I've been getting a flurry of hits recently from this Metafilter thread, where folks are offering up my blog as an exemplar of how to think about and respond to the issue of anti-Semitism. This is gratifying to hear (pro-tip -- most of my posts on the subjects can be found under the anti-Semitism label!). But a few folks in the course of this conversation have been talking about how they've been reading the blog for years, and I'm like, "who are you people? You don't sound familiar at all!" Either they are using different handles when they comment on my blog, or (more likely) they don't leave comments period.
So consider this a thread for lurkers ancient and new to introduce themselves (with as much or as little anonymity as they like). I'm always genuinely interested in who actually takes the time to read my little corner of the internet.
Incidentally, this blog now is automatically cross-posted onto Tumblr (under the title "A Multitude of Commitments"). If you are a tumblr reader of mine, please feel free to participate as well! Either send me a message, or hope on over to the blogspot site and leave a comment with everyone else.
Friday, January 23, 2015
Thursday, January 22, 2015
"Jews Lose": Big Media David Edition
Tablet Magazine invited me to write an essay on the "Jews Lose" doctrine I wrote about previously on this blog. It's obviously exciting to see my name in the big lights, and as an academic I am quite intrigued by this whole "being paid for my articles" concept.
There was one chunk of the article which was cut for space reasons that I wanted to share with you on this space (consider it the "director's cut"). One prominent theme I tried to explore in my essay was this prevailing sense that Jews are the quintessential anti-discrimination "winners". Unfortunately, this label (not accurate to begin with, as my essay demonstrates) isn't always viewed magnanimously, but rather often is presented as an example of unfairness -- why are Jews given so much when other groups have so little? As a result, we get this weird phenomenon where alleged injustices perpetrated against Muslims by non-Jewish institutions (e.g., satirical cartoons mocking Islam) are met with attacks against Jews. A few years ago, we saw this in Holland, where Muslims angry that authorities dropped a hate crimes prosecution against (non-Jewish) Geert Wilders (whose filmed allegedly mocked Mohammed) responded by putting up cartoons mocking the Holocaust.
The broader issue is that presenting Jews as anti-discrimination "haves" often comes in the form of resentment and almost invariably washes away the actual particularities of the Jewish experience. Consider Falguni Sheth’s Salon article exploring the history of Muslim vilification in the context of the recent Paris massacres. She notes that “terrorism” is a “loaded term” that often seems to arbitrarily include only Muslim acts of mass murder. Clearly she has a point, one strikingly illustrated when a former CIA Deputy Director seemingly forgot about Anders Breivik’s massacre in Norway as an example of terrorism in Europe. She also makes the accurate observations that Muslims face considerable pressure to “assimilate” into French society rather than maintain a conspicuous identity as a separate minority group, and that while Charlie Hebdo did satirize Christianity, those cartoons are hardly analogous to those which mock Muslims. Why? Because unlike Muslims, “Christians are neither religious nor ethnic minorities. Christians are not politically vulnerable in the Republic of France; they are the opposite — secure and fully capable.”
All valid points. But then we get to Professor Sheth’s concluding question: “What if the Charlie Hebdo massacre had been committed by Catholic or Jewish extremists?” Wait, what? How did we get roped into this? Are Jews not a distinctive religious group who have faced considerable pressure to assimilate into an unmarked “French” identity? Are they not a religious and ethnic minority experiencing considerable vulnerability, not the least of which is their propensity to be targeted in precisely these sorts of massacres?
The belated appearance of Jews at the end of Professor Sheth’s article does little to advance her argument—it would have just as much force if it solely compared Muslims against a social class that actually was “secure” in its French status. Rather, Professor Sheth seems to include Jews as a means of emphasizing the unjustness of Jews supposedly possessing something other minorities don’t—they apparently do not experience and are not at risk of experiencing the mass vilification and bigotry that Muslims must endure when individual Muslims commit acts of violence. This assertion seems difficult to back up. While thankfully we have not seen a Jewish-initiated mass murder in the West in quite some time, it is notable that we need not wait that long to refute Professor Sheth’s prediction.
Jews don’t have to perpetrate a murderous strike against a vulnerable minority in order for the spotlight to shine on alleged Jewish bad behavior—such rhetoric is a standard part of the conversation any time Jews are the victims of mass political violence. Sometimes it is a BBC reporter lecturing a French Jew at a rally commemorating her murdered peers that “many critics of Israel’s policy would suggest that the Palestinians suffer hugely at Jewish hands as well,” sometimes it is a British parliamentarian whose idea of solidarity with those slaughtered at a Kosher market was to tweet “Je suis Palestinian”, And that does not even get into those who are convinced that Jews are actually responsible for the terror in France—a group that includes the mayor of Ankara, leaders of the Free Gaza movement, the International Business Times (since taken down), and the Ron Paul Institute. My twitter feed may be right that a murder commented by a white guy will be attributed to a “disturbed loner” while a Muslim killer is invariably a “terrorist.” But it is also true that regardless of whether the finger on the trigger is white, black, Asian, Arab, or Polynesian, someone will always be there to insist that the Mossad really did it.
I don't think Professor Sheth wishes that people would attack Jews as a group for individual Jewish sins. But the fact that she doesn't recognize that we do experience this, regularly, for sins real and imagined is worrisome. It demonstrates the power of the assumption that Jews win; even coming in the face of a very high-profile loss of Jewish life that was nonetheless met with the usual discussions about bad behavior by other Jews elsewhere.
There was one chunk of the article which was cut for space reasons that I wanted to share with you on this space (consider it the "director's cut"). One prominent theme I tried to explore in my essay was this prevailing sense that Jews are the quintessential anti-discrimination "winners". Unfortunately, this label (not accurate to begin with, as my essay demonstrates) isn't always viewed magnanimously, but rather often is presented as an example of unfairness -- why are Jews given so much when other groups have so little? As a result, we get this weird phenomenon where alleged injustices perpetrated against Muslims by non-Jewish institutions (e.g., satirical cartoons mocking Islam) are met with attacks against Jews. A few years ago, we saw this in Holland, where Muslims angry that authorities dropped a hate crimes prosecution against (non-Jewish) Geert Wilders (whose filmed allegedly mocked Mohammed) responded by putting up cartoons mocking the Holocaust.
The broader issue is that presenting Jews as anti-discrimination "haves" often comes in the form of resentment and almost invariably washes away the actual particularities of the Jewish experience. Consider Falguni Sheth’s Salon article exploring the history of Muslim vilification in the context of the recent Paris massacres. She notes that “terrorism” is a “loaded term” that often seems to arbitrarily include only Muslim acts of mass murder. Clearly she has a point, one strikingly illustrated when a former CIA Deputy Director seemingly forgot about Anders Breivik’s massacre in Norway as an example of terrorism in Europe. She also makes the accurate observations that Muslims face considerable pressure to “assimilate” into French society rather than maintain a conspicuous identity as a separate minority group, and that while Charlie Hebdo did satirize Christianity, those cartoons are hardly analogous to those which mock Muslims. Why? Because unlike Muslims, “Christians are neither religious nor ethnic minorities. Christians are not politically vulnerable in the Republic of France; they are the opposite — secure and fully capable.”
All valid points. But then we get to Professor Sheth’s concluding question: “What if the Charlie Hebdo massacre had been committed by Catholic or Jewish extremists?” Wait, what? How did we get roped into this? Are Jews not a distinctive religious group who have faced considerable pressure to assimilate into an unmarked “French” identity? Are they not a religious and ethnic minority experiencing considerable vulnerability, not the least of which is their propensity to be targeted in precisely these sorts of massacres?
The belated appearance of Jews at the end of Professor Sheth’s article does little to advance her argument—it would have just as much force if it solely compared Muslims against a social class that actually was “secure” in its French status. Rather, Professor Sheth seems to include Jews as a means of emphasizing the unjustness of Jews supposedly possessing something other minorities don’t—they apparently do not experience and are not at risk of experiencing the mass vilification and bigotry that Muslims must endure when individual Muslims commit acts of violence. This assertion seems difficult to back up. While thankfully we have not seen a Jewish-initiated mass murder in the West in quite some time, it is notable that we need not wait that long to refute Professor Sheth’s prediction.
Jews don’t have to perpetrate a murderous strike against a vulnerable minority in order for the spotlight to shine on alleged Jewish bad behavior—such rhetoric is a standard part of the conversation any time Jews are the victims of mass political violence. Sometimes it is a BBC reporter lecturing a French Jew at a rally commemorating her murdered peers that “many critics of Israel’s policy would suggest that the Palestinians suffer hugely at Jewish hands as well,” sometimes it is a British parliamentarian whose idea of solidarity with those slaughtered at a Kosher market was to tweet “Je suis Palestinian”, And that does not even get into those who are convinced that Jews are actually responsible for the terror in France—a group that includes the mayor of Ankara, leaders of the Free Gaza movement, the International Business Times (since taken down), and the Ron Paul Institute. My twitter feed may be right that a murder commented by a white guy will be attributed to a “disturbed loner” while a Muslim killer is invariably a “terrorist.” But it is also true that regardless of whether the finger on the trigger is white, black, Asian, Arab, or Polynesian, someone will always be there to insist that the Mossad really did it.
I don't think Professor Sheth wishes that people would attack Jews as a group for individual Jewish sins. But the fact that she doesn't recognize that we do experience this, regularly, for sins real and imagined is worrisome. It demonstrates the power of the assumption that Jews win; even coming in the face of a very high-profile loss of Jewish life that was nonetheless met with the usual discussions about bad behavior by other Jews elsewhere.
Wednesday, January 21, 2015
Meanwhile, Back in Northfield...
