The shocking news out of Israel is that Kadima has agreed to join with Likud in a unity coalition formed of 90+ MKs. New Kadima head Shaul Mofaz will join the government as Deputy Prime Minister. Bibi had been in the process of calling early elections that would have almost certainly seen Likud gain seats and Kadima lose (a great many of) them. So it was unexpected that Bibi would agree to this, and everyone is trying to figure out what's going on -- who wins and who loses.
The obvious winner is Kadima -- which just staved off a crushing, potentially back-breaking election defeat. Equally obvious losers are Labor -- which was looking like it was poised to bounce back in the new elections, and Yair Lapid, who had formed a new party that looked like it was gaining traction on a populist platform. But with Likud gaining new breathing room, folks are inevitably wondering if any of Bibi's current coalition partners are on the outs, and eyes are falling both on Shas and Yisrael Beiteinu. The former seems the more immediate target, as one of the first things the new coalition plans on doing is reforming the laws granting ultra-orthodox Jews exemptions from military service. But I'm hearing a lot of chatter that it is Avigdor Lieberman in the cross-hairs. Corruption issues aside, and his disastrous reign as Foreign Minister also aside, Lieberman and his party represent the biggest threat to Likud's dominance as the preeminent right-wing party. It wouldn't surprise me if Bibi was trying to hobble their stratospheric momentum.
Kadima's decision to join the government breaks persistent party policy dating from the last election -- a policy Mofaz swore to continue when he was campaigning for party chairmanship last month. I remember being very sympathetic to Kadima not joining the governing coalition back in 2009. It was a principled stand on the notion that Kadima just couldn't link arms with an essentially fascist party like Yisrael Beiteinu.
But the thing about principled stands is that they come with costs. And this one has been costly. The right/far-right coalition that emerged instead has been a disaster for Israel. And the fact that essentially all of Bibi's coalition partners were to his right meant that the Prime Minister was forced to be far less accommodating and far more belligerent than I think even he would have liked.
J.J. Goldberg makes the case that may well save the Israeli peace camp. Mofaz ousted Tzipi Livni, whom I admired, but on substance they aren't that far apart. That includes Mofaz having good social democratic instincts and, more importantly, a clear-eyed picture of the situation with the Palestinians. Putting Mofaz in government gives Netanyahu a countervailing voice, which at least makes it more likely he'll move the peace process forward. We can only hope, anyway.
The other major question around this whole thing is what it means for Israel's Iran policy. Here, I have little to say. Mofaz is Iranian-born and this an issue close to his heart. But I've seen wildly conflicting predictions about what direction this pushes Israel vis-a-vis Iran. Some think "grand unity coalition" equals run-up to war. Others think that Mofaz has demonstrated no interest in Israel adopting a more aggressive posture. I don't know what to think on this, so I'll just wait and see, like everyone else.
Showing posts with label Shaul Mofaz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shaul Mofaz. Show all posts
Monday, May 07, 2012
Wednesday, March 28, 2012
Out With Livni, In With Mofaz
The Kadima Party held its leadership "primary" the other day, and current leader Tzipi Livni has been ousted in favor of Iranian-born Shaul Mofaz. Mofaz thus becomes the first Sephardic Jew to lead Israel's main opposition party.
I'm a strong Livni booster, so obviously I'm disappointed to see her defeat. Mofaz's views are somewhat of a mystery -- 972Mag has a good takeaway of the fallout we can expect to see from his ascension -- but I'm hopeful that he is at least close to the same mold as Livni; particularly, in urging that Israel take a more proactive and aggressive approach towards securing a peace deal. It is also at least possible that Mofaz will be willing to join a coalition with Netanyahu, which Livni refused to do. This would clearly be superior to the current right/far-right coalition which can barely stand up to settler terrorists, much less forge a deal -- bringing in Kadima would relieve pressure on Netanyahu's right flank and at least open up some space for maneuvering. And for the love of God, anything that gets Avigdor Lieberman out of the foreign ministry is a good thing by me.
But all of this is predicated on a lot of unknowns -- not the least of which how well Kadima even does the next election. So I guess we'll see -- both what the Israeli electorate wants, and what Shaul Mofaz does.
