

"Choose" critical here. The very first post I wrote after 10/7 was titled "Ghouls, Failure, Fatalism, and Responsibility." The "fatalism" portion of that post read as follows.

Finally, there is almost no chance that the fallout from this assault has any consequence other than catastrophe for innocent Israelis and Palestinians alike. And yet, we must resist the sort of fatalism about that seeming inevitability that leads to an abdication of responsibility. Too many voices I've seen today have, in one way or another, expressed sentiments to the effect that the events of today and/or those to come are the inevitable consequence of history's weave. How could you expect Hamas wouldn't seize an opportunity to massacre Israeli civilians en masse? How could you expect Israel won't respond with zero regard for Palestinian life?

No. There is agency here. The word of the day I'm already growing to hate is "(un)provoked", as in an emergent discourse which wants to be absolutely sure we all know that whatever hideous crime Hamas just committed or whatever overwhelming military incursion Israel may be about to launch, there is a reason behind it -- it didn't just happen out of air. Which -- no kidding. In the context of a conflict that's resulted in a half dozen international wars in the space of less than century, nothing is ever "unprovoked". But that doesn't absolve anyone of agency. Hamas made a choice to launch this attack -- a brutal, violent, targeted assault on a civilian population whose only tactical objective was the sowing of terror. They are not the passive receptacles of historical forces beyond their ken. And Israel's choices too (both those that preceded today's events and those that will follow) are choices -- they are not the inevitable consequence of some immutable historical arc.

And what I want to say right now is, it's okay to grieve the choices not made. One need not and one should not indulge in the fatalism of those who said that this was all inevitable -- a fatalism that is ultimately identical regardless of whether it speaks in critical or exculpatory language. In fact, I feel incandescent rage towards those who portray any of this as an inevitability -- that the bloodshed and the massacres and the abuses and the torture and the kidnappings had to happen. They did not have to happen, people chose for them to happen, and different choices could have and should have been made. It is okay to grieve the choices not made.

It is okay to grieve the choices not made. But one still has to acknowledge the choices that were made. Israel made choices that caused it to lose the confidence of erstwhile stalwart defenders, that made large swaths of Americans view it as foe rather than friend, that made not just the "usual suspect" critics but very sober observers take seriously the most serious and severe charges against it as a brutalizer, ethnic cleanser, even genocidaire. We can wish that it made different choices. But it didn't, and for all our grief we must still live in the world that was made by the choices that were made.

Israel is How Europe Can Stick It To Trump

Over the past few days, we've seen a spate of hitherto solid Israel allies in Europe announce they'll be recognizing the state of Palestine. France kicked things off, and it was swiftly followed by the UK and Canada. (There also has been an interesting wave of Arab states calling on Hamas to demilitarize and relinquish power).

I'm not going to comment here on the substance of the decision. Briefly, it is obvious that Palestinians deserve self-determination in a recognized state, and I'm unpersuaded by those who are arguing the move will backfire against the Palestinians. As for those who claim that recognition "rewards Hamas", I say that, if we are to think of this decision in those terms, it's better to see this as not as rewarding Hamas for 10/7, but as punishing Israel for its conduct after 10/7.

But that's not what I want to focus on here. Rather, I want to explore a different question: Why now? What made these countries take this step now?

Obviously, there is not one single answer to that. But in addition to some of the obvious factors -- increased sympathy for the Palestinian cause and increased frustration with Israeli intransigence chief among them -- I suggest an additional cause is that stepping out on Israel is a comparatively cheap and insulated way to symbolically repudiate Trump and Trumpism.

The Trump administration's pivot away from our traditional allies and alliances has been met with a justified mixture of alarm and fury from those we've abandoned. From escalating trade wars to threats of annexation, Trump has done unprecedented damage to America's global standing. People want to see their leaders punch back. But many of the most obvious avenues for retaliation come with substantial risks of their own. As idiotic and self-destructive as tariffs are for the United States, it remains the case that European countries must be careful and adroit in their own trade negotiations. Symbolism has its place there, but it can't be the whole story; missteps can exact real and serious tangible damage on one's own people.

But sticking it to Israel offers much of that same symbolic flouting of Trump, at a much lower risk. Most of the "damage" there, if there is any, will be externalized, not internalized. To the extent some countries might have been reluctant to step out against Israel for fear of alienating the United States, that ship has sailed; today these countries are looking for opportunities to signal they're standing up to the American madman. And while the Trump administration might make noises about retaliation, I think they're fighting on too many fronts for protecting Israel diplomatically to be a serious priority -- and that's even if one believes that Trump's Israel policy is based on sincere ideological commitment, which I don't. If one thinks Trump is just using "Israel" as an excuse to enact various forms of domestic repression, the ultimate disinterest can be doubled. In essence, Europe recognizing Palestine (a) looks increasingly justified and sensible given recent Israeli conduct and (b) offers an opportunity to be seen as standing up to Trump, in a context where tangible blowback is likely to be minimal. No wonder it's looking more attractive!

None of this should be seen as warranting any sympathy for Israel of course. They've chosen their course -- lashing themselves to the most extreme and vicious iteration of global rightwing ultranationalism -- and they have to live with the consequences. That's the risk of hitching your wagon entirely to a single powerful but widely loathed patron -- if daddy gets distracted, you're on your own and you've made yourself an awfully tempting target. Once again, when the right is done finding Israel useful, it will leave it in the wreckage.

What Will the Moral of the Story Be?

Daniel Drezner has a good piece up on the futility of external "calls for a ceasefire" between Israel and Hamas, that helped crystallize some of my feelings on the subject. Many people, as Drezner observes, have written eloquently and persuasively about the disaster that would be sustained Israeli ground campaign in Gaza -- an operation that will endanger countless Israeli and Palestinian lives while simultaneously being unlikely to meaningfully alter Israel's long-term security posture and severely escalating the risk of regional conflagration. Drezner links to articles by Marc Lynch and Daniel Levy and Zaha Hassan as good examples. And like Drezner, I agree with this assessment. The prospect of more war and more killing and more devastation is sickening to me. It won't bring back the dead. It probably won't even permanently degrade Hamas' combat capacities. It just feels like meeting death with more death.

And yet, Drezner observes, few of these commentators have much in the way of practical suggestions for what Israel should be doing instead to respond to Hamas' attack. other than intoning the word "cease-fire". He continues:

Understand that Israel is going to respond because they see no other option after the loss of their deterrent power against Hamas. This is precisely what any other state in the international system would do if it possessed similar capabilities. The intentional attacks on Israeli civilians was heinous. No government could not retaliate, could not demonstrate the severe consequences of such an assault, and still remain a government. This is Politics of National Security 101.

[....] 

For example, I do not disagree with anything Lynch writes in his Foreign Affairs essay. What is less clear to me is what Marc is proposing as a suitable alternative. And this is what keeps nagging at me whenever I am asked if there is anything that can be done to reduce the loss of life. A ground invasion will be grueling in and of itself. It might widen the conflict to include the West Bank, Lebanon, and Iran. But I cannot necessarily think of another policy option that produces a superior outcome for Israel.

