Nonnegotiables

A new group of Michigan Jews has released what they call a list of "nonnegotiables" they're demanding out of Democratic Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed before they'll give him their support. This is nominally a different and unrelated group from those who are actively urging a vote for El-Sayed's Republican opponent, Mike Rogers, though to my mind the difference seems thin. In general, I think the absolute nicest thing one can say the people making these demands is that they are comparable to Muslim and Arab voters who either refused to vote for, or dragged their feet on supporting, Biden/Harris over Donald Trump because of their concerns about Israel/Palestine, and if you're like me that's not a very nice comparison at all.

Anyway, the letter's "nonnegotiables" are listed as follows:

• “Jewish safety — including for Zionist Jews — in Michigan and across America”; 
• “Our right to define our own Jewish identities”; 
• “Jewish sovereignty in Israel”; 
• “Welcoming our full participation in American political life”; and 
• “An affirmative vision for a better future in the Middle East.” 

One could do a line-by-line parsing of what these demands actually mean, but I think the best way to think about it is to envision what would happen if Abdul El-Sayed paired acceptance of these premises with a companion list of additional "nonnegotiables" which also must be accepted:

• “Palestinian safety — including for anti-Zionist Palestinians — in Michigan and across America”; 
• “Our right to define our own Palestinian identities”; 
• “Palestinian sovereignty in Palestine”; 
• “Welcoming our full participation in American political life”; and 
• “An affirmative vision for a better future in the Middle East.”

Now, to be clear, I am not suggesting that the El-Sayed campaign respond to this petition with this companion list. Such a response would undoubtedly be viewed as inflammatory and a provocation. But that itself is revealing -- why would this be viewed as a provocation? More broadly, what can we learn from the likely response to this hypothetical initiative?

Well, for one, the last bullet point is vague to the point of meaninglessness. If it is meant to be a palette cleanser demonstrating that this is not just about punching left, it doesn't work. And most of the other bullet points lie in that interstitial space where either they're banal and obviously accepted by any mainstream Democrat (of course nobody should be subjected to violence due to their identity) or are trying to smuggle in considerable more controversial premises under the guise of the aforementioned banality (e.g., presenting certain forms of speech or political advocacy -- particularly condemnations of Israeli or Palestinian actors deemed overly harsh -- as a safety threat).

This is most obvious in the third bullet point. I have no doubt that a "nonnegotiable" demand to recognize "Palestinian sovereignty in Palestine" would be viewed as extraordinarily provocative by the signatories of this letter, because it at the very least raises the question "what counts as 'Palestine'?" Are we demanding one state from the river to the sea, the entirety of which must be under Palestinian rule? Or is this a two-state solution, with Palestine comprised of the West Bank and Gaza and existing alongside Israel -- in which case stating that the the former should have "Palestinian sovereignty" is perhaps simply a vindication of Palestinian's equal rights to national self-determination? But the thing is, that same ambiguity exists in "Jewish sovereignty in Israel", which also does not clearly delineate if we're talking about a Jewish majority in pre-67 Israel or also a right to rule over the West Bank and Gaza. The former is something that sits well within the norms of contemporary nation-states, the latter is a demand for formalized apartheid. That's a rather large gap, and so one can understand those who are skittish about issuing an unqualified endorsement without having certainty of what exactly is being endorsed. On this point, it is especially notable that while the letter stresses sovereignty as a "nonnegotiable", it does not speak of democracy at all; the only substantive mention of democracy is when it calls the vision of "'one democratic state' between the river and the sea, with 'equal rights for everyone'" a smokescreen for the destruction of Israel.

The reality is that, if these Jews can understand why they might hesitate before unequivocally signing on to supporting "Palestinian sovereignty in Palestine" as "nonnegotiable" -- even if they truly have no quarrel with a sovereign Palestinian state that sits side-by-side with Israel -- they should understand why an El-Sayed might insist on a bit more clarity regarding "Jewish sovereignty in Israel." I agree that there is nothing intrinsically objectionable that there exists a state with a Jewish majority and that one should not demand such a state's dismantlement simply because one thinks the exercise of Jewish self-determination is inherently illiberal. I also agree that there is something very objectionable about a state that may or may not have a Jewish majority permanently subjugating its Palestinian residents because it determines that granting them equal citizenship and voting rights would mean that Jews no longer would exercise "sovereignty." And while it's true that the former position viewing the very existence of a Jewish-majority state in any context as abominable has very real supporters, it's also true that the latter position asserting an entitlement to permanently subjugate and dispossess Palestinians if necessary to vindicate "Jewish sovereignty" ("from the river to the sea") has no small share of backers in the current Israeli government, to say nothing of those abroad. So what, exactly, are we talking about?

In concept, I think El-Sayed's stated opposition to "ethnostates" is a perfectly valid way of parsing the difference: there is nothing wrong with there being an Israel so long as it adheres to the basic demands of liberal democratic equality -- which certainly does not necessarily impugn the existence of a nation with a Jewish majority or even a Jewish national identity, but does impose a set of basic commitments regarding equal voting and citizenship rights -- and this is the same standard we should assess any other nation by (not objecting to Japan or Ireland or Egypt having a particular national identity, but very much objecting if they permanently withhold full voting rights from certain ethnic groups in order to maintain that identity). But unfortunately, this is an area where the letter writers seem determined not to take "yes" for an answer, lashing out at "cleverly worded arguments" on the subject of "Jewish sovereignty", which here seems to be an elbow thrown precisely against people who validly ask the "what exactly are we talking about" question.

So that's my ultimate read. Is this letter being issued in good faith? My answer to that is to ask whether the letter-writers would endorse without qualification the parallel list of "nonnegotiables" I listed above. If they would, then I think these demands are valid ones. If not (and again, not because they necessarily "oppose" the demand, but because they think there are areas of ambiguity or blurriness that need clarification) then I think that same grace should be extended here -- but the tenor of "nonnegotiable" strongly suggests that such grace will not be forthcoming, and that asking for said grace and clarification would instead be dismissed as another "cleverly worded argument" meant to disguise one's bigotry.

Settler MAGA and Settler Susan Collins

The Dispatch has an interesting article about how violent attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinian civilians are "dividing" the settler movement. In one corner, there are those who insist the attacks are aberrational. They condemn them, but also clearly see a significant part of the problem as the "embarrassment" they cause to the settlement cause.

“An overwhelming majority of the settlement movement opposes these acts,” Oded Revivi, a former senior figure in the Yesha Council, an umbrella organization of all the local authorities in the West Bank, told The Dispatch. He said the violence posed both a moral problem and a threat to the legitimacy of the settlement movement. “This is an extremist minority that, quite simply, does the settlements no favors,” he said. “It puts the settlement movement in an embarrassing position and undermines its legitimacy because of these acts.”

Then there is the corner that actively endorses the violence.

In an interview with The Dispatch, Yehuda Shimon—a lawyer who volunteers with Honenu, an organization that provides legal assistance to Israelis facing criminal proceedings over nationalist-related offenses, and a settler himself—unequivocally defended acts of violence by extremist settlers.

At first, Shimon denied that there was such a thing as settler violence at all, repeatedly pointing to Palestinian acts of terrorism. “The entire ‘settler violence’ campaign is something the left-wing media made up. There is no such thing as ‘settler violence,’” he said. He later acknowledged that there is “very limited violence” by settlers, but quickly added that it stems from the fact that “settlers are fed up with taking it,” arguing that Israeli authorities haven’t done enough to prevent terrorist attacks on Jews in the West Bank.

The second reason Shimon cited for settler violence: retribution. “Revenge is a feeling that exists among all peoples,” he said, invoking the American response to the attack on Pearl Harbor as an example. Shimon then made the case for collective punishment: “There is no such thing as uninvolved people. If they had eliminated Sinwar and Hitler when they were children, that would have solved a lot of problems.”

This isn't even the half of it -- Shimon did an interview with the BBC that was unabashedly genocidal ("I think now, after they killed one Israeli, we need to kill all the people in Tal and Sarra, even Jit and Farata.... One Jewish life, it's 10 million [Palestinians]."). He is a true sociopath and a monster, and we shouldn't diminish that a whit.

