Say That I Do, Not That I Say

The other day, I put up a skeet complaining about the faction of progressive commentators who were mad at Kentucky Governor Andy Beshear for not just declaring Mitch McConnell dead and calling a special election to replace him. Their complaints generally took on the theme of aggrievement at Democrats who don't "fight" and a concurrent demand that Beshear "do something" rather than just sit around and vegetate while another Republican lie goes unchallenged. Why don't Democrats ever play hardball?

The problem with this hue and cry, I pointed out, is that it completely misreads what the "hardball" play is. As long as Mitch McConnell is missing, he can't cast votes -- functionally losing the GOP one sorely needed seat. If he dies (or we just decide he's dead), and Beshear calls a special election to replace him, that special election will be won by a Republican who can cast votes, giving the Senate GOP its seat back. Calling a special election helps Republicans. Keeping McConnell's seat in purgatory indefinitely helps Democrats. The hardball move isn't for Beshear to just unilaterally declare Mitch McConnell dead; the hardball move is for Beshear to say he'll do nothing until he sees a long form death certificate and then disconnect his phone.

Nonetheless, the amount of traction the "do something" calls against Beshear has gotten is worrisome. For starters, we shouldn't look past the fact that it is at best conspiracy theory adjacent (it is extremely unlikely that McConnell is secretly dead and that fact is being hidden by nefarious GOP operative -- if for no other reason than, again, his death would be good for the GOP as against the alternative of him lingering but incapable of casting votes). But beyond that, it is the apex of a certain type of brainrot which is so mad at supposedly sclerotic Democratic leadership that it fetishizes the appearance of "doing something" above all else. This is itself a gateway to fascism -- a feature of which Umberto Eco identified 30 years ago as including the cult of action for action’s sake. (“Action being beautiful in itself, it must be taken before, or without, any previous reflection. Thinking is a form of emasculation.”) -- but even if it wasn't, it's just stupidity wrapped in an angry self-righteous shell. It's a large part of what gave us Graham Platner, and what made Platner immune to so many normally career-ended scandals until he finally wasn't -- all could be forgiven because "at least he's a fighter."

This is the problem. Too much of our political energy is being channeled exclusively through the lens of "doing something", where that marks out the sole criteria for goodness or badness, in a way that leads to counterproductive or just bizarre contortions. To give a different example, earlier today Nexus issued a statement defending New York City major Zohran Mamdani from allegations of antisemitism leveled by ADL chieftain Jonathan Greenblatt. Someone on BlueSky, while purporting to "applaud" Nexus for calling Greenblatt out, found the statement to be woefully insufficient. The "absence of action is deafening," he wrote. Nexus' "commitment to fight antisemitism rests on what you do, not just what you say/post."

So what is it that Nexus should have "done", as opposed to just "said"? They should have issued a "call for [Greenblatt's] removal from leadership."

Now, maybe that's a good thing for them to do, maybe not. But I could not help but point out that "calling" for Greenblatt's removal is ... a call. It is words. Again, that doesn't make it pointless -- Nexus doesn't sit on the ADL's board, so they can't actually "do" anything. The point is, though, that if there is a divide between "what you say" and "what you do", this falls pretty decisively on the "say" side of the line. And I flag this here because it seems pretty clear that this was an example of someone for whom "doing" is inherently good and "saying" is inherently inadequate, and so they just instinctively decided that their own preferred tactical intervention had to be a "do" even though it was exactly as much of a "say" as the statement whose inaction was so deafening.

To be clear, I'm not urging a return to cautious moderation. Much the opposite, I think Democrats need to be bold, and when they take back power, they need to exercise it. Recall my wishlist for the first week of the next Democratic administration:

By the end of the first week, I'd want to a complete pro-democracy package (including DC statehood) on the president's desk. I want to see prominent Republicans and ICE leaders who've committed crimes frog-marched in handcuffs. I want the corporate executives who approved "settlements" for Trump's frivolous lawsuits indicted for bribery. I want to see public resources and opportunities expressly redirected away from companies and firms who caved to Trump, and towards those who showed backbone, to show that there are penalties to being a quisling. I want the DOJ to announce an anti-corruption task force geared at identifying all the money stolen from the American taxpayer by the Trump family and clawing back as much of it as possible, and I want them to name and shame the Supreme Court as among the primary obstacles to providing accountability for their crimes. I want to uncover the corrupt insiders who bet on the lives of American servicemembers and have their identities blasted across every newspaper in America in advance of their trials. Do it all, do it fast, weather the storm, then consolidate your position.

These are, I hope one would agree, pretty "fight-y" in character. And importantly, I'd defend all of them on the merits of being good policy, not just as short-term political expediency but in terms of long-term political health. Critically, they are not good just because they give a powerful aura of fighting and acting. And by the same token, while many of these good things can be announced quickly, a lot of them to be fully operationalized do require a lot of the "boring" work of planning and organizing and thinking and researching in order to actually accomplish what they set out to do. Doing that sort of thing isn't backsliding, it's part of making action work.

