Consistent Enforcement of Campus Speech Rules? No, Disparate Treatment!

David Bernstein replies to an Amnesty International/ACLU report decrying crackdowns on pro-Palestinian speech on campus. The report particularly hangs its hat on the issue of double-standards: many of the "rules" pro-Palestinian activists were alleged to have broken were ones the university rarely if ever enforced when flouted by other activists and protesters.

Bernstein concedes that there "is some truth to that conclusion," but ultimately dismisses the "claim that alleged viewpoint discrimination required universities to stand down, for three interrelated reasons." But of these three reasons, two are manifestly unpersuasive. The third, by contrast, has some force but is considerably more limited in scope than he lets on.

Here's objection number 1:

First, arguing some sort of estoppel for cracking down on rule-breaking is a bad legal argument. "But your honor, the government did not prosecute the last ten rapists" isn't going to get you far.

This is a baffling argument to make in the context of free speech in particular. The entire point of the rule against viewpoint discrimination is that it nullifies government actions* even in circumstances where a content-neutral rule, evenly enforced, would be perfectly justified. Bernstein's objection is tantamount to saying that entire doctrine against viewpoint discrimination should be jettisoned.

It's notable that to make this argument even marginally plausible, Bernstein has to reach to an extreme example (rape), one where we cannot imagine a well-ordered society permitting the conduct and "leveling down" is not an option. Of course, the overwhelming majority of speech-rule violations are more analogous to civil infractions or misdemeanors at most, for which systemic under- or nonenforcement is an entirely plausible policy choice. If we adopt the hypothetical to a more analogous example -- a "no parking" sign that is routinely ignored, but suddenly gets resurrected to only tow away cars at the Trump or Harris rally, then I think the "estoppel" argument might get you pretty far indeed. And all the more so in the core speech-regulation context, where the rule demanding viewpoint neutrality is about as central a lodestar as exists in First Amendment law.

Now objection number 2:

Second, the failure of universities to properly punish misbehavior by, say, climate activists was itself viewpoint discriminatory. One can hardly imagine, say, Columbia University, acting with equanimity if anti-abortion or anti-affirmative action protestors engaged in the illicit shenanigans that leftist protestors have engaged in.

This argument drives me nuts, because it asserts as fact something it admits is speculation. The failure to regulate climate activist speech was viewpoint discriminatory because we can't imagine the same administrators wouldn't have punished conservative activists for similar behavior. A version of this argument was trotted out by the conservative judges advocating an academic boycott of Columbia, and I hated it there too: 

It has become clear that Columbia applies double standards when it comes to free speech and student misconduct.  If Columbia had been faced with a campus uprising of religious conservatives upset because they view abortion as a tragic genocide, we have no doubt that the university’s response would have been profoundly different. 

Again, note the assertion that Columbia flatly has adopted a double-standard, based not on anything it actually did, but on how its critics imagine it would have behaved in a hypothetical-but-not-actually-real scenario ("if ... we have no doubt"). Columbia is being punished for a story the judges literally invented so they can be mad about it.

Of course, since the argument by its terms doesn't require grounding in reality, it is absolutely impossible for a university to rebut it. And I'll say flat out that I'm not at all convinced that universities have applied or would apply a "double-standard" in such cases. When David Horowitz started plastering campuses with flyers targeting student pro-Palestinian activists as "Jew-haters" (cf., recent posters at the University of Oregon assailing the campus Hillel director), I don't recall there being any attempt to impose consequences on campus constituents who may have taken part, even though I have no doubt that a diligent administrator could've dug up some rule or another they were violating. Why not? Well for one, had they done so Horowitz and his backers would've thrown a fit about liberal censorship yadayadayada. But for two, if campuses hadn't historically enforced whatever rules limiting flyering in other cases, they'd be in choppy waters if they tried to suddenly start enforcing them against the likes of Horowitz. Which is to say, they abide by a rule against viewpoint discrimination.

Now, the final objection:

And finally, civil rights law require[s] universities to take action against illicit hostile environments. Climate change activists may have broken university rules, but they did not intimidate, harass, and engage in violence against any identifiable group protected by civil rights laws. 

This is the one objection that has some purchase. I agree with it insofar as I agree that otherwise-protected speech can nonetheless be probative of motive with respect to non-protected conduct. And I also agree that some defenders of the campus protesters have undersold or been apologists for aspects of the protest that were not simply inflammatory or offensive speech but were violent, harassing, or otherwise destructive.

But the reality is that the vast majority of campus pro-Palestinian speech -- even that which was understandably offensive, even that which formally may have violated university rules -- was not violent or harassing in a legally-cognizable way. The defense of universities cracking down on actual instances of actionable harassment is fine as far as it goes, but the more numerous instances of universities cracking down on non-harassing speech cannot justify itself via stolen valor. And while I'm not so naive as to think that people would stop being fair weather friends of free speech if universities didn't try to cloak the latter in the aura of the former, there's little doubt that the draconian hyperpolicing of protected speech did more to delegitimize legitimate university interventions than the instances of legitimate intervention did to justify the hyperpolicing.

* For purposes of this post, I'm treating all colleges as if they are akin to government actors, as many private universities at least purport to extend First Amendment-inspired free speech protections that are meant to guard against collegiate administrative overreach.

Collaborating With the Trump Administration's Xenophobia Was Worse Than a Crime ....

One of my favorite quotes of all time comes from the statesman Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, who reportedly remarked after Napoleon's execution of the Duke of Enghien "It was worse than a crime, it was a blunder!" It is useful any time someone takes an action whose obvious moral bankruptcy is somehow eclipsed by its naked strategic idiocy.

For example, few can forget the ADL's fulsome praise when the Trump administration unlawfully seized pro-Palestinian activist Mahmoud Kahlil and tried to place him in a lawless pit. In terms of values, it was transparently appalling. And yet, as pure, cold-hearted tactical thinking, it was somehow even worse. At a time where antisemitism is at a historic ascendence, the ADL's bold strategic pivot is to cut itself off from its historic allies, abandon its longstanding principles, and proudly declare it's every man for themselves. Can anyone guess why that might not be a winning play for a minority community representing less than 3% of the American population?

The underlying assumption, incredibly, seems to be that the Trump administration will be a reliable and steadfast force against antisemitism (remember: Jonathan Greenblatt fundamentally trusts Donald Trump). Anyone with a pulse could have told you this was a sucker's bet, but somehow the American Jewish community's premier advocacy org went all in on it.

And lo and behold: as explicit right-wing antisemitism continues its rise to dominate mainstream conservative institutions, the brief period where the Trump administration even pretends to care about "fighting antisemitism" is snapping shut in favor of stepping up the xenophobic racism even further. The latest development here is the decision to place travel sanctions on several European-based media monitors combatting hate and misinformation, many of whom cut their teeth fighting antisemitism in cyberspace. Indeed, one of the targets, Imran Ahmed (who actually is an American permanent resident), was most well known for trying to flag instances of left-wing antisemitism. Ironically enough, his lawyers are comparing his case to that of Kahlil -- both unified by the Trump administration targeting immigrants for arbitrary arrest, detention, and deportation on the basis of their speech.

In their complaint, Mr. Ahmed’s lawyers likened his case to those of other foreign nationals who have been targeted, such as Mahmoud Khalil, a Columbia University graduate and legal permanent resident whom the Trump administration has sought to deport over his pro-Palestinian comments and activism that the administration equated with “antisemitic hate.”

For his part, Mr. Ahmed has said his organization was founded to look into the growth of antisemitism on the political left. He was among the activists who spoke about how to combat online antisemitism at a 2020 State Department conference during the first Trump administration. 

Who could have predicted that an administration dedicated to empowering racists and bigots of all stripes would use its claimed powers of arbitrary arrest and detention to help racists and bigots? (Everyone. Everyone could). 

And while there is some irony in Ahmed tying his case to Kahlil, the comparison between the two is an apt one. If nothing else it demonstrates that the bedrock motivator for the Trump administration is clearly and obviously not "fighting antisemitism" (or even a highly stipulated and partial "antisemitism" found only among the political left). The unifying thread is a desire to terrorize immigrants and create an open space for racism and White nationalism to spread. There was a brief window where the administration found "antisemitism" a useful fig leaf for its fascism, but that period is most certainly closed, and anyone who was gullible enough to believe it genuine in the first place should have the dignity to hide in shame forever.

