Showing posts with label neoconservatism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neoconservatism. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 16, 2025

Bill Kristol: Warrior for Light



One of my favorite subplots of what has been an overall awful political season has been the redemption arc of Bill Kristol.

For people of my generation or a bit older, it is genuinely hilarious to watch him sound not just like a NeverTrumper, but as a full-blast Resistance Lib.

At one level this didn't come completely out of nowhere. Back in 2016, I predicted the possibility that the neoconservatives might return to the Democratic fold. For those who know their history, neocons were liberals once (as I said then -- not to mix media properties -- this is much like Saruman describing the orcs: "they were elves, once"). They turned away from the progressive movement based on aversion to what they saw as reflexive anti-westernism and a deep, almost messianic, belief in America's ability to spread democracy and liberal values worldwide. 

The latter commitment in particular took them to some pretty dark places, and a lot of, shall we say, "compromises" occurred along the way. But as we reach a crisis point for democracy here at home, some of them -- Kristol being the most prominent -- reached back deep into themselves and remembered what nominally was motivating them as idealistic youngsters.

It's not, of course, like Kristol has some profound influence on the right these days (or the left, or the center). And it should be obvious that none of this requires one to view Kristol as some sort of heroic figure or forget his past "interventions" (forgive the pun).

But as a narrative arc, I can't help but enjoy watching it. And there's so little joy these days; please don't begrudge me for indulging in this one.

Wednesday, March 10, 2021

All That's Old Is New Again in Jewish Politics: The Neo-Neoconservatives

Sometimes, when I feel especially glum about the state of campus politics or political debates on Israel or "antisemitism on the left", I remind myself of history. If one is familiar with the state of Jewish affairs in the 1970s and 1980s, one quickly will realize that none of what we're going through now represents new terrain. Many of the issues, aggressions, insecurities, and controversies that afflict us today were also present then. It's one of the reason why so much of the work from that era -- pieces like Evelyn Torton Beck's "The Politics of Jewish Invisibility" or Melanie Kaye/Kantrowitz's "The Issue is Power" -- is so resonant today. That recurrence could be depressing, but I've always found hope in it. None of the more dire predictions of that time came to pass. Jews were not expelled en masse from the left. There was no widespread public repudiation of Israel's existence outright. There were issues, and tensions, and very real problems -- problems which are very reminiscent to the controversies facing Jews today. And as difficult as they were, these problems were worked through, and we made it through -- if not unscathed, then at least intact. As it was then, so too might it be now.

Today, I found myself wondering if we're seeing another replication of a moment in Jewish history: the (re-)rise of the Jewish neoconservative. Tell me if this sounds familiar: The "first wave" of neoconservatives -- folks like Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, and Norman Podhoretz -- tended to be disaffected liberals or even leftists who starting in the 1960s felt as if the culture currents of the left had grown too extreme. Their particular hobby horse issues were typically (a) foreign policy and (b) "identity" issues (often including campus radicalism). These were persons who might agree that America had done wrong, but were emphatic that the Soviet Union was an evil empire doing worse and that the US must be willing to take any and all steps to rollback communism; they wouldn't defend (at least by the 70s) segregation outright, but presented affirmative action and identity politics as equally wrong as violations of a "colorblind" principle; they'd accept Martin Luther King Jr. (now that he was dead), but saw the current generation of civil rights leaders as too radical. Among Jews, in particular, this often intersected with significant anxiety over how the left was turning against Israel and lumped Jews in with White European oppressors (a move which they linked up to the rise of Third Worldism and identity politics more generally). Some of their concerns were legitimate; some were prototypical examples of fragility or contrarianism. And there was also a feedback loop -- as they grew more strident in critiquing the left, the left grew more hostile to them, which fed into their feelings of alienation (a feeling itself strengthened by the fact that they had viewed themselves as "of the left"), which prompted even more strident critiques. Ever onward.

