What Will Be the Democratic Party's Anti-Incumbent Keyes Number?

Way back in 2005 (20 years ago(!)) the blogosphere discovered the "Crazification Factor" of 27% -- the baseline percentage of Americans who will take an action for reasons that defy any rational explanation whatsoever. The background came in a discussion of President George W. Bush's cratering approval numbers, and a query as to how low they might go, and it's still fun to read to this day:

John: Hey, Bush is now at 37% approval. I feel much less like Kevin McCarthy screaming in traffic. But I wonder what his base is --

Tyrone: 27%.

John: ... you said that immediately, and with some authority.

Tyrone: Obama vs. Alan Keyes. Keyes was from out of state, so you can eliminate any established political base; both candidates were black, so you can factor out racism; and Keyes was plainly, obviously, completely crazy. Batshit crazy. Head-trauma crazy. But 27% of the population of Illinois voted for him. They put party identification, personal prejudice, whatever ahead of rational judgement. Hell, even like 5% of Democrats voted for him. That's crazy behaviour. I think you have to assume a 27% Crazification Factor in any population.

For this reason, the "Crazification Factor" is also known as the "Keyes Number". And though undoubtedly the product of significant cherry-picking, it was fun in the years that followed to find other crazy propositions that clustered around 27% support.

I was thinking about this nugget of blogger history upon reading about an announced primary challenge against incumbent Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL) by progressive influencer Kat Abughazaleh. The announced basis for the challenge is general discontent with Democratic leadership and the "gerontocracy" not being aggressive enough in fighting the Trump administration. But the problem is that nobody -- not even Abughazaleh -- can point to any problems on that front for Schakowsky, specifically. Abughazaleh herself agrees that Schakowsky has been a good Democrat!

Beyond that, Abughazaleh has never held elected office, has no significant political experience, is from out-of-state (she voted in DC last election), and doesn't live in Schakowsky's district. In terms of traditional bases of support, Abughazaleh has literally nothing going for her other than "I am not a long-standing incumbent Democrat."

To be clear, I'm not saying one would have to be crazy to vote for Abughazaleh. Rather, what made the Keyes Factor notable was that the Keyes/Obama race helpfully isolated out every possible reason one might vote for a candidate aside from "I'm attracted to the crazy." Likewise, I'm pointing out that if Abughazaleh does end up facing off against Schakowsky (and the latter hasn't decided if she's seeking reelection), any support the latter gets will be purely, 100% attributable to people voting entirely on the basis of generalized anti-incumbent/anti-established Democrat rage, untethered either to any particular vices of the incumbent or any particular virtues of the challenger. It will, in other words, provide a useful baseline for seeing how powerful this sentiment is amongst the Democratic electorate, because it is a race that is uniquely free of other confounding variables. 

This race will not be like George Latimer beating Jamaal Bowman (an especially well-established challenger taking out a somewhat wounded incumbent, with clear ideological differences), or AOC beating Joe Crowley (a uniquely talented challenger ousting an incumbent asleep at the wheel). Here, the only impetus that might push a voter to pick Abughazaleh over Schakowsky is "Schakowsky is an old, long-tenured incumbent, and I don't like that." That's clearly a sentiment that has no small amount of force amongst Democrats right now -- but is it enough to actually win a race?

I don't think it is. My guess, assuming a head-to-head matchup between Schakowsky and Abughazaleh? I think the latter will end up pulling around 27%. We'll see if I'm right.

UPDATE: Erik Loomis writes a post on this race that I think pretty well encapsulates the dynamic I'm describing above. He opens by admitting he has no quarrel with Schakowsky or her performance in Congress; she has been a solid Democrat. Nonetheless, he finds Abughazaleh appealing because of grievances towards other Democrats that -- with the single exception of "she's old" -- he admits don't apply to Schakowsky.

This offers me a good opportunity to restate my general views on primaries:

(1) I will freely admit I default to being more "pro-incumbent" than a lot of my peers. This is because I view politics as a job and I think one gets better at it with experience (this is also why I oppose term limits). I am deeply skeptical of the populist "we just need some common-sense wisdom from outsiders in order to get things done in Washington" take. I also think primaries-for-the-sake-of-primaries are needlessly fratricidal and shunt energy that should be used to fight Republicans into D-on-D violence. Consequently, for me the burden of persuasion is always on the challenger to justify their primary challenge.

(2) That said, there are lots of good reasons that can justify a primary challenge! A substantially different ideological vision? Absolutely. Proof that the incumbent has gotten too cozy with Republicans and is selling out party priorities? Definitely (hello IDC!). Political heresies that can't be justified by the demographics of the district (fair or not, we have to give more leeway to Joe Manchin than to Dan Lipinski)? 100%. A serious scandal? Obviously. Indeed, where there is a good reason for antipathy towards a specific incumbent, then I think a primary challenge is the right way to push the party in a more positive direction. Nobody is entitled to keep their seat in absence of good performance.

(3) But there does need to be a real reason. "The incumbent is old", without that manifesting in terms of incapacity or unwillingness to "fight", is not a reason. "I feel I deserve to be a bigger deal" is also not a reason (looking at you, Joe Kennedy). "It's time for new blood" is also not, on its own, a real reason.

(4) And finally, I think it is actually bad to challenge incumbents who have objectively good records. We want our politicians to be properly incentivized vis-a-vis good performance. When they misbehave, we should put a little fear into them (and a serious primary challenge is a great way to do that). But the corollary is that when they do well, they should be rewarded with political security. Do badly, get primaried; do well, keep your seat. But if doing the right thing doesn't yield electoral rewards, then the material incentive structure for politicians to do good things frays considerably, and we have to start relying on less reliable and more idiosyncratic mechanisms to get our representatives to vote in the appropriate fashion.

Bow(man)ing Out

As you've no doubt seen, George Latimer has ousted incumbent Rep. Jamaal Bowman in the Democratic primary for New York's 16th congressional district. The margin -- approximately 58-41 -- is similar to Bowman's own primary victory over longtime district Rep. Eliot Engel in 2020 (that was a 55-41 victory).

Of course, we all know the cardinal rule about ousting incumbents in primaries: My challenge is an authentic expression of popular rebellion, your challenge is an astroturfed manipulation by special interests and rabble-rousers.

The reality is that one shouldn't read too much into this result. I think it tells us a lot less about the state of "Israel politics" in the Democratic Party than anybody would like to admit. Yes, AIPAC dumped a truckload of money into this race. But Bowman made plenty of missteps that made him vulnerable; first and foremost being seemingly completely uninterested in connecting with his district once lines were redrawn after the census. Part of what haunted Engel was the sense he had grown distant from his district, but Bowman quickly fell victim to the same sentiment (particularly in contrast to Latimer, who had extremely deep connections and a reputation as an outstanding retail politician). When your closing rally cry is a promise to show "AIPAC the power of the motherfucking South Bronx", and none of your district actually includes the South Bronx, that's not awesome.

All of which raises the question of how much difference AIPAC's money actually made. A colleague of mine described their intervention as "feasting on a corpse", and while I think that's exaggerated, there's little question that AIPAC knows how to pick its spots and is happy to claim credit for backing a winning horse. AIPAC's backing might have given him some extra oomph, but Latimer was already an unusually high-profile challenger given his long run in Westchester politics. Right now, both sides have an incentive to talk up AIPAC's influence -- Camp AIPAC to gain the aura of deterrence, Team Bowman to provide a face-saving excuse -- but for my part I'm doubtful that AIPAC's dollars made much of a difference (or at the very least, the diminishing returns after the first infusion accelerated rapidly). As obnoxious as the glut of money sloshing around American politics might be, it just isn't the case that a truckload of money can simply buy a congressional seat (ask David Trone, or Carrick Flynn). Bowman may have been outspent, but he had plenty of resources (tangible or not) in his corner; he was hardly hung out to dry. And meanwhile, as much as AIPAC wants to crow that "pro-Israel = good politics", it remains the case that most of its advertising in Democratic primaries studiously avoids talking about Israel, suggesting it isn't as confident in its message as its bluster suggests. 

