"Here is what I don't understand, I don't understand how Jews in America can be Democrats first and Jewish second and support Israel along the line of just following their President," King, a hardline conservative from Iowa, said Friday on Boston Herald Radio,Here's what I don't understand: How so many Republicans can within the space of a single sentence call Jews mindless delusional robots and then wonder why they don't vote for their party. Pro tip: this is not how you persuade an out-group that you're their friend.
"It says this, they're knee-jerk supporters of the President's policy," King said.
Friday, March 20, 2015
2014 2015 Will Be The Year
Rep. Steve King (R-IA), Congress' most trusted source on voting rights work ethic basic English vocabulary the Jewish people, sounds off on inexplicable American Jewish voting habits:
Labels:
anti-semitism,
Democrats,
Jews,
Republicans,
Steve King
Called It!
Hey remember that time when, right after the Israeli elections, I insisted that Moshe Kahlon's Kulanu Party wouldn't be a water-carrier for the far-right? I believe my precise words were "I am extremely skeptical that he wants to be the furthest left member of the government coalition." Kahlon has the leverage to make a lot of demands, since any coalition (really for either left or right) has to go through his party. And lo and behold, look at the news today:
Fancy that! There are a couple of ways this might play out. Bibi might hold his ground and Kahlon might blink first -- nobody wants to go through another round of elections. But assuming that Kahlon is insistent, this might knock the religious parties out of the coalition (they hate Lapid and his Yesh Atid party with a passion). With Yesh Atid in, they're not necessary to reach 61 MKs (the right bloc plus Kulanu and Yesh Atid equals 65 seats). And while the religious parties aren't superhawks on Israel-Palestine or other foreign affairs issues, it is definitely the case that subbing in Yesh Atid for them is a shift for the better. It's hard to see how a coalition that includes both the religious parties and Yesh Atid lasts very long.
In other fun news for Bibi, Naftali Bennett's Jewish Home party is demanding that any coalition agreement include a statement opposing a Palestinian state. Given that Bibi spent most of this week walking back his opposition to a two-state solution, earning (to my mind undeserved) plaudits from many pro-Israel organizations who desparately want to believe Bibi is and portray him as on the side of a Palestinian state, this is going to be a fun needle for him to thread. Assuming Yesh Atid and the religious parties can't sit together, Bibi needs Bennett as part of his coalition -- but it is unclear if Lapid (or Kahlon, for that matter) would sign on to any anti-Palestinian-state position that would be satisfactory to Bennett.
The drama never stops.
Kachlon flexes his muscles: demands that Lapid also be in government to give it a less right-wing profile. No Kachlon, no government
— Chemi Shalev (@ChemiShalev) March 20, 2015Fancy that! There are a couple of ways this might play out. Bibi might hold his ground and Kahlon might blink first -- nobody wants to go through another round of elections. But assuming that Kahlon is insistent, this might knock the religious parties out of the coalition (they hate Lapid and his Yesh Atid party with a passion). With Yesh Atid in, they're not necessary to reach 61 MKs (the right bloc plus Kulanu and Yesh Atid equals 65 seats). And while the religious parties aren't superhawks on Israel-Palestine or other foreign affairs issues, it is definitely the case that subbing in Yesh Atid for them is a shift for the better. It's hard to see how a coalition that includes both the religious parties and Yesh Atid lasts very long.
In other fun news for Bibi, Naftali Bennett's Jewish Home party is demanding that any coalition agreement include a statement opposing a Palestinian state. Given that Bibi spent most of this week walking back his opposition to a two-state solution, earning (to my mind undeserved) plaudits from many pro-Israel organizations who desparately want to believe Bibi is and portray him as on the side of a Palestinian state, this is going to be a fun needle for him to thread. Assuming Yesh Atid and the religious parties can't sit together, Bibi needs Bennett as part of his coalition -- but it is unclear if Lapid (or Kahlon, for that matter) would sign on to any anti-Palestinian-state position that would be satisfactory to Bennett.
The drama never stops.
Labels:
Bibi Netanyahu,
Israel,
Moshe Kahlon,
Naftali Bennett,
Palestine,
Yair Lapid
Thursday, March 19, 2015
Look Who's Talking
This is one of those posts that's really about saving a link for myself, but I am interested in these poll results asking Whites and Blacks about the amount of time we spend talking about race. The results aren't really surprising -- most Whites think we talk about race too much, most Blacks think we don't talk about it enough. The reason I'm interested is because I've noticed in several contexts a disjuncture between how different groups view how much time we devote to different issues. For example, in the sexual assault context, there is a "left" narrative that says we undersell the problem -- we need to "break the silence", we need to bring the problem to the surface -- and there is a "right" narrative that suggests that talk about sexual assault is ever-present to the point of absurdity -- everything is being called sexual assault, sexual assault talk is crowding out other related but important issues. Racism seems to also fit inside this mold; I suspect anti-Semitism does as well.
Labels:
anti-semitism,
polls,
racism,
rape,
sexual abuse
Nasty, Brutish, and Short
Blogger legend Kevin Drum explains why the 2016 election is so personal to him. Simply put, he was recently diagnosed with cancer, and Obamacare guarantees that he will remain insured regardless of what happens to his job at Mother Jones. If Republicans are elected and repeal Obamacare, he'll be left in the cold -- "And I feel quite certain that Republicans will do nothing to help me out." Sayeth Richard Mayhew:
Cancer can hit anyone, and under the Republican plan, a one time cancer diagnosis and recovery screws a person for life. Under the Democratic current law and future policy plans, that person is not screwed for life.Yeah, but in defense of the GOP, under their proposal that screwed life will be a hell of a lot shorter.
Wednesday, March 18, 2015
Israeli Electoral Endowment
My Israeli electoral quick reactions are already somewhat obsolete, as they were based on exit polling which turned out to underestimate Likud's performance dramatically. Nonetheless, some of the observations still hold, and I think there is an interesting psychological effect going on here in which perceptions about how the election will go (days or hours before the polls close) are affecting perceptions about how the election did go.
Let's be clear -- I'm not happy about the outcome of this election. The parties I support didn't do as well as I would have liked, by a considerable stretch. And it looks almost assured that Bibi will remain Prime Minister, which is a burgeoning disaster for Israel's international image, its relationship with America, and its long-term viability as a Jewish, democratic state. It feels like the right-wing won big last night.
But if one looks at the actual results, something odd emerges that conflicts with the narrative of a "crushing conservative victory." Let's divide the Knesset into five blocs: conservative, centrist, liberal, Arab, and religious. The conservative bloc in the last Knesset had 43 seats (20 for Likud, 12 for Jewish Home, and 11 for Yisrael Beitanu). The conservative bloc in the next Knesset will have ... 44 seats. 30 will be for Likud, 8 for Jewish Home, and 6 for Yisrael Beiteinu. Even from a progressive standpoint, it is more than a bit weird to think that an election where the right basically tread water, but individual seats shift from the far-right parties to the (relatively) mainstream right is a bad thing.
So if the right didn't increase its seat count, who did? The centrist bloc (Yesh Atid and Kadima) entered with 21 seats. It emerged the exact same -- 21 seats split between the newcomer Kulanu and Yesh Atid. The religious parties (Shas and UTJ) dropped from a combined 18 to a combined 13 -- a five seat dip. The liberal camp -- the seeming clear losers -- entered with 27 seats and left with 28; ZU gaining 3 seats while Meretz lost 2 (so a shift from the left to the center-left). The real winner was the Arab bloc, which pulled in 14 MKs (a gain of 3) to become the third largest party in the Knesset.
So basically, the election left us in a similar position to where we started, except that the Arab political parties gained at the expense of the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish religious parties. Why all the long faces?
One answer is that staying in a "similar position" is not exactly good news for people who think Israel's current position is all too precarious. To the extent this was an opportunity to reverse Israel's eroding global standing, it is a dramatic missed opportunity. Abba Eban would be rolling in his grave. Another possibility is that others don't view Kulanu the way that I do, basically viewing it as part of the right-wing camp. If one takes that perspective, then this was a landslide conservative victory. As noted, I don't take that position -- but the proof will soon be in the pudding.
But I think the bigger issue is that many people really believed that this election would be different -- not just based on idle hopes, but based on polling data. The last few days of polling all pointed to a big Zionist Union victory, and so that became the baseline of what "success" was. When the exit polls came out and showed a neck and neck race, that was a big comedown even though a few weeks prior "neck and neck" was the watchword of the entire race. And when the actual results started to come in and demonstrated that the right had done even better than the exit polls predicted, it felt like a calamity -- not because it objectively was one, but because we had sufficiently altered our expectations and then seen them dashed.
Maybe this is putting on a brave face. Not too brave -- I'm very pessimistic about the next few years for Israel -- but "brave" in the sense that I'm resisting a narrative of a right-wing groundswell emerging out of this election. But I honestly, truly don't believe its accurate. More than half of Israelis, now-represented by 62 MKs, voted for parties that reject both right-wing nationalism and ultra-Orthodox religious conservatism. This is not the worst thing. This is not a catastrophe.
It's just the regular type of bad.
Let's be clear -- I'm not happy about the outcome of this election. The parties I support didn't do as well as I would have liked, by a considerable stretch. And it looks almost assured that Bibi will remain Prime Minister, which is a burgeoning disaster for Israel's international image, its relationship with America, and its long-term viability as a Jewish, democratic state. It feels like the right-wing won big last night.