It would be easy to dismiss Shimon as an outlier, and take Revivi at his word that the "mainstream" position is condemnation of violent settlers. But that is in many ways far too convenient a take. Shimon himself might genuinely be an extreme example, but the article makes clear that it's his people that ultimately are holding sway over Israeli government policy in the West Bank. They're the reason why the IDF "stands down" in the face of violent settler activity; they're the reason why the Israeli government intercedes to sabotage efforts by the security services to actually try and clamp down on Jewish terrorism. It's very much akin to the relationship of MAGA and the GOP, where we're all supposed to pretend like the racists and the extremists are some outlier faction as opposed to the clearly dominant force within the movement.

Meanwhile, the "moderates" (if you will) give off extremely strong Susan Collins vibes. There's a lot of lip-chewing and brow-furrowing, and the regular expressions of "concern" over what's going on. But when push comes to shove, they aren't really willing to endorse substantial, concrete initiatives to crack down on settler terrorism. If they oppose violent settlers, they oppose doing absolutely anything to stop them even more.

The scourge of violence by settler extremists, aided and abetted by the Israeli government, against innocent Palestinians is at a fever pitch. It is in fact dangerous for Israel's security and public image; it would also be abhorrent and evil and demanding of opposition even if it had no negative implications for Israelis at all. Like with the GOP, it's good, I guess, when some people who are part of that "faction" eventually see the light and speak out against the violence and abuse. It's all hands on deck. But at the same time, we cannot wait for the settler leaders to come around to doing something (even if we do buy that they're actually interested in "doing something", which one may not) before we ourselves commit to do something. If the Israeli government wants to lash itself to the mast of protecting violent settler terror-thugs, they should expect to face the consequences of that choice in the international arena.

Permanent Hypermilitaristic Suppression of Palestinians Hasn't Failed Because It's Never Been Tried?

In a recent blog post, Nachum Kaplan claims that the shift in Israel's security orientation post-10/7 stems from its rejection of "the West's most dangerous illusions." It begins as follows:

October 7th was a catastrophic security failure for Israel and an intellectual demolition.

In a matter of hours, assumptions that had governed Israeli strategy for decades were exposed as manifestly inadequate.

So far, so good. Indeed, immediately after the attacks, I said something to this effect:

Hamas' operation represents an explosive repudiation of the notion that Gaza and Hamas could be besieged into obedience. The right-wing fantasy-nightmare that Israelis could (only) be kept safe through ever-greater oppression of Palestinians has been finally and completely falsified. From an Israel security standpoint, the rightwing playbook has only accomplished an unprecedented endangerment of Israeli lives in service of the furthest right-wing fringe. At what point do we say these policies are leading to nowhere but universal damnation?

Except, somehow, these aren't the "assumptions" Kaplan has in mind. In his telling, the policy structure that was exposed as inadequate is a brainchild of liberal internationalism inspired by post-war Europe, centered around shared economic prosperity and political integration. What is replacing it is a "harder" view of power, one that rejects the belief "that every conflict is a misunderstanding, every enemy a potential partner, and every murderous ideology an unmet socioeconomic need waiting for a development grant to address."

This makes me want to scream. I simply do not understand how someone can look at Israeli policy towards Gaza over the decade or so leading up to 10/7 and think it was characterized by economic interdependence under the umbrella of diplomacy and a rules-based international order that would keep everyone safe. That's just not what the policy was. It borders on delusion to assert that's what the policy was. The policy was that Gaza could be kept under indefinite conditions of besiegement and economic isolation, and Israel could successfully avoid significant security blowback because of its vastly superior military and intelligence apparatus.

That's the policy that was in place on 10/7. That the policy that failed on 10/7. It is maddening that the political faction that was in power on 10/7, and for virtually all of the preceding twenty years leading up to 10/7, and whose political raison d'etre was to savagely dismantle any semblance of this liberal, diplomatic, Oslo-inspired policy because it was not sufficiently "realist", can invert reality on this. It was not the liberals who set the policies or priorities that prevailed on 10/7. So why are we acting as if their outlook is what failed? Why are we acting as if "diplomacy and political resolutions are dead ends; the only thing that matters is the size of our tanks" is a strategic pivot, as opposed to returning to the same dry well?

If you want to be skeptical of political resolutions, I don't begrudge that skepticism. It's entirely understandable to imagine a future where there is a decisive political resolution imposed to "settle" the Israel/Palestine conflict, one which at least purports to protect the political, economic, and security interests of all parties, and it still ends up collapsing back into terrible violence and mayhem and oppression. But if you are going to be skeptical of that imagined, as-yet-unattempted future, then surely one must be at least as skeptical of the very real, absolutely-attempted past and present that fervently asserted military might was the only thing that truly mattered. One you are imagining to fail, the other already actually has failed.

Again, the inversion of who has to explain themselves to who is infuriating. Kaplan concludes by demanding that "those promising coexistence, deterrence through prosperity, or security through international guarantees must now answer a more brutal question. What happens when you are wrong?"

To which I want to reply, what if you're wrong? No, check that: you already were wrong! Kaplan's belief is that a "harder" view of Palestinians, one that is less concerned with diplomatic niceties or economic development (to say nothing of political equality) and one that relies on "military capability, credible deterrence, intelligence competence, and the willingness to use force" will keep Israel safe. That view is not a departure from the one that governed on 10/7, it is the view that was in force on 10/7 and which failed on 10/7. In a sane world, we who supported political equality and diplomatic resolution would not need to restore our credibility to the militarists, they would need to restore their credibility to us.

Perhaps Kaplan wants an "but even more so" version of the preceding years militarism. But we still, we can ask "what if you're wrong?" What if, it turns out, the near-exclusive reliance on military might, and the belief that Palestinians can be subjected to political subordination and economic devastation in perpetuity, does not prevent October 7ths from occurring? We have powerful evidence from experience on this point. And even if Kaplan wants to contest that his version of military power über alles is different from the prior iterations, "[w]hat cannot seriously be disputed is that the burden of proof has changed."

But people like Kaplan seem to genuinely not see this. And that is wild to me.

Avoiding the Obvious

Rabbi Seth Winberg, executive director of Hillel at Brandeis, has an interesting/infuriating essay up on JTA about the growing number of young Jews who express preference for a single, binational democratic state in Israel/Palestine. Winberg specifically is focusing on a subset of these Jews, those who are not true anti-Zionist believers but who remain supportive -- at least in concept -- of Israel as a Jewish, democratic state. What explains their support of this plan?

To this question, Winberg gives a summary that is, more or less, exactly correct.

The first, two states for two peoples, looks dead after the peace process has repeatedly failed to deliver that outcome for their entire lives. It’s certainly not an option according to the Israeli consensus, with only 15% of Israeli Jews currently supporting two states. 

The second, in which Israel annexes the West Bank and Gaza and rules millions of Palestinians who cannot vote, seems to be the vision of Israel’s current government.

The third option, one democratic country, imagines equal rights for everyone. To a young American of decent instincts and thin knowledge of the region, schooled to see the conflict as a matter of racial equality, the last sounds like simple justice: one person, one vote.  

This, broadly speaking, is exactly correct (if maybe a bit patronizingly put). There are three possible solutions to the conflict: some form of a two-state solution, a one-state solution without equal rights (i.e., apartheid), or a one-state solution with equal rights. If the apartheid option is viewed as unacceptable, and the two-state solution is viewed as unfeasible, that leaves door #3. It's really not that complicated. And if you're aghast at young Jews picking door #3, then your options are either to make apartheid sound acceptable (hopefully not) or make a two-state solution seem feasible. Again, not that complicated.

But here is where things fly off course. Instead of accepting the obvious point, Winberg veers off into a long digression about connections to Jewish peoplehood and imbrication in Jewish texts and patriotism and distinguishing between country and government. It's long and meandering and frankly I had trouble following it, but more importantly it just has nothing to do with the problem he accurately identified above.

