Israel's Future in an Illiberal World

This essay by Robert Kagan on the current illiberal trajectory of the Israeli state is absolutely outstanding. I can't recommend it highly enough.

Most columns which talk about Israel in conjunction with the rise of global illiberal nationalism basically are exercises in what Marx would've called "bourgeois moralism" -- calling for Israel to resist it (or to stop actively participating in it) because it's wrong. Now, unlike Marx I think there is a perfectly valid place for moralistic appeals. But it certainly opens itself up to a response from a certain sort of fellow, who deems him or herself a hard-headed realist, who knows that such high-minded ethical appeals have no actual purchase in the dog-eat-dog, every-nation-for-itself world of realpolitik. Israel has to do what's best for Israel -- same as every other country. If that means shedding democracy, or liberalism, or egalitarianism, well, boo-hoo for them.

Kagan's contribution is useful because it is expressly addressed to that sort of fellow, and I endorse it not because I agree with this outlook but because I recognize it is an important one that many people -- rightly or not -- hold.

Kagan's essay explores what Israel's status would be -- not what it ought to be, not what it should be if states were fair and just and nice, but what it would be -- in an illiberal world where America and other major powers were motivated primarily by a sort of insular, anti-cosmopolitan nationalism. In this world, bonds between nations would, where they form at all, be based on material concerns and the conveniences of power -- the world Charles de Gaulle imagined when he said "nations don't have friends, only interests." And the answer is that while in the immediate term Israel might find friends in the budding illiberal powers currently popping up -- from Trump to Orban to Modi to Putin -- in the long-term such a world would almost certainly result in an Israel isolated, alone, and -- at best -- abandoned to its own fate.

Historically, Israel viewed its own security and standing as a new and relatively fragile state as being intricately connected to its status as a democratic state and society that would be a member in good-standing of the liberal political order. In a world where Israel's neighbors had more people, more territory, more wealth, and more oil, the main factor that could bind any major power to the Jewish state is a perception of shared values.

But the decline of the post-Cold War liberal order (liberal America and the EU) and the rise of illiberal alternatives (e.g., China and Russia, but also Trumpism in America and right-wing populism in Europe and globally) has given Israel a choice in didn't have before. Today, Israel doesn't have to be liberal in order to gain the support from other global powers. China doesn't care if Israel is democratic. Russia hardly minds if Israel is repressive. And within the traditional seats of international liberalism, one sees rot from the inside -- from Trump's rise to the chaos over Brexit. A right-wing populist like Netanyahu doesn't lack for ideological allies in the international system.

Yet, Kagan warns, Israel is delusional if it thinks that an "America first!" America, no longer concerned with trifling things like "democracy" or "shared liberal values", will be a reliable ally ever outward into the future. Why would it? Insular nationalism by its very nature doesn't lend itself to establishing these sort of enduring, values-based bonds. It is facile to assume that America will simultaneously retreat from seeking to promote a vision of liberal internationalism yet will remain committed to the security and flourishing of small nations halfway across the globe whose very presence seems to alienate much larger and objectively more important countries. If shared values matter, Israel can argue the fact that it's a pariah among some many states is a case of hypocrisy, illiberalism, or outright hate, and that it'd be just plain wrong for America to give into it. But that refrain -- whether fair or not as an ethical matter -- is simply irrelevant if America's foreign policy is "America first!" Only in a world where international ethics matter can Israel appeal to ethics as basis of a stable diplomatic relationship.

Kagan draws a parallel to right-wing Polish nationalists, who somehow think that a US that chooses to abandon NATO will nonetheless maintain a special security commitment to Poland. Those figures are out of their minds: if America ceases to care about the NATO alliance, it will in turn cease to care about Poland -- if not immediately, then shortly thereafter. More broadly: if America is in the game only for itself, playing real power politics, eventually Israel will find itself cut loose as soon as its in the transient American interest to abandon it.

