Showing posts with label ICC/ICJ. Show all posts
Showing posts with label ICC/ICJ. Show all posts

Friday, July 19, 2024

The Settlements Gave Us the ICJ Decision


The International Court of Justice has released a long-anticipated advisory opinion regarding the status of Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories. You can read all of the opinions here, but the top-line conclusion is that the occupation is at this point unlawful, because Israel's actions have made clear that it is not acting in the context of a military occupation at all -- it is acting as if to acquire the underlying territory as part of its own domain. And my overall conclusion is that, while the opinion sprawls and has wide implications, ultimately the vast majority of its conclusions can be laid at the feet of the settlement project. That's what gives the opinion its analytical force, the subject of the main "remedy", and that's what makes it not ultimately a matter of Israel's genuine self-defense and security interests.

To be sure, there is more to the opinion than just an indictment of the settlement project, or even the occupation-qua-occupation. Another aspect sure to get much commentary is the gesture at characterizing Israel's conduct in the West Bank as potentially apartheid -- the opinion was (it seems almost certainly intentionally) ambiguous on this point, and amongst the concurrences one sees both "yes, that's absolutely what it's saying" and "no, we're definitely not saying that". There's also the question of how to apply the ruling to the Gaza Strip -- while nominally covering all of the Palestinian territories, the opinion is primarily focused on the situation in the West Bank, recognizing that Gaza is a different and more complex circumstance for a host of reasons, ranging from Israel's withdrawal in 2005 to the current ongoing war. For the most part, the opinion largely accepts that different analysis will need to be applied there, and so it's fair to bracket that off.

Still, even "just" talking about the illegality of the occupation of the West Bank, the ruling is bombshell enough. Ultimately, the opinion reflects an essential and oft-misunderstood attribute of Israel's relationship with the Palestinian territories: while pro-Israel commentators often treat the language of "occupation" as delegitimizing Israel's activities (cf. Bibi's response to the ruling: "The Jewish people are not conquerors in their own land"), in reality occupation is the most plausible justification for Israel's activities in the Palestinian territories. When one is in the midst of military hostilities with another power, one is allowed to have a military presence on their territory, and one is allowed to impose not infinite but substantial restrictions on the local civilian population to account for security necessities, and one is certainly not required to give the civilian nationals of the opposing power citizenship in your country.

But those prerogatives are predicated on the occupation not being permanent; it is not a claim of permanent jurisdictional right over the underlying territory, it is a temporary state of affairs tied to ongoing hostilities with another power. The ruling of the ICJ can be summarized as a conclusion that Israel is no longer acting as if that was the case. The settlement enterprise, in particular, is the smoking gun evidence here: it is not only clearly impermissible under the law of occupation, but it has nothing to do with effectuating military security in the context of an ongoing state of belligerency and everything to do with acting as if the territories in question are part of Israel's normal domestic territory -- the settlers are, in most every respect, treated identically as if they were Israeli citizens in Tel Aviv. Through the settlements, Israel is taking actions that are fundamentally at odds with it treating the West Bank as being under a temporary occupation, and so it cannot claim the protections international law accords to occupying powers to take actions that otherwise would be obvious breaches of principles of sovereignty and Palestinian self-determination.

For my part, I've only had the opportunity to quickly skim the various opinions, and I'm not an international law expert. There were a cluster of judges who sought to distinguish in various ways between the illegality of Israel's conduct in the West Bank (which they find conclusively established) and the inherent illegality of Israel's presence in the West Bank (which they would not reach), and on my quick read they make a valid distinction. The idea, in essence, is that while it is clear enough that what Israel is actually doing in the West Bank cannot be justified via the security framework of a belligerent occupation (indeed, it openly defies this framework) -- the settlement enterprise being the obvious example -- this doesn't mean that it's impossible in concept for Israel to do things in the Palestinian territories that would be consistent with a genuine military occupation. Israel and Palestine are still in a state of belligerency, and in such a context there likely will be causes where actions could be justified under the framework of a (genuine) military occupation. This probably has more salience in Gaza than in the West Bank, and it further ratifies a point I've made earlier -- that as horrible as the happenings are in Gaza, the West Bank if anything represents an easier case of Israeli injustice: the former at least nominally can be fitted into the framework of a military confrontation subject to a national right of self-defense, the latter appears to be a pure unadulterated land grab.