Let's say a group of the young Jews in question takes on Winberg's ideal course of study. They spend a year in his dojo, burying themselves in Jewish text and ritual. They emerge with a genuine, emotive connection to the entirety of the Jewish people -- in Israel, in America, and around the world. They know full well the difference between country and government. They are proudly part of a live and living Jewish tradition.

They then return to the above trilemma: two states, one apartheid state, or one equal binational state. What's changed? Do they now find apartheid attractive? I hope not! Do they now see two-states as more feasible? I don't see why. Nothing has changed, and so nothing will change. The basic trilemma is identical to what it was before, and so the outcome will be the same as it is before.

Everything Winberg is suggesting about cultivating Jewish connection and peoplehood and authentic bonds may be good for its own sake. None of it changes the dynamics of the problem he's accurately identified. And the most maddening feature of all is that the answer to that problem actually is obvious. If you don't like the binational one-state option, and you're not willing to endorse the apartheid one-state option, then the only move is to do whatever you can to make a two-state solution viable. Actually viable, not just a talking point. That should be the full-court press move of Winberg and all the other Jewish organizations fretting about this problem. Do whatever it takes to bring a two-state solution to fruition, no matter who's standing in the way.

Of course, framed that way, it's obvious why the obvious solution is resisted. In the present moment, genuine, material, full-throated support for a two-state solution puts one in sharp opposition to the Israeli government (and a pretty wide swath of the Israeli Jewish populace too). That opposition is not just rhetorical, it'd be material too -- the government would actively be sabotaging your proposed initiatives, and so many of your initiatives would be directly antagonistic to the government (anything from sanctioning price tag terrorists to imposing boycotts on settlement goods to recognizing a Palestinian state on 1967 borders). For all the talk about separating the concept of Israel-as-a-Jewish-state from a particular suite of government policies, this is what Winberg and his ilk recoil from. They cannot bring themselves to occupy the position of clear and vocal opponents of the Israeli government.  They also cannot bring themselves to endorse either of the two alternatives to the two-state solution. So they start spinning out long complex essays with long complex proposals that sound attractive except for the part that they change nothing about the fundamental problem, which is that you have to back either two-states, one-state with apartheid, or one-state binationalism.

I'm picking on Winberg's essay not because it is unique, but because it is of a type. The trilemma above is a variation on the trilemma we've known about for years: Israel can be Jewish, democratic, or in control of the West Bank and Gaza -- pick two. You can pick any two, but you can only pick two. And everyone kind of knows this, but also resists actually picking the two. They say "it's essential for Israel to be a Jewish, democratic state." Okay, then you must support ending the occupation? "Well," they hem and haw, "I'm not sure about the timing, and there are genuine security needs, and after 10/7 Israel can't be expected to cede control over Palestinian territories." Okay, so if Israel has to stay in control over these territories, democracy means that the Palestinians who live there must get equal voting rights, yes? "No -- that would mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state!" "So control of the territory but no equal rights ... apartheid then?" "How dare you! Israel must be Jewish and democratic." Round and round we go.

There's a lot about Israel/Palestine that is complicated. But this part of it is not complicated. Winberg is right that even among young Jews, there is not a wholesale rejection of the idea of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. What is there is a wholesale rejection of apartheid and a fatalistic sense that a two-state solution is unfeasible. That leaves one equal state. If one doesn't like being left there, your choices are to make apartheid okay again or to make a two-solution viable again. There isn't another move.

Why Should We View the JDL as a "False Equivalency"?

A few weeks ago, there was a protest in front of a New York City synagogue which was hosting a real estate event featuring, in part, properties in Jerusalem. Pro-Palestine protesters, notably, chanted their support for Hamas ("Say it loud, say it clear, we support Hamas here."), the internationally-recognized terrorist organization responsible for (among other crimes) the massacres on October 7. A smaller group of pro-Israel protesters affiliated with the far-right Jewish Defense League chanted their own racist slogans, including "death to Palestine."

The next day, NYC Mayor Zohran Mamdani released a statement condemning the pro-Hamas chants: "Chants in support of a terrorist organization have no place in our city." There was some consternation about the supposed delay (of one day), but it appears that time lag occurred because Mamdani was consulting with high-level members of the Jewish community to ensure he got the statement right.

I noticed at the time, though, that the ultimate statement rightfully condemned the pro-Hamas chanting but not the equally appalling that came from the JDL. "We support Hamas here" is a despicable thing to say anywhere, but especially in front of a synagogue. No person of conscience should defend it (it is not surprising that there are several notable left-wing figures who lack any such conscience). But "death to Palestine" is equally rancid and should be equally indefensible. So why was it not included in Mamdani's condemnation?

I suspected at the time that it was left out because some factions of the Jewish community would have denounced its inclusion. Many of these figures would claim that they do not, of course, defend the JDL or chants like "Death to Palestine". But they would present including it in Mamdani's statement as "both-sidesing" or "all lives mattering" or in some other way diluting of the message condemning the pro-Hamas chants. And it seems the reporting bears my intuition out. An earlier draft of the condemnation was going to condemn the Jewish Defense League, but it was removed following protests by Jewish leaders who viewed it as a "false equivalence."

This is rotten. It's not just that complaints about "both sidesing" lack legs when both sides really did chant despicable things. It's also the choice -- and it is a choice -- by certain Jewish leaders to decide that condemnations of pro-Palestine extremists are in some way "diluted" or are less sincere when they come tied to calling out pro-Israel extremists present at the same event. Why should we feel that way? I don't feel that way. In fact, I feel rather ill at the notion that someone might think my equal standing as a Jew is threatened by condemning phrases like "death to Palestine." What does that say about ourselves? What does that say about what we are saying about ourselves, that we make such demands?

This is, I think, the end result of the tremendously destructive road too many Jewish leaders have committed to trotting down, where we have become obsessed with "all lives mattering" or "us too-ism" to the point that anything that even purports to tie Jewish safety to any sort of political universalism or solidarity is presented as an affront. It is not unrelated to the bone-jarringly stupid choice by the ADL (among others) to self-consciously cut itself off from historic allies because antisemitism must be fought alone or not at all. I don't mean to suggest that there are not serious challenges in the relationships Jews have with other communities, historic allies included. But in all of these cases, we are choosing to isolate ourselves. These are not instances where we are being forced out of coalitions or compelled to go alone. We are choosing to believe that the entire concept of allyship is a form of disrespect.

We don't have to think like this. Nobody is forcing us to hear "chants of 'death to Palestine' have no place in our city" and decide it means "Jews are lesser." There's no reason to make that inference, and there are many reasons not to make that inference. And so while at one level I am glad that Mamdani was consulting with and attentive to Jewish community concerns in the wake of the synagogue protest, it is a very bad thing that we've decided our "concerns" compel him not to condemn obviously despicable and indefensible rhetoric from the likes of the JDL. That Jewish leaders -- especially Jewish leaders who do recognize how wretched the JDL is -- think in those terms speaks to rot in our own psyche that we need to address, and quick.

"Pro-Palestine" is a "They", Not An "It"

There is no doubt that one major development in American politics over Israel/Palestine over the last two years has been a dramatic expansion and mainstreaming of pro-Palestine political advocacy. It's no longer a given that all or nearly all politicians will ritualistically intone "I am pro-Israel." It's no longer the case that self-identified "pro-Palestine" actors are confined to a tiny fringe leafleting outside UC-Berkeley.

One upshot of this growth is pluralism. As a movement gets larger, it encompasses a wider range of perspectives. Social movements, I've long argued, "moderate as they mainstream", and this moderation effect often frustrates the original "hardcore" of the movement, who may view the newcomers as engaging in coopting or even selling out. The moderates, for their part, may well view the old guard as hidebound, extremists, or simply unrealistic. It's a common pattern, and it's pretty clear it's being replicated here as well.

That said, there are a lot of people with strong incentives to downplay this pluralism and instead treat pro-Palestine as a monolithic thing.