The First Circuit's (Mostly) Correct Dismissal of the MIT Antisemitism Suit

Today, the First Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a decision affirming the dismissal of a Title VI lawsuit brought by Jewish students alleging an antisemitic hostile environment at MIT. The court concluded first that the incidents pleaded by the plaintiffs were by and large not instances of actionable discrimination but rather were protected speech, and that what pleaded incidents were plausibly antisemitic were too isolated to meet the "severe" and "pervasive" threshold necessary to assign legal liability. Second, it concluded that even if the first part of the analysis was untrue, the claim failed for the independent reason that MIT could not be demonstrated to have been deliberately indifferent to the antisemitism.

Overall, I think the opinion is strong and reached the correct result. I was particularly happy to see it acknowledge the extraordinarily difficult position academic administrators are in when trying to mediate between cross-cutting speech/discrimination complaints, as this of course reflects my own position in contrast to the many Monday-morning-quarterbacks who think that these questions are perfectly straightforward and the only reason it looks hard is because of instincts towards censorship and/or bigotry.

I also think this decision illustrates a danger in how many Jewish groups are treating law and litigation as a primary mechanism for policing allegedly antisemitic speech. The litigation approach, to my eyes, is very much tied to a broader misapprehension of the legal landscape regarding discrimination that believes, quite wrongly, that Every Group But the Jews gets immediate and unconditional legal protection the instant they feel a twinge of discomfort on campus or in the workforce. Back in 2020, when Bari Weiss resigned from the New York Times while alleging that the conditions she endured at the paper were tantamount to constructive discharge, I made the following observation (after observing that, in fact, the conduct she identified in her letter came nowhere close to that which would support a successful discrimination lawsuit):

Weiss' confusion is in line with something I've noticed from many conservative observers of anti-discrimination law. They wildly underestimate how high the barriers are to winning a discrimination claim -- probably because they're ideologically committed to the notion that minorities get their discrimination claims rubber-stamped (when the reality is such claims are overwhelmingly rejected by the courts, often before reaching a jury). So when they experience something that is in the family of discrimination, they assume that (a) it must be illegal ("if these whiny minorities are winning, surely my very real pain and trauma must present a winning case too!") and (b) if it isn't treated as illegal, that must be because of some latent anti-conservative(/white/male/whatever) bias, rather than the normal functioning of a legal system they generally endorse.

So too here. The misshapen "us too-ism" morphs what is objectively a very precarious strategy (legal discrimination claims are hard to win, especially when the conduct they are challenging is primarily speech!) into something that appears viable. Law very intentionally and in my very appropriately does not purport to capture everything that could be reasonably called antisemitic -- here, the court agrees that there are certain pleaded incidents which were (if the pleaded facts were true) antisemitic (they were just too isolated to support liability), and particularly in the speech domain there may be speech that can be called antisemitic (or at least debated as such) but which cannot have legal liability attached. But the headline that everyone reads when one files a suit and loses is "antisemitism claims found to be meritless," and there is little hope to then reignite the conversation in the more expansive and forgiving domain of discourse and dialogue.

On that note, if there was one area of the opinion where I have a bit of hesitation, it was in how it treats the plaintiffs' arguments for how anti-Zionism is antisemitic (at least in some forms). The opinion somewhat oscillates between two positions here. Sometimes, it suggests that there remains open debate on the contours of when and whether anti-Zionism is antisemitism, and that our legal system "resolves through discourse, not judicial fiat" (30). "Plaintiffs are entitled to their own interpretive lens equating anti-Zionism (as they define it) and antisemitism. But it is another matter altogether to insist that others must be bound by plaintiffs' view" (28). This I think gets it right. But at other points, the opinion shifts away from the lens of "it is inappropriate for judges to resolve this contested ideological question" and instead delivers a flat judgment that the challenged conduct was simply not antisemitic ("The disruptive political protests sympathetic to Palestinian views of the conflict with Israel were not, by and large, antisemitic." (41)). This I think is unnecessary and flouts the prior, careful choice to abstain from making that judgment one way or another.

One last point: I think the way the First Circuit dispenses with the Jewish plaintiffs' sincere belief that anti-Zionism is antisemitic is at odds with the Second Circuit decision I flagged last month regarding a Christian school's stated belief that forcing its girls' basketball team to play against teams that fielded transgender athletes would violate its religion. In the latter case, the Second Circuit treated disagreement with the Christian school's own articulation of what its religious beliefs required as tantamount to religious animus. In this case, by contrast, the First Circuit had little trouble telling the Jewish plaintiffs that they were (at least as far as the law was concerned) incorrect about what sort of conduct does or doesn't target their religious values. To be clear: I think the First Circuit is closer to the mark here than the Second: disagreement with a religious person's views, so long as that disagreement is not itself motivated by religious hostility, should not suffice to make out a claim of religious discrimination. The Second Circuit's opinion was far too expansive and, if applied consistently, almost certainly unworkable. But it goes to illustrate, once again, that these expansive new religious liberty principles being introduced by the judiciary almost certainly are not going to extend to Jewish litigants -- in part because they have to have limits, and Jews are not part of the in-group meant to be protected but not bound.

First Amendment Coronado-ism

We are right now living through one of the most significant rollbacks in First Amendment law since the 1950s. To name a few examples:

• University employees are being fired for speech deemed critical of Charlie Kirk, in circumstances where it is almost impossible to argue that the terminations satisfy the Pickering standard for speech on matters of public concern.
• Legal immigrants are facing deportation for speech that opposes the current foreign policy orthodoxy of the American government; 
• The Attorney General is suggesting, in defiance of decades of well-settled law, that there is a "hate speech" exception to the First Amendment.
• The President is extorting settlements from critical media outlets via utterly frivolous defamation lawsuits, even as more and more conservative judges seek to roll back the landmark defamation decision in New York Times v. Sullivan in order to make such extortions even easier to launch.

There is irony to this. Until very recently, the constitutional law zeitgeist had been to raise alarms over "First Amendment Lochner-ism" -- the use of "First Amendment" claims as a cudgel to block governmental regulations (think 303 Creative or NIFLA v. Becerra). In this telling, our problem is a First Amendment that has spiraled out of control, a hypertrophic commitment to "free speech" that swallows up anything and everything (since what law doesn't, at some level, regulate "expression"?). In a world of First Amendment Lochner-ism, "rollback" was the furthest thing from anyone's minds.

However troublesome or misguided the First Amendment Lochner cases might be, one might think that their saving grace is that their expansiveness offers a bulwark against the sort of First Amendment regression we're seeing today. Yet few -- and I include myself in this -- seem to actually have confidence that these First Amendment principles will in fact serve as a meaningful shield now in the face of these new conservative assaults. It turns out that we don't have a hyperexpansive First Amendment, we have a First Amendment that implacably guards against enforcement of liberal policy objectives while pliable to the point of contortionism in order to accommodate conservative bugaboos.

This, too, reflects the Lochner era. Lochner itself refers to the Supreme Court's finding of a "liberty of contract" implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, which significantly curtailed states' authority to pass economic regulation. But the Lochner era also encompasses a series of rulings that similarly hamstrung federal authority to pass economic regulation -- limits ironically justified by reference to state's rights and respect for federalism. So, for example, in United States v. E.C. Knight, the Supreme Court struck down application of the Sherman Antitrust Act to a sugar refining monopoly, concluding that manufacturing was not "commerce" and so the law impinged on an arena reserved to the states.

Already the heads-I-win-tails-you-lose logic is apparent here: the feds can't pass economic regulations because of states rights, and the states can't pass economic regulations because it violates federal constitutional limits. But the apex of this logic came in a little-known Lochner era case, Coronado Coal Co, v. United Mine Workers, where the Supreme Court considered applying the Sherman Antitrust Act's prohibition on restraints on trade against union activity targeting a coal mine. Again, E.C. Knight had already concluded that the Sherman Act was unconstitutional as applied to employers (and subsequent cases had explicitly held that mining was akin to manufacturing in not being "commerce"). As bitter a pill as that might have been to swallow for the emergent labor movement, at the very least one might think that this logic would equally prevent leveraging the Sherman Act against collective action by employees (via unions). But no -- in Coronado, the Court concluded that the Sherman Antitrust Act, though not constitutionally enforceable against mining companies or manufacturing concerns, could be enforced against labor unions. The hyperexpansive Lochner rules suddenly were quite pliable once a union tried to be their beneficiary.

So I will suggest that today we do not have a regime of First Amendment Lochner-ism. We actually have First Amendment Coronado-ism. If Lochner stands for judges blocking democratic actors via hyperexpansive interpretations of constitutional law; Coronado highlights judges dropping those barriers the instant they pose an obstacle to their own faction's policy objectives. Lochner is bad law; Coronado is simple lawlessness.