It is absolutely true that a political movement, to be worthwhile, has to do some things. We're not a philosophy club; the point is to translate some ideals into practice. But the thirst for action needs to be tempered -- it cannot be its own justification. When we let ourselves indulge action for actions sake (again, even leaving aside the pipeline to fascism risk), we will continually bash our heads into easily avoidable walls and be mad at those not running full speed along side us. That's what we're seeing with the attacks on Beshear, that's what we saw for too long from those demanding everyone hop aboard the Platner train, and that will ultimately rip the party and the movement to shreds.

Permanent Hypermilitaristic Suppression of Palestinians Hasn't Failed Because It's Never Been Tried?

In a recent blog post, Nachum Kaplan claims that the shift in Israel's security orientation post-10/7 stems from its rejection of "the West's most dangerous illusions." It begins as follows:

October 7th was a catastrophic security failure for Israel and an intellectual demolition.

In a matter of hours, assumptions that had governed Israeli strategy for decades were exposed as manifestly inadequate.

So far, so good. Indeed, immediately after the attacks, I said something to this effect:

Hamas' operation represents an explosive repudiation of the notion that Gaza and Hamas could be besieged into obedience. The right-wing fantasy-nightmare that Israelis could (only) be kept safe through ever-greater oppression of Palestinians has been finally and completely falsified. From an Israel security standpoint, the rightwing playbook has only accomplished an unprecedented endangerment of Israeli lives in service of the furthest right-wing fringe. At what point do we say these policies are leading to nowhere but universal damnation?

Except, somehow, these aren't the "assumptions" Kaplan has in mind. In his telling, the policy structure that was exposed as inadequate is a brainchild of liberal internationalism inspired by post-war Europe, centered around shared economic prosperity and political integration. What is replacing it is a "harder" view of power, one that rejects the belief "that every conflict is a misunderstanding, every enemy a potential partner, and every murderous ideology an unmet socioeconomic need waiting for a development grant to address."

This makes me want to scream. I simply do not understand how someone can look at Israeli policy towards Gaza over the decade or so leading up to 10/7 and think it was characterized by economic interdependence under the umbrella of diplomacy and a rules-based international order that would keep everyone safe. That's just not what the policy was. It borders on delusion to assert that's what the policy was. The policy was that Gaza could be kept under indefinite conditions of besiegement and economic isolation, and Israel could successfully avoid significant security blowback because of its vastly superior military and intelligence apparatus.

That's the policy that was in place on 10/7. That the policy that failed on 10/7. It is maddening that the political faction that was in power on 10/7, and for virtually all of the preceding twenty years leading up to 10/7, and whose political raison d'etre was to savagely dismantle any semblance of this liberal, diplomatic, Oslo-inspired policy because it was not sufficiently "realist", can invert reality on this. It was not the liberals who set the policies or priorities that prevailed on 10/7. So why are we acting as if their outlook is what failed? Why are we acting as if "diplomacy and political resolutions are dead ends; the only thing that matters is the size of our tanks" is a strategic pivot, as opposed to returning to the same dry well?

If you want to be skeptical of political resolutions, I don't begrudge that skepticism. It's entirely understandable to imagine a future where there is a decisive political resolution imposed to "settle" the Israel/Palestine conflict, one which at least purports to protect the political, economic, and security interests of all parties, and it still ends up collapsing back into terrible violence and mayhem and oppression. But if you are going to be skeptical of that imagined, as-yet-unattempted future, then surely one must be at least as skeptical of the very real, absolutely-attempted past and present that fervently asserted military might was the only thing that truly mattered. One you are imagining to fail, the other already actually has failed.

Again, the inversion of who has to explain themselves to who is infuriating. Kaplan concludes by demanding that "those promising coexistence, deterrence through prosperity, or security through international guarantees must now answer a more brutal question. What happens when you are wrong?"

To which I want to reply, what if you're wrong? No, check that: you already were wrong! Kaplan's belief is that a "harder" view of Palestinians, one that is less concerned with diplomatic niceties or economic development (to say nothing of political equality) and one that relies on "military capability, credible deterrence, intelligence competence, and the willingness to use force" will keep Israel safe. That view is not a departure from the one that governed on 10/7, it is the view that was in force on 10/7 and which failed on 10/7. In a sane world, we who supported political equality and diplomatic resolution would not need to restore our credibility to the militarists, they would need to restore their credibility to us.

Perhaps Kaplan wants an "but even more so" version of the preceding years militarism. But we still, we can ask "what if you're wrong?" What if, it turns out, the near-exclusive reliance on military might, and the belief that Palestinians can be subjected to political subordination and economic devastation in perpetuity, does not prevent October 7ths from occurring? We have powerful evidence from experience on this point. And even if Kaplan wants to contest that his version of military power über alles is different from the prior iterations, "[w]hat cannot seriously be disputed is that the burden of proof has changed."

But people like Kaplan seem to genuinely not see this. And that is wild to me.