But it's worth emphasizing how little this matters. Several judges chastised the majority for not paying due heed to Israel's genuine security concerns. It's a fair shot, but the payoff is that even being attentive to these concerns would not actually change much (as evidenced by the fact that even the aforementioned "cluster" of judges ended up agreeing with the majority on all or nearly all substantive points). One can wholeheartedly agree that Israel has valid self-defense rights that are operative in the Palestinian territories, and nonetheless conclude "but there are a host of Israeli actions in the West Bank that have nothing to do with security; it's about taking over territory" (indeed, the fact that recognizing the security concerns would have been more or less "free" does, arguably, validate the Israeli suspicion that the ICJ majority genuinely doesn't care about them -- they do not downplay Israel's security needs as a necessary component of their legal analysis, but rather wholly gratuitously).

Once again, the settlements are central to the point: one can wholeheartedly acknowledge that Israel has a raft of genuine security concerns vis-a-vis the Palestinian territories, and still easily come to the conclusion that the settlements evidence an orientation towards those territories that is acquisitive in character. After all, does anyone truly believe that the settlements are a security measure, as opposed to what they manifestly appear to be on face: an effort to establish Israeli civilian control over new swaths of territory? Once in a blue moon one hears the argument (something about setting a "buffer"), but any jurist would be fully justified in dismissing it as specious; and in any event it is a tactic decisively forbidden by the international legal framework that recognizes many other ways in which an occupying power can entrench its security (just not via the transfer of its civilian population into the occupied territory).

Over and over again, we return to the same point: it's all about the settlements. It is the settlements that show Israel doesn't view its occupation as temporary; it is the settlements that demonstrate the unequal treatment of the two civilian populations that reside in the Palestinian territories; it is the settlements that falsify the notion that the deprivation of Palestine's self-determination rights is solely attributable to the regrettable necessities of ongoing military belligerency. The settlements are the problem. Saying that doesn't make figuring out what to do about them any clearer -- if anything, the deep ties the settlement enterprise has to the "regular" Israeli state only accentuates the magnitude of the crisis -- but nonetheless: the settlements are what makes this entire machine run. I don't know what the Israeli/Palestinian conflict would look like if there were no settlements, but it would look different and would and should be treated differently under international law.

There are many facets of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict which are "complicated", which raise difficult questions of security versus self-determination, where compelling but seemingly irreconcilable national narratives stand at an impasse. But the settlements are simple. They are not annexes of a military occupation, justified by an ongoing state of belligerency. They are an attempt by Israel to exercise permanent control over territories it acquired by force, in defiance of clear international legal rules that prohibit exactly that. One can quibble around the edges of bits and pieces of the ICJ's ruling. But the core conclusion that the settlement project is not part of a military belligerency but an effort by Israel to establish indefinite control over Palestinian territories under a separate and unequal legal regime is to my mind impossible to gainsay.

The ICJ's decision is a bitter pill for many friends of Israel to swallow. But if there is one bit of solace they can take, it lies once again in recognizing the true significance of occupation -- it presupposes two states, both of which have unquestionable legitimacy and a right to exist in their own sphere, neither of which has the right to displace the other. Israel has no right to settlements in Palestinian territories, but Israel in its pre-1967 borders is neither a settlement nor a colony: it is a validated member of the community of nations, whose existence is exactly as sacrosanct as any other country, Palestine included. In his separate opinion, ICJ President Nawaf Salam observed this reciprocity: the entirety of the international legal framework which governs this opinion, including the notion that Palestine is being unlawfully occupied by Israel, is based on the original UN partition resolution in 1948 which "provided for the creation of two independent states on the territory of Palestine, one Arab and the other Jewish."