Many people have made arguments of the form "no government could not retaliate" over the past few days, but I think Drezner is getting at an important clarification here. Arguments of this sort sometimes are made in emotional terms -- a country which faced such a terrible wound cannot be expected to turn the other cheek towards it. And against that position, those promoting a cease-fire often reply -- correctly -- that no amount of retaliation or bombing is going to bring back the Israeli dead. If the only argument for a military campaign was one of vengeance, of the inchoate sense that Israel has to do ... something to avenge those Hamas murdered, then I would agree that the calls for a cease-fire have purchase. As understandable as that boil for vengeance might be, it's not a good enough reason for the death and devastation that will inevitably follow a ground invasion of Gaza.

But there's more than a mere emotive desire to do "something" at work here. As a matter of pure, cold strategic logic, Israel cannot allow the moral of the story of Hamas' attack to be "this is a winning move." The attack itself was catastrophic on its own terms. If it is seen by Palestinian militant groups as winning strategy, that's more than catastrophic, that's an actual existential threat. The phrase "reestablish deterrence" may be overused (this post by Cheryl Rofer was a helpful corrective), but if it ever had resonance it does here. When faced with a situation like what Israel just went through, a state must demonstrate that the massacre of its civilians is a capital-letter Bad Idea for the massacrers. And so Israel's response, whatever it is, must in some way effectively communicate that message.

And the fact of the matter is, we're not there yet. Imagine that Israel tomorrow announced a suite of policy alterations towards the Gaza Strip that are the dream of all those signing cease-fire petitions: an end to the siege, a release of prisoners, a commitment to reconstruction, the works. What would be the result? It would be to suggest that, as terrible as Hamas' actions were, they were ultimately what shocked the Israeli government out of its torpor and forced it to the negotiating table. Anyone reading this blog probably can name a half-dozen people in their orbit who already have their "Power Cedes Nothing Without a Demand!" Instagram posts ready to roll. And while the prospect of celebratory postings by really annoying people also is not a good enough reason to blow things up (somewhere I had a post about how any Israeli/Palestinian peace agreement worth its salt is going to involve some people you can't stand being happy, and that can't be a reason to torpedo the agreement), the problem is they'd have a point, and a point that if internalized would be incredibly dangerous in any circumstance where the Israeli/Palestinian conflict doesn't end tomorrow. I'm not sure I agree with Ilya Somin that the Gilad Shalit deal laid the groundwork for Hamas' attack twelve years later, but the risk he's flagging isn't invented. Israel at some level needs to devastate Hamas because the alternative is that Hamas learns that operations like these are winning strategies that should be repeated as frequently as possible.

The fact is that, as much suffering as the people of Gaza have already endured, if an actual cease-fire was imposed today Hamas would almost certainly view its operation as a net win, and Israel cannot allow it to come to that conclusion. So the question for those promoting a cease-fire, as Drezner alludes to, is what pathway other than an overwhelming military response changes the moral of the story? What realistic and enforceable proposal would avoid the death and destruction of a military campaign while nonetheless making clear that operations such as the one Hamas just launched are a Bad Idea?

It's not clear what that alternative could be, and that's the problem that makes the military assault feel so inevitable. Maybe Hamas' leadership turning itself in to be prosecuted for war crimes at the Hague could qualify, but that's obviously not on offer (though I've seen some people suggest it be added to the various petitions floating around anyway -- after all, if they're not limiting themselves to things that might realistically come to pass ....). Some form of reparation (what would that look like?)? A long-sought after diplomatic boon (Saudi recognition)? I don't know. None of these seem plausible, let alone sufficient.

To be sure, this doesn't mean there isn't any space for any public or diplomatic discourse urging restraint on the part of Israel. The need to change the moral doesn't license any and all measures; not every possible Israeli action can be justified based on the need to prevent Hamas from claiming a win. The example I gave last week of saying no to starvation policies is one obvious example, as is opposing the flatly sadistic "bounce the rubble" position of militaristic zealots like Tom Cotton. Ensuring an actual, not just pro forma, opportunity for civilians to evacuate is another (that the initially reported "24 hour" deadline has long since come and gone without the ground campaign beginning suggests that something got through regarding the insufficiency of that timeline). And on the point of evacuation, it also is imperative that the United States extract ironclad assurances that evacuated civilians will be able to return to their homes at the conclusion of hostilities -- a requirement that is demanded by the provisions of international law that permit temporary evacuations of civilians from combat zones, but one can forgive Gaza civilians if they are more than a bit mistrustful of Israel's commitment to that principle). All of these are viable and salutary interventions, and Israel has no justification for opposing them, even if they do make its military endeavors more difficult. 

(It's also worth noting that Hamas must allow, and cannot obstruct, civilian evacuations. Hamas has openly urged Palestinians civilians not to leave the northern Gaza Strip, and there are reports it is actively impeding evacuation efforts).

But the terrible truth is that what's needed now probably isn't public calls for a cease-fire. What's needed now is an off-ramp, something that can plausibly induce Israel to not go down a seemingly inexorable path without it being seen as giving Hamas a win. How do we, to alter the sardonic advice given to the U.S. as it found itself stuck in Vietnam, convince Israel to declare victory and then stay home? Keep in mind that, with respect to everything I just said about the strategic necessity of shifting the moral of the story, none of it at all alters the initial set of observations that an Israeli ground campaign in Gaza would be disastrous for Israel, to say nothing of Palestinians. The whole problem is that this terrible option still seems to be "better" than all the alternatives, and if that is to change it will only be if an alternative that successfully convinces Israel that Hamas didn't win and won't perceive itself as having won. Simply intoning "ceasefire" is not, on its own, such an alternative. If you don't care about any of that and just want to express a message that war is bad, then go ahead and intone. But if you're actually serious about trying to effectuate a change of course, then these are the questions you need to consider.

It is a commentary on the twisted state of the world that the closest thought I have to something optimistic is also somehow among the grimmest. In 1979, Israel and Egypt signed a historic peace treaty. History is not monocausal, but one common narrative about the treaty notes how it came in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel's bloodiest conflict since independence. The key was that both parties viewed themselves as negotiating from a position of strength -- as having "won" something. Israel had successfully repulsed the invasion and had shown that it would not be dislodged from the region. Egypt, though, had -- in contrast to the humiliation of the Six Day War -- fought well and significantly bloodied the nose of their Israeli counterparts, showing they were a military force to be reckoned with. The most cynical way of putting it is that the Egyptians killed enough Israelis, and the Israelis killed enough Egyptians, that both sides could view the peace deal as something they had "won", something they'd extracted through strength, not ceded through capitulation.

So the grimmest silver lining would be to imagine that maybe, after Israel's sure-to-be cataclysmic operation in the Gaza Strip, maybe both sides will see themselves as having killed enough of the other so they can call it a victory. Israel can say it's lopped off Hamas' head and so now a true reconstruction can begin. Whatever Hamas-substitute inevitably rises to take its place can say that the Palestinian resistance forced the Zionists to come to heel. Both sides claim a terrible victory, and so can say that the ensuing peace is something they won rather than capitulated to.