At the end of the day, some neoconservatives remained Democrats, others became leading Republicans. In general, they still styled themselves as social moderates (they weren't going to be found marching against abortion clinics, for example), but they were happy to ally with more "paleo-" elements in the conservative coalition insofar as they would stand against the terrors of out-of-control leftism. And today, many (though not all) of the surviving members of the older wave of Jewish neoconservatives have drifted just a bit back towards the left. They've been markedly overrepresented in the "Never Trump" clique, for instance (Bill Kristol is an obvious example here) -- part of a broader recoiling from the recoiling. Some of the old and long-dormant "liberal" views re-emerged as the growing extremism of contemporary conservativism, and in particular the utter impossibility of reconciling it with anything approaching a defense of classically liberal and democratic values, became impossible to deny.

And yet even as the original cohort of Jewish neoconservatives is becoming more liberal, I feel like I'm seeing the rise of a parallel version of neoconservatism among (some) younger Jews. Once again, it comes from people that would characterize their roots as basically liberal but who are recoiling from bad experiences they've had precisely as liberals in predominantly progressive spaces (campuses, political activism, and so on). Once again, the particular issues that seem to most motivate them are what they see as extremism tied to issues of identity and campus politics (now typically styled as "wokeness" or "Critical Race Theory"). Once again, this anxiety is significantly bound up in claims about how Israel and Zionism are treated in these spaces. Once again, their "personal" politics typically do not seem to be swinging all the way over to the right, but they are increasingly willing to ally and align with more explicitly right-wing actors in the face of a perceived common enemy and they will do so claiming it is an extension of a fight for "traditional" liberal values (around free speech, individualism, or what have you), even when their putative allies make no bones about running roughshod over all of these. Meanwhile, their increasingly loud criticisms of left excesses (some fair and some not) prompt increasingly vocal pushback by the left, furthering the feeling of rejection, setting up its own vicious cycle. If they do end up leaving the Democratic Party, they will be very emphatic in asserting that "the Democratic Party left me."

The young neo-neoconservatives tend to be vocal, and they tend to capture attention. After all, they make for a nice man bites dog story, and they really are tapping into some genuine and reasonable Jewish anxieties -- this was true of the original wave and it's true today. It's also the case that their public salience is far in excess of their numbers -- the vast majority of Jews in the 1970s and 80s did not become conservatives (neo- or otherwise), and the vast majority of Jews today likewise are not publicly or privately wrestling with their political affiliation. It's entirely possible -- maybe likely -- that they will retain a position of prominence even as (because?) they more explicitly align with the right; it's also likely that they will not carry the majority of the Jewish community with them.

So even as there is a part of me that worries -- is this the future of our community -- another part of me looks to history and is reassured. The neo-neoconservatives will be loud, and they'll be influential, but if history is any guide they will not be the vanguard of the new Jewish politics in the 21st century. They are simply what is old, made new again.

Monday, September 16, 2019

Israel's Future in an Illiberal World

This essay by Robert Kagan on the current illiberal trajectory of the Israeli state is absolutely outstanding. I can't recommend it highly enough.

Most columns which talk about Israel in conjunction with the rise of global illiberal nationalism basically are exercises in what Marx would've called "bourgeois moralism" -- calling for Israel to resist it (or to stop actively participating in it) because it's wrong. Now, unlike Marx I think there is a perfectly valid place for moralistic appeals. But it certainly opens itself up to a response from a certain sort of fellow, who deems him or herself a hard-headed realist, who knows that such high-minded ethical appeals have no actual purchase in the dog-eat-dog, every-nation-for-itself world of realpolitik. Israel has to do what's best for Israel -- same as every other country. If that means shedding democracy, or liberalism, or egalitarianism, well, boo-hoo for them.

Kagan's contribution is useful because it is expressly addressed to that sort of fellow, and I endorse it not because I agree with this outlook but because I recognize it is an important one that many people -- rightly or not -- hold.

Kagan's essay explores what Israel's status would be -- not what it ought to be, not what it should be if states were fair and just and nice, but what it would be -- in an illiberal world where America and other major powers were motivated primarily by a sort of insular, anti-cosmopolitan nationalism. In this world, bonds between nations would, where they form at all, be based on material concerns and the conveniences of power -- the world Charles de Gaulle imagined when he said "nations don't have friends, only interests." And the answer is that while in the immediate term Israel might find friends in the budding illiberal powers currently popping up -- from Trump to Orban to Modi to Putin -- in the long-term such a world would almost certainly result in an Israel isolated, alone, and -- at best -- abandoned to its own fate.