It was on the basis of [this] resolution ... that both Israel and Palestine proclaimed their existence.... This resolution forms a whole, whose terms must be read together and inseparably. In other words, neither Israel nor Palestine can claim to derive rights from the resolution while rejecting or ignoring the rights of the other party enshrined in the same text.

Emphasis added. The same commitment to self-determination that validated the creation of a Jewish state in Israel demands acknowledgment of the Palestinians' right to their own state. And vice versa. Those who indulge in nightmarish fantasies of the expulsion and extirpation of Israel-qua-Israel, who see the entirety of Israel as an "occupation" and the entirety of the land as Palestinian by right, are not implementing today's decision, they are flouting it.

The ICJ's opinion is a historic victory for the cause of Palestinian independence. But -- or, in my preference, and -- it continues to insist that the legal grounding for both Palestinian and Israeli liberation depends on, and cannot be separated from, parallel recognition of the other. In this critical -- albeit sure to be overlooked point -- the ICJ's decision is emphatic and unimpeachable in holding that freeing Palestine not only need not, but must not, take the form of replacing, displacing, or otherwise eliminating the state of Israel.

Monday, November 09, 2015

Great (Israel) Cases Make Bad (International) Law, Part II

Back in July, I blogged on an ICC ruling reversing a prosecutor's decision not to open a case in the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident. Comoros had filed a complaint alleging that the killing of 10 persons aboard the boat during the IDF raid was a war crime; the ICC prosecutor decided that the incident lacked the "gravity" that would compel an ICC investigation (if you're wondering "why Comoros?", it's because neither Turkey nor Israel is an ICC party, but the ship was Comoros-flagged).

The ICC panel's decision ordering the prosecutor to reconsider filing the case was notable in that it united right-wing general Israel-defender Avi Bell and left-wing general Israel-critic Kevin Jon Heller in pretty vitriolic criticism. Both agreed that the rule the panel articulated regarding "gravity" was legally novel and practically unworkable; Bell explicitly and Heller implicitly contended that the decision consequently would have no bearing outside the Israel context (where, it seems, the normal rules never apply). My post above (which links to Bell and Heller's arguments) provides more detail, but put simply there is no way that the ICC can be mandated to investigated ever case alleging roughly 10 killings, and given the identity of the complaining party (Comoros) there is no serious argument that the event was part of a larger "situation" in the Comoros that exacerbates the salience of the incident.

In any event, by a 3-2 vote an appellate panel has affirmed the initial decision ordering reconsideration by the prosecutor. I haven't read the opinion so I don't know if it takes any steps to cure the defects Bell and Heller identified, and I look forward to their commentary. But at first glance, this seems to be a continuation of a very deleterious trend: International law principles surrounding Israel tend to be tickets good for this ride only. And that is a principle that is destructive of international law and wholly incompatible with principled commitments to equality.

Friday, July 17, 2015

Great (Israel) Cases Make Bad (International) Law

Yesterday, the ICC pre-trial chamber by a 2-1 vote ordered the ICC prosecutor to reconsider its decision to close its investigation into the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident. I heard about this decision via a column by Bar-Ilan and San Diego law professor Avi Bell, who lambasted it as a completely unprecedented decision that fails as a matter of law and whose legal determinations will by necessity only be applied against Israel. This struck me as intuitively plausible -- I've long thought that international legal determinations made in Israel-related cases tend to be tickets good for this ride only.

But I knew that Bell has somewhat of a conservative reputation on Israel-related issues, and since international law is not my area of speciality, I was curious to hear what more left-wing and Israel-critical voices had to say on the subject. The person I particularly had in mind was Kevin Jon Heller, a international law specialist at the University of London who has been a harsh critic of Israel's behavior from an international law perspective for sometime. That said, just as Bell's more conservative slant doesn't mean that I haven't found his analysis to be thoughtful, likewise I've always found Heller's writing illuminating despite his often adversarial stance towards Israel.