It is, again, a twisted and grim "silver lining". The only thing worse would be for all that's happened to happen, and then for nothing to change at all.

The Abraham Accords and The Prospects of Israeli/Palestinian Peace

I am a booster of the Abraham Accords. I consider them an unadulterated good. In a region of the world that has been beset by tension and conflict, anything that is a step towards collaboration and cooperation is a good thing, and I have no problem saying so.

Some have suggested that the Abraham Accords makes an Israeli/Palestinian peace accord less likely, and oppose them on that basis (or purportedly on that basis). I am not sure whether that's true, but I do think it's worth thinking about how the Abraham Accords interact with a common narrative about the viability of an Israeli/Palestinian peace process -- the idea that an Israeli/Palestinian accord will only come into being if it is attached to a wider regional deal. How do the Abraham Accords affect that narrative?

One way one might think about it is as follows: Israel has, from its founding, labored under a genuine risk of existential destruction that has understandably colored all of its security determinations. The idea that the West Bank (particularly the Jordan Valley) is necessary as a "buffer" in case of attack in an example: something that at face value is an Israeli/Palestinian matter is inextricable from Israel's region-wide security posture. If this is one's view, then the Abraham Accords are a net positive for the prospects of peace insofar as they represent a significant diminishing of existential military threats Israel faces from its neighbors. This, in turn, allows for Israel to relate to the issues of occupation of Palestine qua Palestine, as opposed to re-situating the occupation as part of larger regional security issues (where the existential threats to Israel's safety have, historically speaking, been more salient).

Now to be clear, "diminishing" the existential risks that come from hostile neighboring military powers is not the same as "eliminating" them. Not counting Palestine, two of Israel's four bordering neighbors (Syria and Lebanon) retain a highly belligerent, aggressive posture toward Israel, and that doesn't even get into Iran. Still, there is a marked difference in Israel's existential situation when it was genuinely all alone in the region compared to when it is increasingly aligned with a significant regional bloc. If one has been cynical about or excusing of (choose your favored verbiage) peace prospects because Israel is "surrounded by enemies who want to destroy it", then the breaking of that proverbial (and sometimes not-so-proverbial) siege should be heartening (or take away the excuse).

But there's another line on this that I've sometimes heard. Some people are arguing that the Abraham Accords prove that Israel doesn't need to make peace with Palestine in order to make peace with its neighbors. These people style themselves as responding to hectoring leftists who insisted that if Israel wants to be an integrated member of the Middle East community of nations it would have to resolve the occupation of Palestine first. The target of said hectoring are those members of Israeli society who very much desire the former but have little interest in pursuing the former; the idea is that the former is the leverage necessary to stop foot-dragging on the latter.  But the Abraham Accords falsified the premise, so now these Israelis are celebrating being able to have their cake and eat it too -- they got what they want (regional integration) without ever having to compromise on Palestine at all. For these people, the Abraham Accords are a net negative for the prospects of a peace accord with Palestine; they feel more emboldened that they needn't take a step they do not want to take because a potential cost now appears to have rendered moot.

All of this is a long-winded way of saying that, for Israelis who genuinely want a peace deal with Palestinians and an end to the occupation, the Abraham Accords make it easier for them to say "yes"; and for those who at root wish to thwart such a deal, the Abraham Accords make it easier for them to say "no". For those of us on the outside, and particularly those of us who are cheerleaders for the Abraham Accords, it is important that we stress the narrative that bolsters the former framing. In particular, it means starting to lay off some of the well-worn, historically reasonable but perhaps now dated, rhetoric about Israel being "surrounded by enemies". The reason we celebrate the Abraham Accords is precisely that it represents a break from that history; but we cannot return to it at convenience in order to justify more hesitation and foot-dragging on robustly and vigorously supporting an end to the occupation.

You'll Miss It When It's Gone (Iran Deal Edition)

The UN Security Council today declined to extend an arms embargo against Iran, over furious protests by the United States, Israel, and Arab Gulf States. The main opponents of the arms embargo were, naturally, Russia and China. But several European nations -- France, Germany, and the UK -- expressed hesitation, claiming that the United States was no longer in a position to credibly push for sanctions on Iran after it withdrew from the JCPOA (aka "the Iran Deal").

Fancy that. And speaking of the JCPOA, the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, in its own statement denouncing the UNSC's vote, urged that Security Council consider implementing the JCPOA's "snapback" provisions as an alternative means of blocking Iran from advancing its nuclear weapons program. An interesting idea -- if only a certain country hadn't detonated the JCPOA framework! It's almost like the Iran Deal contained important leverage and hard-won commitments even from countries not otherwise inclined to care about Iranian aggression, and when the United States unilaterally abandoned the deal we lost a ton of international credibility that we can't easily earn back.

Many, many people warned against the reckless decision to back out of the JCPOA, precisely on the grounds that doing so would ruin the ability of the United States to credibly pursue any sort of robust diplomatic containment strategy against Iran going forward. And now we're seeing the real fruits of the Trump administration's decision. Way back when the Iran Deal was initially being debated, I noted that one of the most persuasive arguments I read in its favor was the experts who observed that every time we reject or abandon an "Iran deal", the one we're able to get two or three years later is far worse than the one we left behind. The common cycle is a deal is proposed, conservatives say "how dare you give everything away to the terrorist regime of Iran", we abandon the deal, and then next time around ... we're in an even worse negotiating posture than we were before and what once looked like "giving everything away" now is an unattainable fantasy.

We are, as always, apparently doomed to keep reliving history. Heckuva job, Trumpie.

Quick Thoughts on the Israel/UAE Deal

As you may have heard, Israel and the UAE have announced a historic agreement to normalize ties, in exchange for which Israel has committed to "suspend" plans to annex the West Bank. My quick thoughts:

• This is a good thing. And it's okay to say it's a good thing! It doesn't make you a Trump supporter to say this is a good thing!
• If you can only take joy in policy announcements these days if they anger someone you hate, be advised that the extreme settler-right in Israel is furious about this -- they view it as Bibi once again Lucy-and-the-footballing them with regard to annexation.
• In all seriousness, this is probably the biggest foreign policy accomplishment of Trump's entire term. Of course, when one zooms out, that means his biggest foreign policy accomplishment is "Israel establishing diplomatic relations with its third Arab neighbor, in exchange for which Israel steps off a ledge Trump put them on." Less impressive.
• The best defense you can give of Trump's approach here, appearing to green-light annexation, is that it was a case of brinkmanship that paid off. Still a hell of a gamble though. When David Friedman says Israel could have annexation or peace, but not both, he's basically admitting his favored policy was one which would have denied Israel peace for generations.
• In "brinkmanship doesn't always pay off", see also Iran, whose increasingly belligerent orientation towards its Arab neighbors has had the effect of drawing them closer to Israel in ways unthinkable in the recent past.
• Will this announcement be an "icebreaker" for other Arab states to follow suit? I've seen Bahrain and Oman cited as candidates. One awkward but probably accurate assessment: It's simultaneously healthy for Israel and its Arab neighbors to develop closer ties and for the U.S. and Israel to have greater critical distance.
• While stopping annexation is an unambiguous good thing, it still leaves in place a status quo where Palestinians are under occupation and lack full democratic and self-determination rights. "Stopping annexation" is not and should not be the be-all-end-all of American support for Palestinian equality.
• Has annexation been stopped? Bibi is saying it is still "on the table". What's that I often hear about leaders who say one thing to their domestic audiences and another to international listeners? (I actually think this is Bibi once again playing the rule of Lucy vis-a-vis the settler-right and putting the football back down, but still).