In fact, I'm mostly tired of how the Israel thing completely overwhelms and distorts how we talk about all the relevant players here. Bowman's 2020 victory over Engel was framed as an ousting of a "moderate", but that label almost exclusively played on Engel's pro-Israel voting record -- in reality, he was a reliable progressive vote through his entire multi-decade tenure in office. And Bowman, too, is disserved when people act like the only thing he did in office was yell about Israel. He was a passionate voice for the interests of working class Americans and that passion was an inspiration to many. I have no desire to dance on his grave, any more than Engel's. And, for what it's worth, I suspect Latimer too will be a generally reliable liberal voice in Congress (indeed, my understanding is that New York progressives generally had warm feelings towards Latimer up until the ugliness of this race). The real moral of this story is that while in highly-activated online circles Israel (pro- or anti-) might matter uber alles, that's not what's happening on the ground.

These posts aren't what anyone enjoys reading -- people want to crow at a Squad member being laid low or they want to fulminate over AIPAC bulldozing American democracy. But the reality is that most of the political dynamics in play here are considerably more prosaic. If Cori Bush loses her primary in a few weeks, the same will be true -- she's also facing a strong challenger and she also has had some bad headlines dragging her. And likewise, there's a reason why AIPAC has largely left folks like AOC or Rashida Tlaib or Summer Lee alone -- they haven't shown the same vulnerabilities. There's no unified narrative, save perhaps that there is a lot more political diversity amongst even committed, partisan Democrats right now than there is amongst Republicans.*

* Yet even these stories can be overstated. The linked article uses, as one of its examples of "moderates" prevailing in Democratic primaries, my own congressional district where Janelle Bynum beat 2022 nominee Jamie McLeod-Skinner. Yet I highly doubt that this result has much of anything to do with Bynum's "moderation". McLeod-Skinner was badly damaged by stories that she was abusive towards staff, but more importantly she ousted an incumbent Democrat in 2022 and then lost the seat to a Republican, which I think for many Democrats was an unforgivable failure. There are times when it's worthwhile to dislodge a rooted Democratic incumbent, but if you do it in a swing district you damn well better close the show, and McLeod-Skinner didn't. McLeod-Skinner's track record, coupled with Bynum's own history having defeated the Republican incumbent in a local race before, were I suspect far more decisive than notions that Bynum cut a distinctively "moderate" profile (I think she, like Latimer, will be a decidedly "normal" Democratic representative in Congress).

From Scarsdale To Dearborn, Enough with the Dogwhistles Already

Incumbent Rep. Jamaal Bowman (D-NY) is facing a tough primary challenge from fellow Democrat George Latimer. Much of the heat in the primary has centered around Israel (Bowman is a harsh critic; Latimer has AIPAC backing), and in that context Latimer claimed in a public debate that Bowman's constituency is not the local residents of New York, but rather "Dearborn, Michigan" (and "San Francisco, California"). Dearborn is well-known for its large Arab and Muslim population, and so Bowman quickly called him out for the racist "dog-whistle".

I, of course, immediately harkened back to not-so-fond memories of Antone Melton-Meaux's 2020 primary challenge to Ilhan Omar,* where Omar's campaign sent out a mailer highlighting her challenger's donor support, singling out one from the heavily Jewish suburb of "Scarsdale, New York" (all of the named donors in Omar's mailer were also Jewish). This, too, was pounced on by Omar's opponents and said to be an antisemitic dog-whistle.

Latimer's defenders say he was merely highlighting Bowman's lack of local support. Omar's defenders likewise contended she was being unjustly smeared as a critic of Israel.

So, is this sort of attack a dog-whistle? Quick -- everybody switch sides!

In all seriousness, if you condemned the Omar campaign for its "Scarsdale mailer" you don't get to give Latimer a pass on this. And likewise, if you poo-pooed the Scarsdale mailer as a ginned up controversy over nothing you can sit right down in your high dudgeon over the Dearborn remark.

(My answer: Both instances were shady and both politicians deserved to be called out on it.)

* I'm bemused to rediscover that my blogpost on this controversy was titled "I Have To Talk About Omar and Melton-Meaux, Don't I?", which really captures a certain mood, doesn't it?

The Uncommitted Story, Part II

I've been trying my best to give a dispassionate account of how the "uncommitted" campaign is doing. Obviously, supporters have an incentive to pump up its successes; opponents have a perhaps more mixed set of incentives (you don't want to give the impression that they represent the true majority, but there can be benefit in promoting a scary monster lurking in the woods). 

But for my part, I'd like to think we do ourselves no favors when we delude ourselves about the state of the world. If "uncommitted" is doing exceptionally well and demonstrating a genuine groundswell of opposition to Joe Biden's policies, there's no sense denying that just because one wishes it weren't so. If "uncommitted" is not performing especially impressively and doesn't stand out from always-present grousing at a coronated incumbent, then there's no sense denying that just because one wishes that weren't so.

So to actually figure out how "uncommitted" really is performing, it's important to establish our comparator. JTA put a piece up last night breathlessly comparing "uncommitted's" Super Tuesday support against how "uncommitted" fared in 2020. Framed that way, "uncommitted" had an outstanding night:

The uncommitted percentages barely dented Biden’s overwhelming win in each state, but far outdid 2020 percentages for uncommitted voters. In Minnesota, with 74% of votes counted at 10 p.m. Central Time, uncommitted was getting 20% of the vote; it garnered less than a half percent in 2020.

[...]

In Colorado, with 74% of the vote counted at 9 p.m. Mountain Time, uncommitted was getting 7.5% of the vote. It did not register at all in 2020.

In North Carolina,  at 11 p.m. Eastern Time, with 93% of the vote counted, uncommitted voters were 12.5% of those voting in the Democratic primary. In 2020, it was 1.64%.

In Tennessee, at 11 p.m. Eastern Time with 80% of the vote counted, uncommitted garnered 8% of the vote. It got less than a quarter of a percent in 2020.

In Massachusetts, with 51% of the count recorded at 11 p.m. Eastern Time, uncommitted was getting 9% of the vote. It got less than a half percent in 2020.

The problem is that 2020 is obviously not the right year of comparison -- an open Democratic primary with a sprawling field of candidates to choose from is very different from a reigning incumbent running for reelection (virtually) unopposed (if in 2020 you couldn't find a single Democrat of the approximately 531 running for president to "commit" to, I don't what your problem is).

So in terms of trying to give an objective assessment of "uncommitted's" performance, the actual comparison is to the last analogous presidential primary -- Obama 2012, since that was the last time we had an incumbent Democratic president running for re-election. 

In such cases, we would expect that there will always be some baseline number of people dissatisfied with the incumbent and looking to cast a protest vote. The question for "uncommitted" in 2024 is whether it is exceeding that baseline. Generously, we can assume that any overperformance compared to the 2012 figures is attributable to the "uncommitted" campaign vis-a-vis Gaza (though obviously, that might not be true). By contrast, if "uncommitted" isn't performing any differently (or worse!) than it did in 2012, then it seems unlikely that the "uncommitted" campaign is actually making much of a mark. So, for example, in Michigan "uncommitted" got 2.5% more in 2024 than it did in 2012, and then we have to decide what that level of improvement says about the strength of the underlying sentiment -- my conclusion was that this was a modest impact, but ultimately not too impressive save for the fact that Michigan's narrow margin makes anything meaningful.