What makes Israelis think if the United States were to cease supporting the liberal world order and began shedding the alliances it created after World War II, that the only ally it would not shed would be Israel? (Amusingly, many Poles these days also seem to believe that if the United States pulled out of NATO, it would still maintain the security relationship with Poland.) And how would Israel fare in the kind of world that would emerge if the United States stopped trying to uphold the liberal order? Such a world would once again be a multipolar struggle for power and advantage, pitting Russia, China, India, Japan, Iran, the stronger European powers and the United States against one another — all with large populations, significant territories and vast economies. What would be the fate of tiny nations such as Israel in such a world, no matter how well they might be armed and no matter how advanced their economies? In today’s world, Israel is strong and successful. It outshines its weaker and less-developed neighbors. But in the world of self-interested sovereign nation-states, a world with no liberal community, Israel is a mouse surrounded by elephants, all clamoring for a piece of the Middle East. Historically, from the Romans to the Ottomans to the British and French, the peoples of the Middle East have enjoyed only such autonomy as the ruling empires granted them. Otherwise, they were pawns and victims in a much larger game in which they were hopelessly outmatched.  

Could Israel, with its few millions of citizens, surrounded by enemies on all sides, and no longer living under the umbrella of the United States’ global hegemony, rely on the support of European nations ruled by right-wing nationalists? 

The answer is simply: no. It cannot rely on the enduring backing of foreign nation's committed to their own brand of domestic ultranationalism (it is frankly bizarre that anyone with a modicum of knowledge about Jewish history could believe otherwise), and a world where Israel has thrown its lot with that crowd is a world that will rapidly become exceptionally dangerous for Israel. Kagan concludes:

The price Israel paid for being born into the liberal world order was that it would have to suffer liberal criticisms and be held to liberal standards. This may have been difficult and even, from Israelis’ perspective, unfair, but Israeli leaders have borne this burden for 70 years because they knew Israel had no choice, that there was no home for Israel except within the liberal world order. That many Israelis now believe they have a choice is a reflection of our times, but it is a dangerous illusion. Those Netanyahu campaign posters showing him shaking hands with Putin, Modi and Trump carry the tagline, “A Different League.” Indeed, it is. Good luck.

Good luck indeed. The world Netanyahu hopes to help build is a world where Israel one day -- and perhaps not a particularly distant day -- will find itself truly alone, truly cut-off, and if the worst comes without America or anyone else interested in bailing it out.

Sometimes Conservatives Win Elections. In Conclusion, Jewish Self-Determination is a Failure

I've been wanting to link to this Tablet piece by Eylon Aslan-Levy on why Europe has so much trouble wrapping its head around anti-Semitism for days now, but I've never had the opportunity. The point is, it's really good -- in particular in noting the fact of Jewish history that serious anti-Semitism has typically co-existed with relative Jewish prosperity. But I didn't have much more to say than that, and that seemed thin gruel.

So let's just use the rightness of that post as a counter-balance to the embarassing wrongness of this one. It starts off well enough, with the writer admitting (after a commenter's challenge) that "There is no reason to assume that all Zionists support Likud's policies." Indeed! In fact, we can safely assume that the 77% of Israelis who voted for parties other than Likud oppose its policies at least some of the time, and the roughly 50% of Israelis who cast ballots for parties outside Likud's coalition oppose these policies most of the time.* So while this shouldn't have exactly been some sort of mind-bender, good work nonetheless!

But then we get this howler:

That said: if you support creating a religiously ethno-nationalist and democratic state, you can’t simply disavow any responsibility for the conduct of a right wing nationalist party. In democracies, one faction never retains control forever. The ideology, conduct, and treatment of perceived enemies of the nation we find in Likud seem pretty typical of right wing nationalism generally (they seem worse because the occupied territories and Hamas belligerence provide some unique opportunities for bad behavior). You simply can’t count on a state with a religious ethnonationalist identity that isn’t going to have a belligerent conservative faction in charge occasionally.

Hmmm. Interesting point. But perhaps it could use some editing:

That said: if you support creating a religiously ethno-nationalist and democratic state, you can’t simply disavow any responsibility for the conduct of a right wing nationalist party. In democracies, one faction never retains control forever. The ideology, conduct, and treatment of perceived enemies of the nation we find in Likud seem pretty typical of [the] right wing nationalism generally (they seem worse because the occupied territories and Hamas belligerence provide some unique opportunities for bad behavior). You simply can’t count on a state with a religious ethnonationalist identity that isn't going to have a belligerent conservative faction in charge occasionally.

Consilience is your friend!