I had a lovely conversation with some of my students yesterday during office hours. It was quite wide-ranging, but one thing we talked about was the Jewish cultural-shock of moving from (very Jewish) Bethesda, Maryland, to (very not-Jewish) Northfield, Minnesota for college. Northfield was, by and large, a perfectly fine place to be a Jew. Still, it was markedly different from Bethesda if only because there were so much fewer of us. And going from a place where everyone was intimately familiar with Jews (even if not Jewish themselves, they had a year-long crash course in synagogue practices from riding the Bar and Bat Mitzvah circuit), to a place where many people had never met any Jews at all, does change things. For example, I noted that unlike in Bethesda, at Carleton I did have to contend with people who believed that "the Jews killed Christ". Now technically, I heard that once in Bethesda too. Someone said it in 9th grade social studies, and the entire class burst out laughing. But that, to me, emphasizes the difference all the more -- it's not that there is nobody with anti-Semitic beliefs in Bethesda, it's just that the community culture is such that any such views are going to be marginalized and ridiculed. The difference in Northfield is not that I thought any large proportion of Carls thought I was a Christ-killer, but I didn't think that such views would be immediately understood as transparently ludicrous the way that they were back home.
All of this is a segue to my collegiate town reentering the news in the worst way possible. The local watering hole, The Contented Cow, is hosting a series of talks by a prominent conspiracy theorist of the "Holocaust-denial, Israel is responsible for 9/11" sort. Because nothing goes with a pint like a side of HoloHoax1!!11!.
In any event, I am pleased to see that the community has, apparently, risen up in protest (the conspirator in question, James Fetzer, is complaining that Northfield has not accorded him the "powerful, positive response" he is used to). And in a sense there is nothing more that should be said on this. The pub proprietor's response is to change the format from a "lecture" to a "debate", but I agree with my former Professor Louis Newman that there are some ideas that are better off ignored.
Yet, I can't resist one more comment. The pub, you see, wants to make one thing very clear about its Holocaust-denying, 9/11-was-a-Mossad-operation guest. Can you guess what it is?
All of this is a segue to my collegiate town reentering the news in the worst way possible. The local watering hole, The Contented Cow, is hosting a series of talks by a prominent conspiracy theorist of the "Holocaust-denial, Israel is responsible for 9/11" sort. Because nothing goes with a pint like a side of HoloHoax1!!11!.
In any event, I am pleased to see that the community has, apparently, risen up in protest (the conspirator in question, James Fetzer, is complaining that Northfield has not accorded him the "powerful, positive response" he is used to). And in a sense there is nothing more that should be said on this. The pub proprietor's response is to change the format from a "lecture" to a "debate", but I agree with my former Professor Louis Newman that there are some ideas that are better off ignored.
Yet, I can't resist one more comment. The pub, you see, wants to make one thing very clear about its Holocaust-denying, 9/11-was-a-Mossad-operation guest. Can you guess what it is?
“Fetzer is critical of the Israeli government. Does that make him an anti-Semite? No."Like clockwork.
Tuesday, January 20, 2015
Downton Dreaming
Three episodes into Downton Abbey this season, and I have come to the conclusion that I have greatly wronged Cora in my heart. I had always thought of her as dopey, simpering, and obviously not the brightest bulb in the ceiling. In my defense, there was no point where I didn't recognize her as the smarter of her couple -- Lord Grantham has always been dumb as a post -- but I just thought the two were made for each other. Now I see that I've misestimated Cora greatly. The trick to Cora is that, as an American, she doesn't play the game. It's not that, as I thought, she's oblivious to all the political machinations that surround her. It's that she just doesn't care. In contrast to Ms. Bunting or (sometimes) Tom, Cora isn't actively antagonistic to the trappings of Edwardian nobility. But neither is she defined by her role in it. Cora cares about what Cora cares about, and for the most part she seems happy and content because she happily and contentedly pursues her own interests (and is quite successful in doing so). You'll note that on the rare occasions where she seems to be stymied in her goals, she is quite good at marshaling her power to get what she wants. You'll also note that true power and influence does not lie in constantly overcoming adversity; true power exists where it just wouldn't occur to anyone to be adverse to you.
Cora's influence on the house is subtle but obviously salutary. She's liberal, pragmatic, and modern -- in fact, I think she's very quintessentially "America" her in manner. She generally intervenes on the side of "outsiders" like Tom and Ms. Bunting, and does not seem particularly invested in her daughters following a hidebound and traditional life path. This isn't to say she's opposed to that either; indeed, that remains the default option. It's only that when the girls seem to be taking a different path, Cora rarely seems perturbed by it.
This past episode Cora mentioned that she was half-Jewish (on her father's side). I had my suspicions -- her last name was "Levinson" and she was from Cincinnati, which had a significant Jewish population -- but now it's confirmed and I really want the show to explore this aspect of Cora's identity. I'm not asking that she start fasting on Yom Kippur or hang a Mezuzzah outsider her door (though A Downton Seder would immediately supplant Rugrats as the iconic television Passover of my generation). But there was (and is) a lot of anti-Semitism in England at the time, including a very particular and virulent ("genteel") variety in the upper-crust; it would astound me if Cora never encountered that. Jewishness was highly racialized in England at the time, so it is not as if this quantum of "Jewish blood" would have gone unremarked upon. There's another angle to this too -- when Gregson announced he was going to Germany there was a suspicion that Edith might eventually turn into a Nazi-sympathizer. I don't know if that would have made sense from a character arc perspective, and in any event Gregson has since fallen off the radar. Nonetheless, the coming events in Germany (and Edith's tenuous German connection) makes the family's Jewish background quite salient.
That being said, I honestly wonder if the girls are even aware of their (partial) Jewish heritage. When mentioning it to Bricker Cora didn't act as if it is was something hidden or secret. Still, it is notable that it has never come up before. Cora obviously doesn't seem to be particularly invested in it, though just based on her general character I can't imagine she isn't sympathetic to the Jewish people and their struggles at the time.
In any event, there is a lot to be done here, and I want the show to do it. Cater to my desires, damn it! Where's my hotline to the Jewish-controlled media when I need it?
Cora's influence on the house is subtle but obviously salutary. She's liberal, pragmatic, and modern -- in fact, I think she's very quintessentially "America" her in manner. She generally intervenes on the side of "outsiders" like Tom and Ms. Bunting, and does not seem particularly invested in her daughters following a hidebound and traditional life path. This isn't to say she's opposed to that either; indeed, that remains the default option. It's only that when the girls seem to be taking a different path, Cora rarely seems perturbed by it.
This past episode Cora mentioned that she was half-Jewish (on her father's side). I had my suspicions -- her last name was "Levinson" and she was from Cincinnati, which had a significant Jewish population -- but now it's confirmed and I really want the show to explore this aspect of Cora's identity. I'm not asking that she start fasting on Yom Kippur or hang a Mezuzzah outsider her door (though A Downton Seder would immediately supplant Rugrats as the iconic television Passover of my generation). But there was (and is) a lot of anti-Semitism in England at the time, including a very particular and virulent ("genteel") variety in the upper-crust; it would astound me if Cora never encountered that. Jewishness was highly racialized in England at the time, so it is not as if this quantum of "Jewish blood" would have gone unremarked upon. There's another angle to this too -- when Gregson announced he was going to Germany there was a suspicion that Edith might eventually turn into a Nazi-sympathizer. I don't know if that would have made sense from a character arc perspective, and in any event Gregson has since fallen off the radar. Nonetheless, the coming events in Germany (and Edith's tenuous German connection) makes the family's Jewish background quite salient.
That being said, I honestly wonder if the girls are even aware of their (partial) Jewish heritage. When mentioning it to Bricker Cora didn't act as if it is was something hidden or secret. Still, it is notable that it has never come up before. Cora obviously doesn't seem to be particularly invested in it, though just based on her general character I can't imagine she isn't sympathetic to the Jewish people and their struggles at the time.
In any event, there is a lot to be done here, and I want the show to do it. Cater to my desires, damn it! Where's my hotline to the Jewish-controlled media when I need it?
Tuesday, January 13, 2015
Good Lawyers Make Good Results
This morning, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, involving the exercise of a borrower's "right of rescission" under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). TILA requires that a bank provide its borrowers r with certain disclosures; if it fails to do so the borrower may elect to rescind the loan for three years after the date of closing. The question in Jesinoski was what the borrower needs to do to effectuate the rescission -- did they need only to notify the bank that they were electing to rescind, or did they need to actually file a lawsuit within the three year period. In a 9-0 decision, the Court held that only notification was necessary.
This is a case near and dear to my heart, because I worked on it as a clerk for Judge Murphy (I normally wouldn't reveal my involvement, but Judge Murphy emailed me this morning to "advertise your role in this widely," and far be it from me to ignore an order from a federal judge). Technically, the case I worked on was Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (2013), but they're the same case -- Jesinoski was a per curium opinion by the 8th Circuit bound by Keiran; the only reason that the former was the SCOTUS case was because for a variety of technical reasons it presented a cleaner case to review. The majority in Keiran had held that a lawsuit must be filed within the three year timeline; Judge Murphy dissented and took the (now-vindicated) position that only notification was required.
Not to put to fine a point on it, but we were clearly in the right, and the five page Scalia opinion (shortest of the year, according to SCOTUSblog) explaining why is all the time this question really deserved. The statutory text (15 U.S.C. 1635(a)) is crystal clear: "[T]he obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction . . . by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau], of his intention to do so." The implementing regulations say the same thing ("To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram or other means of written communication."), and pretty much any other tool of statutory interpretation (the view of the implementing agency, the canon of construction for a remedial statute like TILA) points in favor of that outcome.
But if it was so obvious, why did it come out the other way in the 8th Circuit? And not just there -- the Supreme Court was resolving a deep circuit split that pitted (off the top of my head) the 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits against the 3rd and 4th Circuits. I don't think it's a left/right divide -- unanimity of the Supreme Court aside, following the decision in Keiran two Republican appointees on the 8th Circuit (Judges Colloton and Melloy) went out of their way to express their view that the majority had gotten it wrong and Judge Murphy's dissent was correct. Rather, it seems clear to me that it was simply a case of an attorney mismatch.