With that in mind, how did "uncommitted" do compared to baseline expectations on Super Tuesday?

Unfortunately, Colorado and Minnesota didn't hold primaries in 2012, so we can't do a direct comparison. I will nonetheless eyeball agree that the 19% uncommitted took in Minnesota looks relatively impressive (though it actually isn't necessarily an outlier figure, as we'll see below). In the other three states, by contrast, things look very different for "uncommitted":

Massachusetts: 9% (2024) compared to 11% (2012)

Tennessee: 8% (2024) vs. 11.5% (2012)

North Carolina: 12.5% (2024) vs. 21% (2012)

These are all substantial underperformances compared to what we saw in 2012. Again, I understand why "uncommitted" backers are trying to juice them up, but these are not good showings! And these are the highlighted state where uncommitted did best! Except for Minnesota and Oklahoma (which seems to have a disproportionate share of randos on the ballot), Biden's broke 80% in every state he ran in on Super Tuesday. By contrast, back in 2012, Politico was running stories about Obama's primary weaknesses by pointing to states where he wasn't even cracking 60% of the vote (uncommitted got over 40% in Kentucky that year!).

So why is the media making a mountain out of this molehill? Certainly, "uncommitted" can give us some interesting microdata (the frustration among Michigan Arab and Muslim voters seems real, for instance, and notable). And in close states, any type of discontent can make a difference (though that proves too much -- any type can make a difference, meaning that any potential grouse or grumble is equally problematic). But I also think that we're seeing the effects of some relatively online journalists who are attuned to a relatively online campaign and so think there must be a "there" there. That, coupled with a deep-seated desire for anything that makes the horse-race story more interesting, and of course this is a tempting morsel.

But the reality seems to be that Biden actually is doing fine, compared to Democrats in analogous situations, of consolidating support. If anything, we've been seeing pretty persistent underestimation of his electoral appeal (itself perhaps a worthy topic for a post). "Uncommitted" right not seems to be mostly (not entirely, but mostly) sizzle rather than steak.

The Uncommitted Story

Last night, Joe Biden won the Michigan primary with approximately 81% of the vote. Donald Trump also won with 68% of the vote (you wouldn't necessarily clock that Trump did comparatively worse than Biden given the coverage, but that's hardly a surprise anymore). But while the foregone conclusion outcome isn't super interesting, many people have been keeping an eye on the relative performance of "uncommitted" in the Democratic column. 

For those of you who don't know, a campaign largely emanating from Michigan's substantial Arab and Muslim community urged Democratic primary voters to cast a ballot for "uncommitted" as a means of signaling discontent with President Biden's support for Israel in the war in Gaza. A few days ago, I registered my genuine curiosity regarding how "uncommitted" would play out in the Michigan Democratic primary. On the one hand, I said, I absolutely could see it "capturing genuine frustration amongst [Democratic] partisans (so getting substantial support)." On the other, I also could see it "mostly an online/activisty thing (so being a nothing burger come the actual vote tallies)." Since both hypotheses seemed plausible, I was genuinely interested to see what the reality would be.

Towards the start of the evening (with, as I recall, approximately 20% of the votes tallied), I wrote the following:

If “uncommitted” typically gets 10% and it holds at 16% (which it may not, in either direction), I’d say that’s not a huge performance (6% over baseline) but still meaningful given how tight MI will be. It’s not something that should be ignored; but neither is it “popular groundswell of rebellion”.

The "10%" baseline is based on the last analogous election where an incumbent Democrat was running -- Barack Obama in 2012. Ten percent (10.7%, to be precise) of Democratic voters then voted "uncommitted" despite there not being (to my knowledge) any significant organized campaign pushing for the vote, suggesting that this is baseline level of support for "uncommitted" that isn't attributable to anything more than inchoate background status quo discontent. Given that, my assessment was that getting an additional six percentage points of support is not trivial, but also isn't proof of some broad-based sentiments of frustration and opposition.

As I said, though, the tally was early and things might change in either direction over the course of the evening. I saw some people suggest that they expected the number to rise as the night went on, on the theory that "bluer" jurisdictions like cities were going to report later and the assumption that "uncommitted" voters would be more prevalent in those areas. But what ended up happening is that "uncommitted" faded over the course of the evening, finally settling at 13.2% -- about 2.5% over the baseline expectation (it's also below the 15% threshold necessary to pick up statewide delegates at the DNC, though it did get two delegates due to strong local performances).

From my vantage point, this really can't be said to be that impressive of a performance. It still matters in the sense that Michigan will likely be close and so every little bit counts. But ultimately, a well-organized campaign, with the support of some significant local Democratic figures (albeit opposition from many others) managing to overperform doing nothing by 2.5% really doesn't demonstrate much in the way of serious political muscle. I don't want to say the frustration that the "uncommitted" campaign is tapping into isn't real. But objectively speaking, it doesn't seem to be translating into significant alterations in Democratic voter behavior -- to that extent, it may be a largely cloistered thing. If I'm the Biden campaign, I'm certainly not ignoring this issue (for a variety of reasons, not the least being that its salience to activist, elite, and media cadres clearly punches above its weight, and then also because one wants to do the right thing and have a good policy that takes into account the views of all relevant stakeholders). But I think we've dispensed with the need for incipient panic.

That said, the "uncommitted" campaign did a wonderful job of setting expectations. The nice thing about a symbolic play like this is that since an objective win is obviously off the table (and not the realistic goal) pretty much anything can be sold as a victory. If you lose an actual election, you have to (well, I guess we've learned you don't have to) concede defeat. If you're not actually running to win but instead are just trying to trumpet your existence as a voting bloc, however, there's essentially no outcome where one has to "concede defeat". You will never see organizers release a statement to the effect of:

Our goal was to demonstrate that the people of Michigan care about X issue and that our values cannot be ignored. But given our anemic performance, the voters today have made clear that Michigan voters don't care about X at all and that we completely overestimated our influence. Thanks to everyone for taking part in this civic experiment, and we'll adjust our priors accordingly.

Here, the uncommitted organizers really basically set their bar on the floor -- they said their goal was to get 10,000 votes for "uncommitted", and they are celebrating for blowing past that tally. On the one hand, 10,000 is not a completely made-up figure -- it was roughly Donald Trump's margin of victory in 2016. On the other hand, in this primary 10,000 votes would have been barely over 1% of the total tally -- less than half of Dean Phillips' tally and a tenth of the Obama 2012 baseline. It is true that turnout is up considerably since 2012 (10.7% then was a little less than 21,000 votes; 13.2% in 2024 is over 100,000 votes) -- but it's hard to view that as bad news for Democrats.

The other observation I want to make relates to that prediction I saw that the "uncommitted" tally would rise as bluer, urban jurisdictions came in, when the reality was that "uncommitted" faded over the course of the evening. I wasn't following the returns closely enough to confirm whether the bluer areas were in fact reporting later. Assuming that they did, though, I think this is a good time to correct another common and understandable misapprehension: that the most partisan Democratic areas of a state are also necessarily the most progressive.

It's an understandable inference. In a two-party system, we might imagine that a voter who is only slightly left-of-center would regularly be at least tempted to vote GOP (given the "right" candidates), a voter who is more decisively liberal would be less likely to crossover, and the most liberal voter would also be the least likely to be tempted away to the other party. From that, we would infer that the most partisan Democratic voters (those least likely to ever vote Republican) are also the most progressive voters (there preferences are furthest away from those of Republicans).