Seriously, can anyone tell me what work "religiously ethno-nationalist" is doing here? For starters, modern Zionism isn't -- or at least isn't necessarily, and was not originally -- a religious ideology. I know that Jews' unique status as both a religion and an ethno-national group can be confusing, but let's put in a modicum of effort shall we? The author later on admits to some basic misunderstandings of the structure of religious Jewish politics in Israel anyway, but he really should know that founding-era Zionism in particular was sharply secular. Indeed, most of the explicitly religious elements of Israel's current political structure (such as devolving control over family law to religious authorities) is an Ottoman era holdover. Is it one I'd love to see repealed? Yep. Is the most fervent advocate favoring such a repeal in the current Likud-led coalition? You bet.

Okay, how about "ethno-nationalist"? I take the author's point to be that states which specifically are founded on nationalist principles are more vulnerable to reactionary right-wing elements which oppress minorities. Is that true? One problem with figuring it out is that most states today remain founded on ethno-nationalist principles. But even those states which plausibly are not founded on that concept or do not currently identify that way (e.g., the United States, the former USSR, China -- it's notable that all of these cases are at best arguable ones) also periodically see right-wing coalitions come to power and act in ways hostile to minorities. That seems to be a unifying feature of states and polities. Indeed, the real moral of the story here is that a state does not need to explicitly identify itself in ethno-nationalist terms in order for an ethno-nationalist element to have appeal amongst members of a majority ethnic class. Israel, after all, famously does not characterize itself as a Jewish state in its Basic Laws -- it is neither unique nor surprising that this does not eradicate the potency of right-wing ethno-nationalist claims within the Israeli polity.

A great pet peeve of Israel supporters is when people take attributes common across many or all states and single out Israel for special opprobrium. Israel does have a reactionary right-wing nationalist element in it, one that I think is repulsive on its own terms and destructive to the long-term wellbeing of both Israelis and Palestinians (not to mention the Jewish self-determination project more generally). But there's nothing unique or strange about that. Pretty much any democratic polity has elements like that; using their existence to say that the whole group's desire for self-determination is doomed to failure is ludicrous on its face and obviously not going to be applied consistently in practice.

* This is a simplification of course, but its worth noting that in the current coalition only two of the four members of the current coalition (Likud-Yisrael Beiteinu and Jewish Home) are really committed to the settlement and greater Israel project that the author is most angry about. Together, these two entities combined for about 32% of the vote. Yesh Atid (14%) is somewhat ambivalent, while Hatnuah (5%) ran specifically as a pro-negotiations, pro-peace party.

Things People Blame the Jews for, Volume VII: Jews

It is unsurprising that the "blame the Jews" phenomenom would eventually come a full circle. The idea that the entire idea of a "Jew" is a myth is hardly new -- anyone who has seen a "Black Israelite" on a street corner is familiar with the trope, but it has gotten some new life recently with the publication of Shlomo Sand's The Invention of the Jewish People. Sand, a professor of modern French history and film studies, contends that the entire idea of a "Jewish people" is a myth invented towards the end of the 19th century as part of the Zionist enterprise. He further argues that (Ashkenazi) Jews are not descended from people who left modern Israel in the Roman era, but rather are descendants of Khazars (a long-gone kingdom in modern Russia).

One thing that is often remarked upon about anti-Zionist discourse is how it takes attributes that apply to nation-states generally and ascribes a uniqueness (or at least a special virulence) to them when applied to the Jewish state in particular. With Sand's argument we see much the same thing, but applied to the concept of "nations" more broadly. The idea of a "nation" as an "imagined community", whose bonds are constituted intersubjectively rather than representative of some eternal and pure blood tie, is not exactly revolutionary in the field. And that the idea of Jewishness as a nation in the modern sense didn't begin to form until the 19th century too, wouldn't be surprising -- the concept of nations in their modern form didn't begin to emerge until the 19th century. Jewish "peoplehood" was in all probability no more or less developed than those of other peoples across history; but that doesn't make it fake (then or now).

The very, very elementary mistake some people draw from this is that, because the origin story is partially mythological, the community is a fiction. We decide what ties bind us. None of them, in all likelihood, translate into any sort of eternal, transhistorical truth -- an observation that has no bearing on their validity. It's how people screw up social constructivism more generally -- "socially constructed" is not a synonym for "fake." Most important elements of our lives are socially constructed, that doesn't make them any less real.