Peer Review Stinks Roundup

Well, I've just had my ritual instance of early-academic peer review hazing. Grouch grouch grouch etc.. A roundup of things on my browser.

* * *

Foreign Policy has an interesting story about how affirmative action programs work in Brazil. The story is primarily about the concept of "fraudulent" claims of blackness in a country where, on the one hand, most people identify as mixed-race, but on the other hand discrimination is less about "one-drop" ancestry and more focused on phenotype.

Israel appoints its first female Muslim diplomat. She will serve in Turkey.

The Atlanta Jewish Times writes on the racialized Jewish experience of Jews of color.

Lots of interesting data in this new ADL poll, including the perhaps surprising finding that a majority of American Muslims have positive views about Israel. Most Americans also think Donald Trump harbors racist, anti-Latino, and anti-Muslim views (only a minority think he holds antisemitic views), and while a bare majority of Americans are currently concerned about violence in the U.S. against Jews, over three-quarters of Americans are concerned about violence in the U.S. against Muslims.

The Trump administration's Syria policy has been pinballing wildly over the past few days. As I've stressed before, Syria is a complicated issue -- there is no obvious right move. But the fact that the Trump administration seems to just be lurching to and fro virtually at random is not reassuring.

David Friedman Will Be Confirmed Because Republicans Don't Care About Israel

Republicans understand that Israel resides in a dangerous part of the world. Its security -- its very survival -- depends on the daily navigation of increasingly choppy diplomatic waters in one of the world's most volatile powderkegs. Republicans get that. They take these things seriously.

And that's why a Republican Senate will likely confirm a Republican President's nomination of David Friedman as Ambassador to Israel.

It was sadly predictable that the GOP wouldn't care about Friedman comparing liberal Jews unfavorably with Nazi collaborators. It was a little less predictable, but still sad, that many mainstream Jewish organizations have decided to let that slide as well. But one might have though that, with all the talk about the dangers Israel faces and the difficulties it must confront in the diplomatic arena, that the putatively pro-Israel folks might insist that America's diplomatic representative to the Jewish state not be a rank amateur. The only thing thinner than David Friedman's skin is his qualification to serve as an Ambassador. A guy who casually calls other Jews "worse than Kapos" and the ADL "morons" doesn't exactly scream "diplomatic temperament."

It's one thing to blow smoke when you're an irrelevant bankruptcy attorney in New York. As Ambassador these things have consequences. If Israel sits in as precarious a position as we're often told it is, and one cares about preserving its stability and security in the face of regional and international pressure, the idea of having someone like David Friedman sit in our embassy in Tel Aviv Jerusalem Tel Aviv should be flatly terrifying.

If one cares. If one doesn't, and Israel is just a nice talking point to rile up parts of your base, then by all means confirm away.

In any event, right now Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair Bob Corker (R-TN) is refraining from endorsing Friedman until after his committee's hearings, and ranking member Bob Menendez (D-NJ) is refraining from opposing Friedman until the same. I wrote to my Senators urging them to vote against Friedman, but I doubt we'll see any significant Republican defections.

Do You Think Many Jews are Nazi Collaborators? The Trump Admin's Got a Post For You!

Early in the Trump transition phase, it looked as if Mike Huckabee would be appointed Ambassador to Israel. Huckabee had recently accused Jews of plotting false flag hate crime hoaxes to frame Donald Trump supporters; he also has a bit of a history of tossing out casual Holocaust comparisons and then getting really angry when Jews cry foul.

But Huckabee will not be our Ambassador. Instead, Trump has tapped close adviser David Friedman for the role. Friedman has called Barack Obama an "anti-Semite" and contended that J Streeters are "far worse than Kapos." He also asserted, in the course of advocating "allegiance" standards for Israel's Muslim citizens, that "In the United States, advocating to overthrow the government by force or violence can get you life in prison" (No, it can't). And of course, he's an opponent of the two-state solution.

It's a little unnerving that the thing Trump looks for in an Israel Ambassador is a propensity to frivolously toss out Nazi comparisons. It's almost like he won't actually be a real friend in the White House. Imagine that.

So let's go back to that little bit where Friedman unfavorably compared a significant swath of the Jewish community to Nazi collaborators. Remember last week, when the Senate passed the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act 97-0 (it was really controversial)? The ASAA incorporates a definition of anti-Semitism which, among other things, considers Israel/Nazi comparisons anti-Semitic. Surely, the spirit of the law also includes other comparisons of Jewish institutions to Nazis or their collaborators, yes?

The ASAA does not contain an "unless you're a right-winger" carve out. Once again, there's an opportunity for Jewish organizations to demonstrate that they're unafraid to call out anti-Semitic rhetoric when it emerges from the right. One does not have to be a J Street member or even a fan to think that comparing them to "Kapos" is grotesque and marginalizing, and should be (what's the word I'm looking for? Help me out, ADL) disqualifying for any administration post -- much less one deeply symbolic for America's Jewish population.

In fact, I hereby pledge to donate to the first Senator who announces their opposition to Friedman by citing their vote for the ASAA. I am 100% serious. It does absolutely no good for the Senate to announce it takes anti-Semitism seriously, than immediately confirm someone who flouts the spirit of the standard they just articulated. Just as Democrats have an obligation to tackle anti-Semitism amongst their allies, it's time that Republicans take seriously anti-Semitism within their own ranks.

UPDATE: An adapted version of this post is now up at Ha'aretz.

.... And By "Dialogue", We Mean Shut Up

Last April, the UN's Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) passed a resolution that functionally denied any Jewish connection to Jerusalem whatsoever. It went as far as to accuse Israel of planting fake graves and ritual sites to fabricate a mythical Jewish history in the city. It was, by any objective measure, a amalgamation of paranoid conspiracy theories and anti-Semitism. So of course it passed overwhelmingly, because most UN states will reflexively vote for any resolution that is "critical" of Israel.

Of course, Israel cried foul. And so UN officials tried to calm tensions, and asked for "respect and dialogue" over the question of whether the Jews are just pretending to have even heard of this "Jerusalem" place prior to 1947.