I watched the oral arguments in Keiran, and the disparity in talent was quite evident. The lenders were represented by a former Scalia clerk who was simply superb -- one of the best advocates we saw all year. The homeowners were represented by a random mortgage foreclosure defense attorney, who was decidedly mediocre (the CFPB also had an attorney who argued briefly on behalf of the homeowner -- my coclerks and I divided in our appraisal of her -- I found her average at best, my colleagues thought she was pretty solid). One side had eloquent and polished presentation with well-crafted, sophisticated arguments; the other was bumbling and disjointed and did little to give the court guidance as to the right outcome (which could start and end with the clear statutory language). The mismatch in talent canceled out the mismatch in legal justification, and so the result was a deep divide in the lower courts. Once the case went to the Supreme Court, by contrast, the homeowners got much better representation -- plenty of firms are willing to take a prestigious SCOTUS case for little or no fee, simply for prestige -- and when that imbalance was rectified the outcome of the case was assured.
Clerking is an interesting experience. It gives you an inside look at how the sausage is made, which, like most sausage-production, can be equal parts fascinating and horrifying. It also does wonders to alleviate the sense of imposter syndrome -- because a lot of lawyers are bad. Nothing did more to make me feel qualified to be a lawyer -- a good lawyer, even -- than reading the submitted briefs during my clerkship. But while this did wonders for my self confidence, and emphasized that yes I could make a difference, it was also quite sobering. Good representation matters. A lot. And it is no mystery and no coincidence that for the most part it is the big banks that get the former Supreme Court clerks and the poor homeowners who get the remains (or worse, the grifters). Judges, no more than any one else, are not superhuman, and they can be swayed by good advocacy even where the law unadorned seems to obviously suggest another result. Here, the right outcome was reached in the end. It isn't always.
This is a case near and dear to my heart, because I worked on it as a clerk for Judge Murphy (I normally wouldn't reveal my involvement, but Judge Murphy emailed me this morning to "advertise your role in this widely," and far be it from me to ignore an order from a federal judge). Technically, the case I worked on was Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721 (2013), but they're the same case -- Jesinoski was a per curium opinion by the 8th Circuit bound by Keiran; the only reason that the former was the SCOTUS case was because for a variety of technical reasons it presented a cleaner case to review. The majority in Keiran had held that a lawsuit must be filed within the three year timeline; Judge Murphy dissented and took the (now-vindicated) position that only notification was required.
Not to put to fine a point on it, but we were clearly in the right, and the five page Scalia opinion (shortest of the year, according to SCOTUSblog) explaining why is all the time this question really deserved. The statutory text (15 U.S.C. 1635(a)) is crystal clear: "[T]he obligor shall have the right to rescind the transaction . . . by notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the [Consumer Financial Protection Bureau], of his intention to do so." The implementing regulations say the same thing ("To exercise the right to rescind, the consumer shall notify the creditor of the rescission by mail, telegram or other means of written communication."), and pretty much any other tool of statutory interpretation (the view of the implementing agency, the canon of construction for a remedial statute like TILA) points in favor of that outcome.
But if it was so obvious, why did it come out the other way in the 8th Circuit? And not just there -- the Supreme Court was resolving a deep circuit split that pitted (off the top of my head) the 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits against the 3rd and 4th Circuits. I don't think it's a left/right divide -- unanimity of the Supreme Court aside, following the decision in Keiran two Republican appointees on the 8th Circuit (Judges Colloton and Melloy) went out of their way to express their view that the majority had gotten it wrong and Judge Murphy's dissent was correct. Rather, it seems clear to me that it was simply a case of an attorney mismatch.
I watched the oral arguments in Keiran, and the disparity in talent was quite evident. The lenders were represented by a former Scalia clerk who was simply superb -- one of the best advocates we saw all year. The homeowners were represented by a random mortgage foreclosure defense attorney, who was decidedly mediocre (the CFPB also had an attorney who argued briefly on behalf of the homeowner -- my coclerks and I divided in our appraisal of her -- I found her average at best, my colleagues thought she was pretty solid). One side had eloquent and polished presentation with well-crafted, sophisticated arguments; the other was bumbling and disjointed and did little to give the court guidance as to the right outcome (which could start and end with the clear statutory language). The mismatch in talent canceled out the mismatch in legal justification, and so the result was a deep divide in the lower courts. Once the case went to the Supreme Court, by contrast, the homeowners got much better representation -- plenty of firms are willing to take a prestigious SCOTUS case for little or no fee, simply for prestige -- and when that imbalance was rectified the outcome of the case was assured.
Clerking is an interesting experience. It gives you an inside look at how the sausage is made, which, like most sausage-production, can be equal parts fascinating and horrifying. It also does wonders to alleviate the sense of imposter syndrome -- because a lot of lawyers are bad. Nothing did more to make me feel qualified to be a lawyer -- a good lawyer, even -- than reading the submitted briefs during my clerkship. But while this did wonders for my self confidence, and emphasized that yes I could make a difference, it was also quite sobering. Good representation matters. A lot. And it is no mystery and no coincidence that for the most part it is the big banks that get the former Supreme Court clerks and the poor homeowners who get the remains (or worse, the grifters). Judges, no more than any one else, are not superhuman, and they can be swayed by good advocacy even where the law unadorned seems to obviously suggest another result. Here, the right outcome was reached in the end. It isn't always.
Wednesday, January 07, 2015
Rate That Apology, Part 3: Kirby Delauter
I posted on Facebook, though not on the blog, about Kirby Delauter, the Frederick County councilman who became an internet sensation when he angrily told a local journalist that she was prohibited from using his name "without permission." The (above linked) Frederick News-Post editorial in response was a classic, and I highly encourage you to read it.
In any event, after a brief radio silence, councilman Delauter has issued the following statement:
So good job, Kirby. I think this hits all the right notes. 9/10.
In any event, after a brief radio silence, councilman Delauter has issued the following statement:
“The first amendment is alive and well in Frederick County. As a public figure working to maintain and improve the county, it can be very frustrating to feel misrepresented or misinterpreted by a local media outlet.Honestly, I think that's pretty solid. Kind of hangs his colleague Billy Shreve out to dry ("I think The News-Post is extremely biased and someone should sue them"), but that's on Shreve. This one takes responsibility for the wrong and admits that it was a wrong unequivocally. I don't take the notation of how "frustrating" it is to "feel misrepresented" to be an excuse, but simply a point of a context and one we can all relate to, particularly since he doesn't return to it (e.g., with some sly construction about how "everyone should strive to be fair" or like language that suggests there was mutual fault here). The closing sentence is appropriately conciliatory and stresses the right note, which is that the media can and should cover him as an elected official and that's part of what makes our democracy thrive.
“Over my career I have fired off my fair share of angry e-mails, which in hindsight I wish I hadn't. I can't think of one that had a positive effect. Usually, they only served to escalate the conflict. I thought I had long ago learned the lesson of waiting 24 hours before I hit the send key, but apparently I didn't learn that lesson as well as I should have.
“Of course, as I am an elected official, the Frederick News-Post has the right to use my name in any article related to the running of the county -- that comes with the job. So yes, my statement to the Frederick News-Post regarding the use of my name was wrong and inappropriate. I'm not afraid to admit when I’m wrong.
“I got elected to serve all the citizens of northern Frederick County, Democrats as well as Republicans. I look forward to the local papers covering my effort in that regard.”
So good job, Kirby. I think this hits all the right notes. 9/10.
Things People Blame the Jews For, Volume XIV: Charlie Hebdo
A few days ago, there was a bombing at a Colorado NAACP branch office. Some folks noted that this event seemed undercovered in the news media. Today, a dozen people were killed after terrorists stormed the offices of Charlie Hebdo, a French satirical magazine. This has gotten plenty of coverage, and Phoebe Maltz Bovy immediately picks up on the inevitable:
In any event, assuming there is a Jewish conspiracy to overcover Charlie Hebdo at the expense of the NAACP bombing, well, be careful what you wish for -- we might not want too much attention to be put upon the former event. Greta "Reading Gilad Atzmon makes me awfully glad I was raised a Methodist" Berlin knows who really was behind the French strike. Two guesses as to who!
It's the Mossad. I gave you two guesses because "Shin Bet" was also a live possibility.
I do want to give Berlin credit for her celerity. When Ellie Merton won the prize for being the first to blame the Jews for the Anders Breivik massacre in Norway, it was a full two days after the event. Berlin was already pumping her conspiracy theory out in a matter of hours. That's the type of rapid-reaction anti-Semitism that today's on-the-go social media consumers deserve.
Yes, the NAACP attack should get more coverage. No, the fact that the Paris attack (killing 12, as vs thankfully zero, and with major international implications) is more in the news isn't unreasonable. Nor (ahem, Twitter) should it be interpreted as evidence that The Zionists control the media.To be fair, I didn't actually find any examples of this myself -- Phoebe says she read such claims on this thread but that they've apparently been taken down. I trust Phoebe, so I'm running with it, but if you'd like we can devote this comment section to "Things People Blame the Jews For: Making Up Sources."
In any event, assuming there is a Jewish conspiracy to overcover Charlie Hebdo at the expense of the NAACP bombing, well, be careful what you wish for -- we might not want too much attention to be put upon the former event. Greta "Reading Gilad Atzmon makes me awfully glad I was raised a Methodist" Berlin knows who really was behind the French strike. Two guesses as to who!
It's the Mossad. I gave you two guesses because "Shin Bet" was also a live possibility.
I do want to give Berlin credit for her celerity. When Ellie Merton won the prize for being the first to blame the Jews for the Anders Breivik massacre in Norway, it was a full two days after the event. Berlin was already pumping her conspiracy theory out in a matter of hours. That's the type of rapid-reaction anti-Semitism that today's on-the-go social media consumers deserve.
Tuesday, January 06, 2015
How the "Jews Lose" (in the UK)
I got my hands on a copy of Didi Herman's An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness, and English Law (referenced in this post). It is excellent so far. I'm about 50 pages in, and the myriad of ways English judges have of demeaning Jews and Jewish claims is just a joy to behold.