But it isn't necessarily true. At one level, it's falsified by the presence of "both parties are the same" uber-leftists -- such persons may or may not be tempted to vote GOP, but they're obviously not Democratic partisans. The most partisan Democratic clusters are persons who are probably progressive enough not to be tempted by the GOP, but also not so left-wing that they find arguments like that appealing. But beyond that, there's more that goes into committed Democratic Party loyalty than ideological alignment. We know, for instance, that African-American voters are the most committed Democrats and that African-American Democrats are more likely to identify as moderate or conservative compared to White Democrats. There are other factors beyond ideology that are significantly responsible for why Black voters are Democratic loyalists. Likewise, the post 9/11 trend whereby Muslim voters overwhelmingly voted Democratic also was not primarily a feature of deep-seated ideological leftism -- it stemmed from "other factors" (i.e., rampant GOP Islamophobia) which superseded still-extant ideological moderation or even conservatism.

All of this is to say that the assumption that Black voters, because they are steadfast Democratic voters, also must sit on the left edge of the party on an ideological level, is a mistaken apprehension, and consequently the sorts of issues that are motivating the ideological left-edge of the party are not necessarily the same ones that motivate the base of the party. This isn't to say that the Democratic base is actually conservative; it's still probably true that it is relatively to the left of the average person who votes Democrat in any given November. It's just not all the way at the left-most edge of the party. That mistake, I suspect, is a large part of what generated the wrong assumption that "uncommitted" would perform substantially better in those locales.

For what it's worth, on a very quick gaze there doesn't seem to be much correlation between the Black vote and "uncommitted"; if anything, it seems to have underperformed. The overall Black population of Michigan is approximately 14%, and there are four counties which have proportionally larger Black populations than that: Wayne County (Detroit and Dearborn), Genesee County (Flint), Saginaw County (Saginaw), and Berrien County (St. Joseph) (Oakland County, north of Detroit, is exactly 14% Black).

Wayne County saw "uncommitted" get 16% -- but that's almost certainly more a product of Dearborn than Detroit (disaggregating those figures would be very interesting, but the fact that "uncommitted" outright won in Dearborn and Hamtramck, both of which are approximately half Arab-American, mathematically suggests it did much weaker numbers elsewhere in the county). By contrast, Genesee County, which contains Flint, saw "uncommitted" have one of its worst performances -- 9.5%. Saginaw County saw "uncommitted" get 10.2%, Berrien County 9.6%, and Oakland County 12.5%.

Plot "uncommitted" based on the most Democratic parts of the state (based on 2020 Democratic vote share), and things similarly look blurry at best. Joe Biden only won 11 counties in Michigan last time around. He won all of the above-mentioned counties except Berrien, plus Washtenaw (Ann Arbor), Ingham (Lansing), Kalamazoo (Kalamazoo), Kent (Grand Rapids), Muskegon (Muskegon), Leelanau (Traverse Bay), and Marquette (Marquette, on the upper peninsula). "Uncommitted" had possibly its best performance in the entire state in Washtenaw County, at 17.2% -- certainly a product of the University of Michigan community. And it did slightly better than its statewide average in Kent County (13.8%). But in every other county Joe Biden won, "uncommitted" underperformed its statewide average -- from 13.1% in Ingham to 9.1% in Saginaw. That said, the two counties "uncommitted" performed best in (Wayne and Washtenaw) are two of the heaviest Democratic hitters (along with Oakland) in terms of raw Democratic vote margins; the other counties listed, while won by Democrats, tend to be either smaller or closer (or both). 

So I'd say these results are mixed, and again, my advice to Biden isn't to just ignore this issue outright. Rather, it's to observe that the coalitional politics that drove the "uncommitted" movement are distinct from "the base" (and, in particular, Black voters). That's an important thing -- democracy is about appealing to diverse constituencies who have an array of distinct and differentiated interests, and this issue certainly had strong salience amongst Michigan's Arab and Muslim community, plus a fair amount of weight in the collegiate environs of Ann Arbor -- but it's not necessarily the same thing as it's been presented.

Could RFK Jr. Succeed as a Republican?

[Patrick Semansky / AP]

The utterly unsurprising news that the majority of Robert F. Kennedy Jr.'s major financial backers are dyed-in-the-wool Republicans, and that his "surging" poll numbers are being driven primarily by newfound love from Republican voters, makes me wonder: how would he fare if he actually ran as a Republican?

Obviously, on the issues he's a much closer match to the GOP these days. The anti-vaxx paranoia and overall conspiracy mindset goes without saying. His foreign policy stances are called "tankie" when they're nominally coming from the left, but if you're a Republican they're just bog-standard "isolationist" Putin-worship. Even some of his seemingly more "progressive" government spending ideas could easily be folded into a MAGA-style "build baby build" argument; the same goes for his railings against big business vis-a-vis a Josh Hawley style of politics (it's all easier once you remember that all of these positions -- whether held by Kennedy or Trump or Hawley -- are all vibes, no content, so it's no struggle to assimilate them into a new host).

And symbolically, I think he has a lot to offer to the GOP. It's not just the high-profile "defector" thing (as absurd as that label is to apply to someone like Kennedy). He also -- again, symbolically, not substantively -- harkens back to "my granddaddy's Democratic Party", feeding into the larger grievance narrative of older White voters who retain some nostalgia for the mid-20th century glory days but are convinced that "the party left them". And even in presentation, Kennedy has some Trumpian vibes: the superficial visage of power and influence, paired with the superficial visage of being a "rebel" who's standing up to his own "class" (I can't keep repeating that this is all nonsense, but nonsense is very appealing to GOP primary voters).

Do I think he could oust Trump? No, because I don't think anybody can oust Trump in a GOP primary. Do I think he could become a serious player -- more so than the shooting star crashing meteor that is Ron DeSantis? Absolutely. And as, for example, a Trump VP pick, RFK Jr. makes an alarming amount of sense. The biggest question might be whether the delusions that prompted Kennedy to run in the first place will obscure the greener grass that awaits him on the GOP side of the fence; because otherwise going GOP seems like the obvious play for him.

While I'm Here....

I happen to be in Virginia right now, on my way to give a talk at UVA. But I completely forgot that today was Virginia's state legislative primary election day.

I haven't really been following the races too closely (with the minor exception of this post), but so far the results seem positive. On the Democratic side, Sen.  Joseph D. Morrissey, one of those random conservative anti-abortion Democrats who'd managed to hold onto his blue district forever despite constantly seeming on the verge of defecting to the GOP was finally ousted in landslide by Lashrecse Aird. Also, Del. Suhas Subramanyam (D) handily won the nomination for an open state senate seat against former delegate Ibraheem S. Samirah, who had a truly ugly relationship with the Jewish community in his brief time in office.

Across the aisle, at least two open insurrectionists lost in GOP primaries. Far-right Senator Amanda F. Chase was ousted by more traditional establishment-y foe Glen Sturtevant. And fellow Jan. 6er Del. David LaRock lost his bid for a promotion, placing second in an eight-way primary for state senate.

Others who know more than me can cheer and/or lament other developments. But on the whole, this seems pretty good to me!

Who's Afraid of the NoVa Jews

The Jewish Community Relations Council of Greater Washington has put out a voter's guide for Virginia's upcoming 2023 state legislative primaries (concentrating on races in Northern Virginia). There's nothing too remarkable in it -- the candidates give pretty generic boilerplates about how they'll work hard for the people of Virginia etc. etc., and then link to their websites. Basic stuff. 

But I did notice something interesting.

The guide appears to have solicited statements from candidates in all contested primaries (they did not ask candidates who were running unopposed in the primary). In the Democratic races, all but two candidates dutifully replied with statements to the JCRC.* By contrast, in the Republican races, none of the candidates participated in the Jewish community voter guide.

