Torgerson's Twilight

"There is no 'discrimination case exception' to the application of summary judgment." Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F. 3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).

For many years, 8th Circuit precedent held that courts should be reticent to grant summary judgment against plaintiffs in discrimination cases, because so much of the inquiry depends on inference. See, e.g., Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156 (8th Cir.1999) ("Summary judgment seldom should be granted in discrimination cases where inferences are often the basis of the claim...."); Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Summary judgment should seldom be granted in employment discrimination cases because intent is often the central issue and claims are often based on inference."). In Torgerson, the Court en banc rejected that rule and instead declared -- correctly, in my view -- that there is no special standard of summary judgment applicable to discrimination cases.

Earlier this week, the 8th Circuit en banc issued an opinion in Johnson v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (Bye for the majority; Smith, with Melloy and Kelly, dissenting). The case is a seemingly run-of-the-mill age discrimination case. Indeed, for anyone crying foul over Halbig going en banc in D.C., this case provides an excellent illustration of en banc review occurring "whenever judges feel like it." The majority in Johnson does not assert the existence of any circuit split, or the need to overturn prior panel precedent, or the need to announce a significant change or clarification of discrimination law. This was (in the majority's mind, at least) simple error correction, nothing more.

Still, I think Johnson encapsulates a lot of what is wrong with how the courts (or at least the 8th Circuit, with which I am most familiar) approach discrimination claims. In particular, to me it emphasizes that the Eighth Circuit's employment discrimination precedents have already fallen out of line with Torgerson's mandate. It seems clear that there remains a discrimination exception to normal summary judgment rules. The only difference is that, instead of applying a special standard favoring plaintiffs, now the court has constructed discrimination law to improperly advantage employers.

The universal standard for summary judgment, applicable to employment discrimination claims and civil claims generally, is well-established. The court asks if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and granting all reasonable inferences in favor to the non-moving party, creates a "genuine issue of material fact" such that a trial is necessary. Basically, the question is whether, if all reasonable factual disputes (and inferences derived thereto) are resolved in favor of the non-moving party, could that party win? If the answer is "yes", then summary judgment is inappropriate -- a jury should be the one to decide. In other words, at summary judgment the court does not ask how it, in its own independent judgment, would rule. It only is determining whether a reasonable jury could decide in favor of the non-moving party. In discrimination cases, this inquiry often comes down to how the courts appraise what sorts of evidence could allow a jury to reasonably infer that unlawful discrimination occurred.

This standard is well-known and well-trodden territory. It is also, I suggest, entirely incompatible with how the Eighth Circuit handles discrimination cases.

Take the treatment of "comparator analysis." Comparator analysis is simply the attempt by a plaintiff to present an inference of discrimination by comparing how he or she was treated to a similar employee who younger (or white, or male, or whatever). The Johnson court, citing well-worn Eighth Circuit case law, describes the standard for comparator analysis thusly:

[T]he test for whether someone is sufficiently similarly situated, as to be of use for comparison, is rigorous. See Bone v. G4S Youth Servs., LLC, 686 F.3d 948, 956 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1252 (2013). “[Johnson] must show that [he] and the employees outside of [his] protected group were ‘similarly situated in all relevant respects.’” Id. (quoting Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 853 (8th Cir. 2005)). “[I]ndividuals used for comparison must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” Id. (quoting Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000))

Every time I read this standard, I'm shocked anew. The same supervisor, the same standards, the same conduct, under the same circumstances -- but different outcomes. If one can establish that, the casual observer would probably find that to be remarkably powerful evidence of discrimination. Or, in the Eighth Circuit, one has just enough to squeak past summary judgment.

In JBS USA, LLC v. Ridout, 716 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2013), an Eighth Circuit panel tried to restore at least a semblance of sanity to comparator review. Quoting the Seventh Circuit, it observed that the "similarly situated co-worker inquiry is a search for a substantially similar employee, not for a clone." Taken literally, the orthodox comparator standard would exclude evidence where the other employee had engaged in objectively worse behavior (in Ridout, the comparison was between yelling on a loud factory floor versus hanging a mock KKK hood on the locker of a black employee). But Ridout also tried to drill down to the right way of viewing comparator evidence:

[T]he ideal comparator will match the characteristics of the plaintiff employee in as many respects as possible. While no employee is a precise clone of another, the probative value of comparator evidence will be greatest when the circumstances faced by the putative comparators are most similar to the plaintiff's. Where evidence demonstrates that a comparator engaged in acts of "comparable seriousness" but was disciplined differently, a factfinder may decide whether the differential treatment is attributable to discrimination or some other cause. (citations omitted)

What Ridout was trying to get at, I think, was the unremarkable proposition that the probativeness of a prospective comparator is a sliding scale. The more similar the comparator is to the plaintiff, the more persuasive the evidence it is. A perfect comparator would be remarkably persuasive. As the circumstances diverge, it becomes less persuasive. A decent but non-ideal comparator -- say, with the same supervisor and standards, with similar but not identical conduct in different circumstances -- well, one could argue either way. The company would argue that the conduct was materially different and the distinguishing circumstances explain the differential outcomes. The employee would contend that they are similar enough such that a jury can infer that discrimination (rather than the distinguishing characteristics) really motivated the hostile treatment. That sort of debate is precisely what we have juries for.

Of course, at some point if the situations are distinct enough it isn't really evidence at all. But the rule we have is Wonderland -- smoking gun evidence is the minimum threshold, decent-but-not-perfect evidence would be summarily rejected by any rational jury. This is nothing but a special discrimination exception to general summary judgment standards.

A similar double-standard is evident in how the court treats its obligation to view "the record as a whole." Johnson raised a variety of different arguments for why discrimination might be inferrable from the evidence:

For the reasons we have already discussed, the separate aspects of the record Johnson focuses on in his specific arguments do not raise genuine questions of material fact regarding whether Securitas’s asserted reasons for terminating him were pretext or whether age was the “but-for” reason for his termination. Johnson’s argument regarding the record as a whole is merely an amalgamation of the arguments we have already found unavailing.

As the dissent observes, the majority's analysis here "compartmentalizes" these arguments, finds them individually unpersuasive, and then "summarily dismisses Johnson's contention that the record as a whole contains questions of material fact." Again, this seems completely inconsistent with how summary judgment should be applied in civil cases. It is obvious that pieces of evidence, individually insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, can do so in tandem (or in "amalgamation") with one another. It is precisely this mistake that caused the court, in Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1222 (8th Cir.1997), to caution that alleged instances of discrimination (there in the harassment context) should not be "carv[ed] into a series of discrete incidents."