Consider the reports that, in the wake of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza, Hamas has launched a bloody crackdown on dissidents and rivals, including public executions of those they are accusing of being "collaborators". Given that this by all appearances is an extra-legal terror campaign against Palestinian civilians, one would expect it to be condemned, and one need not search far to find various pro-Israel voices running lines to the effect of "now that Israel isn't involved, 'pro-Palestine' groups are silent -- or even support it!" On the latter point, they're not making things up: the National Students for Justice in Palestine organization, following these reports of Hamas' killings, called for "death to collaborators" in apparent endorsement. As awful as it is to see, it appears there are prominent, non-fringe elements of the pro-Palestinian movement who more or less support Hamas engaging in violent terror not just against Israel (we knew that) but against Palestinians as well.

Yet, on another level, the pro-Israel voices I mentioned above are making something up, because the NSJP is by no means the only "pro-Palestine" organization out there, and in fact it is not at all difficult to find pro-Palestinian voices who are horrified by Hamas' rampage of terror. The Palestinian Authority lambasted Hamas' killings as "heinous crimes"; a Palestinian human rights NGO similarly accused Hamas of "extrajudicial executions" which "constitute a legal and moral crime that requires immediate condemnation and accountability."

In the abstract, there isn't anything especially odd or complicated here. "Pro-Palestine" is a "they", not an "it"; it contains a wide range of different groups and outlooks. Under that broad umbrella, why would it be hard to grasp that there might be some people who flatly support Hamas and others who find them risible?

But it's also not hard to see why many players in this drama are so enthusiastic on sweeping that pluralism under the rug. The pro-Israel commentators want the NSJP's pro-murder posts to be the paradigm example of what the pro-Palestinian movement stands for. "This is what this movement really is." In doing so, they can discredit all of the other members -- including those who are rightfully horrified by Hamas' brutality -- by association. And on the other side, obviously groups like NSJP have an incentive to present themselves as the sole and authentic representation of what "pro-Palestine" means. They want the broad, inchoate energy behind "pro-Palestine" to be channeled through them. Groups which take a softer or moderate tone are not allies, they are threats. And with strength in numbers and in unity, there is a lot of tacit pressure to defer to the leadership of established organizations and not disturb their decrees regarding what views "count" as pro-Palestine and what do not -- even if those decrees are often based more on internal political considerations than any healthy respect for pluralism and disagreement.

Yet incentives aside, we would all do better not to indulge in this game. One theme I've been returning to over the past several months is that many pro-Palestinian activists are speedrunning a realization many pro-Israel activists have also had to start grappling with: the reality that many -- not all or even potentially most, but many -- of the people who march under your flag really are exactly as extreme and nasty and blood-thirsty as your worst enemies describe them as. We like to think of these attacks as smears, and often they are insofar as they present sweeping and general guilt across the whole movement. But on the pro-Israel side, it actually is the case that there are many non-negligible figures whose outlook towards Palestinians is one of simple, naked racism; who do not remotely "just want peace"; who absolutely openly endorse human rights violations of the most vicious kind in the name of "security" or "greater Israel". And likewise, on the pro-Palestine side, it actually is the case that there are many non-negligible figures whose outlooks towards Israelis and Jews is one of simple, naked antisemitism; who do not remotely "just want peace"; who absolutely endorse human rights violations of the most vicious kind in the name of "decolonization" or "freeing Palestine." I and many other Jews who identified with Israel had to work through that reality, and so too must the pro-Palestine community work through the reality that it is not a slur or a slander or a bad-faith attack: groups like the NSJP really are right now endorsing Hamas' murder spree targeting Palestinian civilians.

However, this realization is not an accuse to swing all the way in the other direction. Those who endorse Hamas' murder spree are not an inauthentic, fringe, or fake part of "pro-Palestine", but neither are they the authentic, true, or sole representative of it either. The notion that every person who sat at a pro-Palestine campus encampment is now elated to see Hamas executing Palestinians in the streets is simply not credible. Pro-Palestine is a they, not an it. It is irresponsible to deny the presence of this particular faction; it is equally irresponsible to cede it the status of being the only relevant faction.

Grieving Choices Not Made

The big diplomatic news of the week is the rush of longtime Israel-supporting countries -- Canada,  France, Australia, and the UK among them -- announcing their formal recognition of Palestine as a state. Israel and its supporters have sought to discredit this move as "rewarding" Hamas for its 10/7 terror initiative. To that, my semi-sardonic response has been to say that it is indeed very important that initiatives like these not be presented as "rewarding Hamas" -- they must instead be framed as "punishing Israel". Punishing Israel for its intransigence, for its hyper-aggressiveness, and for its brazen acts of sabotage towards the possibility of a two-state solution.

In all seriousness, I think that is a more plausible description of what is going on. These countries have no interest in elevating Hamas -- indeed, they've presented their recognition as in explicit opposition to Hamas (and the PA, for admittedly self-centered reasons, affirms the same). What has motivated them to action is a complete (and completely justified) collapse in any faith that Israel is operating in good faith -- that it harbors any serious commitment to securing a just peace with the Palestinians, that its campaign in Gaza is remotely compatible with the laws of war or even is (at the point) significantly motivated by a desire to see the hostages return, and that the far-right racist extremists in Netanyahu's government aren't entirely running the show. This collapse in confidence is reflected here too -- a dramatic shift in public opinion against Israel, not just amongst Democrats but (younger) Republicans as well, that threatens to leave Israel as a super-Sparta Hermit Kingdom.

I think there are a lot of Jews who look at these developments, look at how they are the bitter harvest of Israel's own choices, and think "I wish they would have chosen differently." Why did they have to go down this route? Why did they have to choose the path of the most bloodshed, the most extremism, the most intransigence, the most of everything awful?

And "choose" is critical here. Anyone who has spent time in Zionist circles is familiar with the old complaint that the world acts if the Palestinians lack agency -- as if none of the current situation is the result of their decisions, it's all just thrust upon them by the big bad Israel. Yet right now, I think it is the Israel apologists who are refusing to reckon with the concept of agency -- they act as if there was nothing (or only the most marginal tweaks) that Israel could have done differently post-10/7: it had to fight Hamas this way, it had to use starvation as a weapon of war, it had to kowtow to settler extremists launching pogroms, it had to publicly announce that blocking the formation of a free Palestinian state was the government's raison d'etre.

No. It did not have to do anything of these things. It chose them, and what we are seeing is the consequence of choices that could have been made differently.

"Choose" critical here. The very first post I wrote after 10/7 was titled "Ghouls, Failure, Fatalism, and Responsibility." The "fatalism" portion of that post read as follows.

Finally, there is almost no chance that the fallout from this assault has any consequence other than catastrophe for innocent Israelis and Palestinians alike. And yet, we must resist the sort of fatalism about that seeming inevitability that leads to an abdication of responsibility. Too many voices I've seen today have, in one way or another, expressed sentiments to the effect that the events of today and/or those to come are the inevitable consequence of history's weave. How could you expect Hamas wouldn't seize an opportunity to massacre Israeli civilians en masse? How could you expect Israel won't respond with zero regard for Palestinian life?

No. There is agency here. The word of the day I'm already growing to hate is "(un)provoked", as in an emergent discourse which wants to be absolutely sure we all know that whatever hideous crime Hamas just committed or whatever overwhelming military incursion Israel may be about to launch, there is a reason behind it -- it didn't just happen out of air. Which -- no kidding. In the context of a conflict that's resulted in a half dozen international wars in the space of less than century, nothing is ever "unprovoked". But that doesn't absolve anyone of agency. Hamas made a choice to launch this attack -- a brutal, violent, targeted assault on a civilian population whose only tactical objective was the sowing of terror. They are not the passive receptacles of historical forces beyond their ken. And Israel's choices too (both those that preceded today's events and those that will follow) are choices -- they are not the inevitable consequence of some immutable historical arc.

And what I want to say right now is, it's okay to grieve the choices not made. One need not and one should not indulge in the fatalism of those who said that this was all inevitable -- a fatalism that is ultimately identical regardless of whether it speaks in critical or exculpatory language. In fact, I feel incandescent rage towards those who portray any of this as an inevitability -- that the bloodshed and the massacres and the abuses and the torture and the kidnappings had to happen. They did not have to happen, people chose for them to happen, and different choices could have and should have been made. It is okay to grieve the choices not made.