I'm a strong Livni booster, so obviously I'm disappointed to see her defeat. Mofaz's views are somewhat of a mystery -- 972Mag has a good takeaway of the fallout we can expect to see from his ascension -- but I'm hopeful that he is at least close to the same mold as Livni; particularly, in urging that Israel take a more proactive and aggressive approach towards securing a peace deal. It is also at least possible that Mofaz will be willing to join a coalition with Netanyahu, which Livni refused to do. This would clearly be superior to the current right/far-right coalition which can barely stand up to settler terrorists, much less forge a deal -- bringing in Kadima would relieve pressure on Netanyahu's right flank and at least open up some space for maneuvering. And for the love of God, anything that gets Avigdor Lieberman out of the foreign ministry is a good thing by me.
But all of this is predicated on a lot of unknowns -- not the least of which how well Kadima even does the next election. So I guess we'll see -- both what the Israeli electorate wants, and what Shaul Mofaz does.
Sunday, November 28, 2010
It Takes Two, Baby
This Jerusalem Post captures two very distinct elements on my outlook on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
The first thing the article talks about the Fatah Revolutionary Council's latest meeting, in which it refused, among other things, to permit recognition of Israel as a Jewish state ("The council also renews its refusal for the establishment of any racist state based on religion in accordance with international law and human rights conventions.") or to consider lands swaps as part of comprehensive peace agreement with Israel ("[I]llegal settler gangs can't be put on an equal footing with the owners of the lands and rights."), or the idea of establishing a Palestinian state with temporary borders in preparation for final status talks. All this leaves me wondering precisely what Palestinians think is being negotiated over here? If negotiations are about compromises and give-and-take, is there anything the FRC is prepared to, well, "negotiate" over?
When it comes to negotiations, Palestinian officials seem to think only one side has an obligation to show up. It's not that there aren't things they have just claim to -- of course there are -- but there's scarcely any notion of reciprocity. "Jewish state"? No. Land swaps? No. Temporary borders? No. Recognition of basic historical facts like the Jewish connection to the Western Wall? No. It's paralleled by the seeming Palestinian approach to armed conflict, where, there too, only one side is apparently allowed to show up.
It's ridiculous. The refusal to countenance land swaps in principle is an arbitrary red-line on a subject which, until now, everyone took for granted would play a role in a final status agreement. And paired with the refusal to consider temporary borders, it puts the kibosh on one of the more promising proposals (by Kadima MK Shaul Mofaz) which would create a provisional Palestinian state on roughly 60% of the West Bank (comprising 99.2% of the West Bank's Palestinian population, plus additional land to create territorial contiguity), as a first step to final borders. Undoubtedly, the ceding of certain settlement blocs to Israel would be matched by land swaps back to the Palestinians. It's a decent plan, and is the outline (subject to negotiation) of a fair one, and now it appears to be a dead one. Go figure.
Meanwhile, shoehorned into the bottom of the article is a proposal by Yair Lapid (son of Shinui founder Tommy Lapid) that we detach the creation of a Palestinian state from the question of peace between Israel and Palestine. It's an idea that's appealed to me for awhile now. Often, the question of Palestinian statehood is debated as a question of dreams and nightmares: the dream that it will lead to a rapid solution to the entire conflict (in which case it should happen immediately), the nightmare that it will lead to a catastrophic and irreversible deterioration in Israel's security situation (in which case it shouldn't).
But of course, those aren't the only alternatives. Also possible -- and I think most likely -- is that the creation of a Palestinian state would neither solve the conflict, nor exacerbate it. It may bring peace moderately closer, or it may make Israel moderately more precarious, or it may have a negligible effect. In that case, it seems like the balance of rights would counsel immediate creation of a Palestinian state, as the benefit to the Palestinians (independence) would outweigh the prospective harms (at worst, moderate deterioration in Israel's security). As Lapid writes, the creation of an independent Palestine may not bring peace, but it certainly will make the conflict easier to manage than in the status quo:
Whatever else one might say about Israel's security posture towards, say, Lebanon or Syria, it's clear that it has been easier to manage than the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The reason is simple -- interstate conflict is well-studied, well-modeled, is easy to predict, and possesses well-established rules and norms of conduct governing the parties. Intra-state occupations and ethnic conflict possesses none of these qualities. Changing the status of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict to something like the Israeli/Syrian conflict would be decidedly less than ideal, but it would also be a marked improvement over the status quo.