Now, to be sure, Northern Virginia has shifted decisively blueward in recent years. So unsurprisingly there are a lot more active Democratic races than Republican contests. Republicans only had active primaries in three races -- SD-29, SD-30, and HD-21 -- compared to 14 contested primaries amongst the Democrats. But, at least judging by a quick perusal of their campaign websites, the Republican candidates in these races seem to be actively running and not complete-nobodies. They could have responded to the voter guide. They just chose not to -- apparently deciding that Virginia's Jewish community was not a constituency that was worth their time to appeal to.

* The Democratic no-shows were Saddam Salim (SD-37) and Sreedhar Nagireddi (HD-26). In both of these seats, there was another Democrat running who did participate (Chip Petersen and Kannan Srinivasan, respectively). Hell, even Ibraheem Samirah (running for Senate in the SD-32 after being ousted from his House of Delegates post last cycle) participated, and he has an ugly history with the DC-area Jewish community that includes calling for the expulsion of Jewish groups from progressive organizing coalitions (he didn't, unfortunately, address those comments in his statement). Samirah also has a primary opponent, current House Delegate Suhas Subramanyam.

New York Primary Predictions

It's primary day in New York (and Florida), and there are quite a few interesting races on tap. I'm not going to predict all of them, but I figure I'd lay a marker down on a few Democratic races.

NY-10: This is a complete free-for-all with at least six candidates still in at least plausible contention, none of whom have broken beyond the high teens or low twenties in polling. That said, Dan Goldman, a relative moderate, does seem to be very slightly pulling ahead, and he might be benefiting from the inability of the field to unite behind a single alternative. Carlina Rivera might have been the mild front-runner at one point, but seems to be fading down the stretch. Yuh-Line Niou is the progressive darling in the race who strikes me as having a very Bernie-like high floor/low ceiling profile, but that could actually work to her advantage in a highly fragmented field. Rep. Mondaire Jones is probably my favorite candidate, but he doesn't seem to quite be able to get out of traffic.

Ultimately, I think Goldman probably will win a very, very divided vote (I'm guessing Niou will poll second). I'm not super confident in that prediction. But I'm far more confident that if Goldman does win, he will not lose to Niou in a hypothetical general election rematch where the latter runs on the Working Families Party ticket -- some extremely wishful thinking from lefty commentators notwithstanding.

NY-12: A slugfest between two thirty-year veterans in Reps. Jerry Nadler and Carolyn Maloney, with newcomer Suraj Patel trying to sneak in between the two. Though Maloney represents more turf, she's been notably vulnerable in recent primaries (Patel held her to a tight race last cycle), and Nadler seems to be pulling away. I don't see Patel able to pull the upset, and I do think Nadler is going to end up prevailing.

NY-16: Rep. Jamaal Bowman has shown a bit of vulnerability in late polling, but he may benefit from a split in the anti-incumbent vote as both Vedat Gashi and Catherine Parker are waging credible campaigns. Gashi has gotten far more attention, but the only poll I've seen has Parker in the lead. For my part, I think Bowman will end up surviving, albeit with less than 50%.

NY-17: Rep. Sean Patrick Maloney pushed Rep. Mondaire Jones out of his seat, but then encountered an energetic primary challenge from State Sen. Alessandra Biaggi. Biaggi took down one of the IDC schmucks a few years back, so I have residual goodwill for that. But I also don't think she has the firepower or local base to take out the well-resourced Maloney. She also made what I consider to be a truly boneheaded decision to embrace the view that women past "childbearing age" won't care about reproductive rights, which seems outright suicidal in a contested primary.

As to the Florida race, I won't venture predictions on any of them, but I do want to keep an eye on the Republican contest in the FL-11, where incumbent Rep. Daniel Webster is facing a challenge from certified crank and absolute shonda Laura Loomer. It would be a tremendous embarrassment if Loomer wins (and if she wins, she's absolutely entering Congress in this strongly GOP district). But what is the GOP today, if not embarrassment persevering?

Massachusetts Primary Results and Lessons

Massachusetts had its congressional primaries yesterday. I put down some predictions, and I'm decently pleased with my performance. I nailed Markey/Kennedy (I said Markey would win by around 10 points, and he won by a 55/45 margin). I got the winners right in the MA-01 and -08 races, but I thought both might be closer than they were. Rep. Richard Neal beat Alex Morse by a 59-41 margin (essentially the same spread as Ilhan Omar over Antoine Melton-Meaux a few weeks ago), and Rep. Stephen Lynch beat challenger Robbie Goldstein 67-33.

So what did we learn?

Begin with the Senate race. From what I saw, Markey overperformed in college-educated, relatively affluent and disproportionately White suburban centers while Kennedy's base was in working class and minority areas of the state. That actually isn't that surprising, given how progressive politics has been playing out over the past few years, but it does clash with some of the self-image of the progressive left which very much sees itself as being the voice of the most down-trodden. Take from that what you will.

Likewise, I'm beginning to see at least a few progressive activists say that their support of Ed Markey is proof that they're not purity-obsessed compromise-averse zealots, since, after all, Markey had his share of heresies in his history (the Iraq War vote being a major one). But he was improving, and he courted their support, and it was important that this sort of behavior be rewarded even if wasn't perfect. And I agree! That's a great lesson and one I hope the left internalizes!

But for now, it still seems to be a lesson that is at best inconsistently applied. There's an alternative universe, after all, where Ed Markey -- forty year congressional veteran, Iraq War supporter, backed by Chuck Schumer, Mike Bloomberg, and the DSCC -- is very much viewed as the quintessential "establishment" candidate who leveraged his insider advantages against the youthful upstart promising to shake things up and harken back to old school Great Society liberalism. Indeed, at the very start of the race that was the narrative Joe Kennedy was very much trying to push. It is to Markey's credit as a campaigner that he managed to turn this story on its head. But the fact is that Kennedy and Markey really don't have that different voting records from one another; and there are countless examples where "voting history akin to Ed Markey's" + "support from Michael Bloomberg" = "irrefutable proof of being part of the Deep Establishment". There's more than a bit of arbitrariness that Markey managed to avoid that label.

Perhaps the best thing Markey had going for him was that, orthodox Democratic voting record notwithstanding, he was warm and welcoming of the progressive wing of the party. There's a good lesson there too: being nice works! People like it when you're nice to them. That may seem banal, but there's a branch of progressive political activism that is very committed to the view that the only way to gain and wield political power is via incessant attacks and ruthless "shoot the hostage" bargaining ("the corrupt neoliberal Democratic Party won't listen to us unless we stop voting for them"). In reality, another good way to curry influence is to build good relationships with those you want to influence; and a good way to lose influence is to be openly antipathic to your nominal targets. This is why the Sanders strategy of "running against the Democratic Party in a Democratic primary" was doomed to fail. Markey, by contrast, built positive relationships both with the Green New Deal and "Squad" types, as well as plenty of more "establishment" oriented politicians. That paid off, big time. But once again, the lesson isn't being internalized -- check out the replies to Elizabeth Warren (who endorsed Markey) uttering some generic boilerplate niceties to Joe Kennedy after his defeat. One would think "having already won, there's no reason to actively antagonize a perfectly decent politician who just got 45% in her own state's primary" wouldn't be controversial. But you'd be wrong.

Finally, with respect to Kennedy himself, I stand by my initial assessment that his challenge was needless fratricide. Kennedy isn't a bad guy, and his record as a congressperson is perfectly solid. But there wasn't any clear reason for his campaign other than "I want to be a bigger deal than I am now", and that's not a good basis for a primary challenge. Once again, there should be a very strong presumption that Democratic Party energies are better spent fighting Republicans than other Democrats. Kennedy violated that presumption and so I'm glad he lost.