And on a professional level, it has to be said that it is nearly impossible to teach Constitutional Law in a such an environment, at least not without collapsing into complete cynicism. I can defend to my students the position that the First Amendment protects even hateful speech; I can't defend the position that the First Amendment protects hateful speech in all circumstances except quoting Charlie Kirk's own words verbatim. I can defend to my students different standards of proof for defamation cases, I can't defend a rule that says it's defamation for a newspaper to criticize a presidential candidate. These developments breed contempt in my students for the entire notion of "free speech" as it's currently operationalized, and frankly I can't blame them for it -- they see it as a sucker's bet, a check they'll never be able to cash. And as someone who does believe in many of the classic free speech shibboleths it breaks my heart to see it.

A few days ago, Justice Barrett defended herself from Justice Jackson's allegation that the Court's only governing principle was "this Administration always wins" by arguing that the Court's rulings are not about this president but all presidents, and "so the decisions that we make about executive power today are the same ones that will still be precedent three or four presidents from now." Even if they were for "all presidents", these decisions would be catastrophic. But there is ample reason to be skeptical that these decisions do in fact augur a general theory of judicial deference to the executive branch, at least when Democrats occupy the office (quoth Scott Lemieux: "don't google 'Biden v. Nebraska'!").

When Justice Barrett pretends that she's enforcing a principle accessible to all, nobody believes her, and nobody should believe her. And just as I predicted the hyperexpansive religious liberty protections would suddenly find their limits when liberal Jews try to access them, so too do I strongly suspect we're going to see a significant rollback of supposed First Amendment Lochner-ism now that it stands in the way of letting conservatives crush speech they do not like.

Unmasking a Social Collapse

The image of masked federal agents seizing Rumeysa Ozturk on the street for the "offense" of writing a disfavored op-ed on Gaza is chilling enough. But surely there is an extra dose of irony in the masks themselves, seeing how the MAGA right has specifically identified banning masks as one of its main demands in its ongoing assault on academia in general and protests in particular.

Of course, wearing a mask has also become a progressive marker of good citizenship in recent years. There's always irony enough to go around.

In so many ways, masks are a microcosm of everything that's gone wrong in our politics over the last five years. First, we saw the histrionic conservative protests over mask mandates, where wearing a scrap of fabric over one's face in the middle of a lethal pandemic was portrayed as the greatest civil rights violation in living memory. Soon, not content with not wearing their own masks, the right extended outward to try to actively curtail voluntarily masking by others, using spurious comparisons to the KKK as flimsy justification for what was obviously kulturkampf.

A few years later, though, as masks became de rigueur in the protester scene, we saw a few too many progressives get a little too cute in merging the medical justification for masking with an obvious desire to shield people from accountability for criminal activity or violation of campus rules. The idea that the protesters who stormed an Israel history class at Columbia wore masks out of respect for avoiding contagious disease is ludicrous.

But it wasn't long afterwards that the progressives' legitimate concerns were validated once again, as unmasked individuals associated with campus protests found themselves easy marks for Trump's authoritarian predations. It was Mahmoud Khalil's decision not to wear a mask, after all, that made him a prime target to inaugurate Trump's censorial crackdown on international students. Here masking isn't about evading legitimate consequences for unlawful acts, it's about protecting oneself from out-of-control abuses of power.

And of course, the masked officers making sure to conceal their identity while abducting a student off the street for WrongThink makes for the full circle: a terrifying encroachment on civil liberties that brings to mind the secret police of history's most repressive regimes.

The reality is that the ethics surrounding masks seem uniquely resistant to being formalized into rules, and instead demand a modicum of virtue and common sense. Anyone should be able to tell the moral difference between masking as a prophylactic health measure, versus masking to shield oneself from public accountability. Yet any malicious actor can easily say, without being easily refuted, that they are wearing their mask for medical reasons. How would one refute that?

A healthy society resolves these problems simply by being healthy. We accept frankly trivial burdens like mask mandates if its necessary to stop a pandemic. We recognize that masked hooligans trashing a classroom are not the same as EMTs in an ambulance. We expect our police to conduct their operations in a manner that permits review and accountability, so that we can all be confident the law will be followed.

Our society is not healthy. And so choices that should be taken for granted, no longer can be.

The Lawless Pit Holding Mahmoud Kahlil

Over the past few days, I like many have been expressing outrage over the arrest and detention of Mahmoud Kahlil, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, due to his involvement in pro-Palestinian protests at Columbia University. Federal agents raided his home and told him that his visa had been revoked; when informed he held a green card, they summarily informed that that had been revoked too.

I know nothing about Kahlil personally or his involvement in the protests (I've seen differing accounts of his role, but I haven't dug deeper because it honestly doesn't matter right now). And on a moral level, so much of what happened here sickens me. It sickens me that a permanent resident could be summarily snatched from his home and detained in clear retaliation for his expression. It sickens me that Jewish organizations putatively "fighting antisemitism" appeared to have played a direct role in his arrest. It sickens me that the ADL has fulsomely praised the operation, tacitly endorsing draconian anti-immigrant legislation that in a prior life it recognized as "the worst kind of legislation, discriminatory and abusive of American concepts and ideals" (I am heartened that other Jewish groups are speaking out against it). It sickens me to see Trump use the word "shalom" as a taunt. It sickens me to witness people trying to argue that this is ultimately Columbia's fault for not cracking down on the protests more aggressively, as if there is some straight line between potential underenforcment of the student codes of conduct and arbitrary arrest and deportation (news flash: university disciplinary issues -- even if you think they're mishandled -- should not be seen as deportable offenses!). 

And finally, it sickens me to see folks trying to finesse the issue by adopting a "well, let's see what the courts say before we rush to judgment" handwash. Partially, that's a problem because the entire seizure of Kahlil is a sterling example of the Queen of Hearts' justice: "sentence first, verdict later." If you've got Kahlil on a deportable offense, go through the legal process and prove it; don't start with the obviously speech-motivated arrest and then after the fact grope around for some figleaf of a legal justification. Everyone and their mother knows that whatever legal argument gets dredged up will be a pretext; the Trump administration is not remotely hiding the fact that it is targeting Kahlil for his speech.

But the bigger problem with waiting for the process of law to take its course is that I don't think people fully realize what a legal blackhole immigration law truly is.

I am not an immigration lawyer. But I do have some experience with immigration law, mostly during my judicial clerkship. My assessment of immigration law following that year can be summarized in two parts: (1) it was some of the most meaningful and impactful work I did, and (2) I never, ever wanted to be involved in it again. The explanation behind both halves of that equation is one and the same: immigration felt like a lawless pit. Our immigration law and doctrine is supersaturated with opportunities for governmental abuse that is largely immunized from any sort of meaningful review. To anyone with a passing familiarity with this system, it is outlandish to assert that our immigration system is too generous to migrants. Our immigration system is cruel, and arbitrary, and unfair, and in many respects essentially lawless. I was involved with it for a very limited amount of time, and to a very limited extent, and it still traumatized me in ways I continue to feel to this day.

So when I read Steve Vladeck's assessment of actual legal questions surrounding Mahmoud Kahlil's detention, I was not surprised, but I was alarmed. Vladeck does not argue that Kahlil's detention is lawful. But he does think it is not as clearly unlawful as is being asserted. The reason why, to be clear, is not that the Trump administration has some secret reasonable argument that's been occluded by the media firestorm. It's that our immigration law is so stacked with vague and abusive rules and dangerously deferential precedents that even misconduct as egregious as this might not be clearly forbidden. The lawless pit holding Mahmoud Kahlil is not something new. The Trump administration might be more brazen in exploiting these opportunities for abuse, but doctrinally speaking it had many tools lying around waiting to be picked up.

Indeed, one interesting thing about Kahlil's case is that it demonstrates a fascinating and underappreciated bivalence in the political salience of pro-Palestinian advocacy. On the one hand, it is very clear that Kahlil was targeted and made vulnerable by virtue of his pro-Palestinian speech. However, it is also clearly true that Kahlil's situation has mobilized and galvanized popular attention also by virtue of the fact that his case involves pro-Palestinian speech. Kahlil's case more clearly demonstrates both the distinct vulnerability but also the distinct power held by pro-Palestinian advocates I can remember in quite some time.