Nor does it particularly matter whether any individual Jewish person can individually trace their bloodlines to someone who lived in Jerusalem in 259 B.C.E. Let's say Sand is 100% right that modern Ashkenazi Jews are descended from Khazars, who were converted by Jewish missionaries from the Holy Land. To assert that this makes anybody any less Jewish or any more disconnected from a historical or Bible-era Jewish people requires us to say that only way to be "truly" part of a people is to descend via bloodline. But that's (a) not true and (b) not something Jews have ever believed. Descent can make one a member of the tribe, but it doesn't make one any more of a member than a convert. In this, one can say that Jewish identity reached a modern (or perhaps post-modern) form ahead of the curve -- our conception of peoplehood was less predicated on a literal chain of "who begats", and instead embraced the idea of created a community and nation out of shared intersubjective bonds and commonalities of creed. Not only is this not an illegitimate form of social organization, nominally it would seem to be superior to assertions that are quite literally based off ethnic essentialism.

The normative argument Sand wants to make -- undermining the "reality" of a Jewish people and its connection to Israel by way of genetics -- is something I've criticized before (and criticized when it is applied to Palestinians, who also are accosted with charges that they are johnny-come-latelys to the territories):

I hate this. I hate this in all of its forms. I hate it when folks try and tell me that Jews don't really belong in the Middle East because they actually descend from Khazars. I hate it when people argue that Palestinians aren't a "real" people because they didn't have national ambitions until relatively recently. I hate it when Israelis are accosted as inauthentic because they have the "wrong" eye color. I hate it when people seem to think this entire conflict is properly resolved via an impossible historical inquiry into who got to the Holy Land "the firstest with the mostest".

It all just strikes me as incredibly primitive -- based on old-school notions of ancestral ties and bloodrights and purity that have no place in modern discussions. I'm a Levi, so I assume I descend from relatively deep Israelite strands. But who knows -- maybe there are some European converts in my family tree. So what? And if some persons with African blood identify as Palestinian and are so recognized by the Palestinian community -- good for them! It is sordid business, this attempt to police each other's racial authenticity for our own transparently political ends.

And that's the problem here. There is an ongoing debate over the genealogy of Ashkenazi Jews (a debate with far more qualified participants than professors of modern French history, I might add), but to assert that it resolves any claims regarding the legitimacy of a Jewish state requires us to believe in some very retrograde notions of statedom -- that they really are and must be predicated on purity of blood and bloodline and a belief that this volk is eternally tied to this soil. The problem being that nobody believes that, and claims of that sort have long since ceased to be necessary for the maintenance of a national identity.

The bizarre summation of Sand's normative attack is that the only legitimate identities are those actually based on historically verifiable racial purity; Jews actually comprise a variety of ethnicities who may or may not share blood ties with ancestral Jews, therefore, Jewishness is a falsehood. To state that argument is to refute it: all identities are socially constructed, and that fact does not falsify the identity to anyone but someone more enamored of old-school racist ideologies than I think Sand would prefer to admit.

On Liberal versus Left Zionism, Part II

Abir Kopty has a post up attacking the entire concept of "liberal Zionism" (reposted here). In fairness, it is responding to a pretty impressively bad "defense" of liberal Zionism from Larry Derfner (for a much, much better one, see David Hirsh). But even granting that, I'm left, well, kind of relieved to be honest. While in a sense it's unnerving that someone could put up what is essentially a warrantless repetition of the phrase "Zionism is not liberal" for a dozen paragraphs and find it persuasive, the part of me that still thinks arguments matter is pleased to see what I'm up against.

The only argument Kopty explicitly makes against the possibility of Zionism being liberal is that "what matters is the implementation of this ideology on the ground." That is to say, because Zionism is and has been implemented in illiberal ways, it is congenitally incapable of being liberal.

This is, to be generous, gibberish -- and counterproductive gibberish at that. I could just as easily respond that Palestinian nationalism is congenitally anti-Semitic and illiberal. That would be true to the same degree, which is to say, not very. While it is true that the dominant "on the ground" manifestations of Palestinian national aspiration have been characterized by bigotry, violence, and so far mostly futile eliminationist desires towards Jews, that does not exhaust all the "live" renditions of Palestinian nationalism, much less all it could be. There are many Palestinians who forward visions of Palestinian nationalism and self-determination that have none of these qualities, and absolutely recognize and defend the equal status of Jews locally and globally. The whole point is to try and make it so they win the day. It would be both ridiculous and foolish of me to try and argue that the history of Palestinian nationalism as played out through anti-Semitic violence permanently corrupts the entire enterprise. And so it is with Zionism: there are a host of live schools of what Zionism is, some morally defensible (some I'd say morally obligatory), others not, and the whole point is to ensure that the former defeat the latter. I mean, I suppose I could rename these concepts "Xionism", but I don't think that would remove the problem in Kopty's eyes.