Indeed, if we examine other cases predicated on circumstantial evidence (which is what an indirect discrimination case really is), this becomes even more obvious. In a suit for wrongful death, simply noting that the defendant had exchanged harsh words with the victim a week before she was stabbed is hardly enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact whether he caused her death. Evidence that the defendant was skilled with knives similarly would be insufficient on its own, as would evidence that he was in the neighborhood at the time of death. But amalgamated together, these individually-insufficient evidentiary arguments very well could send a case to a jury. In no other context would a court reject that sort of argument simply by referencing the individual insufficiency of its constituent parts.

It is possible that the real moral of this story is that, as a Seventh Circuit panel recently suggested, it is time to abandon to the McDonnell Douglas test altogether. If a plaintiff adduces evidence which could give rise to an inference of discrimination, and the defendant offers an alternative explanation that provides a legitimate defense for its action ... we have a dispute of fact. There's no reason to have a special set of hoops for plaintiffs to jump through before a jury gets to do its job. But whether such a drastic reform is necessary or not, even within the confines of McDonnell Douglas it is hard to assert with a straight face that courts are applying the same summary judgment standard as they do for other forms of civil litigation. There is once more an "employment discrimination" exception to summary judgment doctrine. The only thing different is the beneficiary.

Rev. Shipman's Experience

Tablet Magazine has a very revealing interview with former Yale Chaplain Rev. Bruce Shipman, who lost his position after attributing anti-Semitic violence in Europe to "Israel's policies in the West Bank and Gaza." He suggested that "the best antidote to anti-Semitism would be for Israel’s patrons abroad to press the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for final-status resolution to the Palestinian question." In other words, a plea for respectability politics.

The interview was quite informative, in its way. For starters, I found out that Rev. Shipman attended Carleton. That, needless to say, is disconcerting -- I hope he didn't develop his outlook on Jews at Carleton. And I also hope he didn't learn how to answer an interview at Carleton. Because boy, is this one ever a disaster for him.

If one was to characterize a theme to Rev. Shipman's responses, it would have to be "self-pity". He really, honestly, absolutely truly sees himself as the victim here. All the controversy is just hot-headed Jews who refused to listen to reason. We get a long series of remarks on the supposedly shady process through which he was asked to resign; and a clear sense of bitterness that the Episcopalian community didn't stand by him. We also get what he basically admits is a groundless and conspiratorial claim that one of the op-eds written against him (by a Yale student) was actually written by ... someone else. Not gonna say who. Could be anyone. But clearly coordinated. Obviously not a genuine response of anguish from a community member feeling a legitimate grievance. Must be a plot.

While he is quite verbose on the subject of the nefarious plot that brought ruin upon him, he's much more ... taciturn ... when it comes to exploring why his views were so offensive. Consider this exchange:

I guess I’m curious …

I do understand.

Because you weren’t responding to some article about civilian deaths in Gaza.

That’s correct.

You were responding to an article about the murdering of innocent Jews in Europe.

That’s correct.

And so it struck me as curious as why would someone respond to the murder of innocent Jews in Europe by talking about Gaza, except to say that in some way …

I had Gaza on my mind.

… Israel brings this upon …

Gaza was on my mind when I wrote it. But clearly it was not dealing with the larger subjects. And I can understand, and your point is well taken. I do understand.

Is it uncharitable of me to think that maybe he doesn't "understand"?

Or compare the interviewer's lengthy explanation of why -- in the opinion of a far-left Jewish friend -- left-wing Protestants tend to be the most likely candidates for anti-Semitem to Rev. Shipman's response:

I’ll say something very frank, because I appreciate your frankness. I once asked a friend of mine who is a Jew very much on the Left, substantially to the Left of me. You know, someone who favors boycott and divestment [from Israel], someone who favors a one-state solution without question, somebody who is, you know, deeply enmeshed in proudly anti-Israel politics.

Is he for one-state solution?

I don’t know, I’m not entirely clear, but he could be. He runs with plenty of people who are. And he’s Jewish. And I said to him, “You spend so much time among anti-Zionists. How can you tell which ones, which minority, are anti-Semites?” And he said, “Well, that’s easy.” He said, “It’s the liberal Protestants. The Jews aren’t anti-Semitic, even if they’re called self-loathing. And the Muslims aren’t anti-Semitic, because they get us.” He said they understand everything about us, as we understand everything about them. He said it’s the well-meaning leftie Protestants. They profess a deep spiritual kinship with Jews, they’ve often lived in the Middle East, they’ve led tours there.

He’s talking about me! [laughs]

He said, “But they fundamentally see Jews as, their image of the contemporary Jew is of a rich, crass, Zionist who distorts American politics and is bad for the idealized Jew whom they love. Whom they may or may not know any of anymore.”

And, I knew exactly what he was talking about. And I’m not saying that’s you. At all. I don’t know you. But I know people like that … And what I sometimes think is, about the philo-Semitic liberal Protestant experience, is that they don’t understand the why the contemporary liberal Jew might be a Zionist. That in their mind the last good Zionist went out sometime around the late 1960s, was a socialist on a kibbutz somewhere, was totally secular, and that they don’t actually get the lived experience of being, say, a religious Jew in Brussels today.

I think there’s a truth that one can deeply love Jews and have loved Jews, but feel that there are no good Jews left. Except the ones that are entirely secular and anti-Zionist. That there are no good Jews left like there once were.

That’s not my experience.

That's not your experience? Remind me why "your experience" is even remotely relevant? Elsewhere he remarks that "Israel just isn’t good for the Jews, I really feel that. Israel at the present time is not good for the Jews." The underlying assumption, of course, is that what Rev. Shipman "really feel[s]" is remotely useful for providing guidance vis-a-vis what's actually good for the Jews. What has Rev. Shipman done to justify substituting his perspective for those of actual Jews? Blithe dismissal in the place of introspection is the story of this article.

Finally, let's conclude with how the interview concludes -- with what Rev. Shipman hopes "comes out of" this experience:

How are you feeling now? Are you angry?

No. I’m really not. You know, I’m adjusting to a different life. I’ve reconnected with some old friends and made some new ones. I object to being labeled an anti-Semite, which I was in the local paper [the New London Day, in a letter to the editor]. But I really do want to see something come out of this, in the form of an endowment at Yale for the study of the Nakba and the Palestinian diaspora. Where refugees went, their stories, their present conditions.