So I was happy to see that Kevin has written a lengthy analysis of pre-trial chamber's decision. And -- in substance though perhaps not in angle of approach -- he agrees with Bell entirely. Heller describes the decision as "deeply problematic and extremely dangerous decision — nothing less than a frontal assault on the OTP's prosecutorial discretion," attacks it as fundamentally misunderstanding the law regarding "gravity" of the alleged offense, and accuses it of applying the wrong standard of review in a bid to "maximi[ze] its own power". He also (in a comment) claims to be "shocked by the nasty tone of the decision", characterizing comments in the opinion as "exceptionally uncivil, unnecessary, and unprofessional."

Heller's post is more technical than Bell's is (which makes sense, since Heller is writing on a international law blog and Bell in a general news column), and so he focuses more on the damage this precedent would do to the ICC as an institution. The crux of his analysis (though you should read him, the expert, rather than me, the novice) focuses on how the decision misapplies the concept of "gravity". Obviously there are many human rights violations that occur around the world, and the ICC cannot investigate all of them. One main guideposts for the exercise of ICC prosecutorial discretion is whether the case is sufficiently "grave". In this litigation, the "case" gravity was an attack on a blockade-running ship that resulted in approximately 10 deaths. But, the prosecutor argued, "case" gravity is not all that matters: it also is relevant who the alleged perpetrators were (low-level grunts, or top military or political leaders) and the "situational" gravity (that is, the broader context in which the particular alleged wrong occurred). The latter, incidentally, is not as one might expect the "situation" in Israel or Turkey. It's the situation in The Comoros, of all places. Why? Because unlike Israel or Turkey, the Comoros is a party to the ICC convention, and the hook for ICC jurisdiction is that one of the flotilla ships was Comoros-flagged. The prosecutor basically reasoned that (a) there was no basis for concluding that any high-level Israeli officials could be found to have engaged in any rights violations and (b) that as part of the Comoros situation this event was an isolated one-off, hence, the allegations lacked sufficient gravity for the ICC to investigate. And this is what the-pre-trial chamber rejected. It basically collapsed the entire inquiry of gravity into "case" gravity -- is 10 deaths sufficiently grave? -- and answered "yes", regardless of the surrounding situation and regardless of whether any high-level officials are implicated. And this, as Heller observes, is completely unworkable as a legal rule -- it would compel the ICC to prosecute dozens if not hundreds of cases that previously would have been obviously of insufficient gravity.

Of course, the counterargument to that is precisely what Bell and I suspect -- that this precedent won't be one because it won't be applied anywhere else. The ICC prosecutor will not, in fact, prosecute every case where there are roughly ten deaths, and the pre-trial chamber will not disturb that decision once made. While he does not explicitly echo Bell's assertion that the putative rule of decision here will be applied to Israel and nowhere else, Heller seems to think that the decision having no practical significance outside the Israel-context is a more likely outcome than the complete overload of the ICC structure.

The legal rules announced in this case, and the broader willingness of the pre-trial chamber to micromanage the prosecutor's decision, will not have any broad resonance. They will not apply to other cases or controversies, they will not meaningfully alter the governing legal regime. They will simply be the latest datapoint for an undeniable pattern: Israel gets treated differently from any other country in the international legal arena. People worried about the effects on the international legal system as a whole can rest easy.

Wednesday, February 03, 2010

Quick Eats Roundup

The law school threw a dinner party downtown for us 2Ls, to celebrate us reaching the midway (if you know Hyde Park, you'll laugh at the pun) of our law school career. The dinner felt rushed though: arrive, 10 minutes later seated and eating, courses come out rapid fire, speech by Professor Masur, buses arrive, we go home. It was impressive.