That being said, Kopty does sort of gesture in the direction of some bigger claims about liberalism and its demands, which could arguably sustain an assertion that liberalism and Zionism are intrinsically incompatible. Much of the "debate", such as it is, is a reprise of issues I talked about in this post -- specifically, slippage in the use of the word "liberal". That pops up here as well, as Kopty doesn't actually give us a definition of what "liberal" means. For example, "liberal" can simply mean left-of-center. Or it can mean "as agnostic as feasible between competing conceptions of the good life". Or it can mean "viewing its constituent parts as individuals, and taking no notice of 'identity' characteristics such as race, sex, religion, or nationality." It is a fundamentalist account of the last that seems to be in play here.

It is true that this version of liberalism cannot be reconciled with Zionism. That's because it is opposed to all nationalism -- Jewish, Palestinian, French, Chinese -- as well as affirmative action, historically Black colleges, and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. But as I wrote in my other post, finding through "liberalism" that Howard University to be the moral equivalent of Jim Crow Ole Miss is no more a strike against Howard than finding through libertarianism that the Civil Rights Act is unjust indicts anti-discrimination law. The arrow goes the other way. Hence why I rearticulated my Zionism as "left" rather than "liberal", though this is more to avoid confusion, since I don't think the very particular form of liberalism I'm reacting against is the essence of liberalism.

I do not believe it intrinsically wrong for people to organize around identities (race, sex, class, religion, nationality), nor do I think it's wrong for a state (or other entity) to take note of them. As one might guess from the above paragraph, I do not find Howard University or affirmative action morally problematic at all. Nor do I find national self-determination to be inherently problematic. Indeed, I think it can be a very good thing; I think it is a positive good when national groups are able to find a space where they are relatively autonomous and in control of their own destiny. And I am optimistic that such spaces can be created while still respecting the rights and equality of people who don't identify as part of the group -- Howard University is a Black college that nonetheless has White students and faculty members who don't seem to view themselves as second-class members of the Howard community. Which is why I support the existence of a Jewish state, and why I support the existence of a Palestinian state.

Since, for me, "Zionism" is simply the Jewish rendition of "liberal nationalism" (different definitions of liberal strike again!), supporting Zionism flows out of and commits me to two principles: (1) democracy, and (2) national self-determination. The first holds that all citizens in a given territory are given the equal ability to influence via the ballot box the governing authority; the second asks that national groups be given space where they are in control of their own destiny; where they are the norm.

In pursuit of those goals, I am willing to sacrifice another potential moral principle, one which Kopty seems to hold in much higher esteem: the right of people to live on the particular parcel of land they wish. And I apply this even-handedly -- there are many Jewish families that very much wish to live in certain settlements in the West Bank, and I think they will have to let that go; no matter that they view that lands as "home", no matter that they may have deep historic and familial connections to it.

Now, she might protest that she doesn't support the principle that anyone can live anywhere, bur rather that "native people" ought to be allowed to live on (or return to) "their land". But this gets us virtually nowhere. After all, a major part of Jewish history is precisely analogous to her own account of the Palestinian experience: that Jews lived in what is now Israel, were expelled, and now want to come back. That they were expelled for longer can't affect the sort of moralistic, first-principles argument Kopty is making, and if she's actually putting forward a statute of limitations on these sorts of claims -- after a certain amount of time in the diaspora, "return" becomes "colonization" -- I'm sure the Israeli government would like to know about it so they can run out the clock.

Even if we restrict the conversation to land where a person has a familial claim to a particular deed, it doesn't get us that far (though it does get us further). First, there's ample ground to be suspicious that this actually is a universal principle: I see very few right of return advocates protesting in favor of the Jewish family over in Sheikh Jarrah,who are seeking to reclaim land they were expelled from in the War of Independence (as indicated above, I absolutely think the Jewish family at issue in Sheikh Jarrah should not be permitted to live there, as I care more about protecting Jewish and Palestinian national self-determination rights and democracy than I do about letting every person live on the precise acre they wish).