I bet if you raised $5 million they would take it. How rich are you?

Well, it’s not just me, but I’m hoping to interest a sheik in the Gulf.

Have you been in touch with sheiks in the Gulf?

Well, I expect to be; I hope to be.

How does one do that?

This is new for me. I have a good friend who has done well, an English friend from my time in England, who has done well in life, and who has been given a seat in the House of Lords, and I think that he would have access to some of the sheiks in the Gulf and could make the case. This would be good public relations. Bring something good out of my experience, and also help to bring better understanding of the Palestinian situation. Some kind of acknowledgment. I think it’s worth pursuing. I think it’s doable.

I have no issue with increased historical awareness of the plight of Palestinian refugees following Israel's War of Independence taught in tandem with similar Jewish dispossession that occurred at the same time throughout the Middle East. In fact, I think they should be taught together (I hesitate to endorse having the course funded by Gulf Sheiks). But why that should be what we hope to get out of this controversy baffles me. Shouldn't we hope that we commit to, I don't know, deeper understanding of Jewish experience, or greater willingness to recognize the validity of Jewish perspectives, or even something as simple as renewed commitment to combating anti-Semitic violence in all of its forms? But no -- the most important thing we should get out of a statement attributing the death of Jews in Europe to the actions of Jews in Israel is that Palestinian history be heard. Shades of Fatima Hajaig, anyone?

Necrophiliacs Anonymous

California recently passed new rules governing campus sexual assault, predicated on the idea of "affirmative consent":

"Affirmative consent” means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual activity. It is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual activity. Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time. The existence of a dating relationship between the persons involved, or the fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be assumed to be an indicator of consent.

Jon Chait, David Bernstein, Batya Ungar-Sargon, Cathy Young, and Michelle Goldberg (among others) all cry foul. There are several themes to their complaints, which I feel are worth addressing.

First, let me take a moment to articulate what I take this bill to mean. Put simply, I think "affirmative consent" means nothing more than that the person involved actually consents. "Consent" does not spring into being other than by a conscious decision of the participants that they are consenting. We're looking to the state of mind of the sexual participant -- do they conceptualize themselves as consenting? Other models of consent don't really ask this question, because they're looking to the state of mind of the accused. Did something happen that might have put him on reasonable notice that his partner was not consenting? "Silence" supposedly won't cut it because, well, why should he infer anything at all from silence? Silence isn't evidence, it's a lack of evidence. Note here the default assumption that a women is consenting to sex that occurs, which can only be rebutted by some overt act withdrawing it--traditionally restricted to physical resistance although now more expansive ("no means no")--giving the man knowledge that his partner does not consent and the sexual act is now illicit. Silence is presumed to be consent because no affirmative step was taken to withdraw consent; the burden is on the woman to withdraw consent rather than on the man to procure it.

This has several important implications. First, either way we're going to require an "affirmative" act of something -- consent or nonconsent. Either the man is responsible for taking steps to ensure consent exists or the woman is responsible for taking steps to confirm that it doesn't. It is unclear why, between these two competing candidates for positive obligations, the former is so much worse, so much more onerous, than the latter.

Second, recognizing that "affirmative consent" means the existence of actual (not just presumed) consent counters the claim that there is a disjuncture between the "letter of the law" and what will actually be prosecuted under it. The claim here is that while a great many sex acts will "technically" be rape under the statute, we need not worry because the partner allegedly victimized won't press charges (presumably since she actually was fine with the sex). The "problem", we're told, is that this relies on underenforcement of a badly written law -- the sex in question is rape under the law, we're just depending on the beneficence of prosecutors to overlook it. But this seems to rest on a misunderstanding: I don't think under the California bill a case could successfully be brought if the alleged victim testified that she actually did consent. Nonconsent is still an element of the offense, and while it cannot be rejected simply from silence or a prior existing relationship, it obviously can be negated by an outright declaration by the supposed victim that actually, yes, she did desire the sexual activity.

This also relates to the supposed "ambiguity" latent in the definition of consent. How will we know if consent does not exist absent an overt declaration to that effect? I could retort "how do we know if consent exists absent such a declaration" -- a response that demonstrates that this debate is actually about default rules. Do we presume a woman consents unless she manages to convince us otherwise? But the bigger point is that both the call and the response are absurd, resting on a naive belief that (on the one hand) verbal declarations are infallible and (on the other) there is no other means but through verbal statements to reliably communicate information. Does any one believe this? Of course not. If a woman says "yes" with a knife to her throat, we all are quite capable of using context to disregard the statement. And if a woman violently thrashes about or tries to flee the room, I can't imagine we'd likewise have any difficulty inferring nonconsent regardless of whether she actually said "no" or not. If we can do it for nonconsent, why not consent?

Indeed, to a large extent I find the focus on what we supposedly can't infer from "silence" to be nothing short of bizarre. I'm imagining a completely inert woman, who says nothing, does nothing, takes no voluntary action or otherwise exhibits no signals or reaction whatsoever to an ongoing sex act. Having sex with such a person strikes me less as "the grey area between consent and nonconsent" and more like necrophilia. Far from wondering what it means if your partner is completely silent and completely nonresponsive to one's sexual advances; that to me seems to raise very little doubts regarding whether actual consent has been obtained. Does anyone even desire sex like this while still purporting to want a consenting partner? I'm no Casanova, but I'm pretty sure that if your sexual escapades are occurring in complete and utter silence that should be a red flag no matter what your beliefs about sexual assault might be.

This is not to say there are no cases where there might be ambiguity. But ambiguity is inherent in any legal standard. Consider the facts of State v. Rusk (facts recounted at the link). That case, I think, is very easy under an "affirmative consent" rule but obviously quite difficult under the default rule where one needs to affirmatively demonstrate nonconsent. Another case I recall (unfortunately I can't find it) involved a woman who was jogging in an isolated wooded area. A man who outweighed her by over one hundred pounds literally lifted her up and dragged her off the path, and proceeded to have sex with her. She testified that she didn't resist (futile because of the size differential) or call out (futile because of how far away she was from civilization), figuring that either action might provoke the man to greater violence. Does her "silence" mean consent? What about "I don't know if we should -- my husband is in the next room"? If the man keeps going, has she consented or not? Two can play at the ambiguity game.