Historically, Israel viewed its own security and standing as a new and relatively fragile state as being intricately connected to its status as a democratic state and society that would be a member in good-standing of the liberal political order. In a world where Israel's neighbors had more people, more territory, more wealth, and more oil, the main factor that could bind any major power to the Jewish state is a perception of shared values.

But the decline of the post-Cold War liberal order (liberal America and the EU) and the rise of illiberal alternatives (e.g., China and Russia, but also Trumpism in America and right-wing populism in Europe and globally) has given Israel a choice in didn't have before. Today, Israel doesn't have to be liberal in order to gain the support from other global powers. China doesn't care if Israel is democratic. Russia hardly minds if Israel is repressive. And within the traditional seats of international liberalism, one sees rot from the inside -- from Trump's rise to the chaos over Brexit. A right-wing populist like Netanyahu doesn't lack for ideological allies in the international system.

Yet, Kagan warns, Israel is delusional if it thinks that an "America first!" America, no longer concerned with trifling things like "democracy" or "shared liberal values", will be a reliable ally ever outward into the future. Why would it? Insular nationalism by its very nature doesn't lend itself to establishing these sort of enduring, values-based bonds. It is facile to assume that America will simultaneously retreat from seeking to promote a vision of liberal internationalism yet will remain committed to the security and flourishing of small nations halfway across the globe whose very presence seems to alienate much larger and objectively more important countries. If shared values matter, Israel can argue the fact that it's a pariah among some many states is a case of hypocrisy, illiberalism, or outright hate, and that it'd be just plain wrong for America to give into it. But that refrain -- whether fair or not as an ethical matter -- is simply irrelevant if America's foreign policy is "America first!" Only in a world where international ethics matter can Israel appeal to ethics as basis of a stable diplomatic relationship.

Kagan draws a parallel to right-wing Polish nationalists, who somehow think that a US that chooses to abandon NATO will nonetheless maintain a special security commitment to Poland. Those figures are out of their minds: if America ceases to care about the NATO alliance, it will in turn cease to care about Poland -- if not immediately, then shortly thereafter. More broadly: if America is in the game only for itself, playing real power politics, eventually Israel will find itself cut loose as soon as its in the transient American interest to abandon it.
What makes Israelis think if the United States were to cease supporting the liberal world order and began shedding the alliances it created after World War II, that the only ally it would not shed would be Israel? (Amusingly, many Poles these days also seem to believe that if the United States pulled out of NATO, it would still maintain the security relationship with Poland.) And how would Israel fare in the kind of world that would emerge if the United States stopped trying to uphold the liberal order? Such a world would once again be a multipolar struggle for power and advantage, pitting Russia, China, India, Japan, Iran, the stronger European powers and the United States against one another — all with large populations, significant territories and vast economies. What would be the fate of tiny nations such as Israel in such a world, no matter how well they might be armed and no matter how advanced their economies? In today’s world, Israel is strong and successful. It outshines its weaker and less-developed neighbors. But in the world of self-interested sovereign nation-states, a world with no liberal community, Israel is a mouse surrounded by elephants, all clamoring for a piece of the Middle East. Historically, from the Romans to the Ottomans to the British and French, the peoples of the Middle East have enjoyed only such autonomy as the ruling empires granted them. Otherwise, they were pawns and victims in a much larger game in which they were hopelessly outmatched.  
Could Israel, with its few millions of citizens, surrounded by enemies on all sides, and no longer living under the umbrella of the United States’ global hegemony, rely on the support of European nations ruled by right-wing nationalists? 
The answer is simply: no. It cannot rely on the enduring backing of foreign nation's committed to their own brand of domestic ultranationalism (it is frankly bizarre that anyone with a modicum of knowledge about Jewish history could believe otherwise), and a world where Israel has thrown its lot with that crowd is a world that will rapidly become exceptionally dangerous for Israel. Kagan concludes:
The price Israel paid for being born into the liberal world order was that it would have to suffer liberal criticisms and be held to liberal standards. This may have been difficult and even, from Israelis’ perspective, unfair, but Israeli leaders have borne this burden for 70 years because they knew Israel had no choice, that there was no home for Israel except within the liberal world order. That many Israelis now believe they have a choice is a reflection of our times, but it is a dangerous illusion. Those Netanyahu campaign posters showing him shaking hands with Putin, Modi and Trump carry the tagline, “A Different League.” Indeed, it is. Good luck.
Good luck indeed. The world Netanyahu hopes to help build is a world where Israel one day -- and perhaps not a particularly distant day -- will find itself truly alone, truly cut-off, and if the worst comes without America or anyone else interested in bailing it out.