Second, in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, possessing a deed is hardly a conversation-stopper regarding the justness of owning that plot of land -- much Jewish-owned land prior to Israel's establishment was purchased, but from absentee landlords who held title rather than from the peasant farmers who actually lived there. But either actually occupying the land in question trumps deed ownership or it doesn't (universal principles are tricky that way).

Third, to the extent Kopty is making a backwards-looking argument, it doesn't have a logical stopping point, and that raises the question of why the Jewish people can't raise a prior claim of ownership stemming from their (much earlier) exile. The answer being, of course, that it is impossible to trace lineage, much less figure out how to reallocate resources so as to "remedy" the original injustice. The egg is hopelessly scrambled (this is a problem that hardcore "liberals" of the vein we're talking about, like Nozick, recognize as potentially fatal -- the inviolability of property claims is predicated on that property being justly attained, a characteristic that describes precisely no property). It would be wildly unjust to tell Palestinians that their entire history of living in this area is unjust because it all happened on top of prior Jewish dispossession. This doesn't mean historic injustices are irrelevant, it just means that they can't be remedied via an expectations damages model.

More likely, Kopty could also explicitly jettison the importance of national self-determination as a value. That is, whereas I'm saying "we can't allow everyone to live on the precise parcel of land they wish and still respect the national self-determination aspirations of both Jews and Palestinians, therefore, we must sharply limit Palestinian 'right of return' to Israel and Jewish settlement of the West Bank and Gaza," she could say "we can't allow everyone to live on the precise parcel of land they wish and still respect the national self-determination aspirations of both Jews and Palestinians, therefore, we must abandon the pursuit of national self-determination for Jews and Palestinians". Again, from this "fundamentalist" version of liberalism, this is probably the position she should be taking -- nationalism is not liberal in this sense. But as I wrote in my prior post, taking that view is a very reactionary form liberalism that I think is politically dominative and at this point better thought of as conservative.

One of the perks of being a dominating majority is that an entity which is "nothing" is, in effect, "you". American doesn't need to be a "Christian Nation" to be a Christian Nation. One does not have to create a White congressional district to have a Congress full of White people. This is Anatole France's neutrality -- it forbids rich as well as poor to beg, steal bread, or sleep under bridges. It is a state of affairs guaranteed to oppress minorities, and there are excellent reasons for progressives to oppose it. Which is one of the reason this sort of "neutrality" which studiously ignores the differentiated histories and positions of various social groups doesn't interest me. Those groups have justice claims too, and we should absolutely listen to them and give them space. Often times, this means creating nation-states. The moral ground that is good for all is trying to create a pluralist global order where various national groups -- even relatively small ones with severe histories of persecution and oppression -- are given a few acres that is to be theirs. Surely both Jews and Palestinians can see the appeal in that.

* Kopty actually writes: "[W]hat will you do if a given country decides today that the land of 'Israel' belongs to its nation, and brings its people to occupy and ethnically cleanse those who have lived here for 60 years." It almost feels unsporting to take a swing at a pitch just lobbed over the plate like that.

In a related vein, she asks "Shall we go through history and examine the many cases of nations who were at war, but were allowed back to their homes when it ended?" Umm, sure, but I think it will lose out rather dramatically to the many more cases where they weren't.

Influential Roundup

I had class today, and one of my students remarked that the Derrick Bell piece I assigned (Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470 (1976)) was one of his favorites of the year. Of course it was -- Bell was a brilliant thinker who will be missed.

* * *

Rush Limbaugh won't apologize to LRA victims after defending the terrorist cult group as simply a group of Christians that Obama wanted to oppress.

Tom Friedman assesses Barack Obama's foreign policy successes and failures.

The momentum to recall Scott Walker may have stalled, but it is still looking like a razor-tight race.

Some people have promoted this attack on nation-states as "the idea that will not die", but I'm supremely unconvinced. It is hardly the case that multi-ethnic states -- even those without weak governmental structures -- have been paragons of stability and harmony. And there are plenty of post-national movements that still have quite their share of blood on their hands.