Finally, I want to briefly address a complaint I've seen from several sources -- that the California definition of consent is flawed because it would label huge swaths of the American population as rapists. Bernstein's title gets the point across in blunt fashion: "YOU are a rapist; yes YOU!"; and a significant portion of Chait's piece is focused on this concern as well. As a descriptive matter, I have no idea whether this is true -- have most people had sexual encounters where there partner actually did not consent to the act (even if, in their own head, we might have thought they did)? But I want to flag it because I think it presents a very odd -- yet very widely held -- normative position: that by definition rape must be something that is rare (or at least, confined to a narrow class of perpetrators). A definition of rape that encompasses lots of people as perpetrators is, by virtue of that fact, a flawed definition. I raised this possibility in Sticky Slopes -- that we inversely relate the severity of a norm (how bad is rape) with its scope (how many behaviors do we categorize as rape). There is no intrinsic reason, of course, why any such relation should exist. Rape can be very evil and heinous and widely implicate large portions of the American population. There is no rule that says evil must be confined to a narrow band of recognized evildoers.

I should say that Chait, at least, seems to also be making a prescriptive point that where behavior is widespread then sweeping moral condemnation of it is unlikely to be successful. He has some empirical backing for this position (Dan Kahan's work on "gentle nudges" versus "hard shoves"), and that is worth considering to the extent our primary concern is changing behavior. But I want to reemphasize that, while this may accurately describe our moral outlooks, it does not dissipate the strangeness of that conclusion. There is something odd -- almost cheating -- in arguing against a moral claim solely because it would condemn common behavior. It's a naturalistic fallacy on steroids.

"!!!!" ... And Let Me Also Say: "!!!!"

Holy schmoly, Todd Kincannon (former executive director of the South Carolina GOP) wants to execute anyone who's ever been in contact with Ebola. This is part of a stream of horror that begins with "People with Ebola in the US need to be humanely put down immediately," continues through "The people of Africa are to blame for why it's so shitty. They could stop eating each other and learn calculus at any time," and concludes by stating "We should put Wendy Davis' vagina in charge of the Ebola outbreak. It will kill all of them without mercy and go to Nordstrom's afterwards."

And you know it's bad when "We need to be napalming villages from the air right now" doesn't even make my top three. My goodness.

Things People Blame the Jews For, Volume XII: ISIS

I've actually had several opportunities to add this one to the series -- I've seen the "ISIS is really a Mossad operation" bit on numerous occasions -- but the fact that this one came from Malmo, Sweden just broke the camel's back:

A local politician with Sweden’s ruling party said that Israel trained the jihadist ISIS group to wage war on Muslims.

Adrian Kaba, who represents Sweden’s Social Democrats in Malmo’s city council, made the statement this summer during a discussion on Facebook, the Sydsvenskan newspaper reported on Thursday. Reacting to the report, the chairman of the party’s regional branch, Joakim Sandell, said, “An elected official should not be spreading conspiracy theories.”

In his Facebook post, Kaba wrote on July 21: “ISIS is being trained by the Israeli Mossad. Muslims are not waging war, they are being used as pawns by other peoples’ game.”

Malmo is the epicenter of anti-Semitism in Sweden, which is perhaps not unrelated to the fact that their politicians pedal in anti-Semitic conspiracy theories.

But again, Kaba really over-stretched himself here. One doesn't have to say that Israel controls ISIS to claim that they're really basically the same thing. Or perhaps he could, like one of his British counterparts, just complain that ISIS isn't attacking Israel like it should be.

ILWU Statement on "Block the Boat"

Nothing is more progressive than threatening workers!

At 6:00 PM Saturday, ILWU [International Longshore and Warehouse Union) Local 10 and 34 represented longshoremen and clerks dispatched to work the vessel ZIM Shanghai at SSA’s Oakland California Terminal were met with hostile demonstrators, effectively blocking all access to the terminal. Longshoremen and Clerks trying to report to work were threatened physically at some points of ingress and their personal vehicles were physically blocked. As such, all personnel stood-by outside of the demonstration perimeters for health and safety purposes. At approximately 8 PM SSA released all personnel from work.

As far as the union can ascertain, the protests are organized by a coalition of individuals and organizations that plan events and create action alerts under the name of “Block the Boat for Gaza” online.

The ILWU is not among the groups organizing the protests, and the leadership and membership of the ILWU have taken no position on the Israel/Gaza conflict.

Indeed, pretty much all efforts to block Israeli boats on the West Coast end up resorting to threatening the dockworkers. Curious, that.

Hyperbole and a Half

Richard Silverstein, opening a post titled "The European Anti-Semitism Hoax.":

Despite hyperbolic claims like this, “these are the worst times since the Nazi era” ... there is not even a serious, widespread attack on the Jewish community in Europe.

Richard Silverstein, closing that very same post:

To be a Jew in the world has never been more dangerous since World War II.

Clearly, holding even a simple thesis over the course of a single blog post is beyond the capacity of some.

On the degree to which Israeli policies correlate with anti-Semitism abroad, I of course refer back to this post. But I also think this is a rather stark exemplar of my Innocent Until Proven Nazi theory. Silverstein declares it a "hoax" to characterize attacks on Jews worldwide because they do not appear to present an imminent threat of global elimination. Which, while probably true, sets the bar rather low in my view. And indeed, even when we're talking about people who do seem to desire such extermination ("Jews to the gas!"), it's still unfair to consider it a form of anti-Semitism because the motives are so, so different. Arab and Muslim attacks on Jews are simply a response to Jews allegedly being implicated in the oppression of Palestinians. This is distinct from classical anti-Semitism, which contended ... oh wait:

Anti-Semites weren't - aren't - just people who think they're better than Jews. They're people who think they're being oppressed by Jews.

Wasn't the Holocaust really just an overzealous response to Jews oppressing German businesses (Google this event if you want to vomit)? It is ever so important, as Silverstein reminds us, to be absolutely scrupulous in placing "these expressions in a historical and political context."

Double-Counting RECs

Today I wrote a guest-post at the Legal Planet blog (a joint UC-Berkeley/UCLA project) about an interesting challenge before the FTC on how Vermont's Green Mountain Power makes renewable energy claims.