It is okay to grieve the choices not made. But one still has to acknowledge the choices that were made. Israel made choices that caused it to lose the confidence of erstwhile stalwart defenders, that made large swaths of Americans view it as foe rather than friend, that made not just the "usual suspect" critics but very sober observers take seriously the most serious and severe charges against it as a brutalizer, ethnic cleanser, even genocidaire. We can wish that it made different choices. But it didn't, and for all our grief we must still live in the world that was made by the choices that were made.

Israel is How Europe Can Stick It To Trump

Over the past few days, we've seen a spate of hitherto solid Israel allies in Europe announce they'll be recognizing the state of Palestine. France kicked things off, and it was swiftly followed by the UK and Canada. (There also has been an interesting wave of Arab states calling on Hamas to demilitarize and relinquish power).

I'm not going to comment here on the substance of the decision. Briefly, it is obvious that Palestinians deserve self-determination in a recognized state, and I'm unpersuaded by those who are arguing the move will backfire against the Palestinians. As for those who claim that recognition "rewards Hamas", I say that, if we are to think of this decision in those terms, it's better to see this as not as rewarding Hamas for 10/7, but as punishing Israel for its conduct after 10/7.

But that's not what I want to focus on here. Rather, I want to explore a different question: Why now? What made these countries take this step now?

Obviously, there is not one single answer to that. But in addition to some of the obvious factors -- increased sympathy for the Palestinian cause and increased frustration with Israeli intransigence chief among them -- I suggest an additional cause is that stepping out on Israel is a comparatively cheap and insulated way to symbolically repudiate Trump and Trumpism.

The Trump administration's pivot away from our traditional allies and alliances has been met with a justified mixture of alarm and fury from those we've abandoned. From escalating trade wars to threats of annexation, Trump has done unprecedented damage to America's global standing. People want to see their leaders punch back. But many of the most obvious avenues for retaliation come with substantial risks of their own. As idiotic and self-destructive as tariffs are for the United States, it remains the case that European countries must be careful and adroit in their own trade negotiations. Symbolism has its place there, but it can't be the whole story; missteps can exact real and serious tangible damage on one's own people.

But sticking it to Israel offers much of that same symbolic flouting of Trump, at a much lower risk. Most of the "damage" there, if there is any, will be externalized, not internalized. To the extent some countries might have been reluctant to step out against Israel for fear of alienating the United States, that ship has sailed; today these countries are looking for opportunities to signal they're standing up to the American madman. And while the Trump administration might make noises about retaliation, I think they're fighting on too many fronts for protecting Israel diplomatically to be a serious priority -- and that's even if one believes that Trump's Israel policy is based on sincere ideological commitment, which I don't. If one thinks Trump is just using "Israel" as an excuse to enact various forms of domestic repression, the ultimate disinterest can be doubled. In essence, Europe recognizing Palestine (a) looks increasingly justified and sensible given recent Israeli conduct and (b) offers an opportunity to be seen as standing up to Trump, in a context where tangible blowback is likely to be minimal. No wonder it's looking more attractive!

None of this should be seen as warranting any sympathy for Israel of course. They've chosen their course -- lashing themselves to the most extreme and vicious iteration of global rightwing ultranationalism -- and they have to live with the consequences. That's the risk of hitching your wagon entirely to a single powerful but widely loathed patron -- if daddy gets distracted, you're on your own and you've made yourself an awfully tempting target. Once again, when the right is done finding Israel useful, it will leave it in the wreckage.

The Impossibility of Bibi Agreeing To Peace

A hypothetical question for Israel supporters.

Suppose Israel was asked to craft the contours of a peace deal in Gaza. And suppose they were allowed to put any conditions they wanted into that deal, subject to just two limitations:

1. Palestinians cannot be compelled, directly or indirectly, to leave the Gaza Strip;
2. Palestinians must be given full citizenship and democratic rights in whatever sovereign nation agrees to control Gaza.

The first is essentially a rule against ethnic cleansing, the second a rule against apartheid.

Beyond those stipulations, Israel is allowed to put any conditions it likes into the deal.

I do not claim, to be clear, that so long as these conditions are met any agreement between Israel and Palestine would necessarily be just. Rather, I present these as the absolute, barest-of-the-bare minimum redlines that must be respected no matter how one-sided the remaining conditions are in Israel's favor. And the point of the exercise is that, so long as these minimums are acceded to, Israel can load up the "deal" as favorably as it wants.

Given that, my question is simple: could this Israeli government come up with a deal that meets these parameters?

And my suspicion is no, it couldn't. The "unthinkable thought" of 2019 is now a reality. And the impossibility of Israel agreeing to a peace deal that abides by even this extraordinary minimums is a large part of why Israel drags this war on and on and on.

Start with the second proviso. The framing is a requirement of equal citizenship in "whatever sovereign nation controls Gaza", and that ambiguity is intentional: it could encompass an independent Palestinian state, or it encompass Israeli annexation. But of course, this makes the dilemma apparent: Bibi and his coalition are dead-set against allowing an independent Palestinian state to exist, but they are also implacably opposed to incorporating Gaza Palestinians into the Israeli state (at least, on equal citizenship).

This (for Bibi) conundrum inspires increasingly desperate and fanciful efforts to escape the impossible bind -- for example, proposing that some other Arab state assume control of Gaza (for obvious reasons, nobody seems interested in stepping up). The increasingly open gestures towards full ethnic cleansing also can be understood through this "dilemma" -- the fewer Palestinians who remain in Gaza, the less daunting annexation looks.

And ultimately, the impossibility of resolving this problem makes all the other conditions we sometimes talk about moot. Questions about return of the hostages, demilitarization, right of return, reparations, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state -- I don't want to say they're unimportant, but while Bibi is in charge they're epiphenomenal. Even if Israel got what it says it wants along all these fronts (immediate return of the hostages, a demilitarized Palestinian state, rejection of right of return, compensation for 10/7, recognition), I genuinely don't think that this government could say "yes" to the deal if it meant either accepting an independent Palestinian state or incorporating Palestinians into Israel as full and equal citizens. Maybe if you loaded up some comically evil and implausible conditions ("reparations to the tune of $1 trillion/year") -- but that would just emphasize that the response of the Israeli government to this hypothetical would be to search frantically for a way to not make the deal.

For what it's worth, this toxic feature of Bibi and his cronies does I think mark out a tangible and meaningful difference between the current Israeli governing coalition and its realistic rivals. It's become popular to denigrate the belief (or "fantasy", as Ezra Klein said) among liberal Zionists that "Bibi is the problem" by observing that a core hostility to Palestinian rights and equality is shared among a much broader segment of Israeli society (including leading opposition figures) than many would care to admit. There is, regrettably, something to this critique -- but the hypothetical I'm pursuing here does I think suggest how it might be overstated, because I do think that the main opposition would be substantially different along these lines. They have no eagerness to create a Palestinian state, but it is not an immovable object for them; opposition to it does not lie at the center of their entire ideological being. It's not guaranteed or even easy, but given the right conditions, one can imagine them making a deal. With Bibi, one can't -- and that's a big difference.

But in the meantime, it is Bibi in control of Israel, and with Bibi in charge of Israel the impossibility of resolving this problem is a critical reason why the war continues. Agreeing on the contours of a peace deal only is relevant when peace is at hand. So long as Israel remains at war, it can delay having to decide an impossible choice. (The fact that once the war ends Bibi probably has to reckon with his criminal charges is also a factor, and a related one -- it goes to the point that Bibi wants the war to continue and is endangered by the prospect of it ending, no matter what the terms are).

In a different context almost 20 years ago, Ehud Olmert mocked those who obsessed over the exact acreage of a peace deal as having supposedly existential stakes for Israel's existence. 

“With them, it is all about tanks and land and controlling territories and controlled territories and this hilltop and that hilltop,” he said. “All these things are worthless.”