Some of these cases feel a bit archaic -- early 20th century remarks that are so obvious in the construction of Jews are dirty and untrustworthy foreigners. Herman opens with a 1922 insurance case where a policy was held to be validly canceled because the policyholder had not provided his birth name (upon moving to England at age 12, "Euda Gedale" changed his name to "Harry Horne") or revealed that he was born in Romania. This was held to be a material fact that might have legitimately affected the insurance company's decision to issue the policy. Lest we even preserve a modicum of neutrality, the judge hastened to clarify that not every occasion where such facts (national origin, birth name) would they be material -- but in this case, with these facts (Jew, from Eastern Europe), they certainly were. Quoting the court:
Other cases hit upon one of my favorite themes, the idea of the Jew who is far too sensitive about anti-Semitism and is making it up where it does not exist. But the first one that made my jaw hit the floor was a 1987 decision in Simon v. Brimham Associates.* In Brimham, a Jewish man was being interviewed by an employment agency. The interviewer told the man that the employers for the job were Arab and that they would not hire any Jews. They asked the man what his religion was, and he instead walked out of interview. The court found no religious discrimination, because the interviewer did not "know" the man was Jewish and asked all of their interviewees what their religion was. Hence, there was no discrimination, even though the interviewer admitted that he did suspect that the man "might be a Jew" and even though the "religion" question could have served no legitimate purpose other than to effectuate the discrimination the interviewer admitted to in the interview itself. Mind-boggling.**
In any event, thus far the theme of Herman's book seems to be that if you're a Jew in English courts, you will lose, badly, and probably be humiliated in the process. Cheery!
* I should note, by way of caveat, that I have not read the decision myself (I'm working on obtaining a copy) and am no expert on English law, discrimination or otherwise. I am relying on Professor Herman's account, but she is a law professor and so there is no reason to think she is convoying the facts of the case or the opinion inaccurately. UPDATE: I've now read the opinion and Professor Herman was entirely accurate in her description. The decision is absolutely appalling.
** I'd say that in American law this would be an open-and-shut case, since the agency admitted to a "no Jews" policy for the position in question and that's direct evidence of discrimination. But then I remembered that I'm perpetually underestimating the capacity of American courts to avoid making discrimination findings, so I'll back off the conclusion.
Some of these cases feel a bit archaic -- early 20th century remarks that are so obvious in the construction of Jews are dirty and untrustworthy foreigners. Herman opens with a 1922 insurance case where a policy was held to be validly canceled because the policyholder had not provided his birth name (upon moving to England at age 12, "Euda Gedale" changed his name to "Harry Horne") or revealed that he was born in Romania. This was held to be a material fact that might have legitimately affected the insurance company's decision to issue the policy. Lest we even preserve a modicum of neutrality, the judge hastened to clarify that not every occasion where such facts (national origin, birth name) would they be material -- but in this case, with these facts (Jew, from Eastern Europe), they certainly were. Quoting the court:
One can easily think of cases in which [foreign origin] could not affect the mind of a reasonable underwriter. The assured might have come here from a state where the business and social habits, the training and education that a child or young person received, and the view taken as to the observance of legal and other obligations might be notoriously exacting, the same as those prevailing here . . . . Each case must depend upon its own circumstances. The circumstances here are that the plaintiff came from Eastern Europe . . . . It is impossible to say that matters such as nationality, caste and early domocil cannot be of importance in judging as to the risk that underwriters run . . . . To say that is to say that there are no racial differences, no national differences as regards to training and education and the other matters I have mentioned. I say nothing, of course, against the national characteristics of the race to which the plaintiff belongs." (quoted in Herman at 34)Of course you don't.
Other cases hit upon one of my favorite themes, the idea of the Jew who is far too sensitive about anti-Semitism and is making it up where it does not exist. But the first one that made my jaw hit the floor was a 1987 decision in Simon v. Brimham Associates.* In Brimham, a Jewish man was being interviewed by an employment agency. The interviewer told the man that the employers for the job were Arab and that they would not hire any Jews. They asked the man what his religion was, and he instead walked out of interview. The court found no religious discrimination, because the interviewer did not "know" the man was Jewish and asked all of their interviewees what their religion was. Hence, there was no discrimination, even though the interviewer admitted that he did suspect that the man "might be a Jew" and even though the "religion" question could have served no legitimate purpose other than to effectuate the discrimination the interviewer admitted to in the interview itself. Mind-boggling.**
In any event, thus far the theme of Herman's book seems to be that if you're a Jew in English courts, you will lose, badly, and probably be humiliated in the process. Cheery!
* I should note, by way of caveat, that I have not read the decision myself (I'm working on obtaining a copy) and am no expert on English law, discrimination or otherwise. I am relying on Professor Herman's account, but she is a law professor and so there is no reason to think she is convoying the facts of the case or the opinion inaccurately. UPDATE: I've now read the opinion and Professor Herman was entirely accurate in her description. The decision is absolutely appalling.
** I'd say that in American law this would be an open-and-shut case, since the agency admitted to a "no Jews" policy for the position in question and that's direct evidence of discrimination. But then I remembered that I'm perpetually underestimating the capacity of American courts to avoid making discrimination findings, so I'll back off the conclusion.
W.E.B. Du Bois and Albert Einstein
Check out this neat bit of correspondence between W.E.B. Du Bois and Albert Einstein. Du Bois was already familiar with Einstein's reputation (and, having studied in Berlin, was fluent in German), and asked if Einstein might write a short letter of support for The Crisis (house magazine of the NAACP). Einstein agreed, and Du Bois introduced his statement has follows:
The author, Albert Einstein, is a Jew of German nationality. He was born in Wurttemburg in 1879 and educated in Switzerland. He has been Professor of Physics at Zurich and Prague and is at present director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Physical Institute at Berlin. He is a member of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science and of the British Royal Society. He received the Nobel Prize in 1921 and the Copley Medal in 1925.And here is what Einstein wrote:
Einstein is a genius in higher physics and ranks with Copernicus, Newton and Kepler. His famous theory of Relativity, advanced first in 1905, is revolutionizing our explanation of physical phenomenon and our conception of Motion, Time and Space.
But Professor Einstein is not a mere mathematical mind. He is a living being, sympathetic with all human advance. He is a brilliant advocate of disarmament and world Peace and he hates race prejudice because as a Jew he knows what it is. At our request, he has sent this word to THE CRISIS with “Ausgezeichneter Hochachtung” (“Distinguished respect”).
It seems to be a universal fact that minorities, especially when their Individuals are recognizable because of physical differences, are treated by majorities among whom they live as an inferior class. The tragic part of such a fate, however, lies not only in the automatically realized disadvantage suffered by these minorities in economic and social relations, but also in the fact that those who meet such treatment themselves for the most part acquiesce in the prejudiced estimate because of the suggestive influence of the majority, and come to regard people like themselves as inferior. This second and more important aspect of the evil can be met through closer union and conscious educational enlightenment among the minority, and so emancipation of the soul of the minority can be attained.Very cool.
The determined effort of the American Negroes in this direction deserves every recognition and assistance.
Albert Einstein
Sunday, January 04, 2015
The First Roundup of 2015
A new year, a new roundup. For whatever reason, a bunch of really interesting articles popped up today, and I just don't have time to give them all the attention they deserve.
* * *
Hadash (a joint Jewish-Arab party with Communist affiliations) has voted to join a unified Arab list, on the condition that the list include Jews and women (Hadash currently has four MKs, three Arab and one Jewish). Also of note is that former Israeli Knesset Speaker and Labor MK Avraham Burg appears to be considering a return to politics under Hadash's banner. He traveled to Hadash's conference on Shabbat because "because advancing solidarity between Jews and Arabs was 'a matter of life and death' that trumped the ban [on traveling during the Sabbath]."
A very good piece by Laurie Penny on the traumas faced by nerdy men growing up, and how they compare to those faced by nerdy women.
Brief reports to the contrary notwithstanding, Saudi Arabia denies that it will begin allowing Jews to work in the country. Israelis (and those with Israeli passport stamps) are barred from the country outright, Jews can (with some difficulty) obtain tourist visas.
The African Studies Association offers its first panel on African Jews (naturally, the first insight was that the term "African Jews" is too broad to do much useful work, but still).
Nothing too new for those in the know, but this short piece summarizing the empirical research on implicit racial bias may be useful for those looking for a quick-and-dirty introduction.
I am actually stunned by some of the findings in this poll of Israeli political attitudes. More Israeli Arabs have trust in their government than Israeli Jews (43% versus 37%). Strong majorities of both groups declare themselves to be proud to be Israeli (86% of Jews and 65% of Arabs). A bare majority of Israeli-Arabs say they trust the IDF (51%, the Israeli Supreme Court is the most trustworthy institution amongst Israeli Arabs at 60%).
* * *
Hadash (a joint Jewish-Arab party with Communist affiliations) has voted to join a unified Arab list, on the condition that the list include Jews and women (Hadash currently has four MKs, three Arab and one Jewish). Also of note is that former Israeli Knesset Speaker and Labor MK Avraham Burg appears to be considering a return to politics under Hadash's banner. He traveled to Hadash's conference on Shabbat because "because advancing solidarity between Jews and Arabs was 'a matter of life and death' that trumped the ban [on traveling during the Sabbath]."
A very good piece by Laurie Penny on the traumas faced by nerdy men growing up, and how they compare to those faced by nerdy women.
Brief reports to the contrary notwithstanding, Saudi Arabia denies that it will begin allowing Jews to work in the country. Israelis (and those with Israeli passport stamps) are barred from the country outright, Jews can (with some difficulty) obtain tourist visas.
The African Studies Association offers its first panel on African Jews (naturally, the first insight was that the term "African Jews" is too broad to do much useful work, but still).
Nothing too new for those in the know, but this short piece summarizing the empirical research on implicit racial bias may be useful for those looking for a quick-and-dirty introduction.
I am actually stunned by some of the findings in this poll of Israeli political attitudes. More Israeli Arabs have trust in their government than Israeli Jews (43% versus 37%). Strong majorities of both groups declare themselves to be proud to be Israeli (86% of Jews and 65% of Arabs). A bare majority of Israeli-Arabs say they trust the IDF (51%, the Israeli Supreme Court is the most trustworthy institution amongst Israeli Arabs at 60%).