When a generator produces renewable electricity, the power company is entitled to a "Renewable Energy Credit" (REC) (typically 1 megawatt hour of renewable electricity equals one 1 REC). RECs represent the electricity's renewable attributes. These RECs can be bundled or unbundled from the associated electricity. If they're bundled (kept together), then the consumer of the electricity also receives the electricity's renewable attributes -- effectively, the customer is getting green power. But the electricity can also be unbundled from the REC, with different consumers receiving each product. In that case, the consumer who receives the electricity is not actually receiving "clean" electricity -- only the recipient of the REC is (basically, the REC recipient is off-setting dirty power she consumes from another provider).

The FTC petition claims that while Green Mountain Power claims to supply renewable energy to its consumers, it actually sells the associated RECs to other entities elsewhere in New England. This is misleading, since once the RECs are unbundled the electricity consumers are not actually receiving renewable power.

I go into some more detail in my guest-post. If you're interested, I encourage you to check it out.

Homeland Seasons 1-3

Jill and I have been urged by many, many people over the past few years to watch Homeland. We finally cracked last week (it was a trade with my Aunt, who promised to watch Inception) and binged the first three seasons. Thoughts below (possible mild spoilers, depending on how broadly one defines the term):

* For me, this show epitomizes "better than the sum of its parts." I think Homeland is good, albeit not great. But even that positive evaluation is pretty impressive given its raw materials. Three seasons'-worth of plot were driven by a ludicrously forced love story between two characters with almost no chemistry and whose motives were, to say the least, opaque. And both Brody and Carrie distinguished themselves by making awful and inscrutable decisions over, and over, and over again. Literally the only reason I ever rooted for them as a couple was so Morena Baccarin could hook-up with that Captain guy guilt-free.

* Speaking of Morena Baccarin, it is credit to her as an actress that there were very few moments in the series where I found myself squealing about Inara. Jill and I both agree that it is probably good for her that -- following Firefly, Stargate SG-1, and V -- she got a prominent role in a non-Sci-Fi show (though how big a step away "Spy Thriller" really is from her norm is up for debate).

* With apologies to Damian Lewis and his character, this show was far, far, far better whenever Nicholas Brody was locked in a box on another continent.

* Morgan Saylor did a great job as Dana. Dana, on the other hand, did a terrible job as Dana. Also, what is with shows featuring a family with two children, the younger of which is basically a non-entity? Mad Men (pre-Gene), Masters of Sex, I'm looking at you.

* Jill says she's more of a Claire Danes type. I personally favor Morena Baccarin (Inara! Sorry, couldn't help it). But we're both in agreement regarding Mandy Patinkin. I bet he's called "The Bear" all the time.

* Also -- Mandy Patinkin was Inigo Montoya? That's incredible and incredibly awesome.

* Has there ever been a series where "Stand down, acknowledge!" has been used so often, to so little effect? And it only took the show three seasons to become self-aware of that particular running joke.

* Homeland also confirms one my favorite tropes about lawyers on television. To wit, if you're a lawyer in a show about law -- well, I wouldn't call the portrayal accurate, per se, but it has some bearing on what lawyers do if what they did was browbeat potential witnesses by day and have sexual trysts by night. But if you're a lawyer in a show that isn't about law -- you're basically a superspy. At the very least you'll be a crack shot with multiple weapons, and you'll probably be proficient in running a high-stakes kidnapping ring, extortion racket, or intelligence-gathering operation. It's as if Hollywood thinks all law schools offer a mandatory 1L course in wetwork operations. Chicago does, but that's because human life and death can efficiently be reduced to a market transaction.

Behind the Mule

Urging attacks on America, ISIS calls Barack Obama "mule of the Jews". Quick, somebody inform the Greeks!

Oddly, while the ISIS statement asks for attacks against Americans, Canadians, Australians, and the French, it does not appear to mention Israel (at least as summarized in this article). A certain (former) Labor candidate in England must be very disappointed indeed.

South African Jews Meet With South African Leadership

I've done a lot of depressing blogging recently about the state of South African Jewry (no I mean a lot), so it's good to provide some positive news for once. Top members of the South African government, including President Jacob Zuma, met with Jewish community leaders to discuss rising anti-Semitism and to work on ways to promote a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The community leaders seem to think the meeting was very successful, so I'm happy too.

Hamas Arrests Mortar Team

Hamas has reportedly arrested a cell which fired a mortar into Israel yesterday, breaching an agreed-upon ceasefire between Israel and Gaza. And hey, good for them. I know I should have some snarky comment, or at least some cynical statement about how they're just biding their time yadayada, but you know what? We can't ask them to do things like this and then grope for reasons why it doesn't matter when they follow through. I'll curse their sudden-but-inevitable betrayal when it happens, but for now? Good on them.

UPDATE: ... or not?

Word of the Day: Dysphemism

Today, I discovered the word "dysphemism." To be more precise, I thought I coined the term only to discover that the word already existed. Sad for me, although a good sign at my ability to properly match up Greek roots.

In any event, a dysphemism is the opposite of a euphemism -- it replaces a positive or neutral term for a person, concept or activity with one that is negative -- for example, calling a mental hospital a "loony bin" or referring to welfare recipients as "strapping young bucks." I'm intrigued by it because dysphemisms often hold the potential to both conjure up an explicitly negative picture of a given group while allowing the person to claim plausible deniability that this was their intent. For example, when people talk about "young thugs" they are often using a dysphemism for young Black men. Certainly, they are trading on that image which inevitably is conjured up when they make the reference. Yet call them out on it, and they'll immediately cry foul -- who said young Black men? I certainly didn't. Are you saying all thugs are Black people? Who's the real racist now? A similar move gets made with respect to "Zionist" -- it's often a dysphemism for "Jew" that also allows the speaker to disclaim that they're at all talking about Jews.

In any event, yes, there is a word for this. The more you know!

The Bender Theory of Anti-Discrimination

The Bender Theory of Discrimination, named for the loveable Futurama robot who identified it, is that the worst (or in the strongest form, only) form of discrimination is "the kind against me."



Though not canonical, I've often suspected that there was a correlate Bender theory of anti-discrimination. As a society, we have no clear understanding of what constitutes "discrimination" or what steps are required to oppose it. But there is one unifying thread I've identified to all theories of anti-discrimination:

No theory of anti-discrimination is credible if it targets me.

Simply put, any theory of discrimination which encompasses Jane's activities will be rejected as facially ridiculous by Jane. Whatever anti-discrimination entails, it certainly does not entail any critique of my behavior. If it does, the theory is facially invalid and must be thrown out.