He added, “Who thinks seriously that if we sit on another hilltop, on another hundred meters, that this is what will make the difference for the State of Israel’s basic security?”

The hills don't matter, but pretending like the hills do matter, and matter so much that we couldn't possibly make a deal unless we are absolutely guaranteed to control these hills is a way of forestalling having to make a decision on the deal. And the same thing feels true in Gaza. All the talk about needing to destroy one more Hamas battalion, root out one more tunnel network, take out one more "second-in-command" -- who seriously thinks that is what will make the difference? They're delaying mechanisms -- so long as Israel can say "we still must do these military things", they can avoid having to commit to a choice on peace they're fundamentally unwilling to make. Like "airstrikes while you wait", it's something to do while you can't think of what else to do.

All that said, I open to being persuaded otherwise. Tell me a set of provisions -- I wouldn't even demand that they be realistic, so long as they aren't utterly absurdist -- that comports with the above two limitations that you think Bibi would accept, and I'll consider it. But I'm skeptical they exist.

Faithless in Gaza

The other day I was enmeshed in a Facebook thread, as one does, where a colleague was complaining about a post that equally condemned the Capital Jewish Museum shooting by a pro-Palestinian terrorist and the bombing of family homes by the IDF (the sin of "equating", not to be confused with the sin of "one-sided"). The argument was a familiar one: the DC shooter was intentionally seeking to murder civilians (true), while the killing of Palestinian families is an "undesired", tragic byproduct of fighting an urban counterinsurgency.

My response to this argument was not to contest it, exactly. It was to ask my colleague a more basic question: what would falsify his belief? He believes that, for Israel, the deaths of Palestinian civilians are undesired. What evidence would suffice so that he would no longer believe that?

He wouldn't answer.

To be sure, he gave an answer -- but it was just more arguments for why it was still correct to think that these deaths were "undesired". Pressed again to say, okay, but what evidence would make you think otherwise, and I was met with silence.*

That was when it was clear the issue wasn't one of belief, but of dogmatic faith. The bottom line -- "Israel does not desire civilian deaths" -- was written in stone. Everything above that could and would be erased and rewritten to cohere to the bottom line. The "what would falsify" question was impossible to answer, because he knew deep down that if he committed to any non-ludicrous answer, there was a real chance his criteria would be met, and then what would he do?

This does not work. I am familiar with the arguments why the spiraling death toll in Gaza does not mean that Israel "desires" those deaths. I don't find them especially compelling anymore,** but I'm familiar with them. But one argument that has no purchase is the pure tautology: "these civilian deaths are undesired because Israel does not desire civilian deaths". That boils down to rejecting the claim because accepting it would make you feel sad. It does not work.

Nir Hasson had a powerful column the other day about how much of the Israeli media has responded to the IDF killing nine Palestinian children. The media is obsessed with every fuzzy detail or misplaced accent, every AI-generated image or overwrought recharacterization -- but all in order to kick dust around the acknowledged truth that the IDF did kill those children. It is a mirror-image of 10/7-denialism, and, as one expert observes, it is in its perverted way a form of moral self-policing:

"Denying the atrocities that your side has committed is an attempt to maintain your humanity," [Dr. Assaf David, of the Forum for Regional Thinking and the Van Leer Institute] explains. "When you say, 'There are things that my side cannot do,' it is actually a statement saying that I cannot justify these things. It's true that it's a lie and that we do do these things, but denial is trying to set a moral standard."

Denial and justification go hand-in-hand. If it was unjustified then it didn't happen, and if it happened it was justified. Flit back and forth between those positions, and one can keep the faith indefinitely.

But it doesn't work. As one side of the fulcrum grows increasingly untenable, unbearable pressure grows on the other. Here is where one starts to see either absurd exercises in denialism (most 10/7 victims were gunned down by Israel; the images of Gaza destruction are "Pallywood" concoctions) or sickening excursions into justifications (the Bibas children would have grown up to be monsters anyway; Gaza's population are tantamount to Nazi collaborators). Such maneuvers are soul-destroying, but they are inevitable when one's dogmatic faith matters more than truth.

So to my pro-Israel friends, this is my challenge to you. If you still believe that Israel is only acting in the interests of self-defense, that its overall policy and practice is one that provides Palestinian civilians with the protections they are due under international law and as human beings, that the scenes of death and destruction are not "desired" but a regrettable byproduct of the inevitabilities of urban warfare against a terrorist entity like Hamas, I won't argue with you. I'll simply ask you to ask yourself, earnestly and without flinching, what would cause you to think otherwise. Commit to something, now, so that if the evidence does come to pass you don't rationalize it away later.

And if you can't bring yourself to do that simple thing, ask yourself what that really means about the status of your faith.

* The closest he did come to an answer was by citing to civilian:combatant casualty ratios which, he said, were lower in the Gaza campaign compared to other analogous counterinsurgencies (e.g., the anti-ISIS campaign in Mosul, which he said had a ratio of 2.5:1). The Gaza ratio, he said, was closer to 1.5:1 or 1.2:1; so if the Mosul campaign wasn't one of desired civilian death, neither was Gaza. But when I pressed him as to what ratio would flip that intuition (particularly given that the 10/7 ratio was slightly worse than 2:1), he refused to commit to a number -- I suspect because he was not as confident in that 1.2 - 1.5:1 ratio as he made himself out to be and knew that if he, say, matched the 10/7 2:1 figure, he might end up being put to the proof (for my part, I've seen the 1.2 and 1.5:1 ratios cited but I've also seen much worse estimates pegging the ratio at closer to 4:1). The cynic, I suggested, might suspect that the only number he'd commit to is .5 higher than whatever ends up being the real number.

** My view is that the prevailing outlook in both the IDF and the Israeli political establishment is, at best, utter indifference to Palestinian civilian life. To the extent Palestinians civilian safety poses any impediment to a military or political objective -- which always centered around "keeping Bibi in power", and which now includes "conquering" Gaza to boot -- that interest is given virtually zero weight. As the value of children's lives approaches zero, the number of children one can justify killing to get at one Hamas operative (or keep Bibi out of prison one more day) approaches infinity.

Among the bits of evidence that buttresses that view are the spiraling death tally itself (and the individual instances of horrifying death and destruction that are virtually impossible to justify), the regular statements by top-level Israeli officials evincing criminal intentions towards the Palestinian people, the credible reports that the IDF has greatly relaxed its operational controls previously meant to assure adherence to rules of distinction and proportionality in favor of establishing effective "free-fire" zones, and the prevalence of deeply racist attitudes towards Arabs and Palestinians that polling suggests are present in Israel's military-aged populations. 

There may be individual units or actors holding themselves to higher standards; there also are no doubt those holding themselves to a lower one where the death and destruction is itself a desired and terminal end. And none of this is incompatible with the belief that Hamas also is utterly indifferent to the wellbeing of the Palestinian population under its de facto rule, that it operates in civilian areas in a manner designed to further imperil the non-combatant population, and is effectively holding Gaza's population hostage in service of a crude desire to retain power. But in any case, it is wrong to say the deaths Israel inflicts on innocent Palestinians are "undesired", as that implies some level of care and concern for which there is little evidence of.

The Debunkers

Once, when I was in middle school, a friend and I saw a picture of a border guard from some eastern European country inside a Scholastic Magazine and decided it was a fake.

We had a grand time picking out details in the photo that "proved" it wasn't real. The guard's uniform had English on it, not Cyrillic. The rifle he was carrying was wrong (how we knew what rifle he was supposed to be carrying, I don't know). There were other "problems" as well that I can't remember now. But I do remember feeling very proud of ourselves for figuring out that the magazine ran a fake photo; when the reality is that the photo was almost certainly real. We were vastly overreading minor "discrepancies" that probably weren't ultimately discrepancies at all.

The New York Times has a really interesting (and long) profile on a TikTok star who announced she had cancer, and then faced an organized community committed to "proving" that she was lying about it for influence, clout, or clicks.

The story doesn't hide the ball for long: unless her oncologist is in on the grift, the woman really has cancer. Nonetheless, it was fascinating to see how many people got so committed, for so long, into being sure she was faking it.