Again, the core problem of abuse in our immigration system -- the ability to arbitrarily and (functionally) lawlessly detain and deport immigrants for any reason or none at all -- is nothing new. I'm sure immigration activists could hand you hundreds or thousands of comparable stories of lawful residents snatched and detained for the most absurd or malicious of reasons. And while I have little doubt that most persons protesting on Kahlil's behalf would, if you gave them those stories, express genuine outrage over them as well, there's little doubt that the reason this abuse and this outrage captured public attention in the way that it did was because it involves an attempt to suppress pro-Palestinian speech, specifically.

This, to be clear, is not a bad thing. It is a good thing -- anything that encourages people to recognize the wild, lawless abuses latent in our immigration system generally and in the Trump administration's enforcement specifically is a good thing. But it is worth noting the more complex relationship with power that is being demonstrated here. Mahmoud Kahlil's story is about how the Trump administration feels empowered to destroy the lives of pro-Palestinian advocates by any means necessary; it also (sickeningly) is a story about how some Jewish organizations are cheering on the project. But it is also a story about how a connection to Israel/Palestine makes people care about things more often and more intensely than they often otherwise would. That is expression of power, and one that has implications that go well beyond this case.

Steinbach's Revenge

My next law review article is on academic speech issues and the regulation of campus protest. You know, taking a break from the fraught topic of antisemitism and shifting over to something placid and uncontroversial. The article was accepted for publication in March, but I did ask my editors if I could make some revisions before we started the editing process due to, er, recent developments (they've been very supportive).

The framing device for my article was the student protests of a talk by Fifth Circuit Judge Kyle Duncan at Stanford Law last year (remember that?). Much of the attention surrounding that incident focused on the behavior of the Stanford administrator on-site, Tirien Steinbach. Steinbach was widely pilloried for her performance, which critics said was insufficiently protective of Judge Duncan's free speech rights and too accommodating towards the protesters. My view was that Dean Steinbach was being unfairly maligned -- she actually did a decent (not perfect, but who is?) job and that people were underestimating the difficult position she was in and the tough cross-cutting pressures that make superficially "easy" free speech issues hard.

I wonder if Steinbach is laughing, just a bit, right now.

A particular claim one saw coming out of the Stanford incident was that the disruptive behavior of the students was attributable to past and present failures by the Stanford administration to respond to illicit protest with a stern hand. Administrative indulgence was akin to tacit support, which emboldened the students to behave even more brazenly later on, and so the cycle went. If the university stopped mollycoddling and just crushed policy-violating protests with an iron fist, the argument went, then they'd send a message to the students that such activities were not okay, successfully deter future disruptions, and restore calm and campus order. Dean Steinbach's relatively conciliatory approach towards the Duncan protest was easily slotted into a villainous role under this narrative: it was a symbol of the limp and weak-willed administrative cowering that was ultimately responsible for "bad" protests.

When one looks at what is happening on campuses today, it's hard not to feel like that argument has been pretty decisively falsified. The current wave of protests and encampments really can be traced back to Columbia, and in particular Columbia President Minouche Shafik's decision to essentially immediately respond to largely peaceful encampments on her campus with a hyper-aggressive police intervention. The result, it turns out, was not that the students were duly chastened and slunk back to their dorms; the result was a cascading series of escalations and counter-escalations at Columbia and the emergence of copycat solidarity protest encampments at universities across the country. Even if one did believe that Shafik had the formal "right" to enact her decisions, it's hard for me to imagine that anyone can call these policies success stories, regardless of whether your metric is protecting free speech, preserving campus order, defending Jewish students, or anything else.

So with the benefit of now getting to see the road-not-taken, maybe Steinbach's choice to take a more conciliatory, non-confrontational approach toward the disruption at Stanford and not immediately resort to "am I formally allowed to call in the police to drag people away" didn't emanate from some personal disdain for freedom of speech. Maybe she was actually a professional who knew what she was doing.  Maybe there are lessons we can learn from her. Maybe the prevailing administrative value in responding to protests should not be reflexive insistence on asserting yourself as the boss.

There's very little for anyone to feel good about regarding what's happening on campus right now (I share Robert Farley's worry that we're rapidly constructing a social framing where "no one can be serious about protesting the war (or countering protests of the war) unless windows are broken and billy clubs bared"), but if anyone deserves to feel the slightest bit of schadenfreudean satisfaction, its Tirien Steinbach.

Campus Antisemitism Monitors Will Fail in Extraordinarily Predictable Fashion

Trying to capitalize on the latest headlines, a bipartisan group of legislators is seeking to create government "antisemitism monitors" that will be dispatched to colleges and universities across the country. Fail to meet their scrutiny, and colleges could lose gobs of federal funding.

If enacted, this policy will fail in spectacular fashion. How do I know? Because we have a template in state anti-BDS laws, which backfire in similarly predictable ways. The problem is that while it's conceptually possible to craft valid and legitimate anti-BDS legislation, in practice the laws will be enforced by some mixture of apathetic mid-level bureaucrats, terrified associate deans, and hotshot headline-chasing politicians. Put that cocktail together, and the result is such lovely headlines like "homeless hurricane victims can't get disaster relief until they sign anti-BDS pledge."

Indeed, if the antisemitism monitors do come into play, I can predict exactly the scenario that will go down shortly thereafter at Any College, USA.

1. A student group invites some Palestinian poet to give a talk;
2. Canary Mission or similar digs through the poet's instagram and finds a post where they say something that many people might find troublesome: "from the river to the sea" or "the Zionist state will be dismantled" or something of that ilk.
3. They shriek that this is a violation of IHRA and federal law and the university risks losing all its federal funding unless it acts.
4. Some associate dean for student affairs panics and cancels the talk.
5. There's a massive backlash from the students (possibly including protests) as well as various academic freedom/civil liberties watchdogs who call the cancellation out as censorial bullshit.
6. Pro-Israel/Jewish groups make surprised-Pikachu face at how they once again somehow became the poster child for heavy-handed campus censorship. Who could have predicted? (Answer: Everyone. Everyone could have predicted).

And for all the grousing about "only the Jews don't get ..." X Y or Z protections on campus, it's worth noting that no other campus minority currently has a monitoring program like this. A good rule of thumb for whether one is advisable here is if one also would support a similarly empowered and emboldened "anti-racism" or "anti-Islamophobia" monitoring program. If your answer is something along the lines of "while racism and Islamophobia are serious problems, I don't trust the implementation and I'm worried about the possibility of abuse and/or chilling free speech" -- congratulations! You've identified the exact reasons why such a program is inadvisable for antisemitism as well.

Assorted Thoughts on the Chemerinsky Incident

If you're in my neck of the internet woods, you've no doubt heard about the incident in Berkeley where a small group of students conducted a pro-Palestinian protest in the backyard of the Dean Erwin Chemerinsky's house. 

To make a long story short, Dean Chemerinsky had invited the 3L class over to his home to celebrate their impending graduation (he normally invites the 1L class at the start of their law school journey, but since this crop of graduating students spent their 1L year mid-pandemic and so wasn't able to come, he invited them before graduation instead). The local SJP chapter issued a demand that Chemerinsky cancel the dinner, distributing a poster showing a caricatured image of the Dean with a bloody knife and fork over the message "No dinner with Zionist Chem while Gaza starves." Chemerinsky refused to cancel the dinner; so some of the students RSVP'd and, once they arrived at his home and were welcomed into his backyard, stood up with a microphone and began delivering a speech about Gaza. Chemerinsky and his wife (Prof. Catherine Fisk) asked that they stop and leave, as guests in their home; the student with the microphone initially declined, asserting she had a "First Amendment right" to engage in her conduct. At one point, Prof. Fisk placed her hand over the shoulder of the student to try and take her microphone away (the student has characterized this as an assault -- even going so far to imply it was a sexual assault -- and has indicated she wants to file legal action against the law school). Eventually the students left, the Dean released a statement, and the internet was set ablaze.

From my vantage point, the students' behavior was abhorrent and very possibly a violation of the university's code of conduct (and the notion that they are the victims here is farcical). Beyond that bottom line, my emotional reaction to this story has been stronger than I might have anticipated, and it's worth talking through why. I do have a Berkeley connection, and though I've never met Chemerinsky personally, his reputation for both kindness and brilliance is unrivaled in the academy. I also have former students currently at Berkeley Law, and while I cannot imagine they participated in this fiasco, I would be disappointed and crushed if I found out otherwise.