Are Jews planting fake graves to concoct a connection to this "Jerusalem" place? #UNESCO invites respectful dialogue https://t.co/f2YotAbc7k

— David Schraub (@schraubd) April 20, 2016

And so the Israeli government in fact offered to host a seminar detailing Jewish connection to Jerusalem, because apparently now that's a thing we need to "dialogue" about. And of course, UN officials promptly rejected the invitation, perhaps not realizing that "dialogue" means Jews get to participate in the conversation too.

Reflexive UN Votes

I often hear people complain about the United States "reflexively" voting against any UN resolution critical of Israel. I think such complaints are overstated -- at the very least, they should explain which part of the Negroponte Doctrine they object to -- but there is a certain abstract sense to them. There's no reason to think that every resolution that is critical of Israel is worth voting against.

But it is telling that there is no equal ire -- indeed, no commentary at all -- on the 150 countries or so who "reflexively" vote for any UN resolution critical of Israel, no matter how outrageous or even outlandish. Those decisions are just taken to be part of the diplomatic fabric of the universe, I suppose. Here's the latest one that got through a UNESCO committee:

 A UNESCO resolution does not recognize a Jewish connection to the Western Wall and the Temple Mount and calls Israel an “occupying power.”

[...] 

The resolution, which condemns Israeli actions in eastern Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, accuses Israel of being an “occupying power,” of “planting Jewish fake graves in other spaces of the Muslim cemeteries” and of “the continued conversion of many Islamic and Byzantine remains into the so-called Jewish ritual baths or into Jewish prayer places,” according to Israeli newspaper reports.

It also criticizes Israel for its decision to build an egalitarian prayer area in the Western Wall Plaza and for “illegal measures against the freedom of worship” at the “Muslim holy site of worship.” The resolutions refers to the cities of Hebron and Bethlehem as solely Muslim, and raps Israeli control over the Tomb of the Patriarchs and Rachel’s Tomb, both in Hebron.

Maybe the United States would be more inclined to favor an "even-handed" approach at the United Nations if "even-handedness" had even the most trivial constituency in its favor in Turtle Bay. But since it doesn't, it doesn't bother me too much that we have basically decided to write that august institution off when it comes to resolutions related to Israel.

Dayan Train(wreck) Pulls into New York

I've periodically commented on the saga of Dani Dayan, settler leader and vocal opponent of a two-state solution, whom we last saw as Bibi's nominee for ambassador to Brazil. The Brazilians were less than thrilled, viewing the appointment as a slap in the face to their own anti-settlement, pro-two state policies, and refused to accept the appointment. But, since the purpose of diplomats is to solve problems, not to create them, Bibi graciously agreed to withdraw Dayan's nomination dragged out the process for months and did potentially irreversible damage to Israel's standing in Latin America's largest country.

It seems we've finally gotten a resolution, with Dayan accepting a position as Israel's Consul-General in New York. Fortunately, his diplomatic instincts were on full display following the announcement:

Those who did not want me in Brasilia, capital of Brazil, will get me in New York, the capital of the world,

Classy. Fortunately, he followed that statement up with a promise to engage and dialogue with the full range of Jewish organizations and perspectives one can find in America's largest city. Unfortunately, he followed that up by calling J Street "Un-Jewish" and "anti-Israel,"  drawing immediate condemnation not just from J Street but also Ameinu. Such a fine start he's off to!

I still consider this probably a less damaging spot for Dayan than the Brasilia posting, but still -- thanks a lot Bibi. This is going to go great.

Bibi Narrowly Avoids Mature Response to Brazilian Diplomatic Imbroglio

A few months ago, I noted a brewing foreign policy disaster for Israel stemming from Bibi's selection of a prominent settler leader, Dani Dayon, to be Ambassador to Brazil. Brazil indicated that it would not accept the appointment, and as of the start of the year it looked like Israel had gotten the message and was withdrawing Dayon's nomination. It was seemingly the only mature response to yet another ridiculous unforced error by the Netanyahu administration, which has spent the last few years playing demolition derby with Israel's already-fragile standing in the global community.

Which makes it only appropriate to find out that this aforementioned mature response has apparently now been reversed. Instead, Bibi has reportedly informed Brazil that if they don't accept Dayon, they won't get an ambassador -- a de facto downgrading of relations with South America's largest nation. Who does this help? No one. Who does it hurt? Israel (Brazil will survive mostly unscathed, one suspects). What's the point of this? To protect the Israeli right's fragile ego? To bluster and fulminate and show that Israel won't be pushed around? Or just to demonstrate that Bibi has taken up the mantle of how Abba Eban once described Israel's Arab adversaries: he "never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity."

Maybe He Just Likes a Challenge

Whatever one can say about his policy preferences (and I have nothing good to say about them), it's hard to argue that Bibi Netanyahu's foreign policy instincts are anything short of disastrous. Put aside entirely his catastrophic handling of the Iran nuclear deal debate (where he watched an international consensus against a nuclear Iran emerge and promptly enraged every single member of it). Let's just take the latest report out of South America, where Brazil is less than thrilled about who Bibi selected as their new Ambassador:

Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff has expressed discomfort with the appointment of a former settler leader as Israel’s ambassador to her country.

Rousseff sent a backchannel message to Israel with her concerns that accepting Dani Dayan will signal “support for the settlement enterprise,” the Hebrew-language news website Ynet reported Sunday.

An official Brazilian refusal to accept the appointment could spark a diplomatic crisis between the two countries, according to Ynet. The rejection of an ambassador is rare.

What on earth was he thinking? "Hey, South America is an important area of engagement for Israel as it seeks to solidify its international standing. But it's clear that South American countries are sharply anti-occupation -- Brazil, for example, recognized Palestine in 2010. Who is best suited to manage this critical yet delicate situation? I know -- a high-profile leader of a settlement enterprise loathed by the people he's reaching out to!"

It's almost as if, with Avigdor Lieberman no longer in charge of the foreign ministry Bibi decided that someone had to jump in the role of completely unaware self-sabatoeur.

Anti-Semitism as Structural and the Iran Deal Debate

Given that three of my last eight posts have been about the question of anti-Semitism as part of the Iran deal debate, it may surprise you that I've actually been reading even more articles which touch on the issue without comment. These include Jonathan Greenblatt (solid piece), Yair Rosenberg (thoughtful), Jon Chait (good except for the title), James Tarento (blech), Matt Duss and Todd Gitlin's rebuttal to that awful Tablet editorial (strong), and Lee Smith's rejoinder (predictably dreadful).

This has been a trying issue for me, since it puts to the teeth one of my lodestone political commitments: namely, that one folks make an "=ism" charge (be it anti-Semitism or anything else), we should take it seriously it not facially dismiss it as opportunistic or made in bad faith. Obviously, and as my previous posts make clear, I find the particular charges leveled here difficult to swallow. But since my aforementioned principle does not contain a "unless I, David Schraub, personally think the charges aren't going to hold water" exception, that's no object. And I will say that I've recognized this tension from moment one and tried to mold my posts according to said principles. While I've certainly been cutting in my responses to Smith in particular, I have endeavored to explain why his allegations are wrong on their substance, rather than simply dismiss them as part of some pattern or practice of opportunistic wolf-crying. There is a difference between rejecting a charge on its merits after engaging with it, and refusing to consider it in the first place, and I've done my best to stay within the former camp.