A Black Rose
Vox reports on an interesting new study in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology suggesting that people see "black" Americans as less competent than "African Americans". The study gave participants a fictional biography of a person variously described as "black" or "African American", and then asked them to predict qualities about the person. "African Americans" were generally given more positive attributes (higher incomes, more educational experience, etc.) than "blacks."
It's interesting to speculate on what's causing this gap. I recall reading that much of the push towards the label "African-Americans" was a belief that it would partially deracialize the group -- they were a distinct group, yes, but no more so than any other hyphenated American (Jewish-Americans, Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans). This study suggests that reasoning might have some legs to it. Alternatively, it might be that there are internal class divides within the community regarding their favored label -- wealthier or more educated persons favoring African-American, while their poorer peers preferring Black. But I have no idea if that's true.
Anyway, as the study authors emphasize, what is clear is that language matters. A rose given another name does not, in fact, always smell so sweet.
It's interesting to speculate on what's causing this gap. I recall reading that much of the push towards the label "African-Americans" was a belief that it would partially deracialize the group -- they were a distinct group, yes, but no more so than any other hyphenated American (Jewish-Americans, Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans). This study suggests that reasoning might have some legs to it. Alternatively, it might be that there are internal class divides within the community regarding their favored label -- wealthier or more educated persons favoring African-American, while their poorer peers preferring Black. But I have no idea if that's true.
Anyway, as the study authors emphasize, what is clear is that language matters. A rose given another name does not, in fact, always smell so sweet.
Saturday, January 03, 2015
Why are Police Leadership Better than Police Workers on Police Racism?
The other day, the chief of Pittsburgh's Police was photographed holding a poster saying "I resolve to challenge racism @ work. End White silence." (The chief, Cameron McLay, is White). The local police union erupted in rage, accusing the chief of calling his force racist.
Chief McLay's act, and the union response, are part of an emerging pattern I've observed. It's not just that police unions -- and the rank-and-file more generally -- are behaving exceptionally poorly in response to protests over racist police work. It's that police leadership is performing, comparatively at least, so much better. In Richmond, California, the chief of police joined a protest with the sign "Black lives matter"; the local accused him of breaking the law. In Phoenix, a police chief who long clashed with the union was fired, one alleged source of the antipathy was the chief's crackdown on bad apple cops. And in Nashville, Tennessee, Police Chief Steve Anderson made news with a thoughtful letter to a constituent complaining that he had not cracked down sufficiently on protesters, defending their right to protest and observing that all of us have a tendency to get stuck in the views of our own social circles (in fairness, I've seen no reports of any bad behavior or backlash from Nashville police).
This divergence poses a puzzle for some on the left. To be sure, they are reckoning with the fact that a public sector union seems to be among the primary bad guys in this saga -- this article in Jacobin Magazine is a good example from a perspective well to my left. As befits their Marxist perspective, Jacobin argues that police officers are so fully integrated in the project of defending capital and the dominant classes that they have no conception of themselves as in solidarity with the everyday, working class. They are hired to manage and suppress that precise class. I wouldn't buy this explanation anyway, but it is particularly notable in that it can't explain why the police leadership isn't worse (and seems to be better) than the rank-and-file. After all, this narrative (which boils down to little more than "cops are terrible") should see a unified front of police awfulness, indeed, the police leadership should if anything be more enthusiastic players in the capitalism-preserving project. Still, one almost can't fault them for the oversight -- it is hard enough to ask a Marxist rag to abandon a union, to further expect them to throw their lot in with management is obviously a bridge too far.
But those of us not slaves to a defunct economist can think further. So what is the explanation? One answer is simply to blame the unions, and that definitely is part of the story. Protests against police racism are in large part about demanding accountability (firings, lawsuits, or prosecutions) of police officers, and protecting police officers from precisely these consequences is part of the union's job. In general, unionization increases the relative power of labor vis-a-vis management, to the extent that labor is behaving badly, unionization will accentuate those effects. But while unionization may accentuate the hostile attitude police workers take towards reform efforts, I think it is a stretch to say unions produce them. The hostility seems to be genuinely organic to the rank-and-file (witness the mass back-turning on Mayor De Blasio; an action opposed, natch, by NYPD Chief Bill Bratton). So we need another explanation for what causes the working cadre to differ so substantially from its leadership.
If I were a regular police officer, the answer I'd probably give is that police leaders are desk jockeys who don't understand the risks and realities of being a beat cop. It's easy for them to criticize, they just shuffle papers all day. Unfortunately, nearly all police leaders came up through the ranks and have plenty of experience on the streets -- indeed, they almost certainly put in their time in an era when crime was far more prevalent than today. It is unlikely that police leaders are under any delusions regarding the stresses of being a cop.
Another possibility relates to political and interest group pressure. It is almost certainly the case that police leadership are more democratically accountable than are their peers on the line. Sometimes this accountability is direct (as in an elected sheriff), but in nearly all cases the police chief can be hired or fired by the local city or county government. To the extent that the politicians are being pressured to implement reform, those pressures will diffuse down to the police management. Obviously, this depends on who the effective pressure groups are, and perhaps we'd expect to see this divergence be more stark in large cities with majority-minority electorates than in the suburbs. But maybe not -- Pittsburgh and Nashville are both majority-White cities, and Phoenix is 46% non-Hispanic white. Indeed, the only city where minority groups are a clear majority is the suburb, Richmond (though with a population of over 100,000, it isn't exactly typical).
Finally, it may be the case that the structure of police work creates a different perspective for the leadership compared to the beat. Not everything a regular cop does is particularly antagonistic -- directed traffic or providing security at a street fair, for example -- but it is no stretch to say most of their interactions with the populace occur when something bad has happened. That creates a particular perspective wherein their community is the sort of place where bad things happen and they're going to be at the center of it all. Police leadership, by contrast, gets to occupy a much wider vantage point. In addition to engaging with the police themselves and hearing their stories, they also read aggregate crime statistics, listen to public complaints, interact with local political leadership, and liaison with the community. This likely alters their understanding of what good policing is.
Either way, this presents an interesting case. It is one thing to focus on attacking the police unions, it is quite another to suggest that empowering police management might be the most progressive response. At the very least, we need to develop a theory for why in a non-trivial amount of cases, it is the police leadership that seems most amenable to the sorts of reforms progressives want to see with respect to policing behavior.
Chief McLay's act, and the union response, are part of an emerging pattern I've observed. It's not just that police unions -- and the rank-and-file more generally -- are behaving exceptionally poorly in response to protests over racist police work. It's that police leadership is performing, comparatively at least, so much better. In Richmond, California, the chief of police joined a protest with the sign "Black lives matter"; the local accused him of breaking the law. In Phoenix, a police chief who long clashed with the union was fired, one alleged source of the antipathy was the chief's crackdown on bad apple cops. And in Nashville, Tennessee, Police Chief Steve Anderson made news with a thoughtful letter to a constituent complaining that he had not cracked down sufficiently on protesters, defending their right to protest and observing that all of us have a tendency to get stuck in the views of our own social circles (in fairness, I've seen no reports of any bad behavior or backlash from Nashville police).
This divergence poses a puzzle for some on the left. To be sure, they are reckoning with the fact that a public sector union seems to be among the primary bad guys in this saga -- this article in Jacobin Magazine is a good example from a perspective well to my left. As befits their Marxist perspective, Jacobin argues that police officers are so fully integrated in the project of defending capital and the dominant classes that they have no conception of themselves as in solidarity with the everyday, working class. They are hired to manage and suppress that precise class. I wouldn't buy this explanation anyway, but it is particularly notable in that it can't explain why the police leadership isn't worse (and seems to be better) than the rank-and-file. After all, this narrative (which boils down to little more than "cops are terrible") should see a unified front of police awfulness, indeed, the police leadership should if anything be more enthusiastic players in the capitalism-preserving project. Still, one almost can't fault them for the oversight -- it is hard enough to ask a Marxist rag to abandon a union, to further expect them to throw their lot in with management is obviously a bridge too far.
But those of us not slaves to a defunct economist can think further. So what is the explanation? One answer is simply to blame the unions, and that definitely is part of the story. Protests against police racism are in large part about demanding accountability (firings, lawsuits, or prosecutions) of police officers, and protecting police officers from precisely these consequences is part of the union's job. In general, unionization increases the relative power of labor vis-a-vis management, to the extent that labor is behaving badly, unionization will accentuate those effects. But while unionization may accentuate the hostile attitude police workers take towards reform efforts, I think it is a stretch to say unions produce them. The hostility seems to be genuinely organic to the rank-and-file (witness the mass back-turning on Mayor De Blasio; an action opposed, natch, by NYPD Chief Bill Bratton). So we need another explanation for what causes the working cadre to differ so substantially from its leadership.
If I were a regular police officer, the answer I'd probably give is that police leaders are desk jockeys who don't understand the risks and realities of being a beat cop. It's easy for them to criticize, they just shuffle papers all day. Unfortunately, nearly all police leaders came up through the ranks and have plenty of experience on the streets -- indeed, they almost certainly put in their time in an era when crime was far more prevalent than today. It is unlikely that police leaders are under any delusions regarding the stresses of being a cop.
Another possibility relates to political and interest group pressure. It is almost certainly the case that police leadership are more democratically accountable than are their peers on the line. Sometimes this accountability is direct (as in an elected sheriff), but in nearly all cases the police chief can be hired or fired by the local city or county government. To the extent that the politicians are being pressured to implement reform, those pressures will diffuse down to the police management. Obviously, this depends on who the effective pressure groups are, and perhaps we'd expect to see this divergence be more stark in large cities with majority-minority electorates than in the suburbs. But maybe not -- Pittsburgh and Nashville are both majority-White cities, and Phoenix is 46% non-Hispanic white. Indeed, the only city where minority groups are a clear majority is the suburb, Richmond (though with a population of over 100,000, it isn't exactly typical).