Over on the House side, I said that I thought Morse's "scandal" probably helped him more than it hurt him, but that this prediction wasn't really falsifiable. That remains true, but I think his wider-than-anticipated defeat does emphasize that the progressive-insurgent model really is struggling to gain traction outside dense urban districts. There's a good case that Stephen Lynch -- who's probably more conservative than Richard Neal and represents a far more urbanized district -- would make for a better target of progressive energies. The fact that Lynch didn't do that much better than Neal (taking 67% versus 59%) despite facing a far lower-profile candidate suggests there might be more room to run in the former district.

Lastly, there was one race, the 4th district primary (to replace Joe Kennedy) where I didn't venture a prediction because the field was a giant 9-way cluster**** and I didn't have time to even try to figure out what's going on. Election day verified that impulse -- the race hasn't been called, five candidates are in double-digits, and at the moment less than 1,500 votes separate first place (Jake Auchincloss, 22.4%) from second place (Jesse Mermell, 21.4%). Still, while the race hasn't been officially called, most observers seem to think Auchincloss -- who ran as a moderate and used to work for Republican Governor Charlie Baker -- will hold onto his lead and become the Democratic nominee.

Of course, a race this close immediately raises questions about what will happen come 2022. On the one hand, next cycle Auchincloss almost certainly won't benefit from a wildly fractured field splitting the progressive vote. On the other hand, he will benefit from being an incumbent. As Rashida Tlaib just showed, the entrenching effect of the latter can easily wipe away apparent vulnerability implied by the former even after a single election cycle. I suspect that once in Congress Auchincloss will work to lock down his progressive bona fides and will be able to hold onto his seat for awhile. But it is well within the realm of possibility that Joe Kennedy's ill-fated Senate run meant that a safe Democratic seat just got a much more conservative representative.

Massachusetts Primary Predictions

It's primary night in Massachusetts! Time for me to lay down my marker and level my predictions.

MA-Sen: Markey over Kennedy (+/- 10 points). It's hard to remember, but at the start of this race Joe Kennedy really tried to sell this as another example of fresh blood displacing an old, out-of-touch member of the establishment who'd been in Congress for decades. Markey did a fabulous job of flipping the narrative on its head, positioning himself as the progressive champion in the race, and Kennedy never really had a good answer to why Markey deserved to be replaced. A Kennedy has never lost a race in Massachusetts, but I think that streak ends tonight.

MA-01: Neal over Morse (high single digits). I don't think this is that gutsy a pick. If Morse loses narrowly, many folks will say that the big story that broke a few weeks ago (he hooked up with college students while a lecturer at U. Mass-Amherst) likely cost him the race. So more ambitious claim (conveniently unfalsifiable) is that this "scandal" actually helped Morse more than it hurt him. Not only did the narrative quickly coalesce that he didn't really do anything wrong, but it brought Morse a ton of attention and progressive support as another insurgent candidate unfairly targeted by the big bad establishment. Indivisible, for example, went all in for Morse immediately after this controversy hit the papers after being relatively quiet in the run up. I think the attention and (more importantly) anti-establishment cred Morse got is what will make this race as close as it is. But it won't be enough, and Neal will survive another term.

MA-04: [No clue]. There are a million candidates in the race to succeed Joe Kennedy, and all the polls agree they're all tightly bunched together. I have no idea who will win, or any idea who I want to win.

MA-08: Lynch over Goldstein (low double digits). In a different world, this would be the marquee progressive House challenge in Massachusetts this cycle. Stephen Lynch has always been well to the right of the district, cutting a Dan Lipinski-like path through a solidly blue constituency. Robbie Goldstein is a solid candidate who's raised respectable sums, but he hasn't gotten the attention that Morse has received out west (the comparison of Morse vs. Goldstein's chances is another reason I think Morse was helped by the "scandal"). I expect Lynch to win, but maybe not by a particularly impressive margin -- and that might set-up a more serious challenge (whether by Goldstein or someone else) in 2022.

Tennessee Primary Night

Tennessee had a primary tonight. There aren't really any competitive general election races in Tennessee, so I wasn't paying too much attention to the primaries either. But a few things worth noting:

• Tennessee's Senate race wasn't going to be competitive, but everyone thought they knew who the Democratic nominee was. Attorney James Mackler had the DSCC endorsement and raised millions of dollars. Nobody else in the field had broken out of 5 digits in fundraising. Yet Mackler ended up taking third, with the victory going to virtual unknown Marquita Bradshaw. This wasn't on anyone's radar screen (while Bradshaw is definitely a progressive, this wasn't a case where there was some big grassroots energy burbling up against the establishment). Bradshaw will once again be the prohibitive underdog against GOP nominee Bill Hagerty. I admit that every time something like this happens -- a complete unknown randomly secures a major party nomination in a high-profile race -- I brace myself for some embarrassing revelation about something they once said on Facebook or a controversial job they once held.
• Once again, Rep. Steve Cohen (D) faced a credible primary challenger (this time from Shelby County Democratic Party chair Corey Strong). And once again, he had nothing to worry about, throttling his opponent by a 70 point margin. Strong's explanation for why he got into the race is unintentionally hilarious: he acknowledges that Cohen (a) has a great voting record, (b) supported Obama administration policies and opposed Trumpist policies, (c) is a national leader, and (d) has been deeply attentive to his district. So what exactly does he think the angle is? Eventually people will learn.
• Tennessee's 1st congressional district has the longest Republican winning streak in the nation. So when the seat is open, a lot of Republicans jump at the chance to go to Washington. This year, the winner -- with just 19% of the vote(!) -- is Diana Harshbarger. Five candidates had double-digit vote tallies -- the field was that fractured. Meanwhile, I can't figure out how to say "Harshbarger" without sounding ridiculous.
• The most serious primary challenge of the evening came against Nashville-based Democratic Rep. Jim Cooper, who is considerably more conservative than his district demographics suggest is justified. He survived Keeda Haynes' attempt to take him out from the left, albeit by a rather underwhelming 53-44 margin. That might give Haynes some inspiration from a rematch (look at Cori Bush and Marie Newman), but there are rumors floating around that the Tennessee GOP might try to gerrymander this seat out of existence now that the Supreme Court has waved the green flag at partisan redistricting.

What Do Ilhan Omar and Eliot Engel Have in Common?

I fully expect Rep. Ilhan Omar to cruise to victory in the upcoming Minnesota congressional primary election, notwithstanding the eye-popping amount of money raised by challenger Antone Melton-Meaux. But if she does end up losing her race, it will be an almost mirror image of New York Rep. Eliot Engel's apparent primary loss to Jamaal Bowman -- in that (a) the outside world mostly cares about the race because of Israel and (b) the actual reason for the challenger's success will be the incumbent's failure to pay sufficient attention to their home district.

It's flown under the radar, but (speaking as someone who used to reside in Omar's district, before she became congresswoman) there have been recurrent complaints that Omar has been weak on constituent services and local issues. Like Bowman, Melton-Meaux may be attracting outside money because of foreign policy, but his campaign focus is very much tailored to the local.

Ultimately, while the frustrations Melton-Meaux is tapping into are real among Democratic stakeholders in the Twin Cities, I suspect Omar is going to be fine in the primary -- she still seems relatively popular in her district. But the parallel between her situation and Engel's nonetheless amuses me greatly.

How To Lose a Primary, 2020-Style

So far in 2020, four House incumbents have lost renomination to their seats (five if you count New York Democrat Eliot Engel, though absentee ballots in New York haven't been tabulated). But there are ... differences between what causes a Republican and a Democrat to lose their own party's nomination.