Thursday, September 21, 2017

Things People Blame the Jews For, Volume XXXV: War!

There is a class in the political science department here at Berkeley, titled simply "War!" (the exclamation point is included). It explores the concept and practice of war from an international relations perspective -- does it follow political science "rules"? Can it be rational? Are there cultural, geopolitical, or demographic markers that make one more or less war-prone? Of course, it's taught by a Jew.

If that "of course" caused a cocked eyebrow just there, well, you aren't Valerie Plame, who ushered in the Jewish New Year by sharing an essay titled "America’s Jews Are Driving America’s Wars." Shana Tova indeed! It includes such lovely suggestions like demanding the media "label" Jews when they appear on television, "kind-of-like a warning label on a bottle of rat poison." So that's nice. Missing is the apparently trivial fact that Jews are significantly less likely to support Middle Eastern wars than the American population writ large.

Plame has already completed the cycle that started with "yes, very provocative, but thoughtful," proceeded onward to "Just FYI, I am of Jewish decent [sic]", over to "put aside your biases and think clearly," and finally coming to rest on an apology.

Fun bonus fact: The site she shared from is the Unz Review, which was a key driver in directing antisemitic harassment at me personally following one of my Tablet articles (e.g., the infamous "are you this Jew?" email).

But one can't help but feel for Plame, who says she just "didn't do [her] homework" on the venue. I mean, who could have known that an article titled "America's Jews Are Driving America's Wars" would be published on an antisemitic site?

Thursday, June 16, 2016

Richard Armitage Endorses Clinton

Richard Armitage, a high-profile Republican foreign policy specialist who held senior appointments in the Reagan and Bush administrations, has endorsed Hillary Clinton. This isn't that surprising -- I predicted months ago that the neoconservative wing of the GOP would find the Democratic Party might appealing in the era of Trump, and in general those conservatives primarily concerned with international relations have to find Trump especially terrifying.

To be sure, the endorsement of a pure beltway insider like Armitage is more likely to move pundit pens than to carry over any votes. But it still symbolizes the rapidly shifting sands underneath the feet of many Republican elites.

Monday, May 16, 2016

Donald Trump and the Resurgence of Far-Right Anti-Semitism

The Donald Trump phenomenon is the closest thing America has had in my lifetime to an old-school, populist-right movement. And one of the things that usually comes with that territory -- along with racism, xenophobia, and know-nothing nationalism -- is anti-Semitism.

It's no secret that there is a loud and vocal portion of Donald Trump's base that is openly anti-Semitic. And it continues to migrate closer to the "mainstream" of conservative thought, even as it targets other strands of the conservative movement thought of as Jewish. Breitbart was the latest on the bandwagon, commissioning a piece by David Horowitz targeting prominent anti-Trump Republican Bill Kristol as a "renegade Jew".

A friend of mine on Facebook suggested that when Trump loses -- and I have no doubt he will -- the movement that propped him will be primed to blame the Jews for his defeat. There is a recurrent story -- mostly told by GOP elites -- about how conservatives are the real friends of the Jews today. I never thought that was true, but I think within the GOP there had been an internal narrative where traditional populist GOP voters were held in check by party elites in their ability to express anti-Semitism. Donald Trump has upended that barrier as he has so many others, and I have very little faith that the GOP electorate that emerges will have anything but contempt for Jews generally and Jewish conservatives in particular.