On a more personal level, I suspect my views on Israel are quite similar to Chemerinsky (two-stater, sharply anti-Bibi but pro-Israel existing), and I also have been known to host students at my house for dinner (typically my small-group seminar students at the end of the semester). I view the dinners as a nice way to cultivate an environment of care and welcoming in the often-impersonal environs of the law school, and as a way of paying forward the sort of collegiate community I was lucky enough to enjoy as an undergraduate to another generation of students. If that gesture of welcoming students into my home were to be exploited in a manner akin to what the students did here, I'd be devastated. Protests like this are exploitations of trust, they rely on and take advantage of the host's unguarded openness and welcoming. We're not screening people based on ideology, we're not making people fill out political questionnaires, we just -- welcome students into our homes, without reservation. To take advantage of that, to extract costs on that openness, invariably leads to more closedness, more guardedness, and more cloisteredness -- a loss for everyone, and one that can and should be mourned (I saw someone argue on social media that if the Dean didn't want to be protested in his own backyard, he shouldn't have invited these students in the first place and instead tried to screen out whichever students he thought might be likely to protest him. That to me bespeaks an almost impossibly short-sighted and narrow attitude that is utterly toxic to the sort of university community anybody should want to cultivate).

Meanwhile, there's the question of "why was Chemerinsky picked for this protest?" That question has two related dimensions: why Chemerinsky, and why this protest (since virtually everyone seems to think that something as extreme as protesting in your host's own household should be reserved only for the most malign and irredeemable actors). Chemerinsky very much views himself as being targeted as a Jew, citing the bloody fork caricature and its resonance with the classically antisemitic blood libel. The immediate demand of the protesters is for Berkeley to divest from Israel; but the law school dean doesn't make investment/divestment decisions, so they're limply left arguing that Chemerinsky doesn't personally support divestment -- true, but a feature he shares with thousands of other members of the Berkeley community who also don't make investment decisions on behalf of the university. He also has beliefs on Israel that, while anathemas to the SJP crowd insofar as he rejects Israel being wiped off the map, are by no means some sort of Israeli maximalist/anti-Palestinian eliminationism and are entirely mainstream amongst both liberals and Jews (and are again widely present in the Berkeley community and beyond). Again, even if one opposes that stance, there is (or should be) a gap between "what we oppose" and "what we deem protest-worthy", and even among those who are protest-worthy, there is (or should be) differentiation as to when and where a protest is justified.

The most specific thing I've seen people point to in justification of "why Chemerinsky" is an editorial he wrote this past October -- just a few weeks after 10/7 -- recounting the antisemitism he's experienced as a Jew at Berkeley in the wake of the Hamas attack. The usual suspects make the usual claims in response: that Chemerinsky's claims about antisemitism are wrong, unfair, smears, conflations of anti-Zionism and antisemitism, and those sins justify what might otherwise seem an obviously abusive overreach of a protest. On that point, one thing I haven't seen commented on much is the deep and dangerous chilling effect this sort of position has (and is intended to have) on Jewish faculty speaking on the subject of antisemitism. I've written on this in the context of academic freedom, but there is a very significant contingent in American and global society who deeply believe that if you are a Jew and you speak on antisemitism in a way that they don't approve of, it is open season -- you have removed yourself from any and all protections (certainly norm-based, possibly law-based) one might enjoy in a liberal, tolerant society. Needless to say, as a Jew whose academic work centers in large part on antisemitism, this is a tremendously dangerous trend for me personally, and so of course I notice when it rears its head in such an explicit fashion.

Those are the more personal reflections I have. But there are a few more scattered issues I've seen that I might as well address here as well.

• One area where I think the internet breaks our brains is how it interferes with our sense of proportion -- literally, in terms of "how many people are doing/believe in this thing we're upset out, compared to how many don't." The protesters appeared to number about ten students. That's not negligible, but it's also a very small percentage of Berkeley Law's total enrollment. Online, the consensus view from what I'm seeing is pretty strongly that the protesters were out of line here -- and while my internet circles are of course not perfectly representative, my read has been that one has to go pretty far out towards the fringes and randos before one starts seeing folks defending what the students did. But the thing is, even if the breakdown is, say, 80/20 against the protesters, if I'm reading one hundred posts about this event, that means I'm reading twenty people announce they support it. That feels like a lot, even though objectively an 80/20 split is actually extremely lop-sided!

• The students' claim that her conduct was First Amendment protected is ludicrous save for the sheer moxie of lecturing Erwin Chemerinsky on First Amendment doctrine in his own house. One issue some people have flagged is this dinner being an "official" Berkeley Law event, and asking whether that changes thing insofar as Berkeley Law is of course bound by the First Amendment. But there's less here than meets the eye, because even if we view this as a "government" event, not all government events or property are public forums. Even on the Berkeley campus, areas like the administrative back offices or the classroom when classes are in session are not public forums (hence why a professor could remove a heckler from her classroom without it being a First Amendment violation even where that same speech would be protected from sanction on the campus quad). A professor's personal domicile is, if anything, a clearer case -- if public forum analysis applies at all, it is clearly a non-public forum and so the student's protest is not First Amendment protected once she is asked to leave.

• Many people have criticized the protest against Chemerinsky in terms of it being "counterproductive". Who is this supposed to persuade? Don't they realize the protesters are the ones who look bad here? Antisemitism discredits the cause! I understand where this sentiment comes from, but I think it is at least partially misguided. First of all, whether it's "counterproductive" depends on what it's trying to produce. If the immediate goal is sympathy from either Chemerinsky himself or even the public at large, maybe it's ineffective. But if the goal is just "make an enemy miserable", then it may be perfectly effective. Second, there are many theories of protest whose model of change does not depend on the protest immediately swaying popular opinion in their favor. Without overstating comparisons to disanalogous contemporary events, we should all at this point understand how a shocking breach of basic social rules and norms can, even where it's immediately the subject of revulsion, generate a series of events that may ultimately redound to the violator's benefit. Ultimately, while it may be that this protest is counterproductive (though again, that depends on what one is trying to produce), I think the immediate declaration of counterproductivity, insofar as it is paired with a more moralistic condemnation of this sort of protest, is a means of eliding a more worrisome possibility: what if morally-contemptible norms violations are in fact quite productive means for certain social groups to achieve their goals? I've said it before and I'll say it again: antisemitism is a productive ideology. It builds things, engenders alliances, and motivates action. And so opposition to antisemitism, or other norm-violative behaviors, must be willing to oppose such actions even when they're productive -- because they often are.

• Joe Patrice at Above the Law makes clear that he thinks this sort of protest is unjustified, but mentions in passing the "authoritarian" free speech position coming out of the right whereby it is a "free speech violation" if, say, a social media platform blocks or bans you. In many ways, the incident at Chemerinsky's house is the meatspace version of this: Chemerinsky is literally hosting, and a speaker is claiming a First Amendment entitlement to retain access to Chemerinsky's space in defiance of the wishes of the host. It's a bad First Amendment argument as applied to Twitter, and it's a worse First Amendment argument as applied to someone's backyard.

• I'm certainly not the first person to say this, but part of civil disobedience is accepting consequences. While it's true that a good protest will often be disruptive and a breach of the normal rules of operation, it's also the case that the reason a protest is disruptive and a breach is that it violates normal, enforceable rules. To engage in that sort of breach, but then to act scandalized that the relevant authorities treat it as a breach, is to have one's cake and eat it too. And so I get someone feeling strong enough about a particular issue to say "it's worth it to me to violate this rule and face these consequences." I do not get -- or at least don't respect -- someone simultaneously expecting plaudits for being so bold as to defy the rules and demanding exemption from having those rules enforced.

• Finally, I'm increasingly tired of the way these sorts of student protesters weaponize their status to act as if it's unreasonable to hold them to basic norms of conduct, or some sort of authoritarian imposition to subject them to consequences that can be wholly anticipated. It's true that, as we age, it's easy for professors to forget that young students are young and are still learning, and are going to make some foolish choices and say some foolish things because they haven't learned better yet. But it's also the case that as we age and our students seem ever-younger relative to us, we can also forget that the students are in fact adults and are perfectly capable of understanding how to behave as well as eminently-predictable consequences of their actions. I am not someone who thinks student discipline has to be overly punitive, and I respect that student conduct officials often find themselves in difficult spots. But unlike other recent Berkeley events, here we know who the perpetrators are; there does not seem to be much reason for why a conduct investigation shouldn't be opened here other than the administration either not wanting to or being scared to. Formal disciplinary responses are not always the first resort or the best resort, but they are a valid resort, particularly in cases where student behavior seems to be at least partially encouraged by a culture where the very idea of facing consequences for breaking rules is viewed as a form of oppression. There are people who basically immediately say student conduct violation related to speech warrants expulsion and anything short of expulsion tacitly assents to the violation. I don't agree with that, but I also don't agree with the view that every student conduct violation should be assessed solely as a "learning experience". Law and graduate students, in particular, are not smol, they are adults, and adults on the precipice of exercising significant political and social authority -- and part of entering into that latter role is accepting their status as responsible actors who can be held responsible.