For example, Rep. Dan Lipinski (D-IL) was one of the most conservative members of his caucus -- opposing abortion rights, gay rights, and Obmaa care -- despite representing a D+6 seat. If you're wondering how he got elected in the first place, the answer is that the seat was previously held by his own father who -- in classic machine fashion -- won renomination and then announced his retirement, inducing the local party to hand the nomination to his son. He was defeated by Marie Newman, who narrowly lost a challenge in 2018 and by all appearances is a perfectly normal Democrat. This is not at all abnormal.

Contrast that to what happened last night, where Rep. Scott Tipton (R-CO) was stunningly unseated by conservative activist Lauren Boebert. Nobody had the race on their radar because Tipton, who enjoyed Trump's endorsement, hardly seemed to have committed any sins against the conservative movement which would generate primary opposition (The Onion notwithstanding). So what was it about Boebert which caused her to surge to victory? Well, she's a qAnon-endorsing conspiracy theorist whose main claim to fame is running a bar called "Shooters" where the staff openly carries guns and which defied orders to shutdown in the midst of the coronavirus epidemic.

Of course, it's not always better when the incumbent loses because of their apostasies -- particularly when one considers what counts as "apostasy" in the modern GOP. Rep. Denver Riggleman (R-VA) also enjoyed Trump's backing, but lost renomination in a "drive-through convention" to far-right challenger Bob Good. Riggleman's wrongdoing? He officiated a same-sex wedding for two of his former staffers. That's enough to get you bounced in the 2020 Republican Party.

But I guess Republicans did manage to dislodge their most openly White supremacist member this  year -- so good on them for that.

Primary Day Predictions (Kentucky and New York)

It's primary day in America, with some big races in Kentucky and especially New York. Why not lay down a marker  of some predictions?

Kentucky Senate: McGrath defeats Booker. Over/under: 15 point margin.

NY-03: Tom Suozzi (incumbent)

NY-09: Yvette Clark (incumbent) -- but with less than 50%.

NY-10: Jerry Nadler (incumbent)

NY-12: Carolyn Maloney (incumbent)

NY-14:  Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez,(incumbent), and it's not close.

NY-15: Richie Torres breaks from the pack and defeats the loathsome Ruben Diaz Sr.

NY-16: Jamaal Bowman defeats Eliot Engel (incumbent) by a surprisingly comfortable margin (~10 points).

NY-17: Mondaire Jones in a tight race.

Keep in mind: I'm not very good at predicting things. But we'll see how I do?

How Endangered is Yvette Clarke?

Last week, we asked how endangered long-time NYC Rep. Eliot Engel (D) was in his Democratic primary later this month (incidentally, Engel's primary challenger, Jamaal Bowman, just picked up an endorsement from Bernie Sanders). Today, we ask the same question of Engel's neighboring incumbent, Rep. Yvette Clarke, who represents parts of Brooklyn. Like Engel, Clarke has a relatively progressive voting record, while (also like Engel) still generally associated with the establishment wing of the party. And like Engel, she faces a vigorous challenge later this month.

In the 2018 primary, the nation's eyes were riveted by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's upset victory over incumbent Rep. Joe Crowley in the Democratic primary. This overshadowed Yvette Clarke's own narrow escape -- she turned back a challenge from community activist Adem Bunkeddeko with just 52% of the vote. Bunkeddeko is back for a rematch this cycle, but this time he's got company: Isiah James, a Democratic Socialist, and city councilor Chaim Deutsch, who is a conservative Democrat closely tied to the Orthodox Jewish community.  James and Bunkeddeko are running to her left, while Deutsch is tackling her from the right.

So how much trouble is Clarke in?

On the one hand, it is very often the case that a primary challenger who narrowly loses to the incumbent on their first try is able to close the deal on the second, as they become a more familiar figure and gain the attention of lower-information voters. Such was the case for Marie Newman against Dan Lipinski earlier this year, as well as Donna Edwards ousting Albert Wynn back in the youthful days of this blog. There was some indication that Clarke was caught napping last time around, and has kicked her campaign into gear this cycle. But coronavirus and lockdowns are throwing all normal campaigns for a loop, and to the extent Clarke needs to run from behind, she might not be able to do it.

On the other hand, unlike in Engel's race, here the field of challengers hasn't consolidated down. James and Bunkeddeko still may split the anti-establishment vote. And while James' candidacy appears to be sputtering out a bit, Bunkeddeko thus far hasn't received the high-profile endorsements that Jamaal Bowman has managed to pull down -- indicating that his challenge is potentially seen as less viable than Bowman's.

Yet while the conventional wisdom is that fractured fields help incumbents, that may not be the case here given how Deutsch is running his campaign. While Clarke is not a conservative Democrat, she has historically polled well in the Orthodox Jewish portions of her district where Deutsch's base resides -- this area almost certainly gave her the margin of victory in 2018. The way Deutsch is running his campaign -- actively touting endorsements from the NYPD and decrying "looters in the streets" -- seems ill-suited to actually winning a 2020 Democratic primary, but his laser-like focus on the portions of the district where Clarke has historically over-performed could suppress her numbers enough to allow Bunkeddeko to pull through.

This race has flown further under the radar than Engel's, but I think there's a solid chance the incumbent gets unseated. New York is shaping to have another eventful primary.

How Endangered is Eliot Engel?

Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY) has been in Congress for over thirty years. In that time, he's been a pretty standard-issue New York Jewish Democrat -- generally progressive, solidly pro-Israel, slowly working his way up the ranks (he's currently Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee).

This year, however, he's facing a spirited primary challenge from middle school educator Jamaal Bowman. Is this the next AOC-shocker (AOC just endorsed Bowman, as it happened)?

On the one hand: First, Engel would have to be an absolute idiot to be sleeping on this race -- especially given the AOC example from last cycle. So while I'm not versed in exactly what's going on in New York campaigning, I have to assume he's putting out ads and has his campaign apparatus in gear. Engel has the endorsement of the Congressional Black Caucus, which can only help him, and he also has a very large war chest to spend.

Moreover, there actually haven't been that many House Democratic incumbents that have gone down in defeat this cycle, despite a lot of online energy propping up this or that left-wing challenger. For example, there were plenty of people excitedly chatting up Mckayla Wilkes' challenge to House  Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, but earlier this week Hoyer beat her by almost 60 points. We have to remember: online energy doesn't usually translate into actual votes. The main counterexample this year was Marie Newman's defeat of Dan Lipinski in Illinois -- but Lipinski is far to the right of his district and was already shown to be vulnerable when he barely won renomination in 2018. Engel, by contrast, has a largely progressive voting record and has not shown much prior vulnerability.

On the other hand: The energy I'm seeing on Bowman's behalf does seem qualitatively different from those of other seemingly analogous challengers-from-the-left. He gained a boost when another left-leaning challenger dropped out and endorsed him, which will help consolidate the anti-Engel vote. Bowman's also getting outside support from AOC, the Justice Democrats, and the Working Family's Party, which will partially (though not entirely) off-set Engel's financial edge.

Meanwhile, Engel had a major mic gaffe the other day, when he said that "if he didn't have a primary he wouldn't care" about not being given the opportunity to speak at an anti-police brutality press conference. While the remark is pretty clearly being taken out of context (he was saying the primary is why he cared about being denied a speaking slot, not that the primary is why he cared about police brutality issues), politics isn't fair and Bowman's gained huge momentum off the gaffe.

The other big wild card is how the coronavirus epidemic and anti-police brutality protests will effect the race. Normally, the conventional wisdom is that anything that disrupts traditional campaigning helps the incumbent, because it's the challenger who has to overcome inertia. But in this case, I can very easily see these issues congealing into a generic anti-status quo sentiment among Democratic primary voters, a sense that what we have now just isn't working, and that could easily be directed (fairly or not) against an entrenched incumbent like Engel. My gut instinct is that Engel will not benefit from the chaos and uncertainty.