Finally, it may be the case that the structure of police work creates a different perspective for the leadership compared to the beat. Not everything a regular cop does is particularly antagonistic -- directed traffic or providing security at a street fair, for example -- but it is no stretch to say most of their interactions with the populace occur when something bad has happened. That creates a particular perspective wherein their community is the sort of place where bad things happen and they're going to be at the center of it all. Police leadership, by contrast, gets to occupy a much wider vantage point. In addition to engaging with the police themselves and hearing their stories, they also read aggregate crime statistics, listen to public complaints, interact with local political leadership, and liaison with the community. This likely alters their understanding of what good policing is.
Either way, this presents an interesting case. It is one thing to focus on attacking the police unions, it is quite another to suggest that empowering police management might be the most progressive response. At the very least, we need to develop a theory for why in a non-trivial amount of cases, it is the police leadership that seems most amenable to the sorts of reforms progressives want to see with respect to policing behavior.
Friday, January 02, 2015
Sticks and Stones
I'm back from my New Year's travels, and what does my browser greet me with but this chariming story about Israelis settlers pelting an American diplomatic convoy with rocks. The convoy was investigating reports of Jewish vandalism targeting Palestinian olive trees in the West Bank. I have two thoughts:
1) There is no reason whatsoever why Jewish rock throwers should be viewed or treated any differently from Palestinian rock-throwers. We know, after all, just how dangerous throwing rocks can be.
2) If violent Israeli settlers think that the United States isn't on their side, then I'd say the U.S. is doing something right. Sometimes aggrieved foreigners are filmed throwing projectiles at American symbols and our instinct is to assume they must have a point. They don't, or don't always, and this is an excellent example of a group I'm perfectly happy to see unhappy with American policies.
1) There is no reason whatsoever why Jewish rock throwers should be viewed or treated any differently from Palestinian rock-throwers. We know, after all, just how dangerous throwing rocks can be.
2) If violent Israeli settlers think that the United States isn't on their side, then I'd say the U.S. is doing something right. Sometimes aggrieved foreigners are filmed throwing projectiles at American symbols and our instinct is to assume they must have a point. They don't, or don't always, and this is an excellent example of a group I'm perfectly happy to see unhappy with American policies.
Monday, December 29, 2014
Northwestern Law Professor's Home Defaced
On Twitter, Northwestern Law Professor Eugene Kontorovich states that he was among the victims of a string of incidents where anti-Semitic graffiti was sprayed on Chicagoland garages.
Eugene writes often on the intersection of international law and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our politics are not identical, but I've always found his analysis to be thought-provoking. I hope he and his family are feeling safe, and that the offenders are identified and brought to justice.
Eugene writes often on the intersection of international law and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our politics are not identical, but I've always found his analysis to be thought-provoking. I hope he and his family are feeling safe, and that the offenders are identified and brought to justice.
Sunday, December 28, 2014
Riding Up and Down the "Criticism" Ladder
Discourse about discourse about Israel -- a play in four acts.
ACT I: PENN STUDENTS: Mr. Hedges, you write about the Middle East! We would love to have you speak at our conference on peace in the region.
ACT II: MR. HEDGES: Israel and ISIS are historical "mirrors."
ACT III: PENN STUDENTS: Mr. Hedges, we no longer think you'd be a great speaker at a conference on peace in the Middle East.
ACT IV: MR. HEDGES: Man, anytime someone suggests Israel should withdraw to '67 borders they are mercilessly silenced by the all-powerful Israel lobby.
Fin.
ACT I: PENN STUDENTS: Mr. Hedges, you write about the Middle East! We would love to have you speak at our conference on peace in the region.
ACT II: MR. HEDGES: Israel and ISIS are historical "mirrors."
ACT III: PENN STUDENTS: Mr. Hedges, we no longer think you'd be a great speaker at a conference on peace in the Middle East.
ACT IV: MR. HEDGES: Man, anytime someone suggests Israel should withdraw to '67 borders they are mercilessly silenced by the all-powerful Israel lobby.
Fin.
Saturday, December 27, 2014
Cognitive Inequality and the Internet
Kevin Drum offers a theory that the internet drives increases of cognitive inequality. Put simply, "the internet makes dumb people dumber and smart people smarter." (the post was from 2012, but I came across it today). Basically, his point is that the internet makes available a massive glut of information -- accurate and inaccurate -- to the everyday population. If you know how to put in proper searches and have decent source-appraisal and critical-reasoning skills, you can become much, much smarter. If you lack these attributes, by contrast, you'll be a lot dumber.
This theory makes some sense to me, but I'm also interested in how it lines up with some of the motivated cognition research I've become increasingly interested in. An important part of that research is that we selectively interpret the information we receive -- and the information sources we pursue -- so that they are in harmony with our preexisting beliefs. So liberals avoid or discredit Fox, and conservatives do the same to MSNBC. And the thing is, it is very hard to disentangle that sort of motivated reasoning from critical appraisal. If I scroll over a link, see it's going to Breitbart, and say "pssh, obviously I don't need to read that tripe," am I wisely ignoring an incredible source, or am I avoiding information that might disrupt my carefully crafted belief structure? The answer is almost certainly some of each; but how much of each is difficult to determine. Indeed, how do I know that Breitbart lacks credibility? For the most part, it's because (a) a large quantity of sources within my epistemological network say it is and (b) from experience I know that their statements clash pretty consistently with my ideological priors. How is that different from motivated cognition? And we can run this in reverse, of course (witness the worries about "epistemic closure" on the right, or take it even further afield -- how do I know to dismiss conspiracy theories? I never landed on the moon; ultimately, I'm making a decision that NASA and like sources are more credible than expose-the-hoax.angelfire.com based on surprisingly thin gruel.
Ultimately, as depressing as Drum's hypothesis seems to be, I want to believe it is right because it indicates that education and knowledge can nudge us in the right direction of being better thinkers. But people are notoriously difficult to persuade, even when they're wrong. It is possible that the internet doesn't so much further cognitive inequality as it furthers cognitive divergence -- sending each of us down a personalized rabbit hole of groupthink and confirmation bias wherein every thought we think (right or wrong) can find a network of supporting architecture immunizing it from effective critique.
This theory makes some sense to me, but I'm also interested in how it lines up with some of the motivated cognition research I've become increasingly interested in. An important part of that research is that we selectively interpret the information we receive -- and the information sources we pursue -- so that they are in harmony with our preexisting beliefs. So liberals avoid or discredit Fox, and conservatives do the same to MSNBC. And the thing is, it is very hard to disentangle that sort of motivated reasoning from critical appraisal. If I scroll over a link, see it's going to Breitbart, and say "pssh, obviously I don't need to read that tripe," am I wisely ignoring an incredible source, or am I avoiding information that might disrupt my carefully crafted belief structure? The answer is almost certainly some of each; but how much of each is difficult to determine. Indeed, how do I know that Breitbart lacks credibility? For the most part, it's because (a) a large quantity of sources within my epistemological network say it is and (b) from experience I know that their statements clash pretty consistently with my ideological priors. How is that different from motivated cognition? And we can run this in reverse, of course (witness the worries about "epistemic closure" on the right, or take it even further afield -- how do I know to dismiss conspiracy theories? I never landed on the moon; ultimately, I'm making a decision that NASA and like sources are more credible than expose-the-hoax.angelfire.com based on surprisingly thin gruel.
Ultimately, as depressing as Drum's hypothesis seems to be, I want to believe it is right because it indicates that education and knowledge can nudge us in the right direction of being better thinkers. But people are notoriously difficult to persuade, even when they're wrong. It is possible that the internet doesn't so much further cognitive inequality as it furthers cognitive divergence -- sending each of us down a personalized rabbit hole of groupthink and confirmation bias wherein every thought we think (right or wrong) can find a network of supporting architecture immunizing it from effective critique.
Thursday, December 25, 2014
"Jews Lose": The UK Case
I have periodically remarked upon the "Jews lose" attribute of American free exercise doctrine -- namely, that across the entire history of the First Amendment (1789 - present), Jews have never won a free exercise (or RFRA) case in front of the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, religious minorities in general fare exceptionally poorly when presenting such claims before the highest court in the land. The only cases I can think of where a non-Christian claimant has successfully won a religious accommodation claim before the high court are Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006), and Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (the Santeria religion in Hialeah fuses elements of Christianity with native African and Caribbean religions). For the most part, though, Jews (and other religious minorities) lose.
I'm less familiar with the contours and history of anti-discrimination law in the UK. Still, I was surprised (and, on reflection, am surprised that I was surprised) to find out that Jews have never won a reported discrimination (race relations) case against non-Jewish defendants in the history of the United Kingdom (at least dating from the inception of modern anti-discrimination law). The only successful discrimination prosecution by a Jewish plaintiff was a "Jew-on-Jew" case in 2009 (concerning matrilineal Jewish lineage as an admissions requirement for a Jewish school). The linked book is Didi Herman's An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness, and English Law, which looks absolutely fascinating -- unfortunately, I've only been able to get a taste of it through google books' limited preview (this review by Martin Lockshin provides a decent summary). Herman argues that not only do Jews consistently lose in UK courts, but the court when dealing directly with Jews treat both the people and the community with disdain bordering on outright antipathy. Anyone familiar with the Ronnie Fraser ruling is intimately familiar with the form.
One interesting element I was able to glean from the bits I read, however, is that the generally shabby treatment of British Jews in the courts is not just unrecognized by British society; they pretty much assume the opposite. Protection of Jews is viewed as a model through which other groups also can make claims; so one sees arguments of the form "we protect Jews, so why not also protect Sikhs, or Muslims, in the same [assumed to be robust] way?" Protections for other groups are expanded on the presumption that they're getting the same thing as Jews, when in reality those decisions seem to be considerably more expansive than what Jews actually receive. I obviously favor giving both Muslims and Sikhs robust anti-discrimination protection. But the actual practice here is problematic -- it operates under a presumption that Jews represent an anti-discrimination "have" that is unexamined and apparently unfounded. It is axiomatic that Jews are protected -- perhaps too much so, perhaps we are too quick to indulge them when they "cry anti-Semitism". Viewing Jews as the quintessential protected group, courts that in fact consistently deny Jews protection at the level of particular cases see themselves as breaking from the script, rather than repeating a continuous and damaging pattern.