In particular, I noticed the deployment of a sort of Potemkin expertise. The debunkers seized on little details and discrepancies which they persistently viewed as the critical cracks in an otherwise elaborate facade. The tenor was an interesting mix of obviousness ("anyone could spot this is a fake, look at the rubes falling for such a clear con") and sophistication ("look how meticulous my investigation is; the story falls apart when an expert looks at it"). The latter component I think does more work than the former: it concocts an aura of authority that both reassures other readers that the claims are backed up by evidence, and also makes them feel good about being critical consumers not taken in by ruses and cons (when the irony, of course, is that they've talked themselves into not believing the truth).

When I read this story, it reminded me of a similar army of "debunkers" who pore over any claim of atrocity or calamity in Israel/Palestine to "prove" that a claim forwarded by seemingly credible sources (doctors, international media outlets, and so on) is actually a hoax or a lie. For example, this account is dedicated to minute analysis of videos or pictures that purport to show, say, famine in Gaza or bombed out civilian infrastructure, picking out bits and pieces that "prove" it's being staged. There's a whole ecosystem of people on this beat (and not just on the "pro-Israel" side), and their tenor and behavior is very reminiscent of the fanatical debunkers described in the NYT article above. They project expertise via hyper-fixation on detail, and present themselves as simply trying to uncover the truth. But they're obviously not dispassionate; the tiny nits and picks they make to "debunk" adverse narratives are never paired with a similar fine-toothed comb aimed at stories more to their taste. It's not even real skepticism, let alone critical analysis. Yet they have an eager audience from those eager to believe they're seeing through a ruse, who revel in the twin joys of faux-sophistication and confirmation bias.

Now, to be sure, the TikTok case is in many ways simpler: it doesn't have any clear political valence, and it is a single incident capable of being definitively declared true or false. Across the many, many reported incidents of catastrophe and calamity in Israel and Palestine, things tend to be muddier, with more obvious incentives to slant (or invent) claims for political purposes, and there will be inevitably a distribution of results following initial claims. Some will be borne out, some will turn out to be overstated, not what they are initially claimed to be, or even outright falsified. There is value in actual critical assessment and reassessment of what people say is happening inside a war zone -- not the least because even among perfectly good faith actors the chaos of a war zone doesn't lend itself to the conjunction of perfect accuracy and immediate reporting.

Nonetheless, I can't help but think part (though not all) of the deception relies on a persistent assumption that every social calamity is complete and totalizing, such that if there's anything interrupting the grimness then it just cannot be cancer/fascism/famine whatever.

And that's not true. There are times one is living with cancer and yet isn't an emaciated patient confined to her bed. That can be part of cancer, one of the scariest parts of cancer, but a picture that doesn't fit that template doesn't prove the cancer is made up. There are times one is living in a fascist state but does not see jackbooted thugs grabbing people off the streets. That is one of the scariest parts of fascism, but a day one just goes to the market as normal and doesn't see any secret police at all doesn't necessarily falsify the fascism. Cancer isn't always like that, fascism isn't always like that. And famine, too, doesn't always look like "The Vulture and the Little Girl"; a picture of a market with some food in it does not necessarily mean there isn't a famine.

That's why those little bits and pieces aren't the smoking guns they purport to be. Reality isn't as clean as we think it is. People with cancer still go to parks. People under fascism still enjoy nights out on the town. Places afflicting by famine still typically have some food somewhere. Buildings that have been bombed still have unexpected pieces that remain standing.

Each of those faux-"discrepancies" becomes grist for the debunking mill. But it's not real critical analysis; it's just food to keep believing what one already wants to believe.

Like Wildfire

The first I heard of wildfires in Israel, it was in the context of an allegation that the fires were the result of Israeli settlers committing arson while attacking Palestinian farmers.

As best I can tell, that allegation traces back to a stray Haaretz tweet that reads "As wildfire rages in Israel, security source tells Haaretz settlers set Palestinian agricultural land on fire in the West Bank." There doesn't seem to be any further corroboration, and the link in the post doesn't go to any article or news item elaborating (as best I can tell, it was either taken down or never existed in the first place).

Meanwhile, the right-wing coalition running the show in Israel was also quick to blame the fires on arson -- specifically, that caused by Palestinian militants. This, too, seems thinly supported and already has the hallmarks of a smear campaign. Netanyahu, for instance, claimed that 18 individuals had already been arrested for suspected arson; the true figure is three. And one of those three is a sixty-three-year old man with no criminal record who was found with the smoking-gun evidence of a tobacco pipe and some cotton to clean it.

Finally, there are the experts, who posit that the wildfires raging across an arid region of the eastern mediterranean that just had its driest winter on record are probably attributable to ... the climate crisis. Fancy that.

In recent years, right-wing politicians have frequently blamed Palestinians for arson in the wake of wildfire outbreaks, but no one has ever been indicted for nationalist-motivated arson leading to large-scale fires. Most major fires investigated were ultimately attributed to negligence.

The Carmel disaster in 2010 was sparked by a discarded hookah coal. Two of the major fires that scorched parts of the Jerusalem hills in 2016 were caused by a flare gun and welding work. Other large fires were found to have been started by farmers burning waste or hikers making coffee.

The phenomenon of blaming minorities for starting wildfires is not unique to Israel: in Turkey, Erdoğan blamed the Kurds; in Europe, migrants were accused of arson; and in California, claims emerged that LGBTQ individuals in the fire services were responsible for the failure to contain the fires.

It does all hang together, doesn't it. 

Thrilling Over Dead Children

In a generally interesting column about Israel's war aims in Gaza, Raviv Drucker writes:

Today, the lust for revenge, an easy willingness to make use of the madman theory and the widespread view that "they're all terrorists" have led to many actions that cannot be explained or justified. It is immoral, inhumane and taints us all.

This jumped out at me, because of a response to my "Tenth Plague" post I had read a few hours earlier. The response took great delight in trying to come up with myriad thought experiments justifying the killing of children: Would you kill baby Hitler? Would you kill members of the Hitler Youth? Would you kill a neo-Nazi kid who would have voted for Trump? (The last was presented as some sort of gotcha, as if it presented some more difficult quandary than the others).

These meditations, of course, are fun little games one plays in order to rationalize killing children -- a still grimmer (if that's possible) example of refusing to lay down one's toys. They are misappropriations of the famous quip about knowing what one is and just haggling over the price -- the idea being that we're all actually okay with killing children, some are just more clear-eyed about it than others.

The uselessness of the "baby Hitler" hypothetical is obviously that we cannot know in advance who will turn out to be Hitler. The purported way around that is pure racist fatalism -- we do know that these children will grow up to be Hitler, because that is what they do. It is not irony at all that this is exactly the rationale of those who cheered the murder of the Bibas children -- claiming that they will grow up to massacre Palestinians because that is what they do. It's the same sickness, in a slightly different color palette. Let nobody deceive you into thinking that these people are not one and the same.

And what stands out at me, again, about people such as this is the desire -- the thrill -- that some have in finding a way to justify killing children. It reminds me once again of Bernard Henri-Levy's contention about the rise of the "New Antisemitism", speaking of people who want above all else to "feel once again the desire and, above all, the right to burn all the synagogues they want, to attack boys wearing yarmulkes, to harass large numbers of rabbis, to kill not just one but many Ilan Halimis...." It's not just about attacking kids, it's about feeling right to do it. And so they are never more thrilled than when they can tell themselves a story whereby the killing is righteous, and justified, and necessary, and beautiful.

A key part of the story they tell themselves, I think, is that everyone thinks this way. Everyone revels in killing the children of the enemy, some just put on a show of pretending otherwise. It is cynicism posing a "realism" that's actually cowardice. It continues to be a lie, and lie whose only purpose is to give despicable people moral license to promote despicable things.

The Tenth Plague in 2025

My least favorite part of the Passover Seder, by far, is the recitation of the Ten Plagues. It is tradition to spill a drop of wine for each plague, to acknowledge the suffering of the Egyptians and how it lessens our own joy at liberation.