Jewish Protests at Berkeley, a Follow Up and Victory Lap

UC-Berkeley Political Science professor Ron Hassner has ended his sleep-in protest, stating that the university administration has agreed to all of his requests. In particular he flagged the following:

(1) First, he asked that "all students, even the ones wearing Stars of David, should be free to pass through [Sather Gate] unobstructed. The right of protestors to express their views must be defended. It does not extend to blocking or threatening fellow students." The university has since "posted observers from the Division of Student Affairs to monitor bullying at the gate. These are not the passive yellow-vested security personnel who have stood around Sproul in prior weeks. The Student Affairs representatives are there to actively document bullying, abuse, blocking, or intrusion on personal space."

(2) The second request was for the Chancellor to "'uphold this university’s venerable free speech tradition' by inviting back any speaker whose talk has been interrupted or canceled. The chancellor did so gladly and confidently. The speaker who was attacked by a violent mob three weeks ago spoke to an even larger crowd this Monday."

(3) The third request was to fund and implement "mandatory Islamophobia and anti-Semitism training on campus". This has also apparently been arranged.

I give Ron a lot of credit. First, he's not dunking on the administration here, in fact, he gives them a lot of credit: "It is my belief that campus leaders would have fulfilled all these requests of their own accord even in the absence of my sleep-in.... At best, our sleep-in reinforced the university’s determination to act and accelerated the process somewhat."

Second, it's important to emphasize that Ron's protest did not ask or come close to asking that Berkeley silence anyone else's speech, including that of the protesters at Sather Gate. While they should not be able to obstruct Jewish students seeking to travel to campus, they have the right to present their views as well as anyone. It is not a concession but an acknowledgment of the proper role of the university administration that he did not press for them to end the protests outright.

Third, one might notice that Hassner's last demand was for antisemitism and Islamophobia training to be implemented on campus. In recent years, it has become almost cliched to hear certain putative anti-antisemitism warriors express fury whenever the fight against antisemitism is paired with the fight against Islamophobia, racism, or other forms of bigotry. They call it "All Lives Mattering" (although, when these coalitions against hate form and antisemitism isn't included in the collective, they call it "Jews Don't Count"). I've long thought that this was an abuse of the "All Lives Matter" concept, and it is notable that Hassner -- who not only has a ground-level perspective but who is actually putting his money where his mouth is in terms of combatting antisemitism -- doesn't see the pairing as a distraction or diminishment of what he's been fighting for but as an asset. More people could stand to take note.

Art Maven Roundup

All of the sudden, I've been on an art kick. The below image is a silkscreen I recently purchased from DC-based artist Halim Flowers. Flowers was convicted of felony murder as a juvenile and sentenced to two life terms. He was released after serving 22 years following statutory reforms aimed a juvenile offenders who had received life sentences, and now is showing in galleries around the world.

Pictured: "Audacity to Love (IP) (Blue)" by Halim Flowers. The colors are meant to be reminiscent of the Israeli and Palestinian flags (blue and white, and red, white, and green).

* * *

Trump continues to show his contempt for American Jews, saying any Jew who doesn't support him "hates their religion" (and Israel).

An in-depth story about a White supremacist who was elected to city council in Enid, Oklahoma, and the recall campaign to try and remove him.

Given the well-covered softness in Biden's support in the Muslim community, it seems suicidal to me for Democrats to give into the repulsive Islamophobic attacks holding up the confirmation of Third Circuit Court of Appeals nominee Adeel Mangi (the story indicates that Biden has remained rock-solid in backing his confirmation, but there may be some misgivings in the Senate Democratic caucus).

Writing on the sudden "heterodox" support for revisionist accounts justifying George Floyd's murder, Radley Balko flags what has been obvious for a long time: as much as this cadre likes to bleat about respecting truth, free-thinking, and rationality, it is as if not more beholden to ideologically-convenient narratives at the expense of reality. Pretty much everyone on the internet has been sharing this with their own story of the alt-center blowing past truth in order to push conservative grievance politics; mine was watching them stand in unblinking support of a hit piece on California's Model Ethnic Studies Curriculum even after it was revealed the author completely fabricated the inclusion of a seemingly-damning antisemitic quote.

Interesting retrospective on the Israeli Black Panthers in JTA.

The Supreme Court's frosty reception to the contention that government officials privately lobbying social media companies to take down misinformation is a First Amendment violation is the latest suggestion that the Court is finally losing patience with the regular drumbeat of insane legal theories emanating out of hyper-conservative Fifth Circuit.

Jewish Protests at Berkeley

I wrote a few days back about goings-on at Berkeley regarding protests -- which turned destructive -- against an Israeli speaker and a general deterioration of the situation for Berkeley's Jewish community. A few other developments have occurred since then, both of which entail Jews becoming the protesters, rather than the protested.

First, my friend and former colleague Ron Hassner has begun a sit-in in his own office, refusing to leave until the Berkeley administration takes action regarding a series of demands he's made regarding how to address campus antisemitism. Second, a large group of Berkeley Jewish students marched on Sather Gate, where a different group of pro-Palestinian students had been blocking passage as part of their own protest (and reportedly have been haranguing Jewish students in the vicinity). Initially, the plan appeared to be to force a confrontation by attempting to pass through the gate; in the end, the Jewish marchers diverted around the gate, wading across a small creek before reemerging on the other side.

I've given a recap before of my own experience at Berkeley, but that was from several years ago and certainly times and circumstances have changed since then. So I won't comment on the actual state of affairs for Jews on campus -- I'm not on the ground, and people like Hassner are. I do think this is an interesting example of Jews adopting what I termed a "protest politic" -- seeking change via the medium of a protest (as opposed to, say, a board resolution, letter to the editor, or political hearings). I wrote in that post that while I personally am averse to protests (not on general political or tactical grounds; it's a temperamental preference), it does seem that acting via protest -- sit-ins, marches, or even disruption -- was a way of marking yourself as being of a particular political class on campus and so a way of being taken seriously.

At least on campuses, it seems that certain brands of protest have become the language through which communities communicate that they are part of the circle of progressive concern. We can identify an issue as a "progressive" one by reference to how its advocates perform their demands -- the medium rather than the message. If something is demanded through a sit-in or a march, that's an issue that's in the progressive pantheon. Something that is pressed through a Board of Trustees resolution, not so much.

Again, I don't comment on whether these protests are "good", either in their tactical efficacy or their underlying demands. But I do find the adoption of this particular medium, and its comparatively transgressive character, to be an interesting development, and so I wanted to flag it.

Berkeley Has a Tough Task Ahead of It

I just finished a draft article (now before law reviews!) entitled "They Managed a Protest: Prohibitory, Ethical, and Prudential Policing of Academic Speech." As the name implies, it addresses recent controversies regarding free speech on campus, though the framing device is the Kyle Duncan incident at Stanford Law which these days feels almost quaint. In any event, one of my main objectives in the paper is to explore the position of the university administrators -- often untenured -- who are tasked with enforcing free speech policies in the context of campus protests. They occupy difficult positions, not the least because many external observers think their position is easy -- just severely punish disruptive protesters and call it day. What could be simpler than that?

Of course, things aren't as simple as that, even in the seemingly clearest cases. Earlier this week, a group of protesters organized by the "Bears for Palestine" student organization managed to violently shut down a scheduled talk by a right-wing Israeli speaker at UC-Berkeley. Protesters smashed windows and the door of the building where the talk was scheduled to occur, and allegedly assaulted and slurred Jewish students trying to attend the event.

There's little question that this behavior violated UC-Berkeley policy and, probably, state law. The UC-Berkeley Chancellor, Carol Christ, has written a strong statement denouncing these actions. And for my part, as much as I respect the right of students to engage in protest, the allegations of what happened in this event are such that severe punishment -- including potentially suspensions or expulsions -- would seem to be warranted for at least the most serious offenders. To that extent, this is a simple case.

Even still, though, I do not envy the Student Affairs officials* who are tasked with operationalizing that simple case into actual disciplinary action.

To begin, it is abundantly clear that Berkeley is under immense pressure to significantly punish someone. If at the end of their process nobody gets more than a slap on the wrist for violations of this magnitude, they will be accused of turning a blind eye to this sort of behavior, or even tacitly sanctioning it. It needs, at the end of this, to put a few heads on pikes.