The Boycott of South African Jewry Begins

Last month, I noted statements by a prominent South African official calling for a boycott of the South African Jewish community (through its umbrella organization, the South African Board of Jewish Deputies). Today, we see that boycott begin in earnest, as an African National Congress official pulled out of a SABJD conference "Celebrating 20 years of South Africa’s Freedom." The move was praised by various BDS leaders in the South African community (a movement which of course absolutely positively does not target Jews qua Jews) and comes on the heels of a joint statement by the ANC, Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the South African Communist Party, and the South African National Civics Organization which described Israel as "a state founded on the basis of apartheid, which ... is a crime against humanity."

I suppose we can be thankful that they have not (yet) followed up on the other half of their official's "boycott" call, which suggested that members of the South African Jewish community be massacred in "eye for an eye" justice for Gaza civilians. But I suppose we'll have to see what develops.

Oh the Shame!

Grad students at the City University of New York (CUNY) are voting on boycotting Israeli universities. The vote is scheduled for the start of Shabbat, because of course it is (update: it has now been rescheduled). And what did Israeli universities do to deserve such unique sanction? To quote from the resolution:

"Israeli professors and students at Israeli universities who speak out against discriminatory or criminal policies against Palestinians are ostracized and ridiculed if not publicly shamed, or worse."

Ostracized? Ridiculed? Shamed? Say it ain't so! Put aside the complete lack of citation, or notation of the quite robust debate over Israeli policies that occurs regularly in Israeli universities -- with the possible exception of being "ostracized", depending on what that means, how is this different from run of the mill academic disagreement? As Liel Leibovitz observes, the resolution seems intent on constructing a monolithic Palestinian and Israeli civil society -- the former uniformly favoring boycotts, the latter parroting the Israeli governmental line in mindless lockstep. Perhaps they should reread their Said.

"Asajews" and Superstanding

As usual always, David Hirsh knocks it out of the park:

Jews who worry about antisemitism are written off as tribal and self-interested; they are constructed as ‘Zionists’ and hence not as antiracists, intellectuals or legitimate members of the left. This hostile, external construction of Jews is in sharp contrast to the eager self-definition of the ‘as-a-Jew’ critics, who parade their Jewishness in order to discredit, in the eyes of the onlooking world, the fears of their fellow Jews.

The ‘as a Jew’ preface is directed at non-Jews. It tempts non-Jews to suspend their own political judgment as to what is, and what is not, antisemitic. The force of the ‘as a Jew’ preface is to bear witness against the other Jews. It is based on the assumption that being Jewish gives you some kind of privileged insight into what is antisemitic and what is not; the claim to authority through identity substitutes for civil, rational debate. Anti-Zionist Jews do not simply make their arguments and adduce evidence; they mobilize their Jewishness to give themselves influence. They pose as courageous dissidents who stand up against the fearsome threat of mainstream Zionist power.
Ironically, this positioning by the tiny minority tends to set the boundaries of civil discourse in such a way as to exclude and silence the legitimate concerns of the majority. It characterizes antisemitism as a right-wing issue and it teaches antiracists to recognise talk of antisemitism as an indicator of racist apologetics.

We need to agree that antisemitism is serious and that it is real; it is not only a threat to Jews but it is also a threat to the labour movement, to intellectual culture and to wider society. Of course we need then to be able to present and discuss arguments and evidence as to what is antisemitic and what isn’t; how we define it and how we recognise it are rightfully up for democratic discussion. The phenomenon which most definitely closes off the possibility of civilized discourse is the claim that Jews raise the issue of antisemitism, knowing that they’re lying, in order to stifle free speech and criticism.

Emphasis added. And note that the "asajew" formulation is hardly unique to Jews either. Derrick Bell's theory of superstanding identifies the same problem: Blacks who talk about racism and Black issues will be viewed "with a grain of salt" if they're taken seriously at all, but Blacks who criticize other Black people or rally to the defense of White people aggrieved by Black claims will be given enhanced standing and greater credibility.

Their Strongest Light

On occasion of the 7th Circuit opinion in Baskin v. Bogan striking down gay marriage bans, and this afternoon's 9th Circuit arguments on the same question, I got to thinking about the types of arguments were seeing in court by defenders of such bans. Other than generic arguments favoring deference to democratic decision-making -- which could be made about any law -- most sophisticated opponents of gay marriage that I know tend to feel that their strongest argument is a sort of souped-up complimentarianism argument advanced by Robert George and his cohorts Sherif Girgis and Ryan Anderson. I've never found much to that argument -- as far as I can tell, it asks the question "how many moral philosophers does it take to spot a naturalistic fallacy" and answers it with "more than three" -- but if you talk to people who oppose gay marriage but want very much to disassociate themselves from crackpots, that's the argument they make.

The reason I bring this up is because that argument really hasn't made much of an appearance, as far as I can see, in the legal briefs filed by the states defending the bans. While friendly amici have raised their claims, I have found only two merits brief that raises this argument: the defendants' motion for summary judgment in Kitchen v. Herbert (D. Utah), and the appellants' brief in DeLeon v. Perry (5th Circuit, challenging Texas' ban). Courts don't feel compelled to respond -- a quick Lexis search did not find a single gay marriage case where George's work was cited in the actual opinion, and indeed the brief in DeLeon spends some time complaining that the district court did not "read some of the many reasoned defenses of traditional marriage--none of which the court so much as acknowledged (let alone refuted)."

Of course this was a quick read, and it's quite possible more states are making this argument (but just not attributing it to George or his colleagues). Nonetheless, and DeLeon notwithstanding, it seems to be the case that the argument that gay marriage bans are justified because marriage inherently and naturally must only encompass a particular type of complimentary bodily union between a man and a woman is not a major part of the defense proffered by the states. Instead, we're seeing contentions that seem to actively degrade the institution, such as Indiana's assertion that marriage is a necessary prison for heterosexual men who would otherwise recklessly impregnate women and flee to their next one-night stand.

Why is this? One answer is that the states have bad lawyers. But that seems unlikely; and in any event this argument is being spoon-fed to them by very well-connected and vocal amici -- it seems odd that they wouldn't jump on it. Another is that they have such confidence in their other arguments that they don't want to resort to more abstract philosophizing -- a possibility that would be more realistic if the arguments they are raising, such as the "prison for heterosexuals" claim, were not being laughed out of court. A third reason is that, whatever its theoretical merits, the argument does not track well to current legal doctrine. It is seemingly dependent on essentialist notions of sex roles, and courts will immediately recognize the tension between adopting such an argument and adhering to the requirements of the equal protection clause as applied to gender. A fourth argument is that the lawyers for the states find the argument of George and his colleagues no more credible than I do -- relying on a bevy of logical leaps and belied by public experience with gay marriage.