Take, for example, the "lobbying" question, which has been a core area of contention between myself and people like Smith. My litmus test for discussion here has always been broad by design: Is the challenged behavior plausibly anti-Semitic under a plausible theory of anti-Semitism? That standard is designed to allow for considerable breadth both in matters of theory (what do we think anti-Semitism is?) and interpretation (what is the best reading of the challenged statements?). And I think that "lobbying" does clear that preliminary hurdle for discussion: the practice of demonizing a nefarious Jewish lobby as fundamentally illegitimate and destructive of political discourse is sufficiently embedded in Western culture such that -- when the term is deployed on an issue where Jewish contributions to the debate have high salience -- it is worth at least investigating the possibility of anti-Semitism. Now, as I've made clear, I think the results of that investigation are wholly exonerative: the use of "lobbying" in this debate has been entirely indistinguishable from standard, boilerplate usages of the term across all manner of political discussions, making it infeasible to impute it to anti-Semitism here. But that's how one concludes a discussion, not how one initiates it, and I think it is worthwhile to maintain that discussion.

All that said, I've also realized that I've been baited into having a conversation about anti-Semitism on terms that don't really track how I think the issue should be addressed. All the talk about "dog whistles" (much less Tablet's explicit invocation of white power rallies) casts anti-Semitism in a particular mold: a matter of bad intentions and deliberate (if sometimes sotto voce) deployments. Such debates go to the state of mind of the relevant actor, and determining that is inherently a judgment call. If one thinks of the President as a miserly, underhanded figure who's long displayed hostility to Jewish causes, one will be inclined to impute bad motives. If one thinks of him as someone who has consistently enjoyed the support and friendship of the Jewish community and in turn proven himself time and again to be an ally, by contrast, that inference will sound ridiculous. There isn't much that can be done to resolve that debate.

I also don't think it's a particularly useful frame. While anti-Semitism certainly can take the form of explicit (or implicit) prejudicial attitudes, I think it is better to generally theorize it as a structural phenomenon -- exploring how the grooves of our social practice result in situations where Jewishness is problematized, leveraged against the Jews, or otherwise is blocked off from inclusion in democratic deliberation on full and equal terms. One question I've heard from some folks who, like me, are skeptical that the President is campaigning on anti-Semitism to drum up support for the Iran deal have asked "who is it supposed to appeal to? Who are the gentile fence-sitters who will come around to support the deal once they realize its an opportunity to stick it to those disloyal, warmongering Jews?" But even I, fellow-skeptic, can answer this one: The target of such a campaign isn't the goys, it's the Jews -- namely Jewish Democrats. The point (the argument goes) is to tell those politicians that if they vote against the deal they're among the bad Jews, the disloyal Jews, the one's at the beck and call of a foreign power. You don't want to be a bad Jew, do you? And that argument, which leverages the insecure position Jews have against them, would obviously be anti-Semitic.

Now, one thing we can say about the "bad Jews" argument is that it cuts both ways: for every person saying (explicitly or implicitly) "you're a bad Jew if you vote against the deal", there's someone else saying "you're a bad Jew if you vote for it. You're a Jew-in-name-only, you'll sacrifice your people out of blind loyalty to the Democratic Party, Evangelicals are better Jews than you, you Kapo, you who (in Huckabee's striking words) would lead your fellows straight to the oven doors." This argument is anti-Semitic in in the same way the above one is -- it leverages Jewishness against the Jews -- and to the extent it is being made by folks like Governor Huckabee it is equally condemnable to any Daily Kos cartoon attacking Schumer for dual loyalty. This is one of the great joys of the Jewish condition -- we're always taking it from all sides.

But the larger point is that the "bad Jews" argument doesn't need to be made, to be made. That's not a "dog whistle" argument: I did not write "doesn't need to be made loudly to be made". It doesn't need to be made at all. Even if the President finds this entire line of argument appalling, and has no intention (explicit or implicit) of leveraging it -- it's still there. The grooves of society still place Jews in this precarious position, and so we still feel the pressure to demonstrate that we're true patriots who don't vote on provincial lines (or, for that matter, that we're more than just liberals-with-surnames-containing-"Stein", we're Jews and our progressive politics are reflective, not betrayals, of that identity). That's the point of looking at structural phenomena -- it isn't about bad guys using either racist bullhorns or sneaky dog whistles. Structural anti-Semitism is like potential energy -- the fact that it is there, available to be harnessed at any time, is sufficient to effect the risk calculus and thereby alter behavior.

One important dimension of anti-Semitism is political -- specifically, the idea that Jews dominate politics and use their dominant position to oppress and exclude others. This isn't always a visible problem when Jews aren't advocating anything that steps on the toes of powerful interests, but it becomes a big issue when Jewish political advocacy becomes salient on a sharply divided issue (like the Iran deal). For all our supposed political clout, Jews are very uncomfortable when put in a situation where we're a noticed player in an ongoing and contentious issue, precisely because there is nothing worse for the Jews than being seen as ("being seen as", of course, being a matter of perception that need not match reality) the driving force for a policy that many people sharply oppose (or vice versa).

So it's not surprising at all that many Jews -- no matter their politics -- are uncomfortable with the progression of the Iran deal debate. This is a terrible issue for us, one where "Jewish-identified" issues are placed smack in the middle of a fraught and contentious debate, in a cultural context wherein Jews successfully defending their interests (however conceived) in a contested forum is considered to be proof of a political malfunction. But these problems aren't problems of dog whistles; they're problems of structure. The debate thus far has obscured that important truth, and caused many people to misdirect their fire.

Second Blush Thoughts on the Iran Deal

On Facebook, I noted that I was working hard to not have an opinion on the Iran deal, because I knew nothing about it and shouldn't come to a conclusion simply via rote mimicry of ideological cohorts. It was observed by a friend, though, that one of my God-given rights as an American is to "have an opinion based on nothing and then broadcast it publicly through as many channels as possible". And as a blogger, I try my best to live by that credo.

I should start by saying that I have not read the deal itself. This is because the technical characteristics of the deal probably wouldn't mean that much to me, and in particular they'd mean nothing out of context (specifically, the context of feasible alternatives). The sources I read to educate myself include Tom Friedman's interview with the President, Jeffrey Goldberg, AIPAC, Marc Goldberg, David Adesnik, Max Fisher's interview with arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis (highly recommended), Douglas Murray, and of course the metric ton of commentary folks have been blasting all across Facebook for the past few days. Here, then, is where I'm at now.

(1) Obviously, the deal can't be evaluated against an ideal world where America stands steely-eyed and strong and Iran capitulates to everything our heart's desire. One makes deals with autocratic regimes pursuing nuclear weapons under less-than-ideal circumstances -- that comes with the territory. Likewise, we can't evaluate the deal based on what we could have gotten 10 years ago. Assessing this deal is a comparative exercise -- how does reaching this accord compare to either no deal or another deal that could be realistically obtained now?