But if one looks at the actual results, something odd emerges that conflicts with the narrative of a "crushing conservative victory." Let's divide the Knesset into five blocs: conservative, centrist, liberal, Arab, and religious. The conservative bloc in the last Knesset had 43 seats (20 for Likud, 12 for Jewish Home, and 11 for Yisrael Beitanu). The conservative bloc in the next Knesset will have ... 44 seats. 30 will be for Likud, 8 for Jewish Home, and 6 for Yisrael Beiteinu. Even from a progressive standpoint, it is more than a bit weird to think that an election where the right basically tread water, but individual seats shift from the far-right parties to the (relatively) mainstream right is a bad thing.
So if the right didn't increase its seat count, who did? The centrist bloc (Yesh Atid and Kadima) entered with 21 seats. It emerged the exact same -- 21 seats split between the newcomer Kulanu and Yesh Atid. The religious parties (Shas and UTJ) dropped from a combined 18 to a combined 13 -- a five seat dip. The liberal camp -- the seeming clear losers -- entered with 27 seats and left with 28; ZU gaining 3 seats while Meretz lost 2 (so a shift from the left to the center-left). The real winner was the Arab bloc, which pulled in 14 MKs (a gain of 3) to become the third largest party in the Knesset.
So basically, the election left us in a similar position to where we started, except that the Arab political parties gained at the expense of the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish religious parties. Why all the long faces?
One answer is that staying in a "similar position" is not exactly good news for people who think Israel's current position is all too precarious. To the extent this was an opportunity to reverse Israel's eroding global standing, it is a dramatic missed opportunity. Abba Eban would be rolling in his grave. Another possibility is that others don't view Kulanu the way that I do, basically viewing it as part of the right-wing camp. If one takes that perspective, then this was a landslide conservative victory. As noted, I don't take that position -- but the proof will soon be in the pudding.
But I think the bigger issue is that many people really believed that this election would be different -- not just based on idle hopes, but based on polling data. The last few days of polling all pointed to a big Zionist Union victory, and so that became the baseline of what "success" was. When the exit polls came out and showed a neck and neck race, that was a big comedown even though a few weeks prior "neck and neck" was the watchword of the entire race. And when the actual results started to come in and demonstrated that the right had done even better than the exit polls predicted, it felt like a calamity -- not because it objectively was one, but because we had sufficiently altered our expectations and then seen them dashed.
Maybe this is putting on a brave face. Not too brave -- I'm very pessimistic about the next few years for Israel -- but "brave" in the sense that I'm resisting a narrative of a right-wing groundswell emerging out of this election. But I honestly, truly don't believe its accurate. More than half of Israelis, now-represented by 62 MKs, voted for parties that reject both right-wing nationalism and ultra-Orthodox religious conservatism. This is not the worst thing. This is not a catastrophe.
It's just the regular type of bad.
Tuesday, March 17, 2015
Israeli Election Quick Reactions
Confused about the Israeli election outcome? I guarantee you you're not alone. And while my knowledge is highly partial and Americanized, I'd still like to think I'm decidedly above median. In any event, take what I'm saying with a grain of salt. And what I'm saying can be boiled down to, "things are probably going to be okay, but with a non-negligible chance of catastrophe."
Note: For numbers, I'm going to rely on this average of exit polls, though of course final allocation of MKs may vary. Those results are as follows (parenthetical indicates current seats):
Okay, without further delay, here are the highlights as I understand them.
Bibi the Cannibal. The main headlines you're reading now talk about Likud's late-breaking surge to either tie or exceed the vote count for the left-of-center Zionist Union. And while that's true, it's also misleading -- the question is where those votes came from. It appears that for the most part, Bibi cannibalized votes from other, further right-wing parties. Naftali Bennett's Jewish Home is at 8 seats and Yisrael Beytanu is down to a mere 5. The upshot is that those three parties dropped from 43 to 40 MKs.
Many attribute Likud's late turnaround to him taking a hard right turn in the final days of the campaign -- capped off by his best Paul Revere cum Pam Geller cry of "the Arabs are coming!" Now that the immediate danger of a liberal landslide has dissipated, he's sounding more conciliatory notes by promising to promote the welfare of "all of Israel's Jewish and non-Jewish citizens."
The Arabs are coming. Racist though its intent and effect may have been, Bibi was at least descriptively accurate -- this was an election where the Israeli Arab community flexed its political muscle. Two additional seats in the Knesset may not seem like a ton, but becoming the third biggest party (behind traditional powerhouses Likud and Labor) is no small thing. And having united under a single banner, the UAL is poised to wield unprecedented influence in the next Knesset. Indeed, the big question now is whether the Arab parties will break their long-standing policy of refusing to join the government. Of the constituent elements of the UAL, only Balad (a pan-Arab nationalist party) seems absolutely implacably opposed to such an arrangement. Sufficient incentives from Labor could encourage a UAL split and a landmark moment in Israeli political history.
Whose coalition is it, anyway? People keep talking about the right-wing having an easier path to forming a government than the left. And, well, maybe ... but it isn't really as straightforward as that. Canvassing the results, the right bloc starts with 40 MKs (from Likud, Jewish Home, and Yisrael Beiteinu). Add another 13 from the religious UTJ and Shas and they're up to 53. To get over that 61 vote hump, they need somebody else -- and pretty much the only plausible "somebody else" is Moshe Kahlon's Kulanu party. Though running an avowedly centrist campaign, Kulanu's conservative roots have caused many to slot them into the right-wing camp. This is an evaluation I continue to pushback against. Kahlon is, to put it mildly, no fan of Bibi's. And I am extremely skeptical that he wants to be the furthest left member of the government coalition. The political positions he's run on bear a lot in common with the Zionist Union. Moreover, Kulanu's highest-profile member, former US Ambassador Michael Oren, has expressed significant concern over the deterioration of the US/Israel relationship, and he has to know that this would accelerate in dramatic fashion under a purely right-wing government.
So what about a left-wing government? They start with 44 MKs via Zionist Union, Yesh Atid, and Meretz -- with another 13 if UAL was in the picture. In that case, Kulanu's additional 10 MKs puts them over the top, and one has to think Herzog will pull out every stop to make that happen. But assuming that isn't in the cards, Isaac Herzog's path to the Prime Minister's office becomes much harder. Adding in Kulanu puts the center-left camp to 54, but it would be well-nigh impossible for him to get above that because the religious parties and Yesh Atid are mortal enemies. Perhaps he could buy them off, but it seems more likely that they'd be able to fit into a right-wing government without as much trouble.
The final alternative is a unity government combining Likud and the Zionist Union with Kulanu. Those three parties alone carry more than 60 MKs (and that coalition could probably bring in Yesh Atid too). It's not clear whether ZU or Likud really would like that (though it might be the best option available to ZU). But I have to think Kulanu would really like that -- it'd be a centrist party in a centrist government. The other party which would be a big winner in this arrangement would be none other than the UAL. It would become leader of the opposition as the largest party outside of government -- arguably the best possible outcome for the Arab list because being head of opposition means they are incorporated into many high level security and policy decisions. It's a way to "enter government" without actually entering government.
Kahlon the Kingmaker. Ultimately, the results of this election really boil down to Kulanu and what it wants. Does it want a pure right-wing government? It can easily make that happen. Does it want a left-wing government? Harder, but potentially still doable with the right suasion. Does it want a centrist government? If it holds out for one, it's hard to see how either of the big parties can avoid it. All roads lead through Moshe Kahlon. And since my gut tells me he doesn't want to be part of a hard-right, anti-Arab, and internationally isolated coalition, my sense is that he'll be able to force an outcome that isn't great, but isn't catastrophic either.
UPDATE: ...or the exit polling could be entirely off and Likud has a five seat advantage over Labor. Incredibly, this doesn't change the above analysis that much -- the right core now sits at 44 MKs, with another 14 from the religious bloc. So it'd still need Kulanu. But with these results it is easier for Netanyahu to claim a mandate.
If I'm trying to salvage anything, it's that (a) it looks like Yahud is still out in the cold, and (b) a very thin majority of voters voted for non-right-wing, non-religious parties. The center, left, and UAL together combine for 62 seats.
Note: For numbers, I'm going to rely on this average of exit polls, though of course final allocation of MKs may vary. Those results are as follows (parenthetical indicates current seats):
Zionist Union: 27 (21 -- Labor 15, Hatnuah 6)The main potential shake-up at this stage is if the far-right Yahud party squeaks over threshold and takes four seats. If it does, those seats would likely come at the expense of one each from Zionist Union, Kulanu, Yesh Atid, and the United Arab List -- in other words, a pretty substantial right-ward swing.
Likud: 27 (18 [previously in coalition with Yisrael Beiteinu which added another 13 MKs])
United Arab List: 13 (11 across three parties)
Yesh Atid: 12 (19)
Kulanu: 10 (N/A)
Jewish Home: 8 (12)
Shas: 7 (11)
United Torah Judaism: 6 (7)
Meretz: 5 (6)
Yisrael Beitenu: 5 (13)
Okay, without further delay, here are the highlights as I understand them.
Bibi the Cannibal. The main headlines you're reading now talk about Likud's late-breaking surge to either tie or exceed the vote count for the left-of-center Zionist Union. And while that's true, it's also misleading -- the question is where those votes came from. It appears that for the most part, Bibi cannibalized votes from other, further right-wing parties. Naftali Bennett's Jewish Home is at 8 seats and Yisrael Beytanu is down to a mere 5. The upshot is that those three parties dropped from 43 to 40 MKs.
Many attribute Likud's late turnaround to him taking a hard right turn in the final days of the campaign -- capped off by his best Paul Revere cum Pam Geller cry of "the Arabs are coming!" Now that the immediate danger of a liberal landslide has dissipated, he's sounding more conciliatory notes by promising to promote the welfare of "all of Israel's Jewish and non-Jewish citizens."