I'm less familiar with the contours and history of anti-discrimination law in the UK. Still, I was surprised (and, on reflection, am surprised that I was surprised) to find out that Jews have never won a reported discrimination (race relations) case against non-Jewish defendants in the history of the United Kingdom (at least dating from the inception of modern anti-discrimination law). The only successful discrimination prosecution by a Jewish plaintiff was a "Jew-on-Jew" case in 2009 (concerning matrilineal Jewish lineage as an admissions requirement for a Jewish school). The linked book is Didi Herman's An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness, and English Law, which looks absolutely fascinating -- unfortunately, I've only been able to get a taste of it through google books' limited preview (this review by Martin Lockshin provides a decent summary). Herman argues that not only do Jews consistently lose in UK courts, but the court when dealing directly with Jews treat both the people and the community with disdain bordering on outright antipathy. Anyone familiar with the Ronnie Fraser ruling is intimately familiar with the form.
One interesting element I was able to glean from the bits I read, however, is that the generally shabby treatment of British Jews in the courts is not just unrecognized by British society; they pretty much assume the opposite. Protection of Jews is viewed as a model through which other groups also can make claims; so one sees arguments of the form "we protect Jews, so why not also protect Sikhs, or Muslims, in the same [assumed to be robust] way?" Protections for other groups are expanded on the presumption that they're getting the same thing as Jews, when in reality those decisions seem to be considerably more expansive than what Jews actually receive. I obviously favor giving both Muslims and Sikhs robust anti-discrimination protection. But the actual practice here is problematic -- it operates under a presumption that Jews represent an anti-discrimination "have" that is unexamined and apparently unfounded. It is axiomatic that Jews are protected -- perhaps too much so, perhaps we are too quick to indulge them when they "cry anti-Semitism". Viewing Jews as the quintessential protected group, courts that in fact consistently deny Jews protection at the level of particular cases see themselves as breaking from the script, rather than repeating a continuous and damaging pattern.
New Year's Resolutions: 2015
Bender: Isn't it time you gave up all hope of ever improving yourself in any way?
Fry: I know I should but I just can't.
Another year, another iteration of my New Year's Resolutions. As always, we first review how I did over the previous year:
Met: 1, 4, 5, 7, 8 (I was having trouble confirming if I read all of any of the academic books I perused this year, but then I remembered the pulp Star Wars fiction I read on the plane ride to Berkeley. Count it!), 10, 11, 12, 13
Missed: 6 (that's on you guys), 9.
Pick 'em: 2, 3, 14 (I'm looking forward to it right up until about August, where things get very hazy).
Again, not bad! Better than I'd have expected, frankly. I think I do a good job picking resolutions I'm likely to meet. With respect to #3, I don't know if I'm being too harsh or too charitable vis-a-vis my knowledge of Indian law and energy law.
But ever forward we go! What are the goals for next year?
(1) Publish, or have accepted for publication, two articles (I'm feeling ambitious). (Met -- try four articles!)
(2) Have a solid plan for remaining in academia for the foreseeable future. (Met)
(3) Keep in touch with academic persons (not counting my advisors or former colleagues). (Pick 'em)
(4) Finish a complete draft of Dismissing Discrimination. (Met -- different title)
(5) Get a "ShoStreak" of at least 15. (Missed -- peaked at 11)
(6) Make a "move towards the basket" in terms of starting a book project. (Pick 'em)
(7) Eat at a steakhouse in the Bay Area. (Met)
(8) Successfully integrate the updates to my Constitutional Law course. (Met)
(9) Attend (or be scheduled to attend) an academic conference. (Met -- by the barest of technicalities)
(10) Take steps towards building a community of scholars interested in anti-Semitism issues. (Pick 'em)
(11) Get more pants that fit. (Pick 'em)
(12) Find a new (as in not-watched-by-us, not necessarily currently airing) television show to watch. (Met)
(13) Have positive interactions with a supermajority of the Public Law workshop attendees. (Met)
(14) Have a (medical) check-up. (Met)
Well, I think that's a good set. Wish me luck, and a happy new year to all!
Fry: I know I should but I just can't.
Another year, another iteration of my New Year's Resolutions. As always, we first review how I did over the previous year:
Met: 1, 4, 5, 7, 8 (I was having trouble confirming if I read all of any of the academic books I perused this year, but then I remembered the pulp Star Wars fiction I read on the plane ride to Berkeley. Count it!), 10, 11, 12, 13
Missed: 6 (that's on you guys), 9.
Pick 'em: 2, 3, 14 (I'm looking forward to it right up until about August, where things get very hazy).
Again, not bad! Better than I'd have expected, frankly. I think I do a good job picking resolutions I'm likely to meet. With respect to #3, I don't know if I'm being too harsh or too charitable vis-a-vis my knowledge of Indian law and energy law.
But ever forward we go! What are the goals for next year?
(1) Publish, or have accepted for publication, two articles (I'm feeling ambitious). (Met -- try four articles!)
(2) Have a solid plan for remaining in academia for the foreseeable future. (Met)
(3) Keep in touch with academic persons (not counting my advisors or former colleagues). (Pick 'em)
(4) Finish a complete draft of Dismissing Discrimination. (Met -- different title)
(5) Get a "ShoStreak" of at least 15. (Missed -- peaked at 11)
(6) Make a "move towards the basket" in terms of starting a book project. (Pick 'em)
(7) Eat at a steakhouse in the Bay Area. (Met)
(8) Successfully integrate the updates to my Constitutional Law course. (Met)
(9) Attend (or be scheduled to attend) an academic conference. (Met -- by the barest of technicalities)
(10) Take steps towards building a community of scholars interested in anti-Semitism issues. (Pick 'em)
(11) Get more pants that fit. (Pick 'em)
(12) Find a new (as in not-watched-by-us, not necessarily currently airing) television show to watch. (Met)
(13) Have positive interactions with a supermajority of the Public Law workshop attendees. (Met)
(14) Have a (medical) check-up. (Met)
Well, I think that's a good set. Wish me luck, and a happy new year to all!
Tuesday, December 23, 2014
The State Supreme Court Pipeline
Noting several recent appointees to the California Supreme Court who seem like potential future SCOTUS nomineees, Orin Kerr asks why we don't see this more often -- "this" being the use of a state supreme court as a farm system for the highest courts. The appeal of the route makes some sense -- it provides valuable judicial experience while not being hamstrung by Senate gridlock.
One good explanation, which Kerr floats, is that many state court positions are elected rather than appointed. I have two more:
(1) Not all state supreme courts are created equal. It seems to me that nominating a judge from the California Supreme Court would be viewed qualitatively differently than nominating someone from the North Dakota Supreme Court. The high courts of larger states probably would be seen as sufficiently prominent so as to render their justices credible nominees. It might not wholly be a function of size -- certain state high courts have outsized reputations for quality whereas other states ... lag ... but I don't think that every state high court would be considered suitable. Kerr gives the example of David Souter, who spent most of his judicial career in the New Hampshire state court system, but recall that he was first appointed to the First Circuit before being elevated to the Supreme Court. My understanding is that the former appointment was done because of a sense that it would be faintly ridiculous to pull someone from a tiny northeastern state and place him on the highest court in the land. And while his tenure on the First Circuit was brief, it does seem to be the case that even a quick stop on an appellate court is considered sufficient to wash away any "viability" doubts (see also: John Roberts).
(2) For the state court pipeline to work, a lot of pieces need to fall into place at once. Basically, you need a superstar candidate who lives in a viable state that has (at the very least) an ideologically-amenable governor who either personally harbors near-term presidential ambitions or is willing to carry water for someone else who does. The example of David Stras in Minnesota is a good one, but also demonstrates how the stars have to align -- if Stras had been on the University of Illinois faculty instead of the University of Minnesota, or T-Paw had not been elected governor of what remains a blue-leaning state, then that route is closed off. The federal system is much more flexible -- if one really wants to nominate someone, there will probably be a vacancy on the relevant circuit court or the D.C. Circuit, or a district court in a pinch, no matter what state they reside in. And there's no agency problem because the person looking to seed the field already is President.
Of course, it could be argued that (a) every governor imagines themselves to be President one day and (b) if Stras isn't around, they'd just pick someone else. But my sense is that only a few true superstars are thought of as SCOTUS candidates before they ever get into a relatively high-profile judicial role. It's probably not the case that Minnesota had infinite David Stras-calibur candidates for a future SCOTUS nomination waiting in the wings. Rather, I suspect that at any given point there are a handful of Stras types out there waiting in the wings, who may or may not reside in states that have the right combination of factors to make a state court appointment a viable waystation to the Supreme Court. Outside those few cases, our thoughts on viable SCOTUS personnel tend to focus on folks who already are sitting on a major court. Sometimes, like Stras or Goodwin Liu, they get lucky. But for the most part, the federal system just offers more opportunities and a tighter nexus to put someone in the Supreme Court conversation.
One good explanation, which Kerr floats, is that many state court positions are elected rather than appointed. I have two more:
(1) Not all state supreme courts are created equal. It seems to me that nominating a judge from the California Supreme Court would be viewed qualitatively differently than nominating someone from the North Dakota Supreme Court. The high courts of larger states probably would be seen as sufficiently prominent so as to render their justices credible nominees. It might not wholly be a function of size -- certain state high courts have outsized reputations for quality whereas other states ... lag ... but I don't think that every state high court would be considered suitable. Kerr gives the example of David Souter, who spent most of his judicial career in the New Hampshire state court system, but recall that he was first appointed to the First Circuit before being elevated to the Supreme Court. My understanding is that the former appointment was done because of a sense that it would be faintly ridiculous to pull someone from a tiny northeastern state and place him on the highest court in the land. And while his tenure on the First Circuit was brief, it does seem to be the case that even a quick stop on an appellate court is considered sufficient to wash away any "viability" doubts (see also: John Roberts).