(2) This deal clearly has its eye on one thing and one thing only: slowing down Iran getting a nuclear weapon. It doesn't care about ending Iranian terrorism. It doesn't care about liberalizing the country. It doesn't care about rectifying the nation's many, many human rights abuses. All of these things are important, but they're not the subject of this deal (and were not, realistically, going to be improved by any deal). I have heard the argument that lifting the sanctions will nudge Iran in a more conciliatory direction, but I'm highly dubious. I'm also inclined to agree that the cash flow it is about to see stemming from the sanctions relief will redound to the benefit of the various terrorist groups Iran likes to fund.

(3) I am unconvinced that there was a "better deal to be made". As far as I've seen there were essentially two mechanisms America supposedly had for exerting more leverage over Tehran: continuing the current regime of exceptionally tight sanctions, or military strikes. The former doesn't work: The current sanctions regime was unsustainable -- the only way we got countries like Russia and China (and arguably even the EU) onboard with tighter sanctions was in service of getting a deal. If no deal was in sight, most of our international allies would have walked away from the sanctions and we'd be left with nothing. The military option is risky for a host of reasons; it might not work, it definitely will prompt retaliation, it definitely would be a diplomatic catastrophe for the United States in forums far afield from Iran, and it definitely will result in blowback that we really don't need. Robert Farley has long convinced me that the ability of pure airpower to bend other countries to our will is overstated, and the more resources we invest in ensuring that the military operation is successful, the more we risk being mired in yet another intractable Middle Eastern conflict.

(4) Indeed, one thing that Lewis said in his piece -- which, again, is the most informative of all the ones I read -- really stuck out for me. It's that "[e]very six months, the deal we could have gotten six months before looks better. Every time we tried to hold out for a better deal, and every time we got in the position of a worse deal." That dates back to the Bush administration, so this isn't a case of weak Obama being weak and not leading with leadership. The fact is the trendlines haven't been good for awhile now, and experientially speaking trying to get a "better deal" has only made things worse. To quote Lewis again:

I was talking to a colleague who is unhappy [with the deal], and it's kind of fascinating. He's unhappy because, he said, "We spent eight years, and the deal we got is not better than the deal we could have gotten eight years ago." And it's like, oh, no kidding. That's not an indictment of the deal, my friend, it's an indictment of eight years of fucking around. [...]

I would give [this deal] an A....[Now, c]ompared to the deal we could have gotten 10 years ago, if the Bush administration hadn't had their heads up their butts? Not an A! That would have been a great deal!

I remember when they had 164 centrifuges, in one cascade, and I said, "You know what, we should let them keep it in warm standby. No uranium, just gas." And people were like, "You're givin' away the store!"

In short, I think opponents of this deal bear a heavy burden of persuasion as to why this time things will be different. And for me at least, they haven't met that burden. I agree with Jeffrey Goldberg that "The dirty little secret of this whole story is that it is very difficult to stop a large nation that possesses both natural resources and human talent, and a deep desire for power, from getting the bomb."

(5) On the particular metric of "slowing down Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon" -- which again, is clearly the only thing the deal is concerned about -- it seems likely to be a net positive over other feasible alternatives. Lewis certainly seems to think so (including ranking it higher than the alternative of bombing Iran). A lot of the technical details of course mean nothing to me, both on the science side (what are the risks of the technology Iran is allowed to keep) and on the logistical side (is 24 days lead time for inspections a lot or a little?). That said, I don't think the deal's efficacy depends on Iran suddenly not being a power-hungry illiberal reactionary autocracy. The "snapback" provisions seem pretty robust and offer ample opportunities for western states to punish Iran for cheating (or suspected cheating). And notably, these provisions can kick in without assent by China or Russia, who are the players whose commitment is most dodgy.

(6) All of that said, I still have a serious concern, although it's an idiosyncratic one that maybe is only shared by me. One way of thinking about this deal is that it trades reduced Iranian nuclear capabilities (via inspections, etc.) for increased Iranian ability to sponsor terror (because of the cash infusion it will get when the sanctions are lifted). And my quite unique position is that I always thought that Iran getting a nuclear weapon was always exaggerated on the threat scale. Nuclear weapons are and have been easily deterrable via conventional modes of statecraft. Even countries which hate each other (like the US and the USSR) pulled it off for decades. And even if one thinks Iran is so entirely suffused with millennarian impulses with respect to Israel that it would risk itself being wiped off the map via an Israeli nuclear counterstrike, it's difficult to imagine that it would risk harming its own holy sites in Jerusalem. By contrast, Iran's sponsorship of terror organizations like Hezbollah has been a thicket that normal diplomatic statecraft has not been able to satisfactorily resolve. Hence, a trade that reduces the former risk while amplifying the latter strikes me as exactly backwards. This may explain why all major elements of the Israeli polity -- including the liberal opposition -- don't like the deal. It strengthens Iran on pretty much all axes save nuclear weaponry (of course it does -- that's what makes it a deal. Iran gives something -- ability to quickly get a nuclear weapon -- to get something -- increased resource access. Outside fantasies where America Green Lanterns Iran into a total capitulation, that was always going to be the result), and Israel quite reasonably doesn't want to see Iran strengthened. And of course, Israel will bear the brunt of an Iran more capable to fund its proxies in Syria, Lebanon, and around the Middle East.

(7) So if I was to argue against the deal, that would be my point of attack: it weakens Iran along a threat dimension whose danger was overstated at the expense of strengthening Iran along a threat dimension whose danger is understated. Yet ultimately, that argument seems more of a general criticism of misplaced global priorities than it is a specific criticism of this deal. Assuming I'm right that the sanctions would have been unsustainable absent a deal, the choice was never "weakened terror Iran/strengthened nuclear Ian versus strengthened terror Iran/weakened nuclear Iran". The alternative to weakening Iran's nuclear capacities while relieving it of international sanctions was to strengthen Iran's nuclear capacities while relieving it of international sanctions. The lifting of sanctions was baked into the cake -- they knew it, and we knew it, and the only question was whether we could use the leverage we temporarily possessed to get a deal that accomplished the one, solitary goal it set out to accomplish. Based on my read, and what I've seen, I think that it did. The result is, to be sure, an Iran that will in many ways be more powerful and more dangerous in 2020 than it is in 2015. That's a security risk that will need to be dealt with in its own way. But it wasn't an eventuality that this deal, in these circumstances, was capable of forestalling.

Doing Anything for Iran

There is an old joke amongst academics, one that I guess is probably falling out of favor but which I still find funny, that goes as follows:

An attractive female student walks into her professor's office, closes the door, and walks suggestively toward him. "I'd do anything to get an A on the final exam," she says.

"Anything?" the professor asks, eyebrows raised.

"Anything." She replies.

"Would you even," the professor leans in, "study?"

I'm reminded of this joke when I think about Israel, Iran, and all those (Netanyahu being the most prominent) who insist that the Palestinian question is trivial and unimportant compared to the existential threat of a nuclear Iran. They keep saying how we need to do anything to stop Iran from becoming a nuclear power. "Anything?" I want to ask. "Anything!" they thunder. "Would you even ... withdraw from settlements?" Of course not. That's a bridge too far.