But to that end, while I suspect that Berkeley will be able to identify many of the students present at the protest, it likely will not be easy to figure who exactly is responsible for the more egregious acts that would justify the harshest punishment (the antisemitic slurs, the destruction of university property). Many protesters wore masks, and the group itself was comprised of students and non-students. 

So what is the university to do? It could adopt a policy wherein it just throws the book at everyone -- "expel 'em all and let God sort it out." But that sort of short-circuiting of normal due process protections will generate intense backlash and possibly make them vulnerable to a lawsuit. Breaking windows, smashing doors; these are violations of university speech policies. But -- depending on what went down at the event -- being in the vicinity of those actions, without participating in them, may not be. It's the difference between attending Trump's "Stop the Steal" rally versus actually breaching the Capitol. One might not think the former are good people, but they haven't done anything illegal.

In short, there are severe cross-cutting pressures at play here that make reaching even the "simple" right outcome harder than it appears. Those pressures are amplified by the very loud voices on both ends of the spectrum, some of whom will insist that nothing short of a complete extirpation of all pro-Palestinian advocacy on campus means capitulation, others of whom will fulminate that any consequence to any righteous protester on any ground is tantamount to jackbooted censorial thuggery. While we can perhaps justly demand that Student Affairs professionals ignore those voices (easier said than done), their presence, too, complicates significantly the more legitimate problems the office will face in its quest to come to a good decision.

* Disclosure: My wife works in the UC-Berkeley Student Affairs Division, albeit not in a role that has anything to do with meting out student discipline.

Turkey Implements the Stefanik Principle

One of the more common refrains I heard by persons who wanted to defend Elise Stefanik's bad faith grandstanding on campus free speech was the supposedly rhetorical question "how hard is it to simply condemn 'calls to genocide'?" The problem -- well, not the problem because that implies there is only one, but a problem -- is "who decides what count as a 'call to genocide'?" 

We already knew, for instance, plenty of campus actors characterizing Israel's conduct in Gaza as "genocidal"; and it was not long before South Africa brought its own "genocide" charge against Israel before the ICJ. If, as is not improbable, the ICJ rules that at least some of the genocide claims against Israel are "plausible", one can only imagine the turnabout that will occur by the usual on- and off-line subjects who just witnessed pro-Israel activists claim the skins of several high-profile academic actors on the principle of "zero tolerance for permitting speech 'supporting genocide.'" This turnabout was absolutely predictable and while I'm not sure "deserved" is exactly the right word to use here (given that the persons who will be victimized will almost certainly not be named "Chris Rufo" or "Bill Ackman"), it's hard to deny the karmic significance.

But we don't even need to wait that long to see this poisoned tree bear fruit. In Turkey, an Israeli national playing for a Turkish soccer club flashed a signal after scoring a goal meant to represent solidarity with the Israeli hostages who remain in Hamas' captivity. As a result, he's been arrested by the police for "supporting genocide", with threats of further recriminations by the Turkish Justice Minister as well as a promise by his team's president that he'd be kicked off the squad. It's entirely unsurprising that, in the wrong political climate, merely signaling sympathy for Israeli hostages will mark one as a genocidaire (hey, who remembers that essay just days after 10/7 that arguing that even grieving dead Israeli civilians was a means of fueling the Israeli death machine?). Again, all of this was obviously predictable in advance, and while I doubt Turkey is taking its cues from Congress' most craven opportunistic weasel, it still demonstrates the naivete of anyone who thinks that the answer to Stefanik's "genocide" question was "simple".

Free Speech Total War

In the wake of 303 Creative, I argued that one consequence of the Supreme Court's decision would be to supercharge "cancel culture". In a world where a business' decision to serve (or not) a customer is "free speech", then it must be the case that a customer's decision not to patronize a business (and to urge others to follow) is free speech in turn. Indeed, if we follow the metaphor along, "cancel culture" is exactly what the Supreme Court recommends as a remedy for Lorie Smith's homophobic speech, in lieu of enforcement of the anti-discrimination laws the Court struck down. "More speech, not enforced silence" indeed. And what more speech could we ask for than a concerted, express(ive) attempt to boycott her business, to send the message that these views are awful and intolerable and should wither on the vine of the "marketplace of ideas"?

In this way, 303 Creative really did greatly proliferate freedom of speech. But it isn't the freest speech we can imagine. In a Hobbesian sense, the freest free speech regime is one of pure anarchy: anyone can say anything, and anything anyone can persuade anyone else to do is fair game. Hobbes' freedom was the pure war of all against all, with no constraining rules or boundaries whatsoever. Every domain is a legitimate one to wage free speech war. Lorie Smith is wholly within her rights to advocate her views not just by writing a book, but by refusing to serve a customer, by firing an employee, by declining medical coverage -- you name it. And her opponents in turn can advocate their views by boycotting her business, picketing her house, urging her friends to ostracize her -- a war of all against all, with no zones of safety.

We could go further still. In a true free speech total war, if one "persuades" government to punish other speakers for their views, well, one just won a battle of free speech over those parties who oppose such measures (the dissident voices are, of course, free to shout their complaints as they're hauled off to jail, and the majority faction is in turn free to punish them further for their insolence). Nothing is off the table, everything is fair game, when it comes to ideological battles. Even if one can't quite follow me in seeing how express government punishment could be a form of extreme(!) free speech, the point is clear enough even if one takes everything but official de jure censorship off the table (as in the preceding paragraph). 

Of course, this doesn't look much like "free speech" as we typically understand it. Much of the impetus of what is sometimes called "free speech culture" is to remove, less certain topics from discussion, but certain domains from encroachment in ideological battles. Ideological fights should be fought in the arenas of ideology, they should not normally spill over into who one employs (in positions that are not themselves expressly ideological) or who one is friends with or what businesses one patronizes. Even recognizing the pressure that can be placed on "normally" (or "expressly ideological"), the point is generally reasonable enough. 

Consider a world where 303 Creative came out the other way. Someone with Lorie Smith's views continues to hold those views, in private, but as a business owner she dutifully follows the law and serves all her customers as equals. If someone pulled out her private beliefs (shared on Facebook, perhaps), and said "don't patronize this homophobic website designer", that would by many be viewed as a more "standard" case of problematic cancel culture. We might say in that circumstance that taking one's ideological opposition to Smith's views -- however justified -- and bootstrapping them onto whether to hire her as a web designer moves the ideological contest into a problematic domain. To be sure, I can absolutely understand the counterargument: that to give a homophobe money is to "normalize" her, to say her views are "okay", and it is entirely proper not to cooperate in that normalization. And it's not hard to think of cases at the margins where that counterargument may well carry the day. But if it always does, if there is no space between "view I disagree with" and "view whose adherents must be attacked along every possible front," that to me is a very unpleasant place to live in. As I wrote in my 303 Creative post:

One of the virtues of public accommodations law is that it dissipates, under normal circumstances, the inference that basic business transactions are expressive. I very much prefer a world where the bakery that bakes a cupcake for a client isn't seen as sending some sort of message of approval towards the client and the client that eats the baker's treat isn't sending a message of approval toward the baker (beyond "this cupcake is delicious"). That, to me, seems a far more pleasant space to live in than one where every turnip and widget we buy or sell can be taken as some sort of sweeping moral approval for our business partners.

Long story short: Yes, it's true that one can gain ideological victories by not limiting ideological contests to ideological arenas -- attacking them in their profession, their hobbies, their personal life, at every angle. But that world is a very nasty world to live in. Even if we think we might have to do that some of the time, it's very bad if we feel forced to do it all of the time. When social forces move us toward that world -- a free speech total war -- they are moving us towards a deeply toxic and oppressive social milieu.

All of this is lead in to Osita Nwanevu's column this week which, to some extent, endorses "free speech total war" position when it comes to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and in particular campus discourse thereto. In contrast to the normal "free speech" position which suggests that we should protect advocacy of all sorts of views on Israel/Palestine, across the ideological spectrum, Nwanevu pivots sharply in the opposite direction: Progressives shouldn't stop trying to censor "bad" speech on campus, and should accept in turn that they will sometimes themselves be censored. "Students, academics, administrators, and outside influencers with different views will naturally clash and compete. In the end, some institutions will wind up more progressive or more conservative, [and] some institutions will be more or less tolerant of criticisms of Israel." Both "sides" should be free to wage ideological war on the other, and let the chips fall where they may. 