The primary is June 23, and right now I don't really have a prediction. Let's see what develops.

What Went On Downballot Tonight

A bunch of states held primaries today, but for the most part they weren't too interesting. The biggest news by far was the defeat of White supremacist (and former Ted Cruz presidential campaign chair) Iowa Republican Rep. Steve King, who was ousted by State Sen. Randy Feenstra. While this probably locks the normally solid red seat up for the GOP (unless King runs as an independent), most progressives still cheered the defeat of the most avowedly racist member of Congress.

Aside from that, though, there were very few marquee races. Incumbents won, generally quite handily. Rep. Kweisi Mfume (D), who defeated former Rep. Elijah Cummings' widow in a special election a few months ago, repeated the feat in tonight's primary to win the Democratic nomination in Maryland's 7th congressional district. There was some barking by the left at targeting House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, but he crushed a progressive challenger with little trouble. Over in Pennsylvania, Rep. Brian Fitzpatrick, one of the few House Republicans who still can kinda-sorta gesture at being a moderate, looks like he managed to turn back a challenge from his right -- he's up 56/44 with just over half reporting (this seat will be a Democratic target come November).

So barring major action in the federal races, is there anything worth reporting further down the ballot? Potentially.

Start in Massachusetts, which had two State House special elections tonight. Democrats held the HD-37 in Middlesex, and, perhaps more importantly, flipped a Republican seat (HD-3) in Bristol. This follows on the heels of Democrats flipping two Massachusetts State Senate seats from red to blue a few weeks ago. While this has no immediate impact on the Bay State political arena -- Democrats enjoy commanding leads in both legislative chambers -- it still represents good news. The Bristol seat is one where Democrats have historically done well at the top of the ballot but have struggled in more local races; if voters of this ilk are becoming more solidly blue, that can only be a good thing.

Moving over to New Mexico, where a slate of progressive challengers sought to tackle right-wing incumbent Democrats who had joined Republicans to block reproductive rights legislation. In the State Senate, it looks like at least three Democratic incumbents have been defeated, in the 5th, 28th, and 35th Senate districts. Another two races, the 30th district and the 38th district (where the incumbent is State Senate President Pro Tem Mary Kay Papen) are too close to call. Also in New Mexico, Teresa Leger Fernandez defeated Valarie Plame to become the Democratic nominee for the third congressional district, vacated by Rep. Ben Lujan (D). I'm not sad about this result.

Montana kind of was a New Mexico in reverse, with the state GOP divided between a moderate "Solutions Caucus" wing (which has been working with legislative Democrats and incumbent Democratic Governor Steve Bullock) and a hard-line ".38 Special" group, which views cooperation as an anathema. Members of both groups faced primary challenges from the other wing, and the overall results were mixed.

Right-wing challengers targeted two moderate state Senators as well as ten state Representatives. On the Senate side, they split (ousting the incumbent in the SD-28 but falling short in the SD-10). In the House, they won in the HD-35, HD-37, and HD-68 but lost in the HD-7, HD-14, HD-21, HD-39, HD-70, HD-86 and HD-88. Meanwhile, centrist challengers took on four .38 special incumbents in the state House, defeating two. The moderates prevailed in the HD-9 and HD-75, while the conservative incumbents hung on the HD-10 and HD-11. Overall, close to a wash.

Our final stop tonight is Pennsylvania, where a bunch of Democratic incumbents appear to be in trouble, but I've yet to find a clear story as to why. Well, that's not wholly true -- in the SD-17, the incumbent is facing sexual harassment allegations, which probably has a lot to do with his troubles. But Democratic incumbents are also trailing in the SD-1 (Farnese), HD-20 (Ravenstahl), HD-182 (Sims), HD-185 (Donatucci), HD-188 (Roebuck), and HD-190 (Green). So far, I haven't found a clear through narrative for these races akin to what we're seeing in New Mexico or Montana. Of the endangered incumbents, Sims is probably the highest profile -- he recently went viral after accusing Republican colleagues of hiding a positive coronavirus diagnosis from House Democrats, placing them in danger. A lot of votes are still being tabulated because they were sent by mail, so I've been cautioned that some of the closer races (including Sims') may change.

Oh, one last thing: in Iowa, just one incumbent lost her primary race -- longtime Democratic state Rep. Vicki Lensing was ousted by University of Iowa law professor Christina Bohannan. I have no idea what these means politically, but I'm always happy to see law professors succeed in their life projects.

Are Americans Grasping the Reality of Police Violence?

As the nation continues to be gripped by protests against police brutality, I've been struck by the near-constant footage of excessive police force against journalists and civilians who seem to be doing nothing more than exercising their constitutional rights. For me, it powerfully communicates the reality of a central theme of the protests: that the police are out of control and are acting as a tool of repression and violence against the Americans they nominally are there to protect.

But my vantage is only a partial one, and I've been waiting to see evidence about how the American people as a whole are reacting. We all still are living in the shadow of 1968, and there is the constant fear that the narrative that emerges will be one where the police are the victims and "law and order" must be restored. Is that what's happening?

Today, Kevin Drum links to new polling that gives cause for optimism: Asked over the weekend whether "police violence against the public" or "violence against the police" was a more serious problem, Americans picked the former by a 55/30 margin. Independents answered at roughly the same margin -- 54/27. Even White Americans agreed by a 50/35 margin (for Black Americans, the gap was a whopping 85/8).

It's just one poll, and just one question. But it does seem to point to a potential sea change (also on that note: a Minneapolis city councilor talking seriously about trying to disband the Minneapolis Police Department outright).

Meanwhile, it's primary night in several states across America -- off-hand, none of the marquee races seem like they'd be particularly impacted by the protests (maybe the effort to take out White Supremacist GOP Rep. Steve King), but I suppose we'll see.

How It All Came Apart for Sanders

In the space of about a week, Bernie Sanders went from likely Democratic nominee to virtually dead in the water. How did it all go wrong? The New York Times has its entry up in what I'm sure will be a crowded pool.

It's an interesting article, in part because it doesn't have a clear through-line. At times, the piece seems to blame Sanders' reluctance to directly attack Joe Biden (whom he apparently is personally fond of), against the recommendation of more pugnacious advisers (but in line with others who urged him to take a more unifying line). Under this view, going after Biden (on things like the crime bill) would have been the only way to crack his solid support in the African-American community -- but Sanders wasn't willing to "go low" and it cost him.

That account would pose a direct challenge to the "Sanders was too mean" narrative that many folks have coalesced around. But at other points in the article, the authors suggest a different diagnosis -- focusing on Sanders' refusal to modulate his attacks on the "establishment" as a means of expanding his core progressive base and making inroads to the rest of the party. Sanders was extremely reluctant to do the basic political legwork of "assuring concerned stakeholders" or "reach out to secure endorsements", and instead alienated potential allies with undifferentiated broadsides that seemed to be fired against the Democratic Party as a whole. Advisers who defended his strategy here seemed to think that Sanders should only approach the Democratic Party from a position of strength (remember "bend the knee"?). Once Sanders were clearly in a dominant position, then they could reconcile -- but with it obvious who the alpha dog was.

This is a perhaps more "traditional" (if we can use that term yet) account of why the Sanders campaign ended up unraveling, one that puts the blame on his refusal to do the political work of winning an entire party. The same no-compromise qualities that endeared him to his core base severely hampered any instincts Sanders might have had to reach out.

Anyway, it is an interesting piece even (or perhaps because) the account it gives doesn't lend itself to a clear conclusion.