Of course, as the first part of this post indicates, simply establishing a Palestinian state is not so simple, as the Palestinian approach to negotiation appears to be stuck in near-maximalism. But what can you do?
The first thing the article talks about the Fatah Revolutionary Council's latest meeting, in which it refused, among other things, to permit recognition of Israel as a Jewish state ("The council also renews its refusal for the establishment of any racist state based on religion in accordance with international law and human rights conventions.") or to consider lands swaps as part of comprehensive peace agreement with Israel ("[I]llegal settler gangs can't be put on an equal footing with the owners of the lands and rights."), or the idea of establishing a Palestinian state with temporary borders in preparation for final status talks. All this leaves me wondering precisely what Palestinians think is being negotiated over here? If negotiations are about compromises and give-and-take, is there anything the FRC is prepared to, well, "negotiate" over?
When it comes to negotiations, Palestinian officials seem to think only one side has an obligation to show up. It's not that there aren't things they have just claim to -- of course there are -- but there's scarcely any notion of reciprocity. "Jewish state"? No. Land swaps? No. Temporary borders? No. Recognition of basic historical facts like the Jewish connection to the Western Wall? No. It's paralleled by the seeming Palestinian approach to armed conflict, where, there too, only one side is apparently allowed to show up.
It's ridiculous. The refusal to countenance land swaps in principle is an arbitrary red-line on a subject which, until now, everyone took for granted would play a role in a final status agreement. And paired with the refusal to consider temporary borders, it puts the kibosh on one of the more promising proposals (by Kadima MK Shaul Mofaz) which would create a provisional Palestinian state on roughly 60% of the West Bank (comprising 99.2% of the West Bank's Palestinian population, plus additional land to create territorial contiguity), as a first step to final borders. Undoubtedly, the ceding of certain settlement blocs to Israel would be matched by land swaps back to the Palestinians. It's a decent plan, and is the outline (subject to negotiation) of a fair one, and now it appears to be a dead one. Go figure.
Meanwhile, shoehorned into the bottom of the article is a proposal by Yair Lapid (son of Shinui founder Tommy Lapid) that we detach the creation of a Palestinian state from the question of peace between Israel and Palestine. It's an idea that's appealed to me for awhile now. Often, the question of Palestinian statehood is debated as a question of dreams and nightmares: the dream that it will lead to a rapid solution to the entire conflict (in which case it should happen immediately), the nightmare that it will lead to a catastrophic and irreversible deterioration in Israel's security situation (in which case it shouldn't).
But of course, those aren't the only alternatives. Also possible -- and I think most likely -- is that the creation of a Palestinian state would neither solve the conflict, nor exacerbate it. It may bring peace moderately closer, or it may make Israel moderately more precarious, or it may have a negligible effect. In that case, it seems like the balance of rights would counsel immediate creation of a Palestinian state, as the benefit to the Palestinians (independence) would outweigh the prospective harms (at worst, moderate deterioration in Israel's security). As Lapid writes, the creation of an independent Palestine may not bring peace, but it certainly will make the conflict easier to manage than in the status quo:
[T]he establishment of a Palestinian state would “take the world off our backs, curb the process of turning us into a pariah state, enable us to maintain our security with fewer restraints, lift the burden of controlling three million people, and enable us to manage the discussion on our final borders and the future of the settlements.”
Whatever else one might say about Israel's security posture towards, say, Lebanon or Syria, it's clear that it has been easier to manage than the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The reason is simple -- interstate conflict is well-studied, well-modeled, is easy to predict, and possesses well-established rules and norms of conduct governing the parties. Intra-state occupations and ethnic conflict possesses none of these qualities. Changing the status of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict to something like the Israeli/Syrian conflict would be decidedly less than ideal, but it would also be a marked improvement over the status quo.
Of course, as the first part of this post indicates, simply establishing a Palestinian state is not so simple, as the Palestinian approach to negotiation appears to be stuck in near-maximalism. But what can you do?
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