Trump voters have got it in their heads that, in GOP politics as in life generally, Jew = 1%, RINO or outright liberal, elitist, PC, probably connected to the financial industry, and almost certainly in charge of the biased media. They signify everything in the GOP establishment that Trump voters despise (and, to be fair, Trump voters represent the nightmare version of the party that many Jewish Republicans had initially signed up for. It's not coincidence that I've openly wondered if we'll see neo-cons defect back to the Democratic Party).

Wednesday, March 02, 2016

Will the Neo-Cons Return to the Democratic Party?

Neo-conservatives were liberals, once (much as Saruman described orcs: "They were elves, once"). Might they become Democrats again? With Donald Trump presaging a potential outright crackup in the Republican Party, I think it's a very realistic prospect. Trump is, to say the least, not the neo-conservative candidate of choice, but the threat he poses to neoconservatives runs deeper than most. To see why, it's worth digging into exactly how the neo-conservatives originally switched sides.

The origin story of modern neo-conservativism is that some liberals, in the 1970s, grew frustrated with what they took as their cohorts indulging in new age argle-bargle that made them soft in pursuing their own values. Internationally, they perceived concerns about "imperialism" or military overreach as preventing America from being a force for good in the world. They were hawks, but hawks justified by the justness of the American cause. Domestically, they had often supported the civil rights movement in the 1960s but saw little difference between the "old" Jim Crow racial politics and "new" left identity politics of groups like the Black Panthers. They styled themselves as hard-headed social scientists who believed in equality but measured it via data. There's a reason neo-conservatives view themselves as their side's intellectual wing (There are excellent reasons to contest these self-assessments, I'm just going with how the neo-cons viewed themselves).

From this vantage, Trump is conservatism out of the neo-cons' worst nightmare. Domestically, he primarily plays on the social fears of the white base in ways that do not even allow the facade of egalitarianism . His foreign policy is not internationalist in orientation at all and seems entirely uninterested in even pretending to project American goodness abroad. He's openly racist, openly anti-intellectual, and openly fear-mongering.

And against him will almost certainly be ... Hillary Clinton. Someone who absolutely seems to have hawkish tendencies. Someone who seems to surround herself with smart people with good intellectual pedigrees. Someone whose New Democrat husband at least gained the respect, if not the support, of neo-cons in the 90s (they were never among the true rabid Clinton-haters). Someone whose social liberalism is hardly a deal-breaker (neo-conservatives tended to be far more socially moderate than the rest of the GOP).

The GOP that Trump has built has no real space for neoconservatives. But they could easily find a home as the moderate wing of a Clinton-led Democratic Party. If there is any faction within the GOP that I predict to defect not just en masse, but permanently, over to the Democrats following a Trump nomination, it's them.*

* Disclaimer: This post in no way should be read as suggesting that Democrats should alter their position to be more amenable to neo-conservative views. It is pure prognostication; no normative or prescriptive suggestions should be inferred.

Thursday, August 29, 2013

People I Don't Listen To

I don't have strong feelings regarding what we should be doing regarding Syria. People who I trust are similarly ambivalent, which makes me feel more secure in my own uncertainty. But there are several classes of person who I definitely don't trust:

* People who are similarly unsure regarding what we should be doing in Syria, but are quite certain that Obama should be impeached over whatever we do (or don't do).

* People who support bombing Syria because their entire foreign policy could be summed up in a Michael Bay movie.

* People who aren't sure what's going on in Syria, but are absolutely sure that the Jews are behind it.

Fortunately, this significantly narrows down the class of persons whose opinions I need to consider.

Friday, September 18, 2009

Irving Kristol (1920 - 2009)

Speaking of conservative public intellectuals whom I disagree with profoundly but are not "utter morons", Irving Kristol died today. RIP.

Friday, February 20, 2009

Anti-Semites on My Left, Neocons on My Right

It's dangerous in this hood.