(2) For the state court pipeline to work, a lot of pieces need to fall into place at once. Basically, you need a superstar candidate who lives in a viable state that has (at the very least) an ideologically-amenable governor who either personally harbors near-term presidential ambitions or is willing to carry water for someone else who does. The example of David Stras in Minnesota is a good one, but also demonstrates how the stars have to align -- if Stras had been on the University of Illinois faculty instead of the University of Minnesota, or T-Paw had not been elected governor of what remains a blue-leaning state, then that route is closed off. The federal system is much more flexible -- if one really wants to nominate someone, there will probably be a vacancy on the relevant circuit court or the D.C. Circuit, or a district court in a pinch, no matter what state they reside in. And there's no agency problem because the person looking to seed the field already is President.
Of course, it could be argued that (a) every governor imagines themselves to be President one day and (b) if Stras isn't around, they'd just pick someone else. But my sense is that only a few true superstars are thought of as SCOTUS candidates before they ever get into a relatively high-profile judicial role. It's probably not the case that Minnesota had infinite David Stras-calibur candidates for a future SCOTUS nomination waiting in the wings. Rather, I suspect that at any given point there are a handful of Stras types out there waiting in the wings, who may or may not reside in states that have the right combination of factors to make a state court appointment a viable waystation to the Supreme Court. Outside those few cases, our thoughts on viable SCOTUS personnel tend to focus on folks who already are sitting on a major court. Sometimes, like Stras or Goodwin Liu, they get lucky. But for the most part, the federal system just offers more opportunities and a tighter nexus to put someone in the Supreme Court conversation.
Sunday, December 21, 2014
From Individuals to Institutions and Back Again
The "execution-style" killing of two NYPD police officers, apparently in retaliation for the Eric Garner and Michael Brown killings, has shaken up the emergent conversation about police violence. And reasonably so -- after all, it was a shockingly brutal slaying by someone who claimed to be acting under the same banner as that motivating the protesters from Ferguson to New York. And so perhaps it is unsurprising that we fall into familiar patterns, with the protester groups denouncing the killing and labeling it an isolated incident and police unions responding Mayor De Blasio and the protester community has blood on its hands.
In some ways, this conversation is very familiar, but in others it is quite different. We have not seen, to my knowledge, any serious efforts to dig up dirt on the slain NYPD officers -- use-of-force complaints or litigation records. Nor have we seen much in the way of deflecting the motives of the shooter, Ismaaiyl Brinsley. While Brinsley had posted messages on instagram indicating a desire to kill cops, he also shot his girlfriend in Baltimore earlier that day and later killed himself. One could argue that he wasn't the paradigm case of a calculating, rational actor, but rather a disturbed man with possible mental issues. But we haven't talked about that either.
This is not a complaint. This is a compliment. At the individual level, the relevant point of analysis is that two public servants were brutally murdered on the street, and that's horrifying. At the individual level, this is not the time for apologias for the shooter or insinuations that the victims deserved their fates. The way we're talking about this case, on the individual level, is how it should be. It's how it should be for all persons who are killed without justification.
At the institutional level, things grow more complicated. A very proper moral asymmetry, at the individual level, can't work when we try to situate this shooting as part of a broader social problem. The police union's hypothesis -- that these killings are attributable to efforts by the Mayor and other agitators to rile up community sentiment against the police -- is a hypothesis; specifically, it is a hypothesis about what caused the degradation in the relationship between the community and the police. It is not the only hypothesis on that score. At the institutional level, it is just valid (and far more likely) that it is police behavior that is the source of this mistrust and rage. The people aren't being whipped up by demagogues to feel thoughts not their own. This is organic.
This hypothesis doesn't justify, in any way, the shooting. To be crystal clear: even if it is the case that unjustifiable police behavior caused the sense of rage that contributed to this shooting, it would not mean that the shooting was justified. Normative and structural explanations are not the same thing; the move from individuals to institutions alters, among other things, what counts as victim-blaming. One can leverage our rightful aversion to victim-blaming to ends both good and ill; using it to close off important angles of inquiry falls into the latter camp. Realistically, the individual wrongdoer isn't necessarily going to have much bearing on how institutions should alter their behavior.
In any event, obviously there is a disjuncture here, between a populace that views itself as being preyed on by those paid to protect them, and a police force that thinks the community doesn't understand the realities of being a police officer. It's been said before, but it should be said again: Being a police officer is hard. It's hard for the very obvious reason that it requires the officers to put themselves in peril and to commit (in the words of a police chief I worked with back when I was practicing) "to run towards the danger." But that undersells the difficulty considerably, because part of a police officer's job is to do all that while still being trusted by their community. Being a cop would no doubt be easier -- albeit not easy -- if one could make arrests and conduct patrols without having to care about how one was perceived by the neighborhood. But that's not the way it works. If the people don't view the police as being on their side, then the police are doing a bad job no matter how many arrests they make or what the crime stats say. A community that feels constantly terrorized by their local police department is not being effectively policed even if the murder rate has flatlined.
Are people sometimes unfair in their appraisals? Sure they are. But "solely engaging with fair, high-minded people" isn't really part of a cop's job description either. The population is what it is; the burden is on the police to act in accordance with how the community wants the police to act.
Fixing this problem isn't about finding bad apples or folks with malign motives. When people say the problem isn't with a few bad cops, they're not (or at least shouldn't be) saying "because its about a lot of bad cops." They're saying that the search for bad cops -- in the sense of persons who deliberately and consciously abuse their authority -- is a misguided one. Those people exist, but they don't exhaust the problem, because the problem goes beyond finding some stereotypical Bull Connor types. Good people, who think they're doing good, can still be bad cops to the extent that the system of policing doesn't view its perception within the community as one of its metrics for success. That a person fails at their job doesn't make them a bad person, but neither does them not being a bad person mean they're a success. Being trusted by their community shouldn't be some bonus goal attained by the very best police departments. It is their job, as much of their job as putting away bad guys. If the community doesn't trust the police, then the police are failing at their most fundamental duty. It's as simple as that.
In some ways, this conversation is very familiar, but in others it is quite different. We have not seen, to my knowledge, any serious efforts to dig up dirt on the slain NYPD officers -- use-of-force complaints or litigation records. Nor have we seen much in the way of deflecting the motives of the shooter, Ismaaiyl Brinsley. While Brinsley had posted messages on instagram indicating a desire to kill cops, he also shot his girlfriend in Baltimore earlier that day and later killed himself. One could argue that he wasn't the paradigm case of a calculating, rational actor, but rather a disturbed man with possible mental issues. But we haven't talked about that either.
This is not a complaint. This is a compliment. At the individual level, the relevant point of analysis is that two public servants were brutally murdered on the street, and that's horrifying. At the individual level, this is not the time for apologias for the shooter or insinuations that the victims deserved their fates. The way we're talking about this case, on the individual level, is how it should be. It's how it should be for all persons who are killed without justification.
At the institutional level, things grow more complicated. A very proper moral asymmetry, at the individual level, can't work when we try to situate this shooting as part of a broader social problem. The police union's hypothesis -- that these killings are attributable to efforts by the Mayor and other agitators to rile up community sentiment against the police -- is a hypothesis; specifically, it is a hypothesis about what caused the degradation in the relationship between the community and the police. It is not the only hypothesis on that score. At the institutional level, it is just valid (and far more likely) that it is police behavior that is the source of this mistrust and rage. The people aren't being whipped up by demagogues to feel thoughts not their own. This is organic.
This hypothesis doesn't justify, in any way, the shooting. To be crystal clear: even if it is the case that unjustifiable police behavior caused the sense of rage that contributed to this shooting, it would not mean that the shooting was justified. Normative and structural explanations are not the same thing; the move from individuals to institutions alters, among other things, what counts as victim-blaming. One can leverage our rightful aversion to victim-blaming to ends both good and ill; using it to close off important angles of inquiry falls into the latter camp. Realistically, the individual wrongdoer isn't necessarily going to have much bearing on how institutions should alter their behavior.
In any event, obviously there is a disjuncture here, between a populace that views itself as being preyed on by those paid to protect them, and a police force that thinks the community doesn't understand the realities of being a police officer. It's been said before, but it should be said again: Being a police officer is hard. It's hard for the very obvious reason that it requires the officers to put themselves in peril and to commit (in the words of a police chief I worked with back when I was practicing) "to run towards the danger." But that undersells the difficulty considerably, because part of a police officer's job is to do all that while still being trusted by their community. Being a cop would no doubt be easier -- albeit not easy -- if one could make arrests and conduct patrols without having to care about how one was perceived by the neighborhood. But that's not the way it works. If the people don't view the police as being on their side, then the police are doing a bad job no matter how many arrests they make or what the crime stats say. A community that feels constantly terrorized by their local police department is not being effectively policed even if the murder rate has flatlined.
Are people sometimes unfair in their appraisals? Sure they are. But "solely engaging with fair, high-minded people" isn't really part of a cop's job description either. The population is what it is; the burden is on the police to act in accordance with how the community wants the police to act.
Fixing this problem isn't about finding bad apples or folks with malign motives. When people say the problem isn't with a few bad cops, they're not (or at least shouldn't be) saying "because its about a lot of bad cops." They're saying that the search for bad cops -- in the sense of persons who deliberately and consciously abuse their authority -- is a misguided one. Those people exist, but they don't exhaust the problem, because the problem goes beyond finding some stereotypical Bull Connor types. Good people, who think they're doing good, can still be bad cops to the extent that the system of policing doesn't view its perception within the community as one of its metrics for success. That a person fails at their job doesn't make them a bad person, but neither does them not being a bad person mean they're a success. Being trusted by their community shouldn't be some bonus goal attained by the very best police departments. It is their job, as much of their job as putting away bad guys. If the community doesn't trust the police, then the police are failing at their most fundamental duty. It's as simple as that.
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