The fact that the courts have not felt at all compelled to respond to George's contention lends some credence to hypotheses three and four. Either they don't find it to have any legal purchase, or they don't find it to make any particularly significant normative points, or both. A third option, obviously, is that they are consciously ducking the strongest case that could be made in favor of gay marriage bans so as to artificially buttress their own position. Maybe, but it seems unlikely -- Judge Posner is hardly one to shy from a fight, and it seems to me that if he thought there was any credibility to the complimentarian argument, he'd have addressed it.

Interpretations are what they are, but the fact is that what conservatives take to be their best argument against gay marriage simply isn't getting any traction. It's not capturing the imagination of lawyers, it's not capturing the imagination of judges, and it's not capturing the imagination of the public. As I noted in my own appraisal of George's work, the main goal of his argument is probably not to persuade, but to keep the issue in the realm of "reasonable disagreement", so that 50 years from now, we won't utterly condemn anyone who adhered to a position that it is becoming more and more evident every day is utterly indefensible. The failure of it to gain purchase indicates that it will not succeed even in this more modest effort.

UPDATE: I watched the 9th Circuit oral arguments today in the Idaho gay marraige case. It in some ways verified the above -- the attorney for the state of Idaho started to gesture in the direction of the complimentarian argument, but quickly backed away when pressed; instead, he relied on a theory of "child bonding rights" which allegedly required them to have both their mother and father in their life (coupled with a claim that gay marriage "sends a message" that fathers and/or mothers don't matter and thus will degrade heterosexual marriage). It was obvious he was drawing dead (the panel was Reinhardt, Berzon, and Gould -- one couldn't ask for a better one if you favor gay rights), and it's always interesting to watch someone gamely make their argument when they know they're doomed.

It's All Political

As I predicted, the D.C. Circuit will rehear Halbig en banc. Again, I don't think this decision was either compelled or foreclosed by FRAP 35, because I don't think that there is any real standard regarding whether to grant rehearing en banc other than "if the court feels like it" (though the persistance with which some commentators skate past "resolving a circuit split" as a reason for en banc review astounds me, given that it is one of the more common rationales for such review).

Of course, it is widely predicted that the full D.C. Circuit will be more favorable to the government's interpretation of the Affordable Care Act than was the three-judge panel. This fact makes opponents of the ACA sad. Or, in the case of Michael Cannon, it causes them to fulminate about how the decision to rehear is "political". Here is his rationale:

(1) Senate Democrats eliminated the filibuster on most judicial nominations primarily so they could seat President Obama’s nominees to the D.C. Circuit; (2) President Obama and Senate Democrats then “packed” the D.C. Circuit with their judicial nominees; (3) the Halbig ruling was written by a judge supported by President Obama when he was a senator and praised by Democrats for his fair-mindedness; (4) President Obama nevertheless appealed the Halbig ruling to a panel where, thanks to the elimination of the filibuster on most judicial nominees, Democratic appointees now outnumber Republican appointees by 8-5; (5) D.C. Circuit court Judge Harry Edwards made political arguments both during oral arguments over Halbig, when he shouted at plaintiffs’ counsel that they were trying to “gut the statute,” and in his dissent, where he questioned the plaintiffs’ motives; (6) Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid said the Halbig ruling vindicates the decision to pack the D.C. Circuit; (7) the president’s supporters urged him to appeal the Halbig ruling to the full D.C. Circuit, (8) this move is consistent with the Obama administration’s strategy of delaying this litigation as long as possible, which would tend to prejudice the courts because delay further entrenches the subsidies that the Halbig ruling declared illegal, and increases the disruption that will be caused by eliminating those subsidies; and (9) granting en banc review is a highly unusual move for the D.C. Circuit, in large part due to the influence of Edwards, who has argued at length against en banc rehearings because they consume considerable resources and threaten comity among the judges on the circuit.

You'll note that, nine subdivisions notwithstanding, there are not in fact nine different reasons here. Most of them are various building blocks on the claim made in #2, that the D.C. Circuit was "packed" with Democratic nominees after the elimination of the filibuster. Erm, no. "Packing", as in FDR's notorious Court-packing plan, occurs when one increases the number of slots on a judicial (or other) body so as to give oneself more opportunities to make appointments. "Filling preexisting vacancies", by contrast, is not "packing" the Court under any definition -- otherwise every judicial nomination is a form of packing. When I began my clerkship on the Eighth Circuit, for example, that court's composition of active judges was split 9-2 in favor of Republicans (it's now 8-3). That's not because it was "packed", it's because President Bush was fortunate enough to see seven vacancies open up on the Court during his tenure (President Clinton saw two, President Obama so far has seen one). The imbalance is because he filled vacancies; it would be absurd to say he "packed" the court.

What else? Well, #6-8 seem to all assert that it's "political" for supporters of the ACA to want to win in court, rather than just giving up. Oh, and then we have the idea in #5 that saying that the Halbig challenge would "gut the statute" is a "political argument." Put aside the fact that it's, you know, true -- what's "political" about this argument? This is perfectly legal in nature -- the upshot of accepting the Halbig challenge is that a central component of the Affordable Care Act would, legally, cease to function. The political angle is that lots of people would cheer said outcome because they want the ACA to collapse -- but that doesn't make the descriptive observation any less legalistic.

But as bad as all of this is, it pales in comparison to the mutilation of Chevron that we see at the end of the piece:

I do not see the outcome of en banc review as a foregone conclusion. Consider: even though the Obama administration’s record in these cases is 3-1, the government has lost ground as Halbig and King have moved through the federal courts. At the district-court level, the government won twice, once at Chevron Step One (Halbig) and once at Chevron Step Two (King). At the appellate-court level, only one out of six judges found for the government at Chevron Step One. Four Democratic appointees lent some weight to the plaintiffs’ argument that the Obama administration is violating the clear language of the PPACA.

For those of you who aren't versed on administrative law, Chevron is the case that governs judicial review of agency interpretations of federal statutes (as we have here). "Step one" asks if the statutory text is clear and unambiguous. If it is, that resolves the case (either the agency is or is not following the clear and unambiguous statutory command). By contrast, if the text is ambiguous, then we go to "step two" and ask if the agency's interpretation is a "permissible" one (which is to say, not "the best one" or "the one the court would adopt", but one that acceptable). Functionally speaking, most of the action occurs at step one, because if the court agrees that the text is ambiguous it will be pretty hard to persuade them that an agency interpretation of said ambiguity is ludicrous on its face.