Jeffrey Goldberg and Glenn Greenwald are having what has to be a hall of fame candidate in the field of unproductive exchanges. It started with Goldberg quoting a writer saying "however much the extreme left and the extreme right might disagree, the one common ground upon which they met comfortably was anti-Semitism," and using that to segue into discussing "the brown-red coalition aligned against Israel in Europe," and "in less dramatic, but still disturbing fashion", the presence of left-wing writers in The American Conservative attacking Israel (TAC was formed by Pat Buchanan and thus occupies a special space of mistrust in the Jewish American psyche). One of the writers Goldberg singled-out was Greenwald.

Greenwald fired back with a furious post, associating Goldberg with the "neoconservative Israel fanatics" and using his post as a case study for the proposition that "Anyone who criticizes the actions of the Israeli Government will, for that reason alone, have "anti-Semite" tossed in their vicinity and attached to their name". As for TAC, Greenwald says this argument is "rank guilt by association" and that "it's intellectual dishonesty of the lowliest kind to toss around epithets based on Buchanan's views aimed at anyone and everyone who writes for that journal, regardless of what they write."

Goldberg rejoins that whatever his politics are other issues, a cursory reading of his writings on, e.g., the settlements would pretty clear show him to be "not a revanchist Zionist". Greenwald, Goldberg alleges, is merely covering for the fact that writing in The American Conservative, which remains "animated by Buchanan's hostility to Jews and to Israel" is a sure-fire way to convince Jews to run screaming from J Street and back into the arms of AIPAC. Greenwald, in an update to his post, calls Goldberg's rejoinder "adolescent" and says that Goldberg's views on the Iraq war are sufficient to justify labeling him "neoconservative".

Both are tip-toeing but not crossing the other's red-lines: Goldberg doesn't actually call Greenwald an anti-Semite, just someone who associates with them (or near-them, depending on how one reads "less dramatically"); Greenwald doesn't actually make specific claims about Goldberg's politics on Israel, but uses Goldberg's views on Iraq to lump him in with neoconservatives and strongly implies that he holds the same no-criticism-under-any-circumstances standard regarding Israel as his putative compatriots.

I cannot think of a conversation that has this extreme a ratio of heat to light. I think most American Jews have a definitively negative view of The American Conservative, because Buchanan-style conservatism has always been extremely unpopular with American Jews and most Jews do consider him to be flatly anti-Semitic. Greenwald's writing in that magazine was, at the very least, probably a tactical mistake regardless of the content, if the goal is to persuade the Jewish community writ large that the dovish positions that Greenwald holds are a safe location for them. But I don't think he himself is anti-Semitic or that there are any grounds to imply otherwise [UPDATE for clarity: I likewise don't think there are any grounds to imply that Greenwald is anti-Semitic. The original was unclear as to what "otherwise" referred to].

At the same time, if Greenwald thinks that "anti-Semitic" gets hurled at anyone insufficiently hawkish regarding Israel, he seems most interested in propagating a counter-norm wherein anyone with views on Israel to his right (unless they're right-wing anti-Israeli, in which case they're fine no matter how vile their politics otherwise are) is now a "neoconservative", and thus beyond the pale of legitimate discourse.

Meaning that someone like me (likely to be perceived as to Goldberg's left and Greenwald's right) gets to be an anti-Semitic neoconservative! Oh joy.

Sunday, May 11, 2008

No Talking

David Bernstein, Michael Totten, and Noah Pollack do not like Obama's statement on the Lebanon Crisis, which focuses on diplomatic engagement to reform Lebanon's electoral structure, fight corruption, decrease economic inequality, and combat impositions on Lebanese sovereignty (particularly by Syria).

Pollack snarks: "Since his prescription for the Middle East is diplomatic engagement, every disease gets re-diagnosed as something curable through talking."

As opposed to the conservative options, which appear to be restricted to "bomb" or "ignore"?

Thursday, January 03, 2008

Book Jacket Time!

OxBlogger Patrick Porter, reviewing Giuliani adviser Norman Podhoretz's World War IV:
If Kenneth Anderson's writings are the vintage Pinot Noir of the neocon vinyard, Podhoretz's manifesto is the rancid two-dollar Spumante.

Yikes.