For nine of the ten plagues, I'd consider this sufficient. For the Tenth Plague -- death of the first born -- I never have. A single drop of wine as a response to dead children is woefully, horrifyingly grotesque; even when those deaths are in pursuit of the most noble cause of liberation from slavery (though I continue to assert that, as told in the Passover tale, the Tenth Plague was absolutely unnecessary -- it was the Lord who "hardened Pharoah's heart" and precluded an earlier resolution). 

Again, this is something I've believed for many, many years (the above-linked post is from 2007). But it is all the more resonant right now. When one thinks of the Israeli children butchered on October 7, or those murdered in Hamas captivity, or the Palestinian children torn asunder by bombs, or dying in want of adequate nutrition or medical care -- what kind of holiday treats such horrors as a literal drop in the bucket? How can we think that way?

Here, too, the lesson is that such atrocities must not be downplayed, in particular downplayed on the grounds that some overarching "cause" behind them is just; here, too, the lesson also is that what is presented as "necessary" rarely actually is.

Next year without murdered children.

How To Support Anti-Hamas Protests in Gaza

You may have seen that protests have broken out in the Gaza Strip targeting Hamas.

This is a great thing, and the bravery of these protesters deserves nothing but applause. They should be viewed as of a piece with other brave protesters standing up to authoritarian practices in places like Turkey, Israel, and (for that matter) the United States.

But I've noticed some pro-Israel commenters highlighting these protests with a weird tone of empty triumphalism. They're excited about the protests because they're anti-Hamas (makes sense), but beyond expressing that giddiness there's just ... nothing else there in terms of what they, or we, or anyone outside of Gaza might do to back the protesters up.

Nothing on how we might actually support these protests (hint: I suspect they will not find dropping bombs on their heads helpful). And nothing on what, tangibly, we think these protesters should get as an alternative to Hamas rule (again, I doubt they're excited at the process of being evicted to make room for a MAGA seaside resort development).

But if you're going to claim the mantle of supporting these protests, those are the sorts of questions you need to have answers for. You don't get to say "gee, these protests are swell -- anyway, back to bombing!"  (I suppose there is a very slim chance the protesters want the war to continue as a means of ousting Hamas, but anyone making that claim on the protesters' behalf, absent them saying so themselves, bears a very high burden of persuasion). 

And you also don't get to just be coy about the end status of Gaza. I don't have a direct line to the protesters' ears, but I assume they want some form of genuine self-governance and independence. If one isn't willing to accede to that, you also don't get to claim the protests for your own purposes.

Again, the complete inability of Israel to articulate a plausible "day after" upon toppling Hamas is one reason this war is dragging on without end. As long as the war continues, Gaza is Schrodinger's territory -- neither reoccupied and annexed nor granted freedom and independence. Israel doesn't want to commit to either option, so it delays and delays and delays by extending and extending and extending the war.

The Lawless Pit Holding Mahmoud Kahlil

Over the past few days, I like many have been expressing outrage over the arrest and detention of Mahmoud Kahlil, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, due to his involvement in pro-Palestinian protests at Columbia University. Federal agents raided his home and told him that his visa had been revoked; when informed he held a green card, they summarily informed that that had been revoked too.

I know nothing about Kahlil personally or his involvement in the protests (I've seen differing accounts of his role, but I haven't dug deeper because it honestly doesn't matter right now). And on a moral level, so much of what happened here sickens me. It sickens me that a permanent resident could be summarily snatched from his home and detained in clear retaliation for his expression. It sickens me that Jewish organizations putatively "fighting antisemitism" appeared to have played a direct role in his arrest. It sickens me that the ADL has fulsomely praised the operation, tacitly endorsing draconian anti-immigrant legislation that in a prior life it recognized as "the worst kind of legislation, discriminatory and abusive of American concepts and ideals" (I am heartened that other Jewish groups are speaking out against it). It sickens me to see Trump use the word "shalom" as a taunt. It sickens me to witness people trying to argue that this is ultimately Columbia's fault for not cracking down on the protests more aggressively, as if there is some straight line between potential underenforcment of the student codes of conduct and arbitrary arrest and deportation (news flash: university disciplinary issues -- even if you think they're mishandled -- should not be seen as deportable offenses!). 

And finally, it sickens me to see folks trying to finesse the issue by adopting a "well, let's see what the courts say before we rush to judgment" handwash. Partially, that's a problem because the entire seizure of Kahlil is a sterling example of the Queen of Hearts' justice: "sentence first, verdict later." If you've got Kahlil on a deportable offense, go through the legal process and prove it; don't start with the obviously speech-motivated arrest and then after the fact grope around for some figleaf of a legal justification. Everyone and their mother knows that whatever legal argument gets dredged up will be a pretext; the Trump administration is not remotely hiding the fact that it is targeting Kahlil for his speech.

But the bigger problem with waiting for the process of law to take its course is that I don't think people fully realize what a legal blackhole immigration law truly is.

I am not an immigration lawyer. But I do have some experience with immigration law, mostly during my judicial clerkship. My assessment of immigration law following that year can be summarized in two parts: (1) it was some of the most meaningful and impactful work I did, and (2) I never, ever wanted to be involved in it again. The explanation behind both halves of that equation is one and the same: immigration felt like a lawless pit. Our immigration law and doctrine is supersaturated with opportunities for governmental abuse that is largely immunized from any sort of meaningful review. To anyone with a passing familiarity with this system, it is outlandish to assert that our immigration system is too generous to migrants. Our immigration system is cruel, and arbitrary, and unfair, and in many respects essentially lawless. I was involved with it for a very limited amount of time, and to a very limited extent, and it still traumatized me in ways I continue to feel to this day.

So when I read Steve Vladeck's assessment of actual legal questions surrounding Mahmoud Kahlil's detention, I was not surprised, but I was alarmed. Vladeck does not argue that Kahlil's detention is lawful. But he does think it is not as clearly unlawful as is being asserted. The reason why, to be clear, is not that the Trump administration has some secret reasonable argument that's been occluded by the media firestorm. It's that our immigration law is so stacked with vague and abusive rules and dangerously deferential precedents that even misconduct as egregious as this might not be clearly forbidden. The lawless pit holding Mahmoud Kahlil is not something new. The Trump administration might be more brazen in exploiting these opportunities for abuse, but doctrinally speaking it had many tools lying around waiting to be picked up.

Indeed, one interesting thing about Kahlil's case is that it demonstrates a fascinating and underappreciated bivalence in the political salience of pro-Palestinian advocacy. On the one hand, it is very clear that Kahlil was targeted and made vulnerable by virtue of his pro-Palestinian speech. However, it is also clearly true that Kahlil's situation has mobilized and galvanized popular attention also by virtue of the fact that his case involves pro-Palestinian speech. Kahlil's case more clearly demonstrates both the distinct vulnerability but also the distinct power held by pro-Palestinian advocates I can remember in quite some time.

Again, the core problem of abuse in our immigration system -- the ability to arbitrarily and (functionally) lawlessly detain and deport immigrants for any reason or none at all -- is nothing new. I'm sure immigration activists could hand you hundreds or thousands of comparable stories of lawful residents snatched and detained for the most absurd or malicious of reasons. And while I have little doubt that most persons protesting on Kahlil's behalf would, if you gave them those stories, express genuine outrage over them as well, there's little doubt that the reason this abuse and this outrage captured public attention in the way that it did was because it involves an attempt to suppress pro-Palestinian speech, specifically.

This, to be clear, is not a bad thing. It is a good thing -- anything that encourages people to recognize the wild, lawless abuses latent in our immigration system generally and in the Trump administration's enforcement specifically is a good thing. But it is worth noting the more complex relationship with power that is being demonstrated here. Mahmoud Kahlil's story is about how the Trump administration feels empowered to destroy the lives of pro-Palestinian advocates by any means necessary; it also (sickeningly) is a story about how some Jewish organizations are cheering on the project. But it is also a story about how a connection to Israel/Palestine makes people care about things more often and more intensely than they often otherwise would. That is expression of power, and one that has implications that go well beyond this case.