The more workaday "free speech" position on this issue, the one Nwanevu is contesting, holds something like the following: (1) campus administrators should not punish or obstruct university speakers on the basis of their views, no matter how repellant (the prohibition on de jure censorship); and (2) non-administrative actors should largely limit the domains in which they oppose speech they disagree with to appropriate ideological channels (the norm against "cancel culture"). The former lays out, e.g., why one shouldn't prohibit a "bad" speaker from giving a talk on campus. The latter explains why its problematic to, e.g., refuse to hire an undergraduate for a summer internship because one didn't like their column in the campus newspaper.

Both prongs of this position have come under tremendous strain over the past few months(/years). The first position has come under regular fire from various campus actors who demand that bad speech be formally punished -- in the cases of the Milos, the Ben Shapiros, and what have you, but more recently and ironically against the SJP-types. The second position has been said to be under siege by proponents of "cancel culture" who don't just disagree with X Y Z views but insist that their proponents must be fired from their jobs, ousted from campus clubs, and be viciously ostracized online; and likewise is remanifesting when pro-Palestinian students see their employment offers revoked and their likeness plastered on placards declaring them antisemites d'jour.

A popular argument here is that this is the chickens coming home to roost: leftists loudly decried both traditional free speech and free speech culture, and are now reaping what they sowed. Nwanevu takes aim at this account, however:

It is not at all obvious, actually, that defenses of Palestinian resistance, particularly armed resistance, and criticisms of Israel⁠—which has long been neigh-untouchable in mainstream political discourse—would have been more well-tolerated in a world where the campus controversies of the last decade hadn’t happened. We likely would have seen the very same pressure to support Israel after Hamas’s attack; as such, the speech climate likely would have been just as stultifying.

To believe otherwise is to invest fully in an odd precedential logic that regularly leads minds astray in these debates—those who use and abuse power are not always groping around for actions in the past that might justify their actions in the present. Reality is not a judiciary. And believing otherwise gives agency and responsibility over to whataboutism. Israel’s defenders and the right point to campus progressives, progressives might rightly say that conservatives and reactionaries suppressed left-wingers on campus first during the Cold War, defenders of Cold War conservatives might allude to the Soviets and the gulag, defenders of the Soviets might reference the repression of left-wing activists and thinkers by reactionary governments, and on and on backward in time to some creature of the caves who first realized that a club to the head was a reliable way to end arguments.

There is both more and less to this argument than it appears. On the one hand, I think Nwanevu is clearly right that the "precedential" bulwark against censorship would always be one whose robustness would be limited. "Reality is not a judiciary" indeed, there are always counter-precedents to point to, and everything we know about free speech suggests that there are far more fair-weather friends who are perfectly happy to demand freedom for me and censorship for thee than there are truly committed free speech ideologues who may, regrettably, falter in their commitments due to their opponents' hypocrisy. I agree that no matter how fastidious campus leftists may have been regarding free speech in 2022, it would not have stopped some people calling for the censorship of certain pro-Palestinian views in 2023.

That said, I also think Nwanevu is understating the degree to which the progressive development of free speech institutions is serving as a genuine bulwark against more censorial impulses, even now. Much as I think the levels of antisemitism on campus are overstated by alarmists even as they are no doubt real; it also must be said that the degree of censorship directed towards pro-Palestinian advocacy is simultaneously real and overstated by alarmists as well. Everything is a matter of margins: the question isn't whether commitments to free speech would eliminate all calls for censorship (or even successful instances of censorship), it's whether they are comparatively better at providing protection than alternatives.

In that vein: it is frankly absurd to contend that "criticism of Israel" is or has been "well-neigh untouchable" in campus politics. Take your average academic open letter savaging Israel signed by 1000 university professors, and 99.98% of them will not experience any tangible administrative blowback whatsoever. There's a ton of pro-Palestinian speech that does not and should not get any no pushback at all, and that's largely attributable to free speech commitments working.

Even looking at the list of exceptions proves the rule. Students for Justice in Palestine got targeted after it called the October 7 massacre a "historic win" that would augur a righteous campaign whereby Jews would be ethnically cleansed from Israel (yes, they did). Norman Finkelstein was denied tenure after writing a book titled "The Holocaust Industry". One can (like me) think that views like these are nonetheless protected while also zeroing in on exactly what is triggering the censorship -- not "pro-Palestinian speech" generally, but whooping and cheering a mass rape campaign specifically, or stating that Holocaust remembrance was an industry Jews exploit for profit, specifically. If that speech is coterminous with "pro-Palestinian" speech, that's a far more searing indictment of the field than I could give. And the notion that a more stultifying free speech environment than what we're seeing now is impossible to imagine -- well, I don't think it takes much in the way of imagination at all.

All that said, Nwanevu deserves credit for being willing to pay the piper. In the free speech total war "clash" between various stakeholders, sometimes, progressives will lose, not just in the realm of ideas, but lose quite tangibly -- their jobs, their social positions, their livelihoods. If one wants to extract those costs on others, one has to accept them for oneself.

Taking the freedom of institutions seriously in this way is not without costs for progressives. Bill Ackman and the captains of Wall Street do, in this framework, have the right to bar pro-Palestinian activists from employment at Scrooge McDuck Capital. The purges we’re seeing now are not incompatible with sound liberal principles—advocates for the Palestinian cause will not find refuge in them or in a fuzzy speech maximalism defined and defended inconsistently by most of its own proponents.

[....] 

The only recourse is politics—the sturdiest argument against the repression of those speaking for Palestine isn’t that institutions and the billionaires and propagandists pressuring them don’t have the right to try suppressing Israel’s critics but that the Palestinian cause is substantively just, and Israel’s defenders are backing a senseless and immoral war, a stance more and more Americans are coming to agree with.

The "Scrooge McDuck" shot is a bit cowardly -- not because Ackman deserves any special deference, but because right after admitting that it's fine for pro-Palestinian activists to be subjected to the full blast of modern cancel culture it then slyly suggests that the only actual "costs" they might face are withdrawal of opportunities a good cadre member shouldn't desire anyway. The reality is far worse: the costs we're talking about aren't just loss of a chance to engage in rapacious vulture capitalism; they extend to every nook and cranny of the good life, every hobby and professional ambition a young person might have. That's what's on the table here -- for everyone, on both sides. The whole point is that Bill Ackman and SJP are equally entitled to pursue their ideological agenda by any means necessary.  The end game, so bloodlessly described as "some institutions will wind up more progressive or more conservative", is better described as "ideological dissidents will be ruthlessly hounded out of their places of study, of worship, of employment, and of respite" -- dozens of the most caricatured version of Oberlin College being paired with countless New Colleges of Florida. Maybe we might think that, once the dust settles, everyone will be happier sorted into their neat ideological bubbles. But the transitional costs of successfully cleansing out the minorities will be monstrous -- a Tiebout sorting of the most vicious kind. And that really should be an intimidating proposition.

Why does Nwanevu nonetheless endorse going down that road? One possibility is that he doesn't truly believe the war will be as total as he's letting on. But another possibility is that he thinks that, when the dust settles, his side will win. The momentum is on their side. As many of "his" people will have their lives ruined by pro-Israel cancellation, he believes pro-Palestinian cancellation will be able to ruin even more. Is he right? I'm not as sure as he is about who would end up prevailing in a true free speech total war. But I do know that the casualty count will be staggering.

Like in real war, the constraints on free speech total war are fragile. The appeal of total war isn't pure sadism; it genuinely gives one a greater chance to win; it allows one to gain ground and overrun strongholds that otherwise might seem impregnable. But of course, that means that if one side indulges in it, the other must respond in kind -- a vicious circle to a world where everything is fair game and no one and nowhere is safe. And whatever marginal benefits one side or another might get in the conflict, the absolute costs are catastrophic. There's a reason why after World War II we labored as mightily as possible to ensure that a war like that never occurred again -- the world barely survived one war of that degree of fury, and it was far from clear it could survive a second.  

I am inclined to think similarly towards the concept of a free speech total war. Of course, one way of reading Nwanevu's essay is believing that we're already in a world of free speech total war, one impressed upon progressives by conservatives, and they're only playing the hand they've been dealt (indeed, he even alludes to 303 Creative making similar points to what I made in my introduction). As alluded above, I don't think that's true -- I think we're actually quite far from a free speech total war, and we should be very leery about removing the guardrails keeping such a war at bay. A true free speech total war would be cataclysmic, disastrous, and, importantly, would look nothing like even the decayed and damaged free speech culture we have now. It would be far, far worse. We should not run eagerly towards it.