The Arabs are coming. Racist though its intent and effect may have been, Bibi was at least descriptively accurate -- this was an election where the Israeli Arab community flexed its political muscle. Two additional seats in the Knesset may not seem like a ton, but becoming the third biggest party (behind traditional powerhouses Likud and Labor) is no small thing. And having united under a single banner, the UAL is poised to wield unprecedented influence in the next Knesset. Indeed, the big question now is whether the Arab parties will break their long-standing policy of refusing to join the government. Of the constituent elements of the UAL, only Balad (a pan-Arab nationalist party) seems absolutely implacably opposed to such an arrangement. Sufficient incentives from Labor could encourage a UAL split and a landmark moment in Israeli political history.
Whose coalition is it, anyway? People keep talking about the right-wing having an easier path to forming a government than the left. And, well, maybe ... but it isn't really as straightforward as that. Canvassing the results, the right bloc starts with 40 MKs (from Likud, Jewish Home, and Yisrael Beiteinu). Add another 13 from the religious UTJ and Shas and they're up to 53. To get over that 61 vote hump, they need somebody else -- and pretty much the only plausible "somebody else" is Moshe Kahlon's Kulanu party. Though running an avowedly centrist campaign, Kulanu's conservative roots have caused many to slot them into the right-wing camp. This is an evaluation I continue to pushback against. Kahlon is, to put it mildly, no fan of Bibi's. And I am extremely skeptical that he wants to be the furthest left member of the government coalition. The political positions he's run on bear a lot in common with the Zionist Union. Moreover, Kulanu's highest-profile member, former US Ambassador Michael Oren, has expressed significant concern over the deterioration of the US/Israel relationship, and he has to know that this would accelerate in dramatic fashion under a purely right-wing government.
So what about a left-wing government? They start with 44 MKs via Zionist Union, Yesh Atid, and Meretz -- with another 13 if UAL was in the picture. In that case, Kulanu's additional 10 MKs puts them over the top, and one has to think Herzog will pull out every stop to make that happen. But assuming that isn't in the cards, Isaac Herzog's path to the Prime Minister's office becomes much harder. Adding in Kulanu puts the center-left camp to 54, but it would be well-nigh impossible for him to get above that because the religious parties and Yesh Atid are mortal enemies. Perhaps he could buy them off, but it seems more likely that they'd be able to fit into a right-wing government without as much trouble.
The final alternative is a unity government combining Likud and the Zionist Union with Kulanu. Those three parties alone carry more than 60 MKs (and that coalition could probably bring in Yesh Atid too). It's not clear whether ZU or Likud really would like that (though it might be the best option available to ZU). But I have to think Kulanu would really like that -- it'd be a centrist party in a centrist government. The other party which would be a big winner in this arrangement would be none other than the UAL. It would become leader of the opposition as the largest party outside of government -- arguably the best possible outcome for the Arab list because being head of opposition means they are incorporated into many high level security and policy decisions. It's a way to "enter government" without actually entering government.
Kahlon the Kingmaker. Ultimately, the results of this election really boil down to Kulanu and what it wants. Does it want a pure right-wing government? It can easily make that happen. Does it want a left-wing government? Harder, but potentially still doable with the right suasion. Does it want a centrist government? If it holds out for one, it's hard to see how either of the big parties can avoid it. All roads lead through Moshe Kahlon. And since my gut tells me he doesn't want to be part of a hard-right, anti-Arab, and internationally isolated coalition, my sense is that he'll be able to force an outcome that isn't great, but isn't catastrophic either.
UPDATE: ...or the exit polling could be entirely off and Likud has a five seat advantage over Labor. Incredibly, this doesn't change the above analysis that much -- the right core now sits at 44 MKs, with another 14 from the religious bloc. So it'd still need Kulanu. But with these results it is easier for Netanyahu to claim a mandate.
If I'm trying to salvage anything, it's that (a) it looks like Yahud is still out in the cold, and (b) a very thin majority of voters voted for non-right-wing, non-religious parties. The center, left, and UAL together combine for 62 seats.
Labels:
Bibi Netanyahu,
Isaac Herzog,
Israel,
knesset,
Moshe Kahlon,
Tzipi Livni
Revolutionary Fervor
One of the more stressful things about being a graduate student, or other aspiring academic, is the constant refrain that there isn't necessarily a job waiting for you at the end. It's an exceptionally tight market right now, and many extremely smart and qualified candidates won't end up with a position. It can get a bit wearying. And it can get a bit infuriating when you see who has gotten these oh-so-rare positions:
Oh, but it gets better:
In any event, if you're a sociology graduate student wondering who's getting the job you so desperately want, here's your answer. Blergh.
An American college professor was arrested by Miami-Dade police on Saturday for launching into an extended rant about Venezula and smoking on an airplane, all of which was captured on video.Oh lord. You "felt the need" to go on a bender about the joys of your favorite autocrat? Which do you prefer -- his paeons to Carlos the Jackal and Idi Amin, or his penchant for jailing judges he dislikes? To quote Ron White, "next time you have a thought, just let it go."
Karen Halnon, identified as an associate professor of sociology at Penn State, was on an American Airlines flight from Nicaragua to Miami, according to television station WFOR.
“The United States has declared war on Venezuela,” Halnon repeated throughout the video, which was posted to YouTube as a clip titled "Crazy woman on a plane."
“Venezuela has been declared a national security threat," she repeated on the video.
"You're a national security threat," another passenger shot back.
Halnon later told WFOR that she was returning from a trip to Nicaragua working with single mothers and felt the need to talk to people about the destructiveness of U.S. imperialism.
On the tape, she eventually unbuckled her seatbelt as passengers around her groaned.
"My great hero Hugo Chavez nationalized the oil supply," she said. Halnon was then informed by a flight attendant that the police would be arresting her shortly.
Oh, but it gets better:
At one point, Halnon calmly lit a cigarette as the passenger next to her got up and left."Every other revolutionary smokes"? What are you, twelve years old? This is a joke.
"This girl's a gangster," another onlooker said.
Hanlon confirmed to WFOR that she indeed lit a cigarette on the plane.
“I took a few puffs out of it," she said. "Every other revolutionary smokes. Fidel. Daniel Ortega. Tomás Borge. Che Guevara."
In any event, if you're a sociology graduate student wondering who's getting the job you so desperately want, here's your answer. Blergh.
Labels:
academia,
airplanes,
Hugo Chavez,
idiots,
Pennsylvania
Monday, March 16, 2015
Everybody Knows Nothing
It is a long-standing piece of advice on this blog to never listen to journalists talking about a legal issue, because they will butcher it. Badly. I would like to be able to say that this is contradistinction to listening to someone who (a) is a member of Congress and (b) has written the legal provision in question. Alas, that isn't always the case either, as the latest fiasco surrounding Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) demonstrates.
For those of you who missed out on the latest, there is a media narrative that Senator Cotton (while a House member) introduced langauge that "would 'automatically' punish family members of people who violate U.S. sanctions against Iran, levying sentences of up to 20 years in prison." In other words, the claim is that if I violated Iranian sanctions policy, Cotton's amendment would allow for my mom to be tossed in jail for 20 years ("automatically").
The Popehat link above pretty conclusively demonstrates that this is untrue: the law prohibits trade with certain high-ranking Iranian officials; Cotton's amendment would have similarly prohibited trade with close relatives of these officials (so, for example, one could not evade the sanctions by giving a fat contract to the prohibited-person's wife). This is a policy that can be supported or opposed on the merits (it does close a loophole for getting around the sanctions program, but it also arguably punishes innocent people if the bad guy's grandson has no real connection to the human rights violations). But no matter what you think of it, it is not (and is a far cry from) what is described in the preceding paragraph -- jail terms for family members of those who violate the sanctions law.
The problem is that Cotton, Harvard J.D. '02, doesn't seem to know what his own law would do. In a colloquy with then-Rep. Alan Grayson (D-FL) (Harvard J.D., '83 -- Harvard Law really is coming out poorly here), it is evident that neither one understands how this law interacts with a mens rea requirement. Honestly, Grayson seems more confused here than Cotton does -- but since it's Cotton's language, it would be nice if had cleared things up rather than engaging in irrelevant blather about the constitutional rights of Iranian citizens. Instead we got much confusion in Congress, which, naturally, the media made far worse by conflating who can and can't be traded with with who will be punished.
In conclusion, never trust anyone about anything, because everyone is a moron.
For those of you who missed out on the latest, there is a media narrative that Senator Cotton (while a House member) introduced langauge that "would 'automatically' punish family members of people who violate U.S. sanctions against Iran, levying sentences of up to 20 years in prison." In other words, the claim is that if I violated Iranian sanctions policy, Cotton's amendment would allow for my mom to be tossed in jail for 20 years ("automatically").
The Popehat link above pretty conclusively demonstrates that this is untrue: the law prohibits trade with certain high-ranking Iranian officials; Cotton's amendment would have similarly prohibited trade with close relatives of these officials (so, for example, one could not evade the sanctions by giving a fat contract to the prohibited-person's wife). This is a policy that can be supported or opposed on the merits (it does close a loophole for getting around the sanctions program, but it also arguably punishes innocent people if the bad guy's grandson has no real connection to the human rights violations). But no matter what you think of it, it is not (and is a far cry from) what is described in the preceding paragraph -- jail terms for family members of those who violate the sanctions law.