Cannon, you'll note, seems to have this all backwards. The government winning at step two does not "len[d] some weight to the plaintiffs' argument that the Obama administration is violating the clear language of PPACA." To the contrary, it stands for the proposition that the statutory language is not clear at all but the government's read of it is a perfectly valid and permissible one. Now Cannon is right that it is "better", in a sense, for the challengers to lose at step two rather than step one -- but that's just because it's deeply embarrassing for a challenger to ever lose at step one. Whereas a loss at step two occurs simply out of deference to the government, a loss at step one means the court is affirmatively declaring that the plaintiffs' position is unambiguously incorrect as a reading of the statute. To say that the Obama administration is "losing ground" reminds me of Anthony Lane's immortal response to fans who proclaimed that Star Wars Episode III was an improvement over the other two prequels: "True, but only in the same way that dying from natural causes is preferable to crucifixion."

The Text and the Context

On twitter I flagged this post by my former colleague Rob Kar as a truly superb piece of work on the Steven Salaita controversy. I wanted to place that endorsement here as well, because it earned it. And in addition to being stellar on its own merits, it also is a great exemplar of how someone can write a piece I endorse without reservation even where I don't actually agree with all of its points. As should be clear by now, I absolutely agree with Kar's analysis of the academic freedom issues and I think he has a lucid and empathic take on the motivations of all the various players. Since I have taken the position that some of Salaita's tweets are anti-Semitic, while Kar disagrees, that is the topic of this post -- but I don't want that in any way to detract from my admiration for what Kar wrote here or the points he is making (in fact, if I didn't want to have an excuse to praise Kar I probably wouldn't even be using his post as an example -- in the blogosphere no good post goes unpunished, I'm afraid).

Rob's analysis with respect to anti-Semitism focuses considerably on the need to read Salaita's words "in context", agreeing "that reading these [tweets] alone, and out of context, did give me some cause for concern." He is joined in this refrain by, among others, Scott Lemieux ("[W]e should not read the tweet in isolation but in the context of his other writings.") and Dan Filler (Salaita's tweets "must be read in context, rather than individually, if one wants to claim any insights into what he is thinking...."). I am pro-context. I agree with these statements. Though perhaps in context I do not, because I do not have a clear sense about what the speakers mean by the word "context."

Typically, when folks say Salaita needs to be read in "context", they have been contending we must read all (or a representative sample) of Salaita's tweets, not just those that seem to be him in a worst light. At a superficial level this could be read as the anti-discrimination version of the proverbial plagiarist who seeks to defend himself "by showing how much of his work he did not pirate." But I take the exponents of this argument to actually be saying that the meaning of Salaita's tweets should be inferred by reference to his other statements (especially those which immediately surround the offending ones), which cast light upon how best to interpret other such utterances. For example, seeing that Salaita has found certain Jews praiseworthy, has condemned anti-Semitism (albeit in broad strokes, and without any acknowledgment that Jews might have a privileged or even particularly useful understanding of what anti-Semitism entails), and has stated that he views "anti-Semitism" (as he understands it, rather than as Jews do) to be a very grave wrong indeed, should color our read of his tweet contending that "anti-Semitism" (in quotes) has become honorable.

This argument is correct, as far as it goes. All of those facts should be taken into account. I agree that they do imply that Salaita is talking about "false" or "erroneous" charges of anti-Semitism; specifically, his belief that the typical or paradigm case where something is called "anti-Semitic" (at least by a Zionist) is false or erroneous. And I agree that Salaita probably views whatever narrow instances of anti-Semitism he concedes to be "true" charges to be grave sins (though in terms of specifics we basically have ... Macklemore). Yet even with all of that "context", it hardly compels the conclusion that Salaita's statement is unproblematic and that any read of it which views it as anti-Semitic is nonsense. Everyone at least proclaims opposition to various -isms; the existence of such statements is at this stage such a platitude that it scarcely seems relevant, much less dispositive, regarding any analysis into whether a given set of statements implicates a particular -ism. And even taken on pro-Salaita terms, the formulation he used -- which functionally accuses the overwhelmingly majority of Jews of being such pathological liars with respect to their purported oppression that people should be honored if we claim to feel threatened by them -- is problematic in its own right and is utterly toxic to the possibility that any Jew (outside the narrow band that Salaita deems acceptable) who wants to have a serious discussion about the nature of contemporary anti-Semitism will get a fair hearing.

For this, too, is context. Part of the context of Salaita's tweet is a context in which "as usual, Jews are lying/suppressing free inquiry/insane" is considered a valid response to literally any rendition of anti-Jewish hate or violence, anywhere, in any circumstances. What the argument misses, in other words, is that context is not limited to that which Salaita himself creates. Being aware of the salience of the context I mentioned but consciously choosing to ignore it (if not actively trade on it) is a valid consideration in appraising whether something is hateful or not. Indeed, since I don't think the fundamental inquiry here is whether Salaita has a bad heart; I would suggest that it is actually irrelevant whether Salaita was aware of that context (though in this case I think there is little doubt that Salaita is aware of, and agrees with, the prominent trope that Jews routinely make false accusations of anti-Semitism to "silence" all criticism of Israel).

"There is no outside-text", as the deconstructionist mantra goes -- or as I prefer it: "there is no text, only context". The call for context tends not to actually take itself that seriously -- it does not actually want the totality of context to come into play, it wants to arrogate to Salaita and his supporters (political supporters, that is; obviously I am a "supporter" in the limited sense that I think his offer should be reinstated) the exclusive right to define the relevant reality and exclude competing counter-narratives. We are obligated to accept as "context" not just what Salaita says about himself, but what he says about the majority of world Jewry. Context does matter, and it matters when it provides evidence that Salaita does not conceptualize himself as a Jew-hater and does not view his project as one that is designed to demonstrate antipathy towards Jews. But that's not the only context that matters and it is not the only context that is relevant. Equally meaningful is the cultural meaning of what Salaita says -- social contexts which deny that Jewish voices are credible, social contexts which may be perfectly polite to good Jews, respectable Jews, so long as they remain good and respectable and approved by folks like Steve Salaita.