The partisans in the crowd will no doubt insist the two issues should have nothing to do with one another. The President has, for his part, argued that Israel's continued settlement expansion is a major impediment in building global support for policies protective of Israel (such as, say, containing Iran). And he's made it quite clear that he could do a lot more for Israel vis-a-vis Iran if Israel did more for the Palestinians. Maybe he's being unfair. But if Iran really is the serious, eliminationist, existential threat that Netanyahu claims that it is (and I think there is ample reason to support that assessment), then it is more than a little unbecoming for him to put Israel at greater risk of utter annihilation to preserve a few outposts in a desert that everybody agrees should never have been built in the first place. It makes one think that maybe it's Israel that doesn't take the Iran threat as seriously as it should.

The other half of my frustration with conservative criticism of America's policy towards Iran is that I continue to have no sense about what alternative the conservatives think we should be pursuing (two years ago I mentioned how, just as the far-left has strained to figure out which side in the Syria conflict is "Zionist" so they know who to oppose, conservatives are straining to get a bead on what Obama's policy on Syria is so they can advocate the opposite). The Hudson Institute's Michael Doran penned a letter to my liberal Jewish friends that embodies the sin. Doran describes himself as a non-Jew who is an expert on middle east policy. His letter opens with a farcical claim that Obama suggests that his Jewish critics are exhibiting "dual loyalty"* and ends with an are-you-still-beating-your-wife question about whether Iran should "be the dominant power in the Middle East, and should we be helping it to become that power." In the middle is a lot of ventilation about how terrible America's policy has been towards Israel, Iran, and Syria, but not a hint about what we should be doing instead. Consider this passage:

The plain fact is that the United States is doing nothing to arrest the projection and expansion of Iranian power in the region; quite the contrary. In Lebanon, for example, Washington has cut funding for Shiite figures who remain independent of Iran’s proxy Hizballah. In Iraq, the United States, through the Iraqi armed forces, is actually coordinating with Iranian-backed militias and serving as their air force. Indeed, wherever one looks in the Middle East, one can observe an American bias in favor of, to say the least, non-confrontation with Iran and its allies.

The pattern is most glaring in Syria, where the president has repeatedly avoided conflict with Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s closest ally. The tendency surfaced again a few weeks ago in connection with mounting evidence that Assad has routinely attacked his own people with gas. If true, this fact should trigger a sharp American response in keeping with the president’s famous “red line” on the use of chemical weapons. But when questioned on this matter at a press conference, he contrived to find a loophole. Assad’s forces, he said, have been deploying chlorine gas, which “historically” has not been considered a chemical weapon.

We are "doing nothing to arrest" Iran's power projections. We have "avoided conflict" with Syria. We have a "bias" in favor of "non-confrontation." Well, how should we "confront" these countries? Missile strikes? Ground troops? A tactical nuclear strike? Something non-violent? Doran doesn't say. I leave Doran's article without even a smidgen of an idea of what alternative foreign policy he'd prefer, unless he really is just advocating an all-out regional war (I have to add here that complaining about Obama's ambivalent Syria policy without mentioning the complication that ISIS brings to the table is nothing short of shocking).

Ultimately, one suspects that the major factor determining whether the Iran deal is a success or a failure will be whether the international community is willing to put some teeth into enforcing it going forward. That, in turn, depends a lot about how willing the West is to go to the mat for Israel when the chips are down, and that no doubt depends on Israel's standing in the world. Which, to circle back, suggests that maybe Israel should trade what it claims to be the trivial, unimportant conflict to shore up its standing in the major, existential one. That's what one does if one really thinks all options should be on the table. One of those options is saying "in a world where we're on the cusp of having a hostile, nuclear armed regional power on our doorstep, we simply can't afford the diplomatic and security costs of occupying the West Bank anymore."

To be sure, I've read enough complaints about the Iran deal from enough parties I respect for me to believe that it is decidedly worse than ideal. If I could wave a magic wand, I'd no doubt craft a different deal. Of course, if I could wave a magic wand I'd convert Iran into a liberal pluralist democracy which respects all of its neighbors and is friends to all of the woodland creatures. One makes deals with autocratic regimes pursuing nuclear weapons under less-than-ideal circumstances -- that comes with the territory. What I haven't seen is any plan or proposal that would lead to a better deal (or any alternative to signing a deal that would lead to better results than not having one). The conservative refrain that we need to do "anything" to stop Iran from getting a bomb seems to boil down to either one thing (war) or nothing (if they reject war).

* The claim is farcical because Obama is quite adamant that he believes his policies are in Israel's interest and are reflective of Jewish values --as Doran concedes. We might disagree with Obama descriptively on both those points, but by framing the debate in that term he's obviously saying it is permissible and salutary for Jews to think in terms of their own values and sense of what is good for Israel, and that this is a permissible (indeed, valuable) form of deliberation. If anything, this is sterling refutation of the scurrilous dual loyalty charge.

South Sudan Leader Travels to Israel

The President of newly independent South Sudan has traveled to Israel and had warm words for the Jewish state, describing it as a steadfast ally of South Sudan's aspirations of independence and offering a model for how to survive as a young nation with hostile neighbors.

The alliance makes some sense -- Sudan and Israel are not friends, and South Sudan and Sudan obviously aren't either. In any event, hopefully this is the start of a long and mutually beneficial relationship.

Has the Fever Broke?

The situation in Egypt with respect to Israel has badly deteriorated, with Israeli diplomatic staff forced to evacuate after the embassy was attacked by a mob. As distressing as that scene was -- and it was -- it also appears to be non-representative of either the current Egyptian government or the leaders of the protest movement. Indeed, six stranded embassy staffers were rescued by a team of Egyptian commandos, and the Egyptian government has promised to prosecute those responsible for the attack.

Meanwhile, Bibi went out of his way to praise President Obama for his leadership during the crisis:

Netanyahu praised the United States for intervening with Egypt in order to rescue the Israelis. “I would like to express my gratitude to the President of the United States, Barack Obama. I asked for his help. This was a decisive and fateful moment. He said, ‘I will do everything I can.’ And so he did. He used every considerable means and influence of the United States to help us. We owe him a special measure of gratitude,” Netanyahu said.

That's the sort of language that, to me, is designed to extend beyond the proximate events and heal deeper wounds. If so, it is a welcome development and worth noting.

UPDATE: Speaking of fevers breaking, Turkey is backing off earlier threats to send in its navy in escort of new flotillas. Baby steps, people.

Sack Him Sack Him Sack Him!!!!

Every day that Avigdor Lieberman remains Foreign Minister is a day I'm embarrassed for Israel. Even aside from the basic point that he's little more than a fascist thug, his tenure as FM can basically be characterized as one diplomatic catastrophe after another. In a world where Israel is verging on becoming a pariah state, the last thing it needs is a wretched incompetent like Lieberman as its public face.