The problem is that Cotton, Harvard J.D. '02, doesn't seem to know what his own law would do. In a colloquy with then-Rep. Alan Grayson (D-FL) (Harvard J.D., '83 -- Harvard Law really is coming out poorly here), it is evident that neither one understands how this law interacts with a mens rea requirement. Honestly, Grayson seems more confused here than Cotton does -- but since it's Cotton's language, it would be nice if had cleared things up rather than engaging in irrelevant blather about the constitutional rights of Iranian citizens. Instead we got much confusion in Congress, which, naturally, the media made far worse by conflating who can and can't be traded with with who will be punished.
In conclusion, never trust anyone about anything, because everyone is a moron.
Labels:
Alan Grayson,
Congress,
idiots,
Iran,
law,
Tom Cotton
Sunday, March 15, 2015
An Eruv in the Hamptons
Lest you thought that the "Jews call everything anti-Semitic" defense of obvious anti-Semitism was limited to the Israel context, check out these remarks by an activist opposing the construction of an eruv in the Hamptons:
The Forward felt compelled to ask whether [anti-eruv activist Jack] O'Dwyer thought some of his more inflammatory comments might get construed as anti-Semitic.Also, while I have often joked that half of Orthodox Jewish scholarship is imposing atextual onerous burdens on the community and the other coming up with increasingly clever loopholes to get around them, it really doesn't make sense to me this narrative that the eruv allows Orthodox Jews to "break" Jewish law. Obviously it doesn't -- Jewish law restricts certain activities (on the Sabbath) in locations which are not enclosed by the eruv. It's part of the law, it's not a breach of it (which is why it's probably a good idea for non-Jews not to tell Jews what their religious obligations are, but that ship has long since sailed).
“I’m not going to fall for that,” he said. “I don’t feel like answering questions about whether I’m a bigot against Jews. That’s like asking, ‘When did you stop beating your wife?’ They throw it [the anti-Semitic charge] around too much. Nobody believes it anymore.”
With that in mind, Jack, any final words for your Orthodox Jewish neighbors?
“This is America. This is not Israel. This is a rotten thing, for religion to lie its head off and sue a town. Get that stuff off our telephone poles. Go back to where you belong. You don’t belong in the Hamptons with that illogical superstition. That’s my message.”
Friday, March 13, 2015
Thursday, March 12, 2015
Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt: Review
Jill and I finished Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt last night (we started on Saturday). I know what you're thinking: "13 episodes in 5 days -- what took you so long?" And while that is a slow pace for us, we had unusual obstacles: We were vacationing in Vegas and missed our normal Sunday TV, so we had a lot to catch-up on. Even a great new show has to yield when you're behind on Brooklyn Nine-Nine.
The most amazing thing about Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is how fresh it feels. This is particularly astounding when you turn over the constituent elements. The music and comedic beats are highly reminiscent of 30 Rock (unsurprising given the Tina Fey/Jeff Richmond nexus). Character-wise, Jane Krakowski (Jacqueline) is playing the same role she did in Thirty Rock, Carol Kane (Lillian) is playing the same role she is in Gotham, and Ellie Kemper (Kimmy) is (I'm told) playing the same role she did in The Office -- though I see more than a little Liz Lemon in her. Even Ki Hong Lee (Dong) feels like he's playing a character I've seen before, even though a quick IMDB search reveals no prospects.
Yet the concept feels like something that's genuinely new. Kimmy Schmidt escapes from a doomsday cult and, rather than going back to her old life in Indiana, decides to try and make it in New York. I'm pretty sure I came up with something similar in a New Year's Balderdash game, but it would not have anywhere near the polish. The closest cousin to Kimmy Schmidt might actually be Big Love (a great show in its own right). But Kimmy Schmidt is different in important ways, and not just because it is a sitcom. Kimmy was kidnapped in 8th grade -- she neither was a born-and-raised believer in the cult, nor is she completely unaware of the workings of the modern world. Plenty has changed in 15 years, but not so much that Kimmy is utterly lost -- she mostly doesn't know about contemporary slang ("troll the respawn, Jeremy") and pop stars. And she is not particularly conservative -- though she's understandably a bit stunted in her personal and romantic development, she is excited to have a boyfriend and kiss a boy. Kimmy has enough difficulties on her plate without the show going overboard and pretending like she doesn't know what a car is, and that restraint is greatly appreciated.
Another element that has to be remarked upon here is the incredible cast diversity. I give credit to Brooklyn Nine-Nine for being majority non-White male. But Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt might be unprecedented -- there isn't a single White dude in the main cast. The four largest roles are three White women (Kemper, Krakowski -- playing a passing Native American -- and Kane) and a gay Black man (Tituss Burgess as Titus Andromedon). There are a few recurring White male characters amongst Ellie's boyfriends, and of course Jon Hamm as the cult leader Rev. Richard Wayne Gary Wayne (and can I just say how lucky Jon Hamm is to have Mad Men? Because literally every other part I've ever seen him in he's been typecast as "charismatic idiot"). But they're firmly on the periphery.
But by far the most impressive attribute of Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is how it deals with the very real trauma Kimmy experienced. It manages to treat this in a manner that is realistic, sensitive, subtle, and hilarious -- a combination I would not have thought possible in advance, particularly in a comedy of this sort. The trick is that the "jokes" on this front blend in with the overall comedic rhythm of the show, but on closer examination they are obviously distinct. When Kimmy's colleague sneaks behind her to do a playful "guess who" and Kimmy whirls while screaming "I don't like that" (before immediately plastering back on her normal chipper face upon seeing who it was), that's the sort of gag that fits in well with the show's overarching run of jokes. But if one thinks about it, it is clear that this isn't part of Kimmy's normal personality. It's a product of the hell she went through for a decade and a half. She knows it and she wants to escape from it as best she can, and is taking impressive strides in that respect. But while Kimmy might be unbreakable, she is not unaffected, and the series shows that in surprisingly vivid (but not melodramstic) fashion.
And that's what Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is about, ultimately. It is about a bright and irrepressible girl who went through something terrible and is getting past it in her own way. The comedy is there but never at her expense, and underneath it all is a surprisingly poignant commentary on surviving. It really is an excellent show. Indeed, I think it's got a strong case to be the strongest original series Netflix has ever produced.
The most amazing thing about Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is how fresh it feels. This is particularly astounding when you turn over the constituent elements. The music and comedic beats are highly reminiscent of 30 Rock (unsurprising given the Tina Fey/Jeff Richmond nexus). Character-wise, Jane Krakowski (Jacqueline) is playing the same role she did in Thirty Rock, Carol Kane (Lillian) is playing the same role she is in Gotham, and Ellie Kemper (Kimmy) is (I'm told) playing the same role she did in The Office -- though I see more than a little Liz Lemon in her. Even Ki Hong Lee (Dong) feels like he's playing a character I've seen before, even though a quick IMDB search reveals no prospects.
Yet the concept feels like something that's genuinely new. Kimmy Schmidt escapes from a doomsday cult and, rather than going back to her old life in Indiana, decides to try and make it in New York. I'm pretty sure I came up with something similar in a New Year's Balderdash game, but it would not have anywhere near the polish. The closest cousin to Kimmy Schmidt might actually be Big Love (a great show in its own right). But Kimmy Schmidt is different in important ways, and not just because it is a sitcom. Kimmy was kidnapped in 8th grade -- she neither was a born-and-raised believer in the cult, nor is she completely unaware of the workings of the modern world. Plenty has changed in 15 years, but not so much that Kimmy is utterly lost -- she mostly doesn't know about contemporary slang ("troll the respawn, Jeremy") and pop stars. And she is not particularly conservative -- though she's understandably a bit stunted in her personal and romantic development, she is excited to have a boyfriend and kiss a boy. Kimmy has enough difficulties on her plate without the show going overboard and pretending like she doesn't know what a car is, and that restraint is greatly appreciated.
Another element that has to be remarked upon here is the incredible cast diversity. I give credit to Brooklyn Nine-Nine for being majority non-White male. But Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt might be unprecedented -- there isn't a single White dude in the main cast. The four largest roles are three White women (Kemper, Krakowski -- playing a passing Native American -- and Kane) and a gay Black man (Tituss Burgess as Titus Andromedon). There are a few recurring White male characters amongst Ellie's boyfriends, and of course Jon Hamm as the cult leader Rev. Richard Wayne Gary Wayne (and can I just say how lucky Jon Hamm is to have Mad Men? Because literally every other part I've ever seen him in he's been typecast as "charismatic idiot"). But they're firmly on the periphery.
But by far the most impressive attribute of Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is how it deals with the very real trauma Kimmy experienced. It manages to treat this in a manner that is realistic, sensitive, subtle, and hilarious -- a combination I would not have thought possible in advance, particularly in a comedy of this sort. The trick is that the "jokes" on this front blend in with the overall comedic rhythm of the show, but on closer examination they are obviously distinct. When Kimmy's colleague sneaks behind her to do a playful "guess who" and Kimmy whirls while screaming "I don't like that" (before immediately plastering back on her normal chipper face upon seeing who it was), that's the sort of gag that fits in well with the show's overarching run of jokes. But if one thinks about it, it is clear that this isn't part of Kimmy's normal personality. It's a product of the hell she went through for a decade and a half. She knows it and she wants to escape from it as best she can, and is taking impressive strides in that respect. But while Kimmy might be unbreakable, she is not unaffected, and the series shows that in surprisingly vivid (but not melodramstic) fashion.
And that's what Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt is about, ultimately. It is about a bright and irrepressible girl who went through something terrible and is getting past it in her own way. The comedy is there but never at her expense, and underneath it all is a surprisingly poignant commentary on surviving. It really is an excellent show. Indeed, I think it's got a strong case to be the strongest original series Netflix has ever produced.
Tuesday, March 10, 2015
The Greater and the Lesser
Last week, the 8th Circuit ruled in an 8-3 en banc decision that a prisoner had not stated a viable claim against Missouri's lethal injection protocols. The Court also held (this time 7-4) that the prisoner had not stated a valid claim because his complaint only conceded in the abstract that alternative methods of execution were constitutional; he did not specifically say "X method of execution would be constitutional."
The dissenting opinion by Judge Bye begins as follows:
It does not seem wrong to me that government might have a certain power in the abstract but that other constitutional constraints make the practical means of carrying that power out a null set. The problem with the dissenters' position (shared by the majority) is that it distorts constitutional doctrine. The constitutionality of any individual execution protocol is a distinct question from the abstract constitutionality of the death penalty. If an execution protocol fails whatever specific 8th Amendment doctrine we have, it does not matter whether we can envision another procedure that would alleviate these concerns.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Bye begins as follows:
The constitutionality of the death penalty itself is not before us in this case, and we proceed on the assumption the death penalty is constitutional. While it follows there must be a constitutional means of carrying out a death sentence, it has not been determined that Missouri's current execution protocol is constitutional.Is this true (at least as a matter of logic)? I'm inclined to think not. It is perfectly sensible to me the opinion that the death penalty is constitutional in the abstract -- there is no constitutional problem with the state taking a person's life for certain heinous crimes -- and that as it turns out there is no method for carrying that sentence out that satisfies various constitutional constraints. The former question is one of pure legal principle, but the latter is about particular factual assessments about, e.g., the amount of pain and suffering caused by various execution methods and the "evolving standards of decency" that cause our society to reject certain types of punishment as intolerable under the 8th Amendment. Indeed, hasn't this been the functional position of Jewish law: The death penalty is okay in the abstract, but the secondary rules surrounding it interact in such a way as to make it practically impossible to carry out?
It does not seem wrong to me that government might have a certain power in the abstract but that other constitutional constraints make the practical means of carrying that power out a null set. The problem with the dissenters' position (shared by the majority) is that it distorts constitutional doctrine. The constitutionality of any individual execution protocol is a distinct question from the abstract constitutionality of the death penalty. If an execution protocol fails whatever specific 8th Amendment doctrine we have, it does not matter whether we can envision another procedure that would alleviate these concerns.
Monday, March 09, 2015
Las Vegas Trip: Recap and Review
Jill and I, along with my parents and brother, all were in Las Vegas this weekend for a much-needed vacation. All of us love it -- which is amazing, because we're pretty different types of people. My dad and brother are into the traditional Vegas life (playing craps into the wee hours), while Jill and I (and my mom) aren't really gamblers at all. But for us there is great food and other fun activities, and we can keep ourselves amused with video poker without breaking the bank. Highlights:
* Gambling: As mentioned, I'm not a big gambler generally. Mostly I just play video poker, interspersed with some video blackjack. This trip, however, my brother discovered a video craps table and taught me how to play. I certainly see the appeal, and I even was able to fly solo for awhile (it looks more intimidating than it is). But even still, most of my time was spent doing video poker. And luckily for me, I had a bonanza Saturday (for me -- I don't bet large enough figures to actually have a true bonanza) which included hitting a straight flush. While I ended up giving all of the money back on Sunday, it was nice to play with house money for the majority of the trip.
* Boxing: This trip was not originally envisioned to be a "boxing" trip. But that ended up being somewhat of a theme. I found reasonably priced ring-side (fourth row) tickets for Friday Night Fights card at the MGM Marquee ballroom, so Jill, my father, and I all attended. It was a fun show (all but one of the fights ended in knockouts). There was also boxing on NBC Saturday -- putting all my wagers together on both evening's entertainment, I ended up $6 (hey, being up is being up). But in reality, my overall win/loss stat for this trip hinges entirely on a bet that remains pending. I put $60 on Mayweather by decision (technically, Mayweather and "will go" 11 1/2 rounds); a bet that will pay slightly over double if it hits. Getting 2:1 odds on Mayweather by decision? I'll take that action all day.
* Other sports: A few years ago, we were in Las Vegas for my brother's birthday. My gift was a bet on the Cowboys game, and we just hung out in the sports book watching the game with a rooting interest and chilling out. It was really nice. This year, Jill and I had some time to kill on Sunday, so we decided to do the same thing with the Maryland/Nebraska basketball game. I bet on Maryland to win (they were favored by 3), and Jill picked the "over" on points (123). It was a fun and exciting game that (in general and from the vantage of our bets) went to the wire. Final score: Maryland 64, Nebraska 61. My bet pushed, but with 125 points Jill collected on hers.
* Food: Since (despite what the last three entries indicate), I'm really not a huge gambler, the highlight of any Vegas trip for me is the food. This trip we mixed up some old favorites with some new entrants.
* Gambling: As mentioned, I'm not a big gambler generally. Mostly I just play video poker, interspersed with some video blackjack. This trip, however, my brother discovered a video craps table and taught me how to play. I certainly see the appeal, and I even was able to fly solo for awhile (it looks more intimidating than it is). But even still, most of my time was spent doing video poker. And luckily for me, I had a bonanza Saturday (for me -- I don't bet large enough figures to actually have a true bonanza) which included hitting a straight flush. While I ended up giving all of the money back on Sunday, it was nice to play with house money for the majority of the trip.
* Boxing: This trip was not originally envisioned to be a "boxing" trip. But that ended up being somewhat of a theme. I found reasonably priced ring-side (fourth row) tickets for Friday Night Fights card at the MGM Marquee ballroom, so Jill, my father, and I all attended. It was a fun show (all but one of the fights ended in knockouts). There was also boxing on NBC Saturday -- putting all my wagers together on both evening's entertainment, I ended up $6 (hey, being up is being up). But in reality, my overall win/loss stat for this trip hinges entirely on a bet that remains pending. I put $60 on Mayweather by decision (technically, Mayweather and "will go" 11 1/2 rounds); a bet that will pay slightly over double if it hits. Getting 2:1 odds on Mayweather by decision? I'll take that action all day.
* Other sports: A few years ago, we were in Las Vegas for my brother's birthday. My gift was a bet on the Cowboys game, and we just hung out in the sports book watching the game with a rooting interest and chilling out. It was really nice. This year, Jill and I had some time to kill on Sunday, so we decided to do the same thing with the Maryland/Nebraska basketball game. I bet on Maryland to win (they were favored by 3), and Jill picked the "over" on points (123). It was a fun and exciting game that (in general and from the vantage of our bets) went to the wire. Final score: Maryland 64, Nebraska 61. My bet pushed, but with 125 points Jill collected on hers.
* Food: Since (despite what the last three entries indicate), I'm really not a huge gambler, the highlight of any Vegas trip for me is the food. This trip we mixed up some old favorites with some new entrants.
* Noodles (Bellagio): My favorite Thai dish is Pad See Ew (or Gway Teow -- as best I can tell there is no real difference between them). The best Pad See Ew I've had in a place I've lived is at Amazing Thailand in Minneapolis, though Asia Nine in DC is a close second. Frankly, Berkeley should be ashamed at how badly it is losing this category. But anyway, the best Pad See Ew I've had anywhere is at Noodles. Just spicy enough to be perfectly flavorable, and delicious in every bite. Jill, Jason and I had been before and we nominated it for our first restaurant Thursday night. It was a hit with the parents as well. And when Jill and I had one more dinner before we left Sunday night, we thought about trying someplace new -- then decided we'd rather just close the show at Noodles again. And it was delicious. Again. I will, however, agree with everyone who says it is overpriced. 9/10.* Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt: This might get its own post, since it's not really Vegas-related except for the fact that Jill and I started watching it there. So all I'll say here is that (a) it rapidly shifted from "show we'll watch after we finish House of Cards" to "show that we'll finish binging before returning to House of Cards" and (b) we watched 9 episodes in 24 hours, including one in the back of the Planet Hollywood sports book waiting for the Maryland/Nebraska game to begin. It's really good.
* Burgr (Planet Hollywood): Another repeat for Jill and I, new to Jason and the parental units. This is a high-class burger joint, and the burgers were exceptional. Dad and I also shared a pudding shake (half traditional chocolate milkshake, half caramel pudding), which was excellent (and impressed dad with the novelty). French fries were wonderful -- I brought the extras back to my hotel and tried in vain to keep nomming on them (unfortunately, I was too stuffed from all the other meals). The only thing that didn't match the memory was the spiced "devil dogs". Though impressive in length -- at least 1.5 feet -- they weren't sauced with quite the kick I remember. 8/10.
* Crush (MGM Grand): This was the first newbie for us, which Jill and I attended late after the boxing match. We weren't super-hungry, so we kept it light -- a caesar salad for her, a bowl of french onion soup for me, and a margherita flatbread for us to share. Of the three, the caesar was genuinely bad with an overwhelmingly mustard flavor. The french onion soup was genuinely excellent -- savory with a perfect cheesy crouton on top. And the flatbread was fine but unspectacular. It's hard to screw up a flatbread. The highlight might have actually been the blackberry cocktail Jill ordered, which even non-alcoholic I thought was wonderful. 6.5/10.
Trevi (Caesar's): Jason recommended this one (I don't think I had been, though I admit it looked somewhat familiar. I have spent a lot of time in the Forum shops). Jason raved about it, but I was a little underwhelmed. The mozzarella fritta had virtually no flavor (and nowhere near enough marinara sauce to make up for it). Their specialty was a "lasagna pizza" that they graciously made with ground beef instead of ground pork. It was good, but nothing eye-popping. This was still a good meal under any objective metric, but given what one can find in Vegas I can't say I came away impressed. 6.5/10.
Mastro's Ocean Club (CityCenter): We always try to do one nice steakhouse, and the Ocean Club was this year's pick. Mom and Dad had been to the version in Scottsdale, but it was entirely new on the rest of us. I ordered a bone-in filet (I always get a filet), which was excellent. My dad kept insisting that the mac-n-cheese here was the greatest dish ever invented, but I can't say I shared his enthusiasm. Other sides (and the "butter cake" dessert) were right on par with the filet though. But the true highlight was Jill's "Kansas City Strip". If there was one dish this entire trip that knocked my socks off, this was it. And the thing is, a New York Strip (I checked -- they're the same thing) is by far my least favorite cut. Yet this rendition just melted in your mouth like butter. It was absolutely unbelievable. Also, I have to compliment the ambiance of the restaurant, which had this very cool inside balcony thing going on. On price points -- well, you're going to be paying a bit to eat here. The party behind us (15 people) reportedly racked up a $3700 bill. 8.5/10.
Gordon Ramsay Pub & Grill (Caesar's): Jill and I are big GR fans, and we had already been to Burgr and (on a previous trip) GR Steak. So we wanted to complete the Ramsay trifecta. While still quite enjoyable, Pub & Grill definitely ranks last of the three. For someone like me who doesn't eat pork or shellfish, the menu ended up being surprisingly limited (and even the pretzels we ordered as appetizers turned out to have bacon in them! They did take them off our bill). The ale onion soup was quite good, and the wings Jill got were delicious. But when you're up against Burgr and GR Steak, that's tough competition. Oh, and I think this is massively overpriced -- the pub burger, for example, is far more expensive than what you'd get at Burgr. What's the point of that? 7/10.
Bonus hearsay entry -- Tao (Venetian): This was the scheduled meal that got bumped for boxing. But my mom and brother still went, and they thought it was great. But they did say that it might not have been for Jill and I. It was absolutely for the bachelorette party that was knocking back sake bombs like there was no tomorrow.
Wednesday, March 04, 2015
Discovery of the Day: Indian Delegates to Congress
Today I learned an interesting historical tidbit about America's relationship with Indian tribes: In several early treaties, we offered Tribes a "delegate" to Congress. A treaty with the Delaware in 1778 offered "a representation in Congress" to a potential envisioned confederation between the Delaware and other tribes (with the Delaware presumed to be the head of that newly created state). Similarly, a 1775 treaty with the Cherokee allowed them "to send a deputy of their choice" to Congress. Both of these predate the end of the Revolutionary War, but the 1836 Treaty of New Echota between the United States and the Cherokee Nation contains similar language applicable to the modern Congress:
Still, it is an interesting fact of American and American Indian history that I was hitherto unaware of. The more you know!
The Cherokee nation having already made great progress in civilization and deeming it important that every proper and laudable inducement should be offered to their people to improve their condition as well as to guard and secure in the most effectual manner the rights guarantied to them in this treaty, and with a view to illustrate the liberal and enlarged policy of the Government of the United States towards the Indians in their removal beyond the territorial limits of the States, it is stipulated that they shall be entitled to a delegate in the House of Representatives of the United States whenever Congress shall make provision for the same.The Treaty of New Echota was the basis by which Congress justified removal of the Cherokee to present-day Oklahoma (the notorious "trail of tears"). And the delegate provision has never been implemented.
Still, it is an interesting fact of American and American Indian history that I was hitherto unaware of. The more you know!
Tuesday, March 03, 2015
Two Great Tastes!
British MP George Galloway is lashing out at critics who called him anti-Semitic on twitter, demanding that they pay him £5,000 and threatening a libel suit. Galloway's targets include everyone from major media publications to random individuals with less than 100 followers.
Fortunately, the English judiciary's free speech protections in the defamation context are matched only by their sensitivity to matters of anti-Semitism. So there's nothing to worry about it.
Fortunately, the English judiciary's free speech protections in the defamation context are matched only by their sensitivity to matters of anti-Semitism. So there's nothing to worry about it.
Labels:
anti-semitism,
free speech,
George Galloway,
United Kingdom
Sunday, March 01, 2015
Don't Say I Didn't Warn You
I think it is fair to say that Bibi's decision to come speak before Congress is the single most disastrous event for the state of pro-Israel sentiment in my lifetime. There's blame to go around, and one can make the case for (or rather, against) all sorts. Personally, I'm extremely skeptical of Ambassador Ron Dermer's influence given his background as a GOP political operative, but this ultimately falls on Bibi's head. Boehner, well, his job is to protect the interests of his caucus and he only cares about Israel insofar as it furthers that end, so I can't really "blame" him for playing politics.
But that's neither here nor there. I don't care who you blame, I don't care how you sequence the events -- the fact of the matter is that this seems to be the straw that broke the camels back for a lot of people, and there is no way that Bibi's speech could ever be sufficiently useful or influential regarding the Iran threat to justify that break. We should not be in a situation where a majority of Americans don't want to hear the Prime Minister speak. This is a full-blown catastrophe, and an avoidable one at that.
On that note, this Nathan Guttman article on anxieties at AIPAC is very well-taken. AIPAC, of course, was famously blind-sided by Bibi's speech decision. It announced its opposition to the address -- to no avail -- and has been on its heels ever since. It's easy to see why: AIPAC's MO from day one has been to cultivate bipartisan support for Israel without favor to either left or right. It takes positions on substantive issues, to be sure, but by far its most important priority is that Israel must not become a partisan issue.
And now? It is facing the teeth of that possibility. Because there is a significant cadre of conservative organizations that want to make it just that. And they are far more threatening to AIPAC's mission -- and the long-term security of Israel -- that left-ward critics like J Street ever could be.
But what's past is past. And the good news is that AIPAC, and the mainstream Jewish community generally, seems to be waking up as to where the real threat is. The objection to Bibi's speech is a good first step. The across-the-board condemnation of Boteach's ad is another good sign. Ditto the ADL speaking out against those who seek to cloak blatant Islamophobia in the guise of supporting Israel. Simply put, a world in which Americans associate "support for Israel" with "being a right-winger" is not a good world for Israel (even putting aside the fact that the manner in which right-wingers "support Israel" is ludicrously counterproductive). And, given the political proclivities of most Jews, it isn't a good world for Jews who want to retain influence over the state of pro-Israel discourse in America.
Now, I am more closely affiliated with the liberal Zionist groups than I am with AIPAC itself. And my advice to them is the same as my advice three years ago. Seize the center. Work with the more established Jewish and pro-Israel organizations, and leverage their dismay over how partisan right-wing hacks are damaging our crucial relationship. It was never the case that they were in the bag for the most irredentist wing of the Likud Party, and it's certainly and obviously not the case now. The great advantage the liberal Zionists have in America is that they really do represent the consensus Jewish position (not to mention the morally correct one). What divides them from the established organizations -- primarily matters of tone and focus -- are far less important than what they share in common. And what Ameinu and J Street share in common with AIPAC and the ADL and the AJC, and with the American people writ large, is that Israel must be preserved as a Jewish, democratic state in the context of two safe, secure, democratic states for two peoples. The right-wing critics do not share that vision, and so they do not belong in the tent.
AIPAC has been rattled by a threat that caught them unawares. Whether they should have seen it coming is now besides the point. It's time to stop cowering and to start fighting back. And the place to begin are those groups who care more about scoring a transient partisan advantage than they do about making sure that there is an Israel -- a Jewish, democratic Israel -- 30 years from now.
But that's neither here nor there. I don't care who you blame, I don't care how you sequence the events -- the fact of the matter is that this seems to be the straw that broke the camels back for a lot of people, and there is no way that Bibi's speech could ever be sufficiently useful or influential regarding the Iran threat to justify that break. We should not be in a situation where a majority of Americans don't want to hear the Prime Minister speak. This is a full-blown catastrophe, and an avoidable one at that.
On that note, this Nathan Guttman article on anxieties at AIPAC is very well-taken. AIPAC, of course, was famously blind-sided by Bibi's speech decision. It announced its opposition to the address -- to no avail -- and has been on its heels ever since. It's easy to see why: AIPAC's MO from day one has been to cultivate bipartisan support for Israel without favor to either left or right. It takes positions on substantive issues, to be sure, but by far its most important priority is that Israel must not become a partisan issue.
And now? It is facing the teeth of that possibility. Because there is a significant cadre of conservative organizations that want to make it just that. And they are far more threatening to AIPAC's mission -- and the long-term security of Israel -- that left-ward critics like J Street ever could be.
A new reality of overt partisanship has now tinged the U.S.-Israel relationship.I don't want to say I told you so, but ... I did. Repeatedly. These groups were never invested in the mainstream pro-Israel consensus, and our broad communal organizations should have moved to isolate them from the "pro-Israel" community with just as much vigor as they give to isolating groups like the JVP. It's not entirely their fault -- left groups that are still pro-Israel made a major strategic error of their own in not affirmatively aligning with the center, being too committed to wrongfully portraying AIPAC as a pure tool of conservative interests.
The brawl set off by Netanyahu’s speech has also emboldened other Jewish groups to challenge AIPAC’s own longtime status as the strategic center for pro-Israel activism in Washington. As the lobby kicks off its three-day extravaganza in Washington’s Convention Center, it faces the need to now prove to members of Congress and to supporters that AIPAC is still the main voice of pro-Israel activism, despite increasing challenges coming mainly from a growing right-wing flank.
“Enough with this bipartisan nonsense,” Jeff Ballabon, an Orthodox GOP activist told members of Conservative Political Action Committee convened in Washington just days before the pro-Israel lobby’s conference. “The real base of support for Israel,” he argued, will not be found among Democrats and liberals, but rather “here, at CPAC.”
A full-page New York Times ad sponsored by Rabbi Shmuely Boteach demonstrated how fractured the pro-Israel community has become when discussing Netanyahu’s visit.
Boteach, whose 2012 congressional run was heavily supported by right-wing donor Sheldon Adelson, ran an ad accusing national security adviser Susan Rice of having a “blind spot” when it comes to genocide.
[...]
Threats to AIPAC’s hegemony in past years came mainly from the dovish end of the spectrum, particularly with the appearance of the lobby J Street. But now much stronger competition is emerging from hawkish groups, like The World, that are less interested in bipartisanship. An important funder for several of these groups is the Republican mega-donor Adelson — a former AIPAC backer, who angrily stopped giving to the lobby several years ago, when it decided to announce it supported a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.
But what's past is past. And the good news is that AIPAC, and the mainstream Jewish community generally, seems to be waking up as to where the real threat is. The objection to Bibi's speech is a good first step. The across-the-board condemnation of Boteach's ad is another good sign. Ditto the ADL speaking out against those who seek to cloak blatant Islamophobia in the guise of supporting Israel. Simply put, a world in which Americans associate "support for Israel" with "being a right-winger" is not a good world for Israel (even putting aside the fact that the manner in which right-wingers "support Israel" is ludicrously counterproductive). And, given the political proclivities of most Jews, it isn't a good world for Jews who want to retain influence over the state of pro-Israel discourse in America.
Now, I am more closely affiliated with the liberal Zionist groups than I am with AIPAC itself. And my advice to them is the same as my advice three years ago. Seize the center. Work with the more established Jewish and pro-Israel organizations, and leverage their dismay over how partisan right-wing hacks are damaging our crucial relationship. It was never the case that they were in the bag for the most irredentist wing of the Likud Party, and it's certainly and obviously not the case now. The great advantage the liberal Zionists have in America is that they really do represent the consensus Jewish position (not to mention the morally correct one). What divides them from the established organizations -- primarily matters of tone and focus -- are far less important than what they share in common. And what Ameinu and J Street share in common with AIPAC and the ADL and the AJC, and with the American people writ large, is that Israel must be preserved as a Jewish, democratic state in the context of two safe, secure, democratic states for two peoples. The right-wing critics do not share that vision, and so they do not belong in the tent.
AIPAC has been rattled by a threat that caught them unawares. Whether they should have seen it coming is now besides the point. It's time to stop cowering and to start fighting back. And the place to begin are those groups who care more about scoring a transient partisan advantage than they do about making sure that there is an Israel -- a Jewish, democratic Israel -- 30 years from now.
Don't Worry About Ted Cruz
If you're a Democrat and you're worrying about potential Republican presidential nominees, there's an interesting hydraulic relationship. Generally a moderate is both more worrying (because they're more electable) and less worrying (because they're, well, moderate). Hardliners have it in reverse -- it is terrifying to imagine them as President, but one calms down when it becomes clear they'll never be elected. The most worrisome, of course, are those who can successfully present as moderates while nonetheless actually being really conservative.
Scott Walker has concerned many Democrats for this very reason; he has managed to win several elections in a blue-tinted state even while being quite right-wing. Fortunately, there is now good evidence that Walker isn't exactly prime-time ready. Liberals were driven crazy by the media's refusal to acknowledge Paul Ryan as a creature of the far-right (and for acting as if he's handsome, when he is very clearly a White Walker). But I haven't heard a lot of buzz around Ryan this time around; maybe his moment has passed.
The current darling of the far-right is Texas Senator Ted Cruz. On the metric of "how would he do as President", he's an easy case -- the guy is a lunatic who would make for a catastrophe if placed in charge of the country. The question is whether there is anything that would make him more electable than his extremist profile would suggest. And after much thought, I've decided the answer is no.
Let's dispense with one obvious possibility: Cruz's Latino heritage. I don't think this will meaningfully help him amongst Latinos. Despite what the media might think, Latinos, like Black people, are not retarded kittens -- they vote, the same as most of us, on the basis of a judgment regarding how a given candidate matches up with their political and policy priorities. Cruz's policies (especially on immigration) don't line up with most Latinos, and they know it.
As for everyone else, here is my proposition regarding Ted Cruz, on which I welcome your input:
Ted Cruz is a smart man who would make a terrible President. Fortunately, he'll make a terrible presidential candidate too.
Scott Walker has concerned many Democrats for this very reason; he has managed to win several elections in a blue-tinted state even while being quite right-wing. Fortunately, there is now good evidence that Walker isn't exactly prime-time ready. Liberals were driven crazy by the media's refusal to acknowledge Paul Ryan as a creature of the far-right (and for acting as if he's handsome, when he is very clearly a White Walker). But I haven't heard a lot of buzz around Ryan this time around; maybe his moment has passed.
The current darling of the far-right is Texas Senator Ted Cruz. On the metric of "how would he do as President", he's an easy case -- the guy is a lunatic who would make for a catastrophe if placed in charge of the country. The question is whether there is anything that would make him more electable than his extremist profile would suggest. And after much thought, I've decided the answer is no.
Let's dispense with one obvious possibility: Cruz's Latino heritage. I don't think this will meaningfully help him amongst Latinos. Despite what the media might think, Latinos, like Black people, are not retarded kittens -- they vote, the same as most of us, on the basis of a judgment regarding how a given candidate matches up with their political and policy priorities. Cruz's policies (especially on immigration) don't line up with most Latinos, and they know it.
As for everyone else, here is my proposition regarding Ted Cruz, on which I welcome your input:
Ted Cruz : Presidential nomination :: Robert Bork : Supreme Court nomination.Ted Cruz (like Robert Bork) is a very smart man. But he is also a supremely arrogant man. This distinguishes him from, say, Sarah Palin, who is supremely arrogant but also dumb as a post. But Cruz, like Bork, thinks so highly of himself that he can't even pretend to present himself as mainstream. Bork was successfully Borked mostly because he was allowed to hang himself -- Bork was so confident that his constitutional vision was correct that he presented it completely unadulterated, and Democratic Senators were happy to let him wax lyrical. The result was a nominee who was terrifying to the general public. I have no doubt Cruz will do the exact same thing. He is, I think, incapable of pivoting to the center even as a matter of image. His inflexibility on this is part of the reason why many in his own caucus hate him -- Cruz loves to get up on his grandstand and is happy to do so even when it hurts his own party. So far, it has helped him just fine, since he's in a solid red Senate seat. But when trying to appeal to voters in Virginia or Minnesota or Nevada? Yeah, best of luck.
Ted Cruz is a smart man who would make a terrible President. Fortunately, he'll make a terrible presidential candidate too.
Wednesday, February 25, 2015
Hebrew Letters in Berkeley
I have a t-shirt which says "Carleton College" in (transliterated) Hebrew letters. I put it on today, for no particular reason other than it rising to the top of the t-shirt drawer, before heading off to the post office for an errand.
While there, the post office clerk asked what my shirt said. I responded "Carleton College". "Oh, that's cool. Is it in Arabic?" "No, Hebrew." "Oh, that's cool." Both "that's cools" were said with enthusiasm and a warm smile.
And the tension in my gut dissipated, and I relaxed.
I got nervous when asked about my shirt. I got nervous because I knew the answer would reveal myself as Jewish -- and Jewish-identified. These I think are different, for the casual anti-Semite -- the difference between "being gay in private" and "throwing it in my face." I feel like people who have negative feelings about Jews have particularly negative feelings about Jews who consciously identify as Jewish, such that they wear a "Jewish shirt" out in public.
Now, I should say that I did not feel nervous because I predicted any sort of imminent physical threat -- "going postal" jokes notwithstanding, I didn't expect anything truly bad to happen at the post office. But I got nervous, because I didn't know what it would mean to "out" myself as Jewish. Not everyone, after all, thinks that "that's cool." Some people, and more people than there used to be, think it isn't cool it all.
This is quite saddening, less because I feel any serious risk of being violently attacked, and more because I used to be very excited when the topic of my Jewish identity became salient. At Carleton, where there weren't a lot of Jews, I generally thought of my Jewishness as an "interesting fact about myself," something I was happy to talk about and explain to other curious souls. This isn't to say there was never any awkward moments -- ask me about the time my Freshman-year floormates got me Schindler's List for my birthday -- but I felt happy at the opportunity to share about my Jewishness.
The recent set of journalistic projects wherein people walk through European streets (Malmo, Sweden; Paris, France) while identifiably Jewish make salient the reality of this worry. That is not to say it happens everywhere, or every time, and there will always be those who cry "fraud" (Rania Khalek would no doubt rather focus on "Jewish privilege"). But the point is that it is always there, in the back of my mind. I cannot just "be Jewish" in the world, I have to make continual conscious decisions about when and how I present my Jewishness in the world and when and how I hide it. That's a feeling that I didn't have, or didn't have to the same extent, even a few years ago. And it is a sad feeling.
While there, the post office clerk asked what my shirt said. I responded "Carleton College". "Oh, that's cool. Is it in Arabic?" "No, Hebrew." "Oh, that's cool." Both "that's cools" were said with enthusiasm and a warm smile.
And the tension in my gut dissipated, and I relaxed.
I got nervous when asked about my shirt. I got nervous because I knew the answer would reveal myself as Jewish -- and Jewish-identified. These I think are different, for the casual anti-Semite -- the difference between "being gay in private" and "throwing it in my face." I feel like people who have negative feelings about Jews have particularly negative feelings about Jews who consciously identify as Jewish, such that they wear a "Jewish shirt" out in public.
Now, I should say that I did not feel nervous because I predicted any sort of imminent physical threat -- "going postal" jokes notwithstanding, I didn't expect anything truly bad to happen at the post office. But I got nervous, because I didn't know what it would mean to "out" myself as Jewish. Not everyone, after all, thinks that "that's cool." Some people, and more people than there used to be, think it isn't cool it all.
This is quite saddening, less because I feel any serious risk of being violently attacked, and more because I used to be very excited when the topic of my Jewish identity became salient. At Carleton, where there weren't a lot of Jews, I generally thought of my Jewishness as an "interesting fact about myself," something I was happy to talk about and explain to other curious souls. This isn't to say there was never any awkward moments -- ask me about the time my Freshman-year floormates got me Schindler's List for my birthday -- but I felt happy at the opportunity to share about my Jewishness.
The recent set of journalistic projects wherein people walk through European streets (Malmo, Sweden; Paris, France) while identifiably Jewish make salient the reality of this worry. That is not to say it happens everywhere, or every time, and there will always be those who cry "fraud" (Rania Khalek would no doubt rather focus on "Jewish privilege"). But the point is that it is always there, in the back of my mind. I cannot just "be Jewish" in the world, I have to make continual conscious decisions about when and how I present my Jewishness in the world and when and how I hide it. That's a feeling that I didn't have, or didn't have to the same extent, even a few years ago. And it is a sad feeling.
Law Review Tales
It's law review submission season! Every one is angsting (obviously yours truly included), and PrawfsBlawg has a lovely thread in which all of us can vent our fears and frustrations. But I thought it would be more light-hearted to detail some standard experiences I think all law professors have had I've had and thereby extrapolate to all of my colleagues. Such as ....
(1) Submitting an article, then within 15 minutes frantically clicking refresh on your email despite the fact that any news that comes in the first 15 minutes could not possibly be good.
(2) Getting that first rejection three hours after the initial submission ("after careful review ....").
(3) Submitting two articles at around the same time (we'll call them "A" and "B"). A is clearly a better article than B. B gets three offers immediately and ends up placing in a solid journal. A languishes and isn't touched by anyone.
(4) Obsessing over comparisons between US News law school rankings versus Washington & Lee law review rankings (hint: if you're at the point where it's not obvious on face which journal you should pick, it doesn't matter).
(5) Obsessing over comparisons between flagship journals and speciality journals (hint: this comparison is impossible, but it's as impossible for tenure and/or hiring committees as it is for you).
(6) Getting your article rejected after you've already withdrawn it from a given journal ("you can't reject me, I reject you!").
(7) Getting your article accepted after you've already withdrawn it from a given journal (far more tragic than #6).
(8) Submitting an article, having it rejected, resubmitting next cycle with the single change of deleting "originalism" from the title, having it accepted by a top journal (technically this didn't happen to me. It happened by me, and my articles editor team, when I was a law review editor).
(9) Once the piece is accepted, being asked for a citation for "the law of supply and demand." Don't forget a parenthetical!
(10) It all turning out okay in the end.
(1) Submitting an article, then within 15 minutes frantically clicking refresh on your email despite the fact that any news that comes in the first 15 minutes could not possibly be good.
(2) Getting that first rejection three hours after the initial submission ("after careful review ....").
(3) Submitting two articles at around the same time (we'll call them "A" and "B"). A is clearly a better article than B. B gets three offers immediately and ends up placing in a solid journal. A languishes and isn't touched by anyone.
(4) Obsessing over comparisons between US News law school rankings versus Washington & Lee law review rankings (hint: if you're at the point where it's not obvious on face which journal you should pick, it doesn't matter).
(5) Obsessing over comparisons between flagship journals and speciality journals (hint: this comparison is impossible, but it's as impossible for tenure and/or hiring committees as it is for you).
(6) Getting your article rejected after you've already withdrawn it from a given journal ("you can't reject me, I reject you!").
(7) Getting your article accepted after you've already withdrawn it from a given journal (far more tragic than #6).
(8) Submitting an article, having it rejected, resubmitting next cycle with the single change of deleting "originalism" from the title, having it accepted by a top journal (technically this didn't happen to me. It happened by me, and my articles editor team, when I was a law review editor).
(9) Once the piece is accepted, being asked for a citation for "the law of supply and demand." Don't forget a parenthetical!
(10) It all turning out okay in the end.
Monday, February 23, 2015
Energy Lobbying, Environmental Costs, and Zero-Sum Competition
Exelon Corporation, one of the largest energy companies in the United States, has come out in favor of the EPA's Clean Power Plan and has even asked for a carbon pricing schema. This stands out, as one does not typically expect to see large energy companies endorsing aggressive carbon regulation. And I should hasten to add that what follows is not a specific speculation on Exelon's motives. Exelon might have any number of reasons for the position it's taking, not the least of which could be a fear that absent their intervention the EPA plan could end up being more environmentally protective (and thus more economically burdensome). Nonetheless, in general it does seem a little odd: why would an electricity company support EPA rules that almost certainly would place greater costs on its line of business.
The answer might lie in the difference between competitive and monopoly electricity markets. In the former there are multiple firms competing for customers and market share. In the latter, there is a single firm with a guaranteed franchise and customer base. These two models have been struggling for primacy in the electricity sector for the past several decades -- as it stands, we have competition in the generation and wholesale sectors, whereas most (but not all) states have maintained a retail electricity monopoly. At first glance, though, this different market structure is unrelated to support of greater environmental regulations. For either it increases costs, and we can stipulate (though this may or may not be true) that it equally increases costs for firms operating in a competitive versus a monopoly context. It is therefore unlikely that any firm will unilaterally adopt superior environmental restrictions (with some allowance for trying to gain public goodwill or carve out a unique market share). And so it seems unlikely that any firm would lobby to put in place a regulatory regime which increases these costs.
But look a little closer. For the monopoly firm, a policy proposal which increases its costs is an unmitigated bad. The cost increase may be minor, in which case it will be moderately opposed, or significant, in which case it will be significantly opposed, but there is never a corresponding benefit to the cost increase. But in a competitive world, things are different because there is also the opportunity to take over one's competitor's turf. Here, cost increases can be a good thing if one is in a position to better ride them out than one's adversaries. Imagine Company A has already significantly invested in renewable energy infrastructure such that new carbon mandates are likely to only cause a small price increase. Company B, by contrast, is less prepared to handle these new mandates and would be forced to increase prices quite a bit. Company A may well lobby for the regulatory shift because it would give it the opportunity to gobble up market share currently held by B.
This matters because it suggests that, in a competitive context, there is sometimes a business incentive for firms to lobby on behalf of cost-increasing environmental regulation where it feels it can better absorb the costs compared to other companies in the field. To the extent that environmental regulation often in practice needs business buy-in to be effective, this is an avenue worth exploring.
I said that this was not a speculation on the Exelon situation, particularly, and it isn't. That said, I did notice that the speaker who delivered this missive to FERC was described as "Exelon’s senior vice president of federal regulatory affairs and wholesale market policy." If Exelon's wholesale division (remember that wholesale electricity is a competitive sector) thinks that it is better positioned than its rivals to meet EPA carbon requirements, then that would explain why it would come out in support of this initiative even though in absolute figures it probably will raise its cost of doing business.
The answer might lie in the difference between competitive and monopoly electricity markets. In the former there are multiple firms competing for customers and market share. In the latter, there is a single firm with a guaranteed franchise and customer base. These two models have been struggling for primacy in the electricity sector for the past several decades -- as it stands, we have competition in the generation and wholesale sectors, whereas most (but not all) states have maintained a retail electricity monopoly. At first glance, though, this different market structure is unrelated to support of greater environmental regulations. For either it increases costs, and we can stipulate (though this may or may not be true) that it equally increases costs for firms operating in a competitive versus a monopoly context. It is therefore unlikely that any firm will unilaterally adopt superior environmental restrictions (with some allowance for trying to gain public goodwill or carve out a unique market share). And so it seems unlikely that any firm would lobby to put in place a regulatory regime which increases these costs.
But look a little closer. For the monopoly firm, a policy proposal which increases its costs is an unmitigated bad. The cost increase may be minor, in which case it will be moderately opposed, or significant, in which case it will be significantly opposed, but there is never a corresponding benefit to the cost increase. But in a competitive world, things are different because there is also the opportunity to take over one's competitor's turf. Here, cost increases can be a good thing if one is in a position to better ride them out than one's adversaries. Imagine Company A has already significantly invested in renewable energy infrastructure such that new carbon mandates are likely to only cause a small price increase. Company B, by contrast, is less prepared to handle these new mandates and would be forced to increase prices quite a bit. Company A may well lobby for the regulatory shift because it would give it the opportunity to gobble up market share currently held by B.
This matters because it suggests that, in a competitive context, there is sometimes a business incentive for firms to lobby on behalf of cost-increasing environmental regulation where it feels it can better absorb the costs compared to other companies in the field. To the extent that environmental regulation often in practice needs business buy-in to be effective, this is an avenue worth exploring.
I said that this was not a speculation on the Exelon situation, particularly, and it isn't. That said, I did notice that the speaker who delivered this missive to FERC was described as "Exelon’s senior vice president of federal regulatory affairs and wholesale market policy." If Exelon's wholesale division (remember that wholesale electricity is a competitive sector) thinks that it is better positioned than its rivals to meet EPA carbon requirements, then that would explain why it would come out in support of this initiative even though in absolute figures it probably will raise its cost of doing business.
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