* * *

The bullet-proof tailor of Bogota. This is really, really cool. Involves a reporter getting shot in the gut.

Egyptian journalist union punishes two members for contacts with Israel. One of the writers is "editor in chief of the state-run weekly Democratiya, or Democracy", the title of which I find unbelievably ironic.

Anti-Semitic acts soared in France last year.

Radical rabbi blames gays for natural disasters, warns against eliminating DADT. For the record, Israel has let gays and lesbians serve openly for over 25 years (and it's still kicking!).

Appeals court reverses trial court decision which had thrown out genocide charges against Sudanese President Bashir; Kevin Jon Heller defends the reversal against critics.

Sen. Blanche Lincoln (D-AR) wants it all ways: the joy of controlling the legislative agenda, and the joy of attacking mythical "liberal extremists" for controlling the legislative agenda.

Justice Department issues a recruitment call for mentally retarded lawyers. Sarah Palin is presumably thrilled.

Saturday, October 17, 2009

PA Won't Oppose War Crimes Trials for Hamas Militants

Interesting. Although, lest we forget, the Fatah-controlled PA has very little to say about whether Hamas militants go before an international court. Not only do they not control Gaza (where the criminals would be), they are, to reiterate, pretty mortal enemies with Hamas. It's tempting to view this conflict monolithically, but there are factions, and Fatah and Hamas are nearly as opposed to each other as each are to Israel. So this is more a case of killing two birds with one stone for Fatah than it is a brave stand of principle.

There's also the fact that no international body will ever indict a Palestinian rocket man. So it's cost-free along that axis as well.

Saturday, May 23, 2009

Biographical Tidbit

I knew of Judge Thomas Buergenthal as the American member of the ICJ and the only dissenter to the ICJ's ruling that Israel's security barrier violated international law. Judge Buergenthal's argument was predicated on the fact that the court did not have the requisite factual record before it to determine whether Israel's legitimate security considerations warranted the building of the barrier (he did not say they necessarily did, only that without critical absent facts it was impossible to make a determination on that crucial issue); hence, he believed the court should have declined its discretionary jurisdiction. I remember when reading the original opinion how annoyed I was at the degree to which it brushed aside these concerns, and I was pleased at least one judge had the temerity to stand up and call it out. (Incidentally, for an opinion concurring in the judgment that I nonetheless found illuminating at the time and today, see the separate opinion of Judge Higgins).

In any event, I knew that. I did not know that Judge Buergenthal was also a Holocaust survivor. I imagine that experience is one that informs his jurisprudence -- I can't imagine it didn't in the ICJ separation barrier case.

Tuesday, December 02, 2008

MacKinnon Appointed to Advisory Post at the ICC

Just a quick congratulations to feminist pioneer Catherine MacKinnon, who has been appointed as a special gender adviser to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. MacKinnon, who recently has won some major legal victories securing the rights of women in the context of war crimes, will make an excellent addition to the body as it seeks to enforce international human rights norms.

Wednesday, January 02, 2008

Iran Pressures Argentina Over Bombing Investigation

I haven't been closely following the story of Argentina's continuing investigation into Iran's links to a 1994 bombing of the Buenos Aires Jewish Community Center. Last I had heard, prosecutors had asked to put out an arrest warrant on former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani and several other top Iranian leaders in connection with the attack, which killed 84 people.

But it appears that the investigation is still live, because Iran is starting to push back. An official Iranian news organ is reporting that their own prosecutors are threatening to lodge a complaint against Argentina with the ICJ. I can't figure out what the grounds for the complaint are other than "attempting to damage international prestige of Iranian government," which (though this may come as a surprise to the Iranian government) I do not believe is a crime outside the state of Iran. International Law professor Julian Ku likewise doesn't know on what the Iranian's are staking their claim, even if the Argentine allegations are false (and there is no particular reason to think that they are).

You'd almost think they were worried about this case receiving more exposure.