San Francisco is a very, very strange place.

85-year old state senator releases a Rocky ad. Oh for cute.

Re: Occupy DC: "When the Jews show up, you know it's serious."

The mystery of why Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI) is seen as some sort of wonk, rather than a nutjob hack, endures.

Simply Silly

Can you be anti-Zionist (in the expansive sense of wanting to eliminate the Jewish state in Israel) and not be anti-Semitic? Depends on your definition of the latter, but for the most part I say "sure, if you're willing to oppose all other existing nation-states and equally call for their dissolution". Take a comment left at Orthodox Anarchist, laying out the Anarchist Federation's (UK) position on the conflict:

No state solution in Gaza

One thing is absolutely clear about the current situation in Gaza: the Israeli state is committing atrocities which must end immediately. With hundreds dead and thousands wounded, it has become increasingly clear that the aim of the military operation, which has been in the planning stages since the signing of the original ceasefire in June, is to break Hamas completely. The attack follows the crippling blockade throughout the supposed ‘ceasefire’, which has destroyed the livelihoods of Gazans, ruined the civilian infrastructure and created a humanitarian disaster which anyone with an ounce of humanity would seek an end to.

But that’s not all there is to say about the situation. On both sides of the conflict, the idea that opposing Israel has to mean supporting Hamas and its ‘resistance’ movement is worryingly common. We totally reject this argument. Just like any other set of rulers, Hamas, like all the other major Palestinian factions, are happy and willing to sacrifice ordinary Palestinians to increase their power. This isn’t some vague theoretical point – for a period recently most deaths in Gaza were a result of fighting between Hamas and Fatah. The ‘choices’ offered to ordinary Palestinian people are between Islamist gangsters (Hamas, Islamic Jihad) or nationalist gangsters (Fatah, Al-Aqsa Martyrs brigades). These groups have shown their willingness to attack working class attempts to improve their living conditions, seizing union offices, kidnapping prominent trade unionists, and breaking strikes. One spectacular example is the attack on Palestine Workers Radio by Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, for “stoking internal conflicts”. Clearly, a “free Palestine” under the control of any of these groups would be nothing of the sort.

As anarchists, we are internationalists, opposing the idea that the rulers and ruled within a nation have any interests in common. Therefore, anarchists reject Palestinian nationalism just as we reject Israeli nationalism (Zionism). Ethnicity does not grant “rights” to lands, which require the state to enforce them. People, on the other hand, have a right to having their human needs met, and should be able to live where they choose, freely.

Therefore, against the divisions and false choices set up by nationalism, we fully support the ordinary inhabitants of Gaza and Israel against state warfare – not because of their nationality, ethnicity, or religion, but simply because they’re real living, feeling, thinking, suffering, struggling human beings. And this support has to mean total hostility to all those who would oppress and exploit them –the Israeli state and the Western governments and corporations that supply it with weapons, but also any other capitalist factions who seek to use ordinary working-class Palestinians as pawns in their power struggles. The only real solution is one which is collective, based on the fact that as a class, globally, we ultimately have nothing but our ability to work for others, and everything to gain in ending this system – capitalism – and the states and wars it needs .

That this seems like a “difficult” solution does not stop it from being the right one. Any “solution” that means endless cycles of conflict, which is what nationalism represents, is no solution at all. And if that is the case, the fact that it is “easier” is irrelevant. There are sectors of Palestinian society which are not dominated by the would-be rulers – protests organised by village committees in the West Bank for instance. These deserve our support. As do those in Israel who refuse to fight, and who resist the war. But not the groups who call on Palestinians to be slaughtered on their behalf by one of the most advanced armies in the world, and who wilfully attack civilians on the other side of the border.

Neither one stare nor two states, but no states.

Whoever dies, Hamas and the Israeli state win.

Now, I happen to think this is rather silly, but it's at least quite even-handed in its foolishness.

Of course, I could argue that -- insofar as I don't believe the putative "solution" which actually give either Jews or Palestinians (but for purposes of this post, Jews) what they need in order to secure their liberation -- it really doesn't matter that it is a "neutral" rule: it's a rule that perpetuates the subordinated status of Jews. And that's bad. But I'm in a good mood today, so I'll give the AF a cookie for at least going all-in on its proposal, rather than only asking Jews to eat the cost.

I still